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According to a study of kPMG in 2010 the share of companies regarding 
white collar crime as a serious problem for economy increased by nine percent in 
2006 to 2010. Blue chips companies even valued this problem at ninety percent. It 
was assumed that the extend of economy crimes will increase further. The German 
Federal office of Criminal Investigation stated that white collar crime is responsi-
ble for more than 4 Billion €, which exceeds fifty percent of the total damage for 
the year 2011.
Criminal offences in financial statements, the topic of this investigation 
started in spring 2011, are mainly carried out without being realised. Therefore it is 
impossible to furnish reliable figures in undetected crimes; however according to 
appropriate literature it is estimated up to 80 percent. The reasons for this are seen 
in insufficient regulations of legal guidelines by a number of authors.
The focus should especially be directed to the question how the measures 
of detection and prevention of accounting fraud are presented by the government 
and how their efficiency is estimated. Therefore the “Catalogue of Measures to 
Strengthen Companies´ Integrity and to Protect Investors” of 2003 and the result-
ing legitimation are the central point.
The issue of this investigation is to find out how the companies registered 
in the DAx, MDAx, SDAx and Tec-DAx estimate the efficiency of the Catalogue 
of Measures of the government in regard to its intention. hereby the estimation 
of the efficiency of individual points is reflected and is listed in a ranking by the 
companies. In addition companies are asked for the estimation of further appro-
priate and possible measures and the evaluation of the cost-benefit-ratio of the 
measures taken by the companies. The results of the investigation presented in the 
following are based on the evaluation of questionnaires sent to 160 companies reg-
istered in the four DAx segments in the time of the end of April to the beginning 
of December 2012.
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The results show that the representatives of the companies assess the legal 
regulations concerning the disclosure and prevention of accounting fraud on the 
whole as helpful. The majority of the companies claim that the legal implementa-
tion of the “10-Point-Program” of the government can be considered sufficient for 
their own company with regard to disclosure and prevention of accounting fraud. 
only one of five possible suggested measures for the prevention and disclosure of 
accounting fraud was accepted. Concerning the cost-benefit ratio the majority of 
the companies state that the costs overweigh the benefits.
Whereas the effect of legal measures is differently discussed in the litera-
ture, the evaluation by big companies can be defined as sufficient concerning legal 
regulations but companies even criticise them with regards to the costs.
The given results of the survey correspond to kPMG ś research dated 2012, 
which state, that concerning white-collar-crime-affected companies the number 
of falsifications of annual statements respectively financial information decreased 
during spring 2010 and summer 2012 from 13 percent to 3 percent.
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Sometimes a personal event leads a person to deal with a special topic on a sci-
entific level. The following study was driven by such a personal experience. It was 
the life-changing experience I made during my visit to a prison in Gelsenkirchen 
Feldmark as part of my studies in July 2010. It rarely occurs that a professor lead-
ing the department of criminology is permitted to visit a prison with a group of 
students. Apart from the tour of the premises, personal contact with the prisoners 
was also planned. I was lucky enough to be part of such a group. As a result of the 
visit of the prison in Gelsenkirchen Feldmark, my already existing interest in the 
subject of white-collar crime was greatly aroused. The impressions gathered were 
so influential that a deep dive study of this topic was a logical consequence. Even 
if one spent only one day within the walls of this very restricted world and saw the 
living standards of the prisoners, people that before they were sentenced had led 
a “socially inconspicuous life”, then one starts to get a feeling for what this must 
mean for a person in this situation. That person will never be the same again.
The residential cell is small and only equipped with the basics. The prison in 
Gelsenkirchen Feldmark does not enable prisoners to take any proper vocational 
training or a distance learning course. The use of the Internet is not permitted. 
Prisoners are often affected by strong drug consumption and are given very lim-
ited opportunity or incentive to communicate with each other or the outside world. 
Men and women are separated and live in opposite building blocks. Their commu-
nication is limited to signaling with flashlights or communicating with the help of 
mirrors. If a person requires, for example, pens, books, clothes or newspapers then 
these must be requested in written form. Whether the request is approved, de-
pends on the decision of the competent official. once a month family and friends 
are allowed to visit. Physical contact is prohibited during these visits. 
Even if there are good reasons for the rules of everyday prison life, one can 
feel that prisoners are so disenfranchised that it is hard for a person to endure. This 
assessment is supported in my view through a statement made by the director of 
the Gelsenkirchen Feldmark prison. he stated that there was not a single prisoner 
who did not want to leave the prison as quickly as possible.
All the more, one asks oneself, what drives people who, based on what 
one can ascertain from their external situations, have no apparent need to enrich 
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themselves to use criminal means and to risk not only their freedom and a radical 
change to their bourgeois life but potentially even, as detailed above, being dis-
enfranchised and restricted. This begs the question how high the damage is that 
people, who do not even have a responsible view of their own life, inflict on com-
panies and the society as a whole. Furthermore, taking into account the immense 
damage caused, what does the society – here particularly the German society – do 
to protect itself from this type of damage. In a democratic country, the elected 
government acts in the name of society. The topic of this paper, therefore, looks 
into the initiatives that the German Federal Government has taken in the form 
of the “Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ Integrity and to Protect 
Investors” and the question of its effectiveness.
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1.1 relevAnce
The most spectacular cases of fraud such as Balsam/Procedo (1994), Flowtex 
(2000) and Comraod (2002) has shaken public trust where accounts were partially 
manipulated with participation of the management and with high criminal en-
ergy. In 1996 the former manager of the health insurance funds company Leuna 
was able to undertake loss-minimizing balance sheet manipulations which did not 
come to light until three months after the fusion with other health insurance funds 
companies. She was dismissed without notice; the Federal Social Security Court 
(Bundessozialgericht) sentenced her to pay approximately 266,000 euros in dam-
ages; criminal proceedings closed in 2009 with an acquittal (cf. NewsAdhoc, 2009, 
www.news-adhoc.com/ex-krankenkassenchefin-haftet-fuer-bilanzmanipulation-
idna2009050530070). In May 2011 the district court Essen sentenced the former 
Arcandor manager Thomas Middelhoff to pay 2,575 euros damages together with 
interest to Jan Eric Peters (small shareholder) for wilful and immoral damage to 
the capital market read in conjunction with Article 826 of the German Civil Code 
(LG Essen, 05.05.2011 - 4 o 244/09; cf. Jahn/ knop, 2011, www.faz.net/-gqp-z3i5). 
hartmut Fromm the lawyer of Thomas Middelhoff wanted to appeal against the 
judgement (cf. Jahn/ knop, 2011, www.faz.net/-gqp-z3i5). In May 2012, however, 
the paper file was put away, so that probably no appeal was lodged.
Individual companies are increasingly subjected to violations. As such a 
study on white-collar crime undertaken by the auditing company kPMG1 in the 
summer of 2012 came to the conclusion that the topic of white-collar crime in the 
332 medium-sized German businesses polled showed that nearly every fourth 
company had become a victim of economic crime in the past two years. Every 
minute a company with more than nine employees is damaged by white-collar 
crime whereby each case of white-collar crime costs a company on average 30,000 
euros. Companies subjected to white-collar crime accrue material damage of over 
300,000 euros each year. The perpetrators were mainly (48 per cent) own company 
employees. Management and even top management were involved in the crimes 
in more than every third case. The situation is even more alarming when taking 
into account that the companies polled saw the risk of white-collar crime as being 
1  one of the four largest auditing firms, the acronym stands for the founders of 
the company: klynveld, Peat, Marwick and Goerdeler.
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higher in other companies than in their own and that they were satisfied with the 
measures they had undertaken to date. This often stands in stark contrast to the 
actual provisions made as only, for example, about thirty-four per cent train their 
employees on topics of white-collar crime (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 3, 6, 7). Referring to 
the study of kPMG in 2010 they already judged white collar crime as a serious dan-
ger and anticipated a further increasing trend (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 6). Concerning 
white-collar-crime-affected companies accounting fraud increased from 6 percent 
to 13 percent during 2006 to 2010 (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 8). 
The Federal Criminal Police office (Bundeskriminalamt) found that in 2011 
white-collar crime had cost over four billion euros and thereby approximately half 
of the total damage tracked by the German police force’s crime statistics. The will-
ingness of companies to involve law enforcement agencies has sadly declined over 
the past two years. only in about fifty per cent of the cases determined were law 
enforcement agencies asked for help (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 4 f). These facts founded 
an important source for this study, which started in spring 2011. 
The most common forms of white-collar crime are according to the survey 
conducted by the auditing firm kPMG, classical asset misappropriation such as 
theft, embezzlement and the illicit use of company resources for personal use. In 
contrast to these types of crimes, breaches based on balance sheet manipulations - 
despite occurring less often - have a higher financial impact and cause also hard to 
calculate immaterial damages which are many times worse (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 11). 
To make a concrete statement about this is not possible as the damage is impossible 
to quantify and estimates in this respect differ substantially from each other. There 
is no doubt, however, that the immaterial damage caused is a key aspect when 
assessing the actual damage which occurred. The Situations Report on White-
Collar Crime from 2010 published by Germany’s Federal Criminal Police office 
(BkA) states examples such as (cf. Bundeskriminalamt (hrsg.), Bundeslagebild 
Wirtschaftskriminalität, 2010, p. 9):
•	 Distorsion of competition
•	 Dismay of dependent business partners who were not involved in the crime 
•	 Loss of reputation
•	 Loss of confidence in the existing free market economy’s ability to function.
The preceding study of kPMG from 2010 also found that the number of 
financial information and annual financial statement counterfeits is growing. 
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Concerning white-collar-crime-affected companies in 2006 it was still six per cent 
but in 2010 it was already thirteen per cent. Furthermore, the study shows that, 
with regard to white-collar crime, there has been a strong shift towards the sectors 
of finance and accounting as well as the credit business. kPMG draws the conclu-
sion from this data that white-collar crimes are increasingly shifting upwards in 
company hierarchies. They see the reason in the fact that a more senior position 
as well as considerable expertise is required to circumvent the controls in these 
sectors (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 8 f). The current study from 2012 shows that concerning 
white-collar-crime-affected companies the number of financial information and 
annual financial statement counterfeits has reduced to three per cent (cf. kPMG, 
2012, p. 11).
In 2008 hofmann assumed that the majority of accounting frauds occur be-
low the threshold of perception and remain undiscovered. A reliable estimate of 
unreported cases is not possible but is already estimated at approximately eighty 
per cent. In Germany, at least, every second white-collar crime remains undiscov-
ered. Therefore, Müller (1996) and Lange (2007) speak of a “fraud iceberg“2 where 
one normally assumes that one-seventh is visible and six-sevenths are under the 
water surface (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 218 f).
2  „Fraud-Eisberg“
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Illustration 1: Fraud Iceberg
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The auditing firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (pwc) also concludes in their 
study in 2011 that many more companies are impacted by white-collar crime than 
is known. The reason is seen in the fact that white-collar crimes are hard to prove 
(cf. pwc, 2011a, p. 19). 
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1.2 objective
The objective of this study is to examine the current possibilities for uncov-
ering and preventing balance sheet manipulations. Since balance sheet manipula-
tions form a part of fraud (fraud, tricks, deception, embezzlement) many meas-
ures taken to disclose and prevent accounting fraud also apply to other fraudulent 
crimes. vice versa measures taken to disclose and prevent other fraudulent crimes 
also apply to the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations. Based 
on this, the following study makes parallel use of the terms balance sheet ma-
nipulations, white-collar crimes and fraud. Recent literature has coined the phrase 
“accounting fraud” that is also applied when reviewing primarily financial ac-
counting fraud.
The responsibility to disclose and prevent balance sheet manipulations is 
first and foremost with the company itself, specifically the supervisory board and 
management board, followed by accounting, internal audit and at the end of the 
day the responsibility of each and every employee. Companies can live up to their 
responsibility to disclose and prevent balance sheet manipulations within their 
own organisations in many ways, for example, by putting emphasis on efficient 
value management or on serious efforts to form company ethics. Red flagging 
management, crisis management, pre-employment screening and whistle-blowing 
systems should be operational. Also the effectiveness of the internal control sys-
tems should be ensured through the establishment of specific control activities. 
Additionally, the people monitoring the company as well as internal control and 
the supervisory board can contribute through observant fulfilment of their duties. 
A further responsibility for the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet ma-
nipulations lies with the auditing firm whose possibilities are assessed by external 
publications in very different ways. The opinion that disclosure of balance sheet 
manipulations does not belong to their responsibility is in contrast to the other 
school of thought which thinks that especially they should be particularly critical 
with regard to balance sheet manipulations. 
The focus of this study is directed at the question of what measures are taken 
by the government to disclose and prevent accounting fraud and the effectiveness 
of the measures taken. For this reason the Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen 
Companies’ Integrity and to Protect Investors as well as the resulting legislation 
form the central point of this study.
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Driven by the increase in cases of accounting fraud, the state’s responsibil-
ity is especially growing in importance as companies can decide for themselves 
whether they want to introduce an anti-fraud management system and, depend-
ing on how upright a company is, this system can be more or less effective. on 
the other hand, the state can make use of its legislature to enforce binding regula-
tions that need to be adhered to. The goal of this study is therefore to demonstrate 
to what extent the German Federal Government has established such regulations 
and what safeguards are in place to ensure its effectiveness. This also includes the 
question of the form of control and the type of sanctions as both are important for 
the efficiency of legislative measures. Furthermore, there is an investigation into 
how companies listed on the DAx, MDAx, Tec-DAx and SDAx rate the effective-
ness of the government’s Catalogue of Measures with regard to its goals. hereby 
the companies were asked to provide their assessment as to the effectiveness of 
individual points which then were ranked, their assessment of the usefulness of 
possible further measures and their valuation of the balance of costs and benefits 
of the measures to be implemented.
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1.3 the study’s structure
At the start of the study, there is a classification of balance sheet manipulations 
in the context of white-collar crime. The elements of a balance sheet manipulation of-
fense are narrowed down and explanatory models for the act of committing a balance 
sheet manipulation are presented. Tackling the question of the effects of balance sheet 
manipulations shows its possible impact on companies, possible effects on business 
owners, investors and shareholders, the actual perpetrators as well as on the state, the 
consumer and the economy as a whole. 
This is followed by taking a look at the government initiatives to hinder and 
disclose balance sheet manipulations. In this context the Catalogue of Measures to 
Strengthen Companies’ Integrity and to Protect Investors is introduced. It involves the 
personal liability of company organs, the German Corporate Governance, the further 
enhancements made to accounting regulations and the alignment with international ac-
counting standards. Strengthening the role of the independent auditor, monitoring the 
legality of actual company financial statements through an independent source as well 
as the electronic disclosure of company reporting and the improvement of investor pro-
tection are some further sectors for which the German Federal Government proposed 
measures in its 10-Point-Program. The imposed legislature which goes hand in hand 
with the proposed measures are introduced and scrutinised as to their effectiveness, 
taking account of external publications published on this topic. The points 9 (Ensuring 
the reliability of company ratings made by finance analysts and rating agencies) and 10 
(Tightening of penal provisions for offences within the capital market sector) have an 
exceptional position as there is no legislation with regard to point 9 and, with regard to 
point 10, the Federal Government of Germany also has no legislation planned. 
Describing the structure of the proposed research project should subsequently 
highlight how the practical part of this study is designed. Thus, as a first step the com-
panies questioned as part of the empirical study are categorised. The second step is to 
define the goal of the investigation. After explaining the methodology applied to the 
study, the answers to the blocks of questions of the questionnaire, located in the appen-
dix, are presented. As a final step the results are interpreted. 
Concluding the study, the key statements of the theoretical part are compared to 
the results of the analysis of the empirical part of the study. The assessments made in 




In order to capture the offense of balance sheet manipulations in a concrete 
form the following chapters will review it in the context of white-collar crime and 
its terminology. 
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2.1 Accounting irregulArities in the context of White-
collAr crime 
Sutherland’s famous essay “Wild-Collar-Criminality”, written in 1940, was 
the first to draw attention to the fact that, in all the scientific debates around 
acts of economic fraud, there is no agreed definition or common terminology 
(cf. Sutherland, 1940, in Peemöller and hofmann, 2005, p. 19). A German Legal 
Colloquium on White-Collar Crime in 1984 also failed to reach a consensus (cf. 
Gisler, 1994, p. 30). The first definitions, which focused on the social background of 
the criminal, were initially created by the social sciences. They saw economic fraud 
as a breach of law by the upper class which was often viewed as a “trivial offence”. 
Peemöller and hofmann however point out that definitions created by other disci-
plines – and this applies also to broader legal definitions – are only conditionally 
applicable. This is valid, although the assessment of facts surrounding a case of 
white-collar crime would encompass elements of economic, legal, psychological, 
sociological as well as ethical and moral points of view. Peemöller and hofmann 
made reference to Müller, who had highlighted the complexity of this relationship 
(cf. Müller, 1995, p. 839 ff; cf. Peemöller and hofmann 2005, p. 19). 
Ultimately, an all-encompassing general definition of the term is not pos-
sible. To enable the circumstances surrounding accounting fraud to be recognized 
and determined, an indicator model was developed. This model lists factors that 
can determine the fact that accounting fraud has taken place.
The more indicators apply to a specific case, the higher the likelihood of ac-
counting fraud: (cf. Peemöller and hofmann, 2005, p. 20; Müller 1995, p. 840): 
•	 Elements of a cause of action: There is a breach of law. 
•	 Breach of trust: The principle of fairness in commercial transactions has been 
infringed.
•	 De-personalization of the victim: The victim is either not acknowledged or 
only partially acknowledged by the offender.
•	 Economic expertise: Detailed economic knowledge is the basis for the behaviour 
shown. 
•	 No evidence of force: The overall goal is not primarily reached through the 
application of physical force.
As there is no generally applicable definition of white-collar crime, but be-
cause a definition of the term in a scientific context is of absolute necessity, this 
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study will make use of the term “white-collar crime” using the competence of the 
court division of the chamber for economic crimes for business offences according 
to the German Judicature Act (GvG).
The competences listed in § 74 c include criminal offences according to
“1. The Patents Act, the Utility Model Act, the Semiconductor Act, the Plant 
varieties Protection Law, the Law on Trade Marks, the Law on Design Patents, the 
Copyright Act, the Unfair Competition Act, the Insolvency Statute, the German 
Stock Corporation Act, the Company Disclosure Act, the Law on Private Limited 
(liability) Companies, the German Commercial Code, the SE Implementation Act, 
the Law on the execution of the Council Regulation (EEC) over the European 
Economic Interest Grouping, the Cooperatives Act, the SCE Execution Law, and 
the Conversion Law.
2. The laws on banking, deposit, stock exchange and credit institutions 
as well as the laws on insurance supervision (vAG) and the German Securities 
Trading Act.
3. The Penal Code for Business 1954, the German Foreign Trade and Payments 
Act, the Laws on Exchange of Goods, as well as the Financial Monopoly, Tax and 
Customs legislation, also in terms of the penal provisions that may be applied ac-
cording to other laws. This is not the case if the same offence occurs under the Law 
of Narcotics, and also not for tax offences relating to vehicle taxation.
4. The Wine and Food Law.
5. Subsidy fraud, investment fraud, credit fraud, bankruptcy, creditor fraud, 
and debtor fraud.
5a. Anti-competitive agreements when tendering as well as bribery and cor-
ruption in commercial transactions.
6a. Fraud, computer fraud embezzlement, extortion, granting advantages, 
bribery, and the non-payment and misappropriation of salaries.
6b. The Temporary Employment Act (AÜG) and the third book of the Social 
Code as well as the Act to Combat Clandestine Employment. 
 (…).“ (GvG §74 c (1), translated in context by the author)3
3 „1. nach dem Patentgesetz, dem Gebrauchsmustergesetz, dem 
halbleiterschutzgesetz, dem Sortenschutzgesetz, dem Markengesetz, dem 
Geschmacksmustergesetz, dem Urheberrechtsgesetz, dem Gesetz gegen den 
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The focus of this study, however, is on accounting fraud.
The definition applied to the term white-collar crime will be based upon 
the systemization of inconsistencies in accounting as published by the Institute of 
Auditors (IDW) in the Auditing Standard PS 210 section 7.
The systemisation of accounting irregularities published by IDW states that 
data provided in financial statements and the accompanying management reports 
are false if one or more statements made within are incorrect. This false information 
can be provided accidently (error). These inaccuracies can be caused by spelling or 
unlauteren Wettbewerb, der Insolvenzordnung, dem Aktiengesetz, dem Gesetz 
über die Rechnungslegung von bestimmten Unternehmen und konzernen, 
dem Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter haftung, dem 
handelsgesetzbuch, dem SE-Ausführungsgesetz, dem Gesetz zur Ausführung der 
EWG-verordnung über die europäische wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung, 
dem Genossenschaftsgesetz, dem SCE-Ausführungsgesetz und dem 
Umwandlungsgesetz,
2. nach den Gesetzen über das Bank-, Depot-, Börsen- und kreditwesen sowie 
nach dem versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz und dem Wertpapierhandelsgesetz,
3. nach dem Wirtschaftstrafgesetz 1954, dem Außenwirtschaftsgesetz, den 
Devisenbewirtschaftungsgesetzen sowie dem Finanzmonopol-, Steuer- und 
zollrecht, auch soweit dessen Strafvorschriften nach anderen Gesetzen an-
wendbar sind; dies gilt nicht, wenn dieselbe handlung eine Straftat nach dem 
Betäubungsmittelgesetz darstellt, und nicht für Steuerstraftaten, welche die 
kraftfahrzeugsteuer betreffen,
4. nach dem Weingesetz und dem Lebensmittelrecht,
5. des Subventionsbetruges, des kapitalanlagebetruges, des kreditbetruges, des 
Bankrotts, der Gläubigerbegünstigung und der Schuldnerbegünstigung,
5a. der wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Absprachen bei Ausschreibungen sowie der 
Bestechlichkeit und Bestechung im geschäftlichen verkehr,
6a. des Betruges, des Computerbetruges der Untreue, des Wuchers, der 
vorteilsgewährung, der Bestechung und des vorenthaltens und veruntreuens von 
Arbeitsentgelt,
6b. nach dem Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz und dem Dritten Buch 
Sozialgesetzbuch sowie dem Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz,
(….).“ (GvG §74 c (1)).
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calculating errors made by the accounting department, by an unknown false appli-
cation of accounting standards or by overlooking or making wrong assessments of 
issues. The effects of an accidental non-compliance of other, non-accounting relat-
ed statutes can result in these types of issues. however, false information provided 
in the accounts also can be caused by violations (fraud). violations are deliberate 
and are undertaken to achieve a specific goal. Deceptions, pecuniary damages and 
statements are classified as violations that deliberately do not take into account the 
effects of the law (for example, monetary penalties or obligations to compensate) 
within the accounts (cf. IDW PS 210, 2006, p. 1423 f).
In cases of deception, there is a deliberate act of putting false information in 
the annual financial statement as well as in the accounts. It is balance sheet ma-
nipulations that are made through deliberate false application of accounting stand-
ards. They are undertaken by boards of directors, supervisory boards or employ-
ees and in some cases with the help of third parties. A repeal of effective control 
measures by the management and other executives is often part of the deception 
(cf. IDW PS 210, 2006, p. 1424).
Pecuniary losses are, for example, embezzlement and theft. Pecuniary losses 
are, on the one hand, misuse or a diminishment of company assets. on the other 
hand, it is an extension of commitments relative to company assets. Pecuniary loss-
es are undertaken by boards of directors, supervisory boards or employees and 
in some cases with the help of third parties. If pecuniary losses are not properly 
shown in the accounts then this in itself, pursuant to the IDW test standards, is a 
violation. If they are listed then it comes under the category of other breaches of 
law (cf. IDW PS 210, 2006, p.1424).
hauser points out that breaches made by the company are unlawful acts that 
break private laws as well as public norms. In this category are, for example, acts 
such as intentional deception of contractual partners as well as intentional breach-
es of environmental protection regulations (cf. hauser, 2000, p. 44). These acts are 
breaches of the law. If these breaches of the law are intentional and lead to a decep-
tion of the accounts, then they are to be classified as fraud pursuant to the IDW. 
Also henzler applies the aforementioned categorisation (cf. henzler, 2006, p. 24). 
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2.2 fActuAl findings of Accounting frAud
If accounts and the corresponding sets of financial statements4 are falsified 
and not depicted in a transparent form for the recipients to be informed then this is 
an act of accounting irregularity. Accounting irregularities are made to gain an ad-
vantage for the company management or for other people related to the company. 
5 The people receiving the accounts are intentionally and purposefully influenced 
or deceived by the manipulated annual financial statements. 
The two extremes of legal accounting policy on the one hand and accounting 
fraud on the other are not easily separable.
4 This includes profit and loss statement, the notes and the management report. 
The profit and loss statement must be created according to § 275 hGB in a stag-
gered format applying the total expenditure format or the cost of sales method. 
The details of both approaches are defined within. According to § 275 hBG the 
notes must contain those specifics that are mandatory positions within the balance 
sheet or profit and loss statement. Also data pertaining to the notes need to be in-
cluded even if they were not included in the balance sheet or profit and loss state-
ment due to an exclusion based on an exercised right to vote this out. The manage-
ment report, according to § 289 hGB, must reflect the business development and 
corporate status in such a way that an accurate and fair view is portrayed. As such 
the analysis must include the financial key indicators relevant for the business 
field and these must be explained referencing the stated sums and data as stated 
in the financial statements. In addition the forecasted development with its key 
opportunities and risks must be analysed and explained. 
5  This can include, for example employees, who receive profit related pay or 
whose further employment depends on attaining certain goals and who thereby 
have a personal interest in a particular presentation of the financial statement.
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Illustration 2: Measures of Structuring of Balances according to Kalveram and 
Le Courtre
The illustration highlights how difficult it is to establish a clear differentia-
tion. Between the two extremes of legal accounting and illegal accounting exists 
a more or less wide limbo, in which the boundaries to illegality become blurred. 
Examples of these are the so-called creative accounting or earnings management. 
It is not clear if it is a case of aggressive accounting within a legal framework or a 
breach of the law (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 95). hence a criminal case of the facts can-
not always be made. Schmittmann, for example, draws attention to the fact that, 
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in this context, it is extremely difficult to prove that false statements were made or 
that a deliberate deception occurred given the existing assessment criteria and as-
sessment scope (cf. Schmittmann, 2006, p. 30).
In addition, the Commerzbank case illustrates the difficulty that occurs 
when evaluating a company if, on the one hand, nationally valid accounting prin-
ciples and, on the other hand, internationally valid accounting principles apply. 
The Commerzbank posted a profit as well as a loss for the year 2011. Pursuant to 
the German accounting principles of the German Commercial Code (hGB), the 
Commerzbank made a loss of 3.6 billion euros. In contrast to this, pursuant to 
international accounting principles of the IFRS it made a profit of 638 million eu-
ros. The Commerzbank is, the same as for all other large corporate enterprises, 
required to apply and publish both types of accounting principles. The result of 
the loss made pursuant to the accounting principles of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB) meant that it did not have to pay interest on the government stake of 
1.9 billion euros. This is because according to the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
accounting principles the Commerzbank must only pay interest to the government 
when it is making a profit. As such the Commerzbank saves the interest payment 
and the government misses out on the interest payment. The government stake was 
a result of the financial crisis and to support the distressed large German bank. on 
the other hand, the Commerzbank was interested in portraying their company as 
a profitable entity through applying the IFRS accounting principles as it urgently 
needed to attract new investors for a capital increase (cf. Jungbluth, 2012, p. 26). This 
case highlights the fact that the evaluations pursuant to the German Commercial 
Code (hGB) and the IFRS can lead to substantial deviations. Depending on the 
publication of the respective results in the media the company can, dependant on 
its own interests, influence the public’s view. 
The following chapter is looking into accounting fraud and specifically into 
balance sheet manipulations, as these are deliberate breaches of accounting rules. 
Balance sheet manipulations are categorized as profit/loss neutral or breaches 
which affect the balance sheets. Profit/loss neutral breaches are balance sheet ma-
nipulations. The breach is against the principles of balance sheet transparency. 
This occurs through insufficient nomenclature, false grouping, false balancing 
or omission of necessary balancing as well as through insufficient explanations. 
Breaches which affect the bottom-line are called accounting fraud. here there is 
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a breach against the principles of faithful economic representation. This contains 
non-inclusion of balance sheet items, inclusion of fictive, non-existent items and 
evaluation offences (cf. Brinkmann in Freidank, 2005, p. 244 and henzler, 2006, 
p. 26). Both types of breaches lead to financial statements not reflecting the true 
picture of assets, liabilities and the financial position of a company regarding the 
principles of proper accounting. This is a breach of general standards according 
to § 264 (2) German Commercial Code (hGB) as well as a breach of consolidated 
financial statements § 297 (2) German Commercial Code (hGB), which oversees all 
regulations of accounting (cf. Ransiek, 2012, p. 965).
A reliable statement about the criminal-political significance of accounting 
fraud is not possible according to Ransiek who refers to Schmedding (1991). This is 
because there are neither criminal statistics held by the police nor conviction statis-
tics which separate accounting policy frauds. Additionally, the general rule is that 
damage must occur before you can be prosecuted, although this, i.e. the damage 
occurring, is not a legal precondition of accounting fraud (cf. Ransiek, 2012, p. 973).
36 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
2.3 explAnAtory models for the Act of mAnipulAting 
Accounts
The zurich-based attorney-at-law Marc Jean-Richard-dit-Bressel declared in 
November 2010 on a Swiss Association of Experts for the Combating Economic 
Crime Conference that fraud is always occurring (cf. Capodici, Schafft die krise 
mehr kriminelle?, in: züricher Tageszeitung dated 09.11.2010, found in: harz et al., 
2012, p. 9). Thereby, he referred to the following quote: “If poverty prevails, then 
need turns you into a thief. Greed tempts him when prosperity prevails.”6 (trans-
lated in context by the author) (cf. harz et al., 2012, p. 9). Apart from such philo-
sophical statements, business management and economics use many geometric 
figures to visualize multi-layered phenomena. Against this background Donald 
R. Cressey developed the “Fraud Triangle“ in the 1940s (Fraud Triangle or Crime-
Risk Model) that summarizes various research approaches that demonstrate the 
key drivers of white-collar crime. The Fraud Triangle highlights three main factors 
that justify white-collar crime occurring. It lists out prerequisites that must be ful-
filled before a person can turn into an offender. 
These conditions are specified by Schneider using improved explanatory ap-
proaches of the Leipziger Progression Model. The psychological view of the ac-
counting criminal‘s personality can be seen in close relationship to their motives. 
The motives, on the other hand, stand in close relationship to the ever-growing 
influence of the shareholder-value philosophy.
2.3.1 Fraud Triangle / Fraud Diamond
The Fraud Triangle as well as the further developed Fraud Diamond relate 
to white-collar crime in general and as such are a useful tool for explaining the 
specific context of accounting fraud. The Fraud Triangle Model identifies the risk 
of a white-collar crime from occuring as high when the following conditions are 
met: first there is an incentive for or pressure on the potential offender to commit a 
white-collar crime, second he is given the opportunity for committing a crime and 
third the offender can make the act he committed justifiable to himself. 
6  „herrscht Armut, macht die Not den Dieb. Die Gier verleitet ihn, wenn Reichtum 
um sich greift“
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Illustration 3: Fraud Triangle
What the prerequisite of pressure and incentive can look like is highlight-
ed by an example from Tanski regarding the company Worldcom. According to 
Tanski the key triggers of the balance sheet manipulations discovered in 2002 are 
the sudden market slump in the telecommunications sector as well as caution in 
the assessment of the subsequent market situation that had replaced the previ-
ous market hype. Declining share prices, significant decreases in profit and an 
increasing unrest on behalf of investors and creditors placed the company under 
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growing pressure. By manipulating the balance sheets, the annual financial report 
is adjusted in order to meet the general expectations. Tanski views the fraudu-
lent proceedings at Worldcom as the phenomenon of a negative control loop (cf. 
Tanski, 2002, p. 2003 f). In relation to the prerequisite of pressure knabe et al dif-
ferentiate between the economic pressure on the company on the one hand, or 
the perpetrator being in a financial bottleneck on the other hand. In regard to the 
second aspect, they noticed that honest people, too, can come under such high 
pressure that they get into the situation to accept fraudulent behavior. (cf. knabe et 
al., 2004, p. 1058). Schruff uses an example for the prerequisite of pressure whereby 
analysts, institutional investors, important creditors or other third parties have 
expectations that are possibly unrealistic. overly optimistic press reports regard-
ing the company earnings or the development of earnings can lead to increased 
expectations and a corresponding increase in share prices. This can create pres-
sure to undergo balance sheet manipulations (cf. Schruff, 2005, p. 209). The IDW 
recognizes that the pressure of the capital markets or of the parent company on 
the legal representatives to achieve certain financial goals creates a motivation for 
balance sheet manipulations (cf. IDW PS 210, 2006, p. 1426). Brinkmann points out 
that management income is often linked to the development of the company which 
leads to a high vested interest in a positive portrayal of the company situation. 
As such, it was often personal earning goals by the management that led to bal-
ance sheet manipulations whereby the company earnings were portrayed more 
favorably than they really were. Brinkmann further states that the motivation to 
manipulate company earnings can be monetary or non monetary. The individual 
characteristics of different cultures play an important role. Especially top manage-
ment in the Confucian countries in East Asia (for example, China and South korea) 
are motivated to undergo balance sheet manipulations in an attempt to avoid loss 
of reputation (cf. Brinkmann, 2007, p. 158).
The incentive or pressure that, according to Cressey, leads to criminal behav-
ior can be caused by personal, company as well as macroeconomic developments.
For an act of fraud to occur in the arena of white-collar crime, the second 
prerequisite of the Fraud Triangle Model must also be fulfilled, namely there must 
be an opportunity to commit a crime. This is, for example, the case when there 
is no effective company monitoring of the accounting processes and the internal 
control systems on behalf of the supervisory board (cf. Schruff, 2005, p. 209) or 
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when ineffective controls provide management with the opportunity to overcome 
controls (cf. knabe et al., 2004, p. 1058). Brinkmann points out that internal control 
systems can only effectively protect a company from balance sheet manipulations 
if all employees, including the management, actually undertake the required con-
trol actions. In the case when management is motivated to manipulate financial 
publications, those employees actively engaged in the creation of the financial pub-
lications will possibly be given incentives or, through threat of punishment, will 
be forced into not undertaking control actions (cf. Brinkmann, 2007, p. 159). Based 
on the summary of the results of two kPGM studies from 2007 and 2011 hülsberg 
and Engels noted that in 74 per cent of the cases according to the 2011 study the 
perpetrator makes use of the weaknesses in the internal control systems. This val-
ue was 25 per cent higher than in the study from 2007. hülsberg and Engels see 
this increase based upon the fact that the topic of white-collar crime has become 
increasingly important for companies over the last 10 years and that companies 
are increasing their monitoring activities. They conclude that the perpetrators are 
possibly becoming cleverer and that criminal energy is on the rise – or that, whilst 
internal controls are becoming more sophisticated, the adherence to them is insuf-
ficiently controlled. As the offenders are mainly in management positions they 
have the possibilities to overcome the controls (cf. hülsberg/Engels, 2011, p. 15). 
The auditing company pwc highlights a paradox situation in their study 
from 2007 in regard to the development of white-collar crime. one would actually 
assume that incrased controls would lead to a decline in criminality. This is, how-
ever, currently not the case; the impact and the prevention have had the opposite 
effect on crime statistics. The authors of the study explain the phenomenon by the 
fact that, through an improved control environment, more offences are uncovered, 
however, without having an immediate effect on reducing crime. The impression 
is raised that the more aware companies are of white-collar crimes, the more these 
crimes take place. The authors raise the point, though, that the higher the sensi-
tivity, the more offences are discovered due to an improved control environment 
which would previously have remained unnoticed. Initially, the improved suc-
cess record of an improved control environment is alarming as more cases are 
discovered and the crime rate seemingly increases. only by and by this effect will 
slowly decrease. This assessment is also in line with decades of research in the 
field of deterrence. This has shown that the highest deterrence effect is achieved 
through an increase in the subjective risk of being discovered, less so by the threat 
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of strict consequences. Controls are most effective when they are known by eve-
ryone, when they are communicated within the company and are perceived by all 
(cf. pwc, 2007, p. 30). By comparing companies with a relatively weak control envi-
ronment (up to five control measures) with companies with a high level of control 
(more than five control measures), the authors were able to demonstrate that not 
only do the latter have more cases of claims but that they suffer twice the financial 
damage. They point out that the first group, namely companies with a weak con-
trol environment, do not realize the extent of damage being incurred and therefore 
underestimate the actual risk. This leads to a treacherous confidence that has fatal 
effects. Companies in this category easily get into a cycle of “ignorance or inability 
to learn”. As they cannot assess the actual damage created, they see less of a need 
to inform themselves about better control and preventive measures. As a result, 
only 9 per cent of these companies request consultation, whilst 34 per cent of the 
companies with a high level of control and prevention do so. These companies 
have also learnt how to better handle claims (cf. pwc, 2007, p. 37). 
The third prerequisite of the Fraud Triangle Model relates to the potential 
offender. knabe et al. speak of a personal, quasi character or cultural component 
that allows the perpetrator to undertake the act and to justify the crime to them-
selves. They assume that there are individuals that, based on their character, are 
more likely to knowingly and deliberately commit a fraud. And they assume that 
honest people, too, can accept fraudulent behavior if under high pressure. The risk 
of committing a fraudulent act is high if one or more people are motivated to com-
mit a crime, are given an opportunity and are not prevented by business morals 
from committing the fraudulent act (cf. knabe et al., 2004, p. 1058). Schruff states 
examples for the inner justification for fraud as overly high interest on behalf of 
the management to increase share prices with the motto “for the good of all” (cf. 
Schruff, 2005, p. 209). The IDW also notes that the inner justification is dependent 
on the attitude, the character or the moral concept of the person acting (cf. IDW PS 
210, 2006, p. 1426). According to Brinkmann, the ethnical moral concepts of an em-
ployee are not just based on their degree of socialization but also on the acquired 
moral concepts and the specific situation of a given company. The acquired moral 
concepts and specific situation within a company determine to what degree an of-
fender subjectively views undertaking a fraudulent act as fair. If an employee feels 
he/she is treated unjustly compared to a colleague, this situation makes it easier to 
justify the act. The inner justification is also made easier when an employee cannot 
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identify with the company culture any more, for example, because he/she is re-
quested to constantly adhere to impossible conditions to reach budget projections 
(cf. Brinkmann, 2007, p. 158). The auditing firm kPMG comes to similar results in 
their study from 2006. The aspect of inner justification has a subjective component 
but the social context of the company plays a decisive role in relation to the per-
sonal justification for the undertaking of a fraudulent act. The moral perspectives 
are comparable to the social context of the company and justifications such as “the 
others do it as well”, “I deserve this”, “that was not too much” or “we are insured” 
arise from this (cf. kPMG, 2006, p. 24).
In 1995 Müller already noted that a company culture that is not based on eth-
ical values can lead to a softening of the sense of guilt of the individual employees. 
These undertake, for example, bribe payments, which are tolerated or requested by 
the highest levels of company management and which are not seen as indecent and 
which lead to them possibly trying it themselves to improve their sales turnover 
using such “creative” measures (cf. Müller, 1995, p. 840). Subsequently, for example, 
employees that are responsible for the creation of the accounts can be requested 
by the company management to manipulate the accounts to suit their needs and 
receive personal advantages for doing this. Müller points out that a company cul-
ture which is founded on ethical principles which are also lived can have a positive 
exemplary function (cf.. Müller, 1195, p. 840). 
According to the Fraud Triangle, all three prerequisites of incentive/pres-
sure, opportunity and attitude must be present for fraud to occur. Terlinde notes in 
relation to the study published by Loebbecke/Eining/Willingham in 1989 that, in 
cases where one or more of the three factors cannot be found, the chances of bal-
ance sheet manipulations occurring is zero (cf. Terlinde, 2005, p. 204).
In the course of nearly seven decades since Cressey developed the Fraud 
Triangle, the three prerequisites and the subsequent criminal profiles have not 
fundamentally changed. however, due to the dynamics of the market and techno-
logical developments the model had to be extended. Wolfe/hermanson extended 
the Fraud Triangle model to include “ability” and turned it into the Fraud Diamond 
(cf. Rienecker, 2009, p. 20 f).
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Illustration 4: Fraud Diamond
The ability to undertake a fraudulent act assumes that the potential offender 
holds a position within the company hierarchy that allows him/her to make deci-
sions and to steer employees in the wanted direction. In connection with this po-
sition of power, the following perpetrator characteristics can be found: the delin-
quent is intelligent enough to discover weaknesses in the system and has a certain 
degree of criminal creativity. Their strong self-confidence leads them to the secu-
rity of thinking that they will not be discovered and give them the possibility to 
persuade others of their doings or to overlook them. Furthermore, they are in the 
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position to disguise their fraud over a long period through the chosen approach. 
They show themselves resistant to the stress factor created by the house of lies that 
is created through their fraudulent behavior (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 213; Rienecker, 
2009, p. 21 f).
2.3.2 Approaches to Further Developments 
The ability to recognise the basic threat of fraud that every company is subject 
to, the knowledge of the theoretical explanations leading to white-collar crime and 
the insight into the criminal’s motivation are the prerequisite for implementing an 
effective and sustainable anti-fraud management. For this reason, the previously 
demonstrated approaches to explain the root causes of white-collar crime have 
been extended and have undergone further differentiation as part of scientific re-
search. The following chapters explain these further developments in more detail. 
2.3.2.1 The Leipziger Progression Model of White-Collar Crime 
Schneider’s Leipziger Progression Modell of White-Collar Crime7 attempts to 
concretize the motivational factors driving economic crime (driving force) beyond 
the motive of greed as outlined by Coleman and to isolate it from other possible 
triggers. The study develops factors of inner and outer boundaries whose existence 
can stop the criminal act from occurring, whereas their absence is to be rated as a 
personal risk factor. As such, it is a supplement to Coleman’s study of 1987 “Toward 
an interpretation theory of white-collar crime” which until then had been the only 
attempt at developing a specific white-collar crime theory. While Coleman saw the 
combination of individual motive, structural frameworks as well as neutralization 
strategies as the trigger for the act of white-collar crime, Schneider lays emphasis 
on personal risk factors which find nearly no consideration in Coleman’s approach 
(cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 137-139). Schneider bases his approach on the existence of 
studies which show that, when comparing a white-collar criminal with a non-
delinquent employee, one finds there are differences in the value orientation, i.e. 
in the characteristic interests and basic intentions. Schneider draws on existing 
theoretical explanation models which he then specified and adjusted taking the 
7  The shown sketch of the Leipziger Progression Model is based on Schneider’s 
publications from 2007 and 2008.
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social inconspicuousness of the white-collar criminal into account. The objective 
of his study is to re-adjust this integrative approach and to specify it according to 
the given set of problems. The presumption is that personal factors that are crucial 
for the emergence of a white-collar crime are more subtle and less obvious than 
with other forms of crime. As such the Leipziger Progression Model analyses the 
processual character of the act of white-collar crime and the driving factors that 
occur throughout the process (cf. Schneider, 2007, p. 558).
During everyday work there will often be situations which offer the oppor-
tunity to commit a white-collar crime. Even with routine activities, in which safety 
relevant operations are undertaken by the same employee, without control by a 
third party, criminal situations can arise. These are situations that can principally 
be used to take criminal action. In such cases, a prudent employee will at best 
be able to acknowledge the possibility of a crime occurring, inform accordingly 
and make proposals for improving the situation. Whether this occurs depends on 
how the individual employee rates the situation. The rating of the situation on the 
other hand depends on the varying personal risk constellation. The personal risk 
constellation is divided into pre-conditions where you are either pre-disposed to 
crime or resistant to crime. A person who is pre-disposed to crime will likely com-
mit a criminal offence despite otherwise social unobtrusiveness.
Schneider differentiates between five groups of personal risk factors which 
can be split into crime pre-disposed and crime resistant categories (cf. Schneider, 
2008, p. 139 ff).
Based on Agnew “Foundation for a General Theory of Crime” (1992) work he 
places certain emotions (negative emotions) in the first category. These are emo-
tions stemming from negatively-perceived relationships to other people such as 
colleagues or superiors. Frustration based on not receiving a, in the persons view, 
deserved recognition or not receiving an expected promotion increases the risk of 
committing a white-collar crime. In such cases, the incentive is there to compen-
sate the negative emotions by carrying out a punishable act (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 
139).
on the other hand, you have the crime resistant factors which Schneider 
relates to satisfaction and an inner balance which is based on a healthy self-assess-
ment, being appropriately remunerated by your employer and being appreciated 
by colleagues and superiors (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 140). 
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The second category relates to life style. Schneider denotes a lack of aspira-
tion and an unrealistic relationship to money as the life style related predilection 
towards crime. Despite the possibility to fulfill material wishes, these factors lead 
to delinquency as they create a plausible reason for acting whereas the existence 
of neutralization strategies help the doer to maintain his self image of non delin-
quency (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 140). 
In contrast a normal aspiration level and a realistic relationship to money 
and property are recognized as crime resistant factors. When these personality 
traits exist, the individual is not expected to commit a crime (cf. Schneider, 2008, 
p. 141).
Thirdly a personal crisis can be the determining factor leading to an act of 
white-collar crime. The trigger can be, for example, the need to repay high tax debts 
or failed investments. Retaining ones aspiration levels can then, in such cases, lead 
to a pre-condition of being pre-disposed to crime (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 141).
A crime resistant pre-condition would be to lower ones aspiration levels to 
adapt to the situation at hand (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 141).
The next two categories relate to the levels of inner and outer stability (social 
bonds). Also here Schneider differentiates between crime pre-disposed and crime 
resistant pre-conditions.
The fourth category refers to job-related sub-cultures within ones working 
life (work-related subcultures)8 which are important in determining a pre-condi-
tion of being pre-disposed to crime. Such sub-cultures are created, for example, by 
the extension of a person’s working life in to their recreational time, the merging of 
work and after work time and through the selection and limitation of the contacts 
selected. values and certain ways of behavior are thus established whose deviating 
character even the individual involved can hardly apprehend. Schneider points 
out that when looking at this newly developed behaviour from a purely formal 
point of view one would view it as socially nondescript as the sub-cultural orien-
tation is integrated in the person’s working life and as such even family members 
8  The term sub culture refers to a within itself closed social sub culture formed 
by a group of people which differ from the socially dominant culture in their val-
ues, norms, needs, behavior and symbols. In sociology the concept of a sub culture 
describes and explains contemporary value orientation and life-styles as well as 
describing and explaining deviating or delinquent behaviour.
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would interpret it as being integrated at work. Should the person involved have 
close ties to job related sub-cultures and no opposing relationships exist, then this 
can support the decision to commit a criminal act not least of all because the per-
petrator, should he be discovered, will not expect condemnation from within the 
sub-culture (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 142).
The crime resistant counterpart would be to have strong relationships, for 
example with ones family of origin, with ones procreation family (meaning the 
family created through marriage) and not to delinquent friends within and outside 
of ones ’ working life (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 142).
The last of the five categories within the model relates to the person’s value 
orientation. Based on empirical studies, Schneider sees the following factors as 
pre-conditions to being pre-disposed to crime: economic success, a high living 
standard, hedonism, power and influence being important to the person, whereas 
traditional values such as conventional work ethics or law abidance and integrity 
are not guiding factors for a crime pre-disposed situation. Although, the potential 
white-collar criminal may proclaim to such values in a situation not pre-disposed 
to crime. A one-sided orientation towards materialistic values can be categorized 
as a personal risk factor towards having a pre-disposition to crime (cf. Schneider, 
2008, p. 143).
Schneider names the orientation towards traditional and modern idealistic 
values as the crime resistant counterpart. Referring to hermann (2003, p. 345 ff) 
he refers to values such as friendship, an outgoing personality, being in a steady 
relationship, political engagement, tolerance, self-responsibility, having an inner 
calm, environmental responsibility, healthiness, emotionality, creativity and social 
responsibility (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 143).
Should a “doer” find himself in a situation which offers a pre-disposition to 
crime, then it is of importance whether personal risk factors exist or not. Schneider’s 
described risk factors influence the individual person’s decision whether or not to 
commit a crime. Every single risk factor increases the overall risk that situations 
are viewed as good opportunities by a person with a crime pre-disposition and 
eventually lead to a criminal act taking place. Should a person’s personal risk fac-
tors accumulate, then this can lead to a syndrome of criminal endangerment which 
Schneider reflecting the work of Bock “kriminologie” (2000) refers to as “relevance 
of connections”. Relevance of connections are basic intentions and especially strong 
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interests that in summary denote a personality. The importance is not the number 
but the intensity of the personal risk factors. Should the intensity of the risk fac-
tors reach a critical mass, then it will result in a criminal offence taking place (cf. 
Schneider, 2008, 147).
The starting point of the model sees a person in a situation pre-disposed to 
crime. In order to be able to make use of the situation as a good opportunity for 
committing a crime, he must not let it pass (first phase of the progression model). 
To be able to recognize a situation as a good opportunity for committing a crime, 
the person must have detailed knowledge of the respective processes and work 
routines which the potential delinquent can then misuse for his own needs. This is 
the reason why white-collar crime is generally not committed by people until they 
have been in the company for around about two years. Should a person not have 
these insights, then he will not be able to recognize a good opportunity. Another 
reason for not recognizing the opportunity is a pronounced orientation towards 
values of conformity. In such cases purist values such as irreproachability, correct-
ness and righteousness act as perception filters. 
Should the view of the potential criminal not be obscured by purist values 
or the lack of procedural knowledge, then the person moves towards the stage of 
assessing the situation within the progression model (second phase of the progres-
sion model). Whether an individual then exploits a situation pre-disposed to crime 
to undergo a criminal act or not depends on his individual risk constellation. If 
this includes mostly crime pre-disposed factors, then the situation will be viewed 
as a good opportunity for committing a crime. In this phase, a person’s value ori-
entation also acts as a filter. Crime resistant values can still stop a person from 
committing a crime in this phase of the progression model. Should however crime 
pre-disposed values prevail, then the person will commit a crime. 
At the time of criminal action the third phase of the progression model is 
reached. At this stage no new or fundamentally different aspects will intervene. 
Schneider views that for the act of the crime the increase in mass and intensity of 
personal risk factors is the decisive factor (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 144-147)
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Illustration 5: Leipziger Progression Model
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The fact that there may be cases where a crime can be explained simply 
through being provided with a good opportunity and not by a person’s risk con-
stellation, delineates, according to Schneider, the boundaries of the Leipziger 
Progression Model. According to him, though, the majority of cases of white-collar 
crime are based, according to current scientific research, on situational and per-
sonal conditions being the trigger for committing a crime (cf. Schneider, 2008, p. 
147)
2.3.2.2 The Offenders Motives for Committing White-Collar Crime
The study Offenders Motives for committing White-Collar Crime was published 
in 2008 in Pforzheim (Germany) as part of the sequence “Contributions from the 
University Pforzheim” and encompasses the analysis and interpretation of thir-
teen qualitative psychological interviews with perpetrators from various penal in-
stitutions. In addition, the authors (Cleff / Luppold / Naderer / volkert) analysed 
and evaluated 60 court records of white-collar criminals from eleven nationwide 
scattered public prosecutors’ offices. The focus being on fraud, embezzlement, 
breach of trust and corruption on a management and executive director level. The 
intention being that by using these chosen perimeters, it was possible to create 
clusters of quite similar, empirically relevant cases. The reason for focusing on 
the management and executive director level was to investigate such white-collar 
crimes where there was a marked scope for decision making. Naturally the study 
was based only on known and registered cases which were punished with a mon-
etary and / or prison sentence (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 19). As the authors’ findings 
underpin the Leipziger Progression Model with its empirical data, the most impor-
tant results of the study will be briefly touched upon. 
The study attempts to take specific aspects of the Leipziger Progression 
Model, which are important for an empirical study and systemization of motives, 
and thereby also for the prevention of a possible white-collar crime and to develop 
these further (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 17).
The authors view the part of the Leipziger Progression Model as positive 
which illustrates the progressive character of white-collar crimes while integrat-
ing a great deal of explanatory approaches towards the acts of white-collar crime. 
The strength of the model is that it illustrates the main moderation variables on 
the path towards committing a white-collar crime – such as emotional factors and 
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dissatisfaction as well as social factors like work-related sub-cultures which stand 
in competition with private social networks (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 16 f).
The authors however note critically that the awareness of the internal rela-
tionship between various personal risk factors requires proper detailed investiga-
tion which the Leipziger Progression Model in its systemization and interpretation 
does not offer. This makes it hard to identify further reasons for committing white-
collar crimes beyond those of being in a situation that provides a good opportunity 
for committing a white-collar crime. According to the authors this basis is however 
required to allow systemic studies on the relevance of individual motives to be 
placed in a higher context and thus enabling conclusions for the prevention and 
combating of white-collar crime to be drawn (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 17). 
A further weakness of the Leipziger Progression Model the authors say is 
that it does not take into account the various strategies surrounding potential per-
petrators in dealing with inadequate or negative emotional states and the resulting 
anticipated problem solving strategies. Exactly this is the point where their study 
starts. Their study supports the Leipziger Progression Model in its fundamentals. 
It differentiates itself however in so far as that it views and differentiates the pro-
gression of a white-collar crime in context with individual aspects such as the in-
dividuals emotional state, the personal motivational structure, the differential psy-
chology of an individuals’ personality and the subjective perception of potential 
opportunities for committing a crime (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 17).
Based on the investigation of the crucial motives for committing a crime, 
typical personality traits and favorable conditions, five different perpetrator pro-
files were identified that allow for a better understanding of how white-collar 
crime comes into being. The authors wanted to understand the complex interac-
tion of emotional, motivational and cognitive processes on the path to committing 
a crime in order to be able to discuss potential consequences for preventing and 
fighting white-collar criminality. The results of this study will be placed in relation 
to the portrayal of white-collar perpetrator profiles. 
2.3.2.3 Profiles of White-Collar Criminals
There is insufficient scientifically-based practical knowledge of the person 
the white-collar criminal is. In face of the lack of a comprehensive theoretical ex-
planatory approach as to the reasons behind white-collar crime, Schneider has 
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made a substantial contribution with his Leipziger Progression Model. his depic-
tion of the progressional path identifies which phases a potential perpetrator must 
pass through from finding a good opportunity for committing a crime to actu-
ally committing the crime itself and which personal risk factors and constella-
tions were relevant in making the decision to commit the crime. The Pforzheimer 
authors’ findings demonstrate which aspects of the individual personality play an 
important role. A further study which offers essential data on what type of person 
a white-collar criminal is and what crimes he committed in detail is provided by 
the study “Profiles of a Fraudster” by kPMG from 2007. The study is based on in-
vestigations into real cases which the forensic department of the kPMG undertook 
within the EMA region (Europe, India and the Far East as well as South Africa). 
Structural data from 360 fraud investigations was compiled and summarized. 
kPMG points out that the survey is not representative from a statistical or math-
ematical point of view as it only relates to registered cases and ones which they 
investigated. Despite this, the study is important for two reasons: on the one hand 
it provides important background information on the perpetrator or perpetrators 
and on the other hand the study is based on the encompassing knowledge of real 
cases and not on voluntarily provided information. In addition to this it provides 
an all-encompassing profile of the perpetrator (cf. Schneider, 2007a, p.3).
The results from the Leipziger Progression Model, the Pforzheimer contribu-
tion to a criminal’s motives and the kPMG study “Profile of a Fraudster” build the 
basis for the following description of a white-collar criminal.
The essential data gathered surrounding the person of a white-collar crimi-
nal shows that it is predominantly men of middle age who, at the time of discov-
ering an opportunity to commit a crime, had spent at least two years in a senior 
position working for a company. Seventy percent of the criminals were between 36 
and 55 years of age. In eighty-nine percent of the cases, the perpetrators were the 
company’s own employees. There were only thirteen cases where the person had 
been with the company for less than two years. In sixty-eight percent of the cases 
the perpetrator acted alone. Sixty percent belonged to the upper management and 
of these thirteen percent were part of the executive management. overall, being in 
a managerial position played a role in eighty-six percent of the cases investigated. 
In twenty-four percent of the cases the time spent to commit the criminal trans-
action took less than a year, whereas in sixty-seven percent the perpetrator was 
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active for one till five years until they were discovered and their activities stopped 
(cf. Schneider, 2007a, p. 5 f).
The statistical results of the Fraudster-Profile-Study complement the existing 
theoretical and empirical knowledge about the prevailing conditions that lead to 
white-collar crime by including, for example, the relevance of factors such as “gen-
der” in relation to the development of white-collar crime. The results of the study 
show that eighty-five percent of the perpetrators are men and fifteen percent are 
women. An interpretation into this number is however not possible as one has to 
take the overall distribution of gender in the affected departments into account. 
Concerning this there is no data available. It is however remarkable that in every 
fourth case not committed by a single person, women play a role in committing the 
crime (cf. Schneider, 2007a, p. 10 f).
Based on the analysis of the interviews conducted, the authors of the 
Pforzheimer study identified 5 basic types of white-collar criminalists that can be 
split into two groups. The first group encompasses perpetrators with a visionary 
personality structure who show characteristics of egocentric, frustrated and nar-
cissistic tendencies. The second group encompasses perpetrators with dependant 
and naïve personality structures (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 23 ff).
Perpetrators with a visionary personality structure are intelligent people 
who want to turn their vision into reality. Their actions concentrate on career suc-
cess with the goal of making a difference (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 23).
A person with a tendency towards being an egocentric visionary is a person 
who deliberately ignores rules and laws in order to achieve his very ambitious 
goals. That includes following materialistic goals that allow him to live a hedonis-
tic, luxurious life-style. The satisfaction achieved from committing a crime wears 
off quickly so that he yearns for ever greater successes (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 23).
Motives and values: with money an egocentric visionary can defy social re-
strictions. It allows him to live independently and in luxury. he demonstrates his 
independency and dominance with his house, his yacht. his emotions belong to 
himself and he remains emotionally untouched by others. he ignores rules and 
laws and proves (to himself) that he is independent (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 25).
The variant of a frustrated visionary is a type of perpetrator who is a doer. 
Despite of his intelligence he always falls short of his own high expectations of 
himself. he strives to achieve something special. his visions appear to be of a quite 
53ACCoUNTING FRAUD
non-materialistic and socially motivated nature. he feels misunderstood and left 
alone in his wish to fulfill his visions and is therefore disappointed and frustrated 
(cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 23f).
Motives and values: Money allows the frustrated visionary to prove himself 
and to gain social recognition. Just like the egocentric visionary, he places a great 
importance on status symbols. But it is also important for him to prove to others 
that he can achieve great things. From this self-realization he gains his emotional 
satisfaction (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 25).
Both types – egocentric and frustrated visionary – have a narcissistic ten-
dency. This ties in with literature which compares offenders and non-offenders of 
white-collar crime and which found that offenders show higher values of person-
ality dimensions in the realms of narcissism (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 24).
In a person with the tendency of a narcissistic visionary, this inclination is 
especially strong. With an exaggerated self-image he wants to receive permanent 
reassurance from his immediate environment. Career success and money help him 
to feel reassured. If he gets criticized, he reacts angrily, irritably and provocatively 
(cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 24).
Motives and values: The narcissistic visionary receives reassurance and con-
firmation through money. his needs are about his narcissistic, smug nurturing of 
his own materialistic independency, and the demonstration of professional genius 
and superiority. For that purpose he will also use illegal ways to make himself, at 
least in his typically, strongly convinced way, invulnerable (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 
25).
For the dependent type social relationships are vital. he cannot be alone and 
is strongly plagued by separation anxiety. This leads to the fact that he accepts het-
eronomy through others in a passive manner. This in turn can lead to him being 
persuaded to undergo an illegal act by people with whom he has an emotionally 
dependent relationship although these actions are against his own personal sense 
of right and wrong (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 24).
Motives and values: Money gives the dependent type the feeling of belong-
ing. he tries to tie other people to himself through money. he mainly acts in a 
heteronomous way as he wants to experience the appreciation of others. Money 
enables him to secure the structure of his personal relationships. It supports him in 
his struggle against anxiety not to lose social attention and emotional relationships 
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(cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 26).
The profile of the naïve perpetrator is shaped by simple intellectual struc-
tures compared to those of the intellectual visionaries. The naïve person tries to 
act in a conscientious and dutiful manner and holds on to traditional values. he 
feels quickly overwhelmed, acts without thinking and is gullible. As such he can 
perform illegal acts without realizing what he is doing (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 24).
Motives and values: For the naïve perpetrator money is a means of securing 
his existence and that of his family. he tries to please everybody and to fulfill all 
requests satisfactorily. Thereby he pursues traditional values such as responsibility 
towards his family, but also towards the company in which he works (cf. Cleff et 
al., 2008, p. 26).
All of the perpetrator profiles listed are marked by a highly subjective sense 
of justice. They define their rules and norms themselves and do not question 
whether their actions are legal or not. For them the deciding factor is whether they 
perceive the act as legitimate or illegitimate. This subjectivity around their sense 
of justice is a result of their individual neutralization and justification strategies. 
offences are made light of, the general acceptance of the doings postulated, and 
the offences viewed as compensation for too low income or received injustices. 
These strategies serve to calm their own conscience and to uphold their self-image 
(cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 27).
While the listed perpetrator profiles all demonstrate a subjective sense of 
justice, they differ in the perception of potential opportunities for crime and in the 
assessment of the risks associated with the crime. The egocentric visionary actively 
seeks opportunities and is fully aware of the possible consequences. The frustrated 
and narcissistic visionaries are latently ready to act. Whereas the frustrated vision-
ary desperately grabs an opportunity, the narcissistic perpetrator does not fear the 
consequences due to his exaggerated opinion of himself. The dependent personal-
ity is torn between the conflict of social obedience and possible sanctions whereas 
the naïve quite accidently finds an opportunity, uses it and is hardly aware of the 
possible consequences (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 30).
of the five perpetrator profiles, which differ in the complex interaction of 
their emotional, motivational and cognitive perception processes on the way to 
committing a crime, four could be proven based by the cluster analysis of the court 
records. The differentiation of the narcissistic visionary could not be proven. The 
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authors of the study base this on the fact that a more encompassing study of the 
court records is required including insight into psychological evaluations to be 
able to better identify narcissistic personality structures (cf. Cleff et al., 2008, p. 39).
The categorization of white-collar criminal profiles according to intra-psy-
chological characteristics as undertaken by the Pforzheimer study should contrib-
ute to the prevention and countering of white-collar crime. As such, the authors 
formulated initial conclusions from the results. Thereby they show important pro-
posed prevention measures9 as published in academic literature and place them 
in relation to the measure and its potential effect on a certain perpetrator profile. 
Thereby the measures discussed in the published literature become a further con-
firmation as to their usefulness. After outlining the profile of white-collar crimi-
nals, this chapter will also take a specific look at the accounting fraudster. Finally 
the shareholder value principle will be briefly outlined as the fraudulent behav-
ior of individuals must be seen in close connection to structural and systemic 
conditions. 
2.3.3 Looking at the Accounting Fraudster
All people that are party to the creation of the annual financial statement 
and are in a position to influence the accounts can, in principle, commit an act 
of accounting fraud. This can be members of the executive board, of the supervi-
sory board or employees in the accounting department. Depending on how the 
accounting fraud is conducted, it can be a single offender or a case of a collusion, 
whereby a group of people commit the offence together (cf. von hollen, 2005, p. 7). 
Terlinde completed a study in Germany in 2005 which identified the way in 
which criminal activity is spread over different hierarchical levels. Two percent of 
balance sheet manipulations are committed by the Supervisory Board, 3 percent 
by non-managerial positions (lower level personnel), 14 percent by middle man-
agement, 39 percent by financial board members or accounting managers, 3 per-
cent by the Executive Board and 41 percent by executives or managing directors (cf. 
Terlinde, 2005, p. 323). The comparatively high number of 41 percent of accounting 
9  The study refers to preventive measures that were proposed by the following 
authors: Bussmann/Salvenmoser (2006), Ernst & Young (2007), Menzies/Tüllner 
(2008), Samson/Langrock (2007), Schmidt (2004), Noll (2002), Wieland (2008).
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frauds occurring on the executive or managing director level differs only by one 
percent point compared to the Beasly/ Carcello/ hermanson (1999) CoSo-study 
conducted in the USA (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 214).
There is also a correlation between the amount of damage caused and the 
amount of control and empowerment the perpetrator has. Considerable financial 
damage is caused twice as often by fraud committed by top management as it 
is by lower level personnel. Accounting fraud committed at higher hierarchical 
levels causes considerably higher material and immaterial damage to a company. 
Comprehensive levels of authority allow board members to bypass internal con-
trols and to instrumentalize employees in attaining their goals and misuse them 
for fraud (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 59 f). Apart from material gains, the reasons for 
committing a crime are the drive for more power, recognition and prestige as well 
as to satisfy their pronounced personal vanity. This narcissism of top managers, 
blind to the fact that they are damaging the company long-term, turn them into 
criminals responsible for accounting scandals (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 
155).
Also a personal vendetta can be a reason for accounting fraud. In this case, 
the main aim of the offender is to damage the company without attaining a per-
sonal tangible gain (cf. Sell, 1999, p. 19, footnote 14).
Even if balance sheet manipulations are normally committed by people in 
leading managerial positions, other people are often involved. These are normally 
people within the accounting department who have performance-related pay and 
whose further employment depends on the company’s success or who are paid for 
their complicity (cf. henzler, 2006, p. 33).
The delinquents undertaking an accounting fraud are trying to mislead those 
people interested in the company accounts about the actual state of the company. 
The deception can be either to let the company appear in a better financial state as 
it actually is; or to portray the company in a worse state than it actually is.
Motives for a better portrayal of the company accounts can be, for exam-
ple, personal enrichment plans on behalf of the management. This can, for exam-
ple, be the case when a large part of management remuneration is based on share 
programs (cf. Marten et al., 2003, p. 383). This incentive principle works in such a 
way that the management participates in the shareholder value by being given a 
certain amount of shares at a fixed price at a fixed point of time in the future. The 
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more the share prices grow, the higher the profit the managers stand to gain as 
they only have to pay the previously determined fixed price (cf. Wöhe/Döring, 
2000, p. 97 f). In relation to this point, one should also highlight the fact that a mo-
tive is also given by the fact that the future of the company management is also 
dependent on their ability to increase shareholder value (cf. Marten et al., 2003, p. 
383). The 2009 study of the auditing firm pwc comes to the conclusion that the too 
high pressure to meet targets is also one factor that fosters white-collar crimes (cf. 
pwc, 2009, p. 45). here the motive is that managers tied to targets and who want 
to fulfill these, use an opportunity to show the accounts in a better light than they 
actually are if they cannot achieve these targets. A further motive can be the need 
to increase needed liquidity through equity investors or capital providers as the 
risk of investing is reduced for the potential investors with an improved portrayal 
of the company (cf. Terlinde, 2005, p. 12). Peemöller and hofmann also state further 
motives as being “calculating oneself richer”10 (translated in context by the author) 
meaning amongst other things that for an upcoming sale of the company, the com-
pany value is corrected upwardly in order to achieve the best possible sales profit. 
Furthermore, a high company value can protect companies against takeovers as 
the company planning the take-over must first be able to raise the purchase price. 
It is also possible to postpone the point in time when insolvency proceedings must 
be filed in cases where the company is in a financially bad position and is threat-
ened with over-indebtedness. Possibly the company can even find new investors 
that provide sufficient equity capital in this time (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 
152). 
Motives that lead to a worse portrayal of company financials as they actually 
are can be in the interest of a company, for example, when low earnings can reduce 
the tax burden payable. In addition to this, lower company profits can signal to 
business partners that it is not possible to accommodate them financially. Personal 
enrichment motives on behalf of the management can then become a motive for 
accounting manipulations when the company management makes the annual re-
sult look even worse than it already is by pulling ahead expenditures into the 
current fiscal year as they would anyway not be eligible to receive premiums and 
bonus payments. In the following years the company results are by implication 
then portrayed better than they actually are. These types of manipulations make 
10  “eines Sich-reicher-Rechnens“
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shareholders and third parties think that the improvements made from the very 
bad year in relation to the results of the following years are more impressive than a 
relatively constant profit over several years (cf. Terlinde, 2005, p. 12 f). In addition to 
this, Brinkmann provides a further reason for portraying accounts in a worse state 
than they actually are as the attempt to build hidden reserves for the future. In the 
public sector, it sometimes occurs that worse portrayed earnings can lead to being 
eligible for higher grants (cf. Brinkmann, 2007, p. 158). The possibility to have easier 
tariff negotiations and staff reduction measures is a further reason for companies 
to portray the financial situation in a worse state than they actually are. Also it is 
easier to compensate a no longer wanted associate (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, 
p. 152). 
2.3.4 The Principle of Shareholder Value
Explanatory models of accounting fraud look at the key motives leading a 
person to become a perpetrator but one should also look at criminal behavior in 
relationship to the structural and systematic background. This is especially impor-
tant due to the ever-increasing importance of short-term company performance as 
seen since the nineties. Success is more and more often defined through increasing 
stock prices rather than by long-term sustained growth. The pressure to present 
good financial statements is growing steadily. Not just prestige and image but also 
a company’s ability to attain capital is widely dependent on it. This is where the 
role of rating agencies and bank ratings are of particular importance. Banks mostly 
use the customers’ creditworthiness as the basis for lending money and for the 
credit conditions granted. For companies which are “rated”, a change in status, be 
it rated either up or down, has serious consequences. That is why it is so tempting 
to make the balance sheets appear better than they actually are. A good rating 
does not just influence the interest rate of bank credits and the issuing of bonds 
but primarily influences the current market share. That in turn means the depend-
ence on the development of the share price increases which in turn is the root 
cause of most accounting fraud scandals. In this context, the liberalization of cer-
tain industries should be mentioned, based on the move to market self-regulation. 
Protective measures were successively reduced and regulatory rights of authorities 
limited (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 153 ff). The result of inflating turnover 
and profits through questionable business practices and accounting methods to 
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drive share prices up had catastrophic outcomes. Sablowski states that especial-
ly some of those companies which in the nineties had the highest growth rates, 
the strongest growth in shareholder value and which were seen as exemplary in 
the eyes of investors collapsed like a house of cards. Not just the individual mis-
takes were publically discussed but also the institutional problems. But neither the 
drive for shareholder value, the market share orientated financial system nor the 
neo-liberal deregulation of energy supplies or telecommunications was ever ques-
tioned, although these were the prerequisites for the rise of the later bankruptcies 
(cf. Sablowski, 2003, p. 201 f).
In Germany, the impact of deregulation and the shift in focus towards share-
holder value can be illustrated by looking at the development of energy compa-
nies. In the energy provider sector, companies such as RWE, EoN, EnBW11 who 
were previously more than 50% state owned were privatized. The deregulation 
and privatization shifted not just the majority but also the power structures. The 
majority of shares and power now lie in the hands of private investors. This led to 
a fundamental change in company politics. The overall company goal now became 
shareholder value. With this orientation towards profit maximization companies 
had and still have to adjust to market conditions. The energy sector is an oligopoly, 
as four companies share the sector and, as such, price is not a result of supply and 
demand. Supply is often artificially throttled so that price can be dictated. There is 
also the surmise that the big four undergo price-fixing. The state has given away 
their power but a self-regulation of the market never occurred. Due to the size of 
the companies, they wield so much power that the proper control of their financial 
statements seems hardly possible.
The insight won in this thesis regarding possible models of explanation for 
the occurrence of balance sheet manipulation has been summed up in a short re-
port that will be published in a scientific journal within the framework as part 
of the promotion program of the UCAM-FOM.
11  This encompasses three of the four largest energy suppliers in Germany (the 
fourth company is vattenfall whose headquarters are situated in Sweden). These 
four companies hold the majority of Germany’s electricity market and own the 
majority of the electricity grids.
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2.4 results of Accounting irregulArities
Specialist literature looks at the affects of balance sheet manipulations in re-
lation to the damage caused. Accordingly, the next chapters will firstly look at the 
effects of balance sheet manipulations on affected companies as well as on inves-
tors and shareholders. Then the potential implications for the perpetrator will be 
explored. As a last point, the overall market implications of balance sheet frauds 
shall be looked into.
2.4.1 Implications for Companies
Accounting fraud, when discovered, can inflict serious if not existential 
damage to companies. The company is liable for damages caused to investors, pro-
cess costs and penalty payments ruled by court. An example for the downfall of 
a reputable company is the private bank house herstatt which was driven into 
insolvency in 1974 through accounting fraud and currency speculations. At first 
the accounting fraud and currency speculations led the company into a danger-
ous imbalance. The banks supervisory board was misled by manipulated status 
reports. only when, in April of 1974, the losses of DM 400 million could not be kept 
secret any longer, did the Supervisory Board request the chief financial officer to 
undertake a special investigation. The company’s equity at this point was already 
used up. In June of 1974 the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority withdrew the 
herstatt Bank’s authority to conduct banking business according to § 35 II of the 
German Banking Act. In addition, it ordered winding down the company and an 
immediate payment stop (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 80 f).
If a company is not completely closed-down, then the discovery of balance 
sheet fraud leads to liability claims, process costs and fines as well as to costs in 
relation to correcting the financial information (data gathering, data preparation 
and data publication). Companies which are on the stock market also have to bear 
immense share price losses. 
In addition, there can also be indirect pecuniary damages caused by exter-
nal factors. This can be demonstrated using the example of the American energy 
company Enron. Enron was audited by the auditing firm Arthur Andersen over 
a period of several years. Apart from the auditing service Arthur Andersen also 
rendered consulting services to Enron at the same time and was “part of Enron’s 
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creative accounting measures”12 (translated in context by the author) (cf. Peemöller/
hofmann, 2005, p. 35). Arthur Andersen also destroyed evidence after the balance 
sheet manipulations were discovered. The result was a direct pecuniary damage 
but also an indirect pecuniary damage, as the result of the publicising of the fact 
that documents had been destroyed led to an exceptionally significant negative 
income return13 (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 35; hoffmann, 2008, p. 46). This 
also highlights why dual contracts of auditing and consulting services should be 
prohibited. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in one of the following 
chapters (see chapter 3.4.5).
A study published in January 2010 which the audit and management con-
sultancy company kPMG had the Emnid-Institute carry-out and which involved 
300 German companies made the following clear: affected companies judge the 
average damage caused in the last three years by cartel law violations, money laun-
dering, corruption and the manipulation of financial statements or balance sheet 
information to be over 200 million euros (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 10).
The study showed that within the area of white-collar crime there was a 
strong shift towards fraud in the financial and accounting sectors as well as in the 
credit business. This means that white-collar crime is increasingly performed by 
people higher up in the company hierarchy. In line with this trend, systemized, 
internal control systems are uncovering more and more cases of accounting ma-
nipulations (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 9).
Regarding the estimated damage of over 200 million euros (kPMG study 
from 2010), it should be noted that this value is an average value from the 300 
German companies polled. This does not take into account that, on the one hand, 
there are companies that are being damaged through the discovery of balance 
sheet manipulations and that, on the other hand, there are companies that at least 
for a period of time can generate advantages totalling several millions through 
undiscovered balance sheet manipulations (capital increases, subsidies, taxes).
Apart from the financial damage, one needs to take a look at the indirect 
damages. Indirect damages can have a great magnitude and can therefore lead to 
further financial damages. one of these damages is the loss of reputation, with 
12  „an den kreativen bilanziellen Gestaltungsmaßnahmen Enrons beteiligt“
13  The fraudulent behaviour eventually led to the dissolution of Enron as well as 
the auditing firm Arthur Anderson (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 29 und 35).
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publically listed companies it also means a drop in share prices, a decline in em-
ployee morale, an impairment of business relations as well as an impairment in the 
relationship with public authorities. The companies’ assessment of these indirect 
damages has changed significantly over the last decade. A study from 2011 that was 
conducted in Germany on behalf of pwc and the University of halle-Wittenberg 
by TNS Emnid showed that the loss of reputation has increased significantly over 
time. In 2001 only 10 per cent of the German companies affected reported a loss of 
reputation whereas in 2011 it was already over 40 per cent (cf. pwc, 2011a, p. 22.). 
As part of this study, 830 German companies that had at least 500 employees were 
polled (cf. pwc, 2011a, p. 12 und 15). The authors of the study see the occurrence 
of indirect damages as increasingly hard to calculate and hard to manage. These 
types of damages have become an increasing threat to companies. The authors 
of the study also point out the significant management costs that are caused by 
white-collar crime. The tackling of white-collar crime as well as the judicial pros-
ecution of the cases cost a lot of time and money. Also rebuilding one’s reputation 
with the public requires not insignificant efforts. This can partly be explained by 
the fact that more than half of the offenders are the company’s own employees 
and that the public as well as the supervisory authorities are reacting increasingly 
sensitively towards this type of cases (cf. pwc, 2011a, p. 24 f).
2.4.2 Implications for Company Owners, Investors and Shareholders
The term Principal-Agent-Conflict describes the prevailing state on the 
anonymous capital markets. Investors and shareholders (principals) put their capi-
tal in to the trust of managers (agents). As investors and shareholders do not have 
the ability to effectively control these managers, it is possible for them in turn to 
use their power of authority to commit fraud worth billions of euros. Information 
asymmetries play a key role here. The financial statement of a company holds 
an important function in terms of information flow to shareholders. Managers 
can withhold or falsify information so that the company’s statements are false. 
Statutory auditors cannot see into the finite detail of company’s status. Also share-
holders often do not familiarize themselves with the complex financial reports but 
rely on press releases (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 48).
Investors only use their right of information in a limited form and so enable 
a control vacuum to occur. Neither private nor institutionalized investors can close 
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this gap through their participation at the annual general meeting. Accordingly, 
increasingly few investors make use of their right to vote. Especially many small 
investors forgo their right to attend the annual meetings as they know that their 
single vote has no real influence. The limited influence of shareholders on the stra-
tegic direction of a company leads to the already discussed question as to whether 
shareholders can still be described as sovereigns of companies (cf. hofmann, 2009, 
p. 48 ff).
Apart from the large accounting fraud scandals in the US, there were also 
some sensational cases in Germany where investors were damaged by managers 
following their own dubious interests. Managers made heavy gains through in-
sider trading whilst the investors hopefully held on to their devalued shares (EM 
Tv/Informatec). In the case of Camroad, the statutory auditors were not able to 
expose the “empty bookings” and the faked false optimism intentionally created 
by management (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 47 f).
2.4.3 Implications for the Perpetrator
The prosecution of white-collar offenders is affected by grave structural is-
sues. Apart from the low perceptibility, there is also the high factual and legal 
complexity of the cases and lengthy proceedings that often stretch over a number 
of years. Problems proving accountability and personal guilt go hand in hand with 
an increased defense potential on behalf of the accused (cf. Bussmann, 2003, p. 91). 
Personal guilt and being punishable presumes pursuant to § 331 of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) intentional behavior which must be proven. The account-
ing fraudster must, for example, specifically have thought it possible that the af-
fected depiction was false or included a deception and have accepted it (cf. Wulf in 
Freidank, 2005, p. 222). Furthermore, the Public Prosecutors handling these types 
of cases are insufficiently staffed and professionally overtaxed (cf. hofmann, 2008, 
p. 68). If a white-collar offender is sentenced, despite the structural issues with the 
prosecution, then they can be sentenced to monetary punishment, imprisonment, 
court trial costs and compensation claim payments. 
For pure accounting fraud, i.e. prosecutions which only take the creation of 
false financial statements or violate the report-back obligations of the statutory au-
ditors into account, a prison sentence of one to three years or a monetary penalty is 
foreseen (§ 331, 332 hGB). The conviction process, however, is made difficult by the 
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wide scope of accounting law to define when a wrong accounting case according 
to § 331 hGB occurred. According to § 332 hGB, a careless audit as such cannot be 
sanctioned but rather the dishonesty of the auditor which must be proven as clear 
and deliberate false accounting. As accounting fraud often occurs along with other 
deceptions such as tax fraud, fraud and corruption, it frequently plays a secondary 
role in the overall penal procedure. on the other hand, due to the number of major 
scandals they have increasingly become the focus of law-enforcement agencies (cf. 
hofmann, 2008, p. 68 ff).
Specific cases of accounting fraud will be highlighted using three examples. 
Informatec AG founded in 1988 was one of the first new market companies that 
was for a long time one of the favored companies on the growth-oriented stock 
market. The price of Informatec shares rose steadily. After the euphoria came the 
sudden crash when in August 2000 it became known that the company had is-
sued several ad-hoc publications that had been wrong. The two board members 
Gerhard harlos and Alexander häfele had driven the shares prices up through 
misreporting data and then sold Informatec shares worth 15 million euros. In 2001 
Informatec had to file for insolvency. In November 2003 both board members were 
sentenced by the Augsburg regional court pursuant to § 400 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act for deliberate misreporting of data to investors and for insider 
trading to monetary punishments and imprisonment. harlos was sentenced to 
two years imprisonment on probation; häfele had to go to prison for two years 
and nine months. one investor who had invested DM 91,000 in Informatec shares 
based on the misreported data was liable for complete compensation by the two 
board members. This was ruled by the Federal Supreme Court in karlsruhe in a 
civil law proceeding against the defendant. The court recognized that this was a 
case of personal liability of the board members. It saw the fact of immoral willful 
intent as fulfilled pursuant to § 826 of the German Civil Code (BGB) (cf. Peemöller/
hofmann, 2005, p. 106 f; hofmann, 2008, p. 68). 
Comroad AG based in Munich was founded in 1995 and was launched on the 
new market in 1999. According to the auditing firm kPMG, Comroad was already 
financially over-indebted in 1998 but presented ongoing outstanding business re-
sults. After it came to light that customers were actually only phantom customers, 
kPMG withdrew its audit agreement in February 2002 with immediate effect. In 
March 2002 the chairman of the executive board Bodo Schnabel was dismissed 
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without notice and was arrested in April 2002. In November 2002 Schnabel was 
sentenced to seven years imprisonment by the regional court of Munich. he was 
found guilty of fraud (§ 263 German Criminal Code) as well as insider trading 
(§ 14 Securities Trading Act) and of manipulating share and market prices (§ 20a 
Securities Trading Act). Schnabel’s wife was sentenced to imprisonment for two 
years for aiding and abetting but this was suspended on probation. In addition, the 
confiscated property of the married couple Schnabel worth 20.1 million euros was 
declared forfeited (§ 73 German Criminal Code) and was transferred to the Land 
of Bavaria (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 111 - 113). 
Management striving for personal profit maximization cannot only be found 
in capitalistic companies whose structure is based on profit maximization. The 
union owned construction company Neue heimat made headlines in the seventies 
because the chairman of the board Albert vietor used his position for years for his 
own personal gain. vietor and five further managers were fired with immediate 
effect by the Supervisory Board of Neue heimat in 1982. False accounting, credit 
fraud and personal enrichment led to the insolvency of the Co op AG that was part 
of the German Trade Union Association (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 83 ff).
once one has been sentenced then the loss of reputation and the social de-
cline of the fraudulent manager is pre-programmed. Suitable employment cannot 
be found and the need to move the family can arise. The whole social environment 
of the family can break away, being socially ostracized can lead to a break-up of 
the family itself. The effects on the personal social arena can in its negative impact 
potentially be even graver than the judicial punishment.
Pursuant to § 332 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) independent au-
ditors and their aids can be sentenced to monetary punishment or imprisonment 
of up to three years for the false reporting of the auditing results of, for example, 
the annual financial statement, the management report, the consolidated financial 
statement, the consolidated management report of a corporation or of an interim 
financial statement as well as the concealment of relevant events in the final audit 
report or because of a falsely issued audit certificate. If the breach of reporting 
duty is done against payment or with the intent of enrichment, then the delin-
quent can be sentenced to a monetary punishment or imprisonment of up to five 
years. Apart from the direct financial loss for the independent auditor there can 
be further financial damage when they, for example, make “voluntary” payments 
66 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
to avoid negative publicity or a lawsuit that can go on for years. The case of the 
auditing firm kPMG is a good example to illustrate this point which, without rec-
ognition of a legal obligation in the case of Flowtex, paid out DM 100 million to 
aggrieved creditors (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 45 f). In the Comroad case the speaker of 
the management board, harald Wiedmann, tried to counter the loss of public im-
age of the corporation by announcing that the already attested financial statements 
from 2001 of all 45 kPMG mandates that were listed on the new market would be 
re-audited (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 113).
2.4.4 Implications for Society: State, Consumer, Economy
As already stated in the explanation of the shareholder value principle, the 
financial-political development led to the liberalization of certain industries and 
placed trust into the self-regulation of the markets. Safety precautions were suc-
cessively reduced and intervention rights of authorities limited. At the same time 
the incentive to portray oneself better than reality grew. The dependence on good 
ratings drives company policy and can tempt people into manipulating the ac-
counts. In cases of accounting embellishments, countries can suffer high losses if 
they embark on salvage operations by granting government guarantees or sub-
sidies. Should a company go insolvent after all, then the government money is 
irretrievably lost. A deliberate deceit in the form of worsened balance sheets and 
understated operating results leads to the country losing tax income. Worsened 
balance sheets are also used to attain government subsidies, leading to an increase 
in profit which the state pays for. Use of state assets for surreptitiously attained 
subsidies or for the salvage of irresponsibly and fraudulently led companies has 
indirect implications for society. Tax increases may become necessary. The society 
loses general trust in companies as well as in the capital markets, and in account-
ing and auditing practices (cf. henzler, 2006, p. 38 f).
This loss of trust has negative consequences for the overall economy of a 
country. It creates uncertainty and as such a reduction in people’s willingness to 
invest and engage. The overall existing capital is not invested as heavily, which 
also leads to a reduction in consumption. This can lead to problems in attaining 
capital and can impact interest rates, which in turn can lead to a company’s down-
fall. Ultimately the mistrust in the economic system grows (cf. henzler, 2006, p. 38 
f). Such developments will impact the prosperity of a country and its society.
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Now that the terminology of balance sheet manipulations has been reviewed, 
explanatory models for the act have been shown and the impact of accounting 
fraud on those affected understood, the attention will now turn to the legislative 
provisions for stopping balance sheet criminality from occurring.
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3 cAtAlogue of meAsures to strengthen compA-
nies’ integrity And to protect investors
In February 2003 the German Government issued the final version of 
the catalogue of measures to strengthen companies’ integrity and to pro-
tect investors (Maßnahmenkatalog der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung der 
Unternehmensintegrität und des Anlegerschutzes, 2003). This so-called 10-Point-
Program is orientated towards the proposals made in 2001 by the “Corporate 
Governance” commission, was discussed in detail from the legal policy point of 
view at the 63rd Association of German Jurists in 2002 and was subsequently once 
again revised (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 262 f; on page 263 hofmann wrongly calls it 
the 64th Association of German Jurists; this is however the 63rd Association of 
German Jurists). The catalogue of measures consists of non-committal proposals 
and thereby offers only directional guidance for legislative definitions. Through 
legislative implementation of these proposals, the framework for strengthening 
the self-regulation of the capital market should be improved and behavior damag-
ing the capital markets should be prevented. Since then different, separate legisla-
tive procedures are looking to legislatively codify selective measures.
The legislative implementation of the 10-Point-Program shall now be re-
viewed in detail. For this purpose, a short overview of the relevant codified meas-
ures will be provided beforehand.
Point 1: Personal liability of executive committee and supervisory board 
members towards the company: Improving the shareholders right 
of action 
Implementation: (01.11.2005) German Law on Corporate Integrity 
and Modernization of the Right of Avoidance (as well possible for 
“Right of Avoidance” is “Right of Rescession”) (BGBI issue 2005 
part I no. 60, page 2802 ff) 
Point 2: Introduction of personal liability of executive committee and 
supervisory board members towards investors in the case of 
deliberate and grossly negligent false information to the capital 
market; improvement of the collective enforcement of investors’ 
claims 
Implementation: (13.10.2004) Draft of the Capital Market 
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Information Liability Act; (01.11.2005) German Capital Markets 
Model Case Act (BGBI issue 2005 part I no. 50, page 2437 ff) 
changed on (01.11.2012) German Capital Markets Model Case Act 
(BGBI issue 2012 part I no. 50, page 2182 ff)
Point 3: Further developed German Corporate Governance Code, 
especially relating to the transparency of share-based or 
incentive-based compensation of board members 
Implementation: last issue of the German Corporate Governance 
Code dated 13.05.2013, (Governmental Commission of the German 
Corporate Governance Code, 2013)
Point 4: Improvement of accounting rules and adaption of international 
accounting principles 
Implementation: (10.12.2004) Accounting Law Reform Act (BGBl 
volume 2004 Part I No. 65, Page 3166 ff); (29.05.2009) Act to 
Modernize Accounting Law (BGBl volume 2009 Part I No. 27, Page 
1102 ff)
Point 5: Strengthen the role of the final auditor 
Implementation: (10.12.2004) Accounting Law Reform Act (BGBl 
volume 2004 Part 1 No. 65, Page 3166 ff); (01.01.2005) Final Auditor 
Supervision Act (BGBl volume 2004 Part I No. 76, Page 3846 ff); 
(06.09.2007) Professional Supervisions Reform Act (BGBl volume 
2007 Part I No. 45, Page 2178 ff); (29.05.2009) Act to Modernize 
Accounting Law (BGBl volume 2009 Part I No. 27, Page 1102 ff)
Point 6: Inspection of the legality of specific financial statements through 
an independent party (Enforcement) 
Implementation: (21.12.2004) Law on Financial Reporting 
Compliance (BGBl volume 2004 Part I No. 69, Page 3408 ff)
Point 7: Continue reforming the stock exchange and further development 
of regulatory law 
Implementation: (01.01.2007) The Electronic Commercial and Co-
operative Registers and Company Register Act (BGBl volume 2006 
Part I No. 52, Page 2553 ff)
Point 8: Improving investor protection including the area of the “grey” 
market  
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Implementation: (30.10.2004) Investor Protection Improvement Act 
(BGBl volume 2004 Part I No. 56, Page 2630 ff); (15.05.2009) second 
issuer guideline of the German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin) (German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority, 2009)
Point 9: Ensuring the reliability of company ratings made by finance 
analysts and rating agencies 
Implementation: There are currently no specific legislative 
initiatives 
Point 10: Tightening of penal provisions for offences within the capital 
market sector  
Implementation: There will likely be no separate legislative 
initiative
The listing of these laws shows impressive, promising names of acts. The de-
scription of the content of these acts should answer the question whether they are 
actually sufficient to put a stop to accounting fraud and insufficient capital market 
information provided by corporations.
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3.1 personAl liAbility of executive bodies 
The Board of Management, Supervisory Boards and Final Auditors must ad-
here to the faithful representation and accounting transparency requirements. The 
party who has to prepare the accounts must inform faithfully, by reporting all 
that can be said about the state of the company. They are not allowed to omit or 
conceal anything substantial. Assets, debts and risks are not allowed to be fabri-
cated or kept secret, so that the actual economic condition of the total company can 
be portrayed correctly. The Supervisory Board signature on the annual financial 
statement documents their personal liability towards the shareholders. The legal 
manifestation is made with the signature on the annual financial statement con-
firming that the legal requirements of accountability are fulfilled (cf. Luttermann, 
2010, p. 342 ff).
Luttermann refers to the endeavors of Executive Bodies to decouple the 
general standard of faithful representation from the commercial law principles of 
proper accounting. This decoupling would lead to a dominance of individual rules. 
This dominance would in turn allow creative and fraudulent Supervisory Boards 
to apply evaluation and accounting patterns that suit their current corporate situ-
ation best and thereby enabling the Annual Financial Accounts to be manipulated 
in either direction (cooking the books). however, general standards and individual 
rules systematically complement each other in Accounting Law, as in every other 
field of law. The general standards provide the common thread for the guideline 
to faithful representation and transparency, whereas the individual rules pro-
vide the concrete framework. Luttermann calls the attempt to separate the gen-
eral standards from the individual rules as “an inacceptable attitude of arbitrari-
ness14” (translated in context by the author) (Luttermann, 2010, p. 344). This attempt 
goes against the current legislation. Luttermann demands that one controls those 
in power, as the accounting law should stop Executive Boards and Supervisory 
Boards from using other people’s money to deceive and manipulate, to succumb 
to their personal weaknesses and amend results in the direction they require. The 
judicature is called on to review cases of accounting fraud and to increase the per-
petrators liability (cf. Luttermann, 2010, p. 341 ff).
In principle the personal liability of the Board Management and the 
14  „inakzeptable Geisteshaltung der Beliebigkeit“
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Supervisory Board Members can deter them from committing a fraudulent act. If 
caught breaching their duty, they must expect negative consequences. In particu-
lar, the fraudulent behavior of various managers within the former “new market” 
turned the liability of Board Management and Supervisory Board Members into an 
important issue at the Corporate Governance discussion. The Federal Government 
reacted to the situation by incorporating proposals into the “10-Point-Program” 
catalogue of measures to target a change to the legal prerequisites of executive 
body liability for giving out false capital market information. The proposed meas-
ures affect the area of the so-called executive body internal liability (this refers to 
the liability of the executive body towards the corporation) as well as the area of 
the executive body’s external liability towards third parties, in particular that to-
wards shareholders. The stricter laws in relation to the liability of executive boards 
affect primarily their board members but they also relate to the supervisory board 
members.15 Whether the intended goal of increasing the threshold to committing 
a fraudulent crime can be achieved through the specific changes made to the law 
will be scrutinized below.
Before the implementation of the “10-Point-Program“, the corporation as 
such was generally liable towards third party claims. Members of the board or of 
the supervisory board are only liable for shareholder damages in exceptional cir-
cumstances (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 264 f). 
3.1.1 Liability Towards the Corporation
According to §§ 93 and 116 of the German Stock Corporation Act board and 
supervisory board members that breach their duties are jointly and severally liable 
towards the corporation for the damage done. “The liability is unlimited from a 
monetary perspective and is also applicable for simple negligence. Provided the 
legal prerequisites apply then even a minority of shareholders can force such a 
regress according to §§ 147 f of the German Stock Corporation Act”16 (translated 
15  According to Seibert the act does not increase the liability of the supervisory 
board members. To the contrary the later explained “Business Judgement Rule“ 
restricts their liability (cf. Seibert, 2004, p. 2). 
16  „Die haftung ist betragsmäßig unbegrenzt und greift auch bei einfacher 
Fahrlässigkeit. Sofern die gesetzlichen voraussetzungen vorliegen, kann auch 
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in context by the author) (Duve/Basak, 2005, p. 2645 f). § 93 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act defines in more detail the liability of the board members. here 
it is stated that the “board members must apply the diligence of a reputable and 
conscientious managing director. A breach of duty does not occur when a member 
of the board makes a corporate decision where he/she could reasonably assume, 
based on sufficient information, to be acting in the best interest of the company. 
Regarding proprietary data and company secrets that became known to board 
members in line with their job as board members, they must maintain silence”17 
(translated in context by the author). A case for want of care can be, for example, 
when there is a violation of the statutorily regulated individual’s duty, for example 
in relation to the founding of a company, regarding mandatory reports in relation 
to the accounts or insolvency. In addition, there is a general obligation towards dili-
gence and loyalty whereby this is measured against the benchmark of a reputable 
and conscientious managing director. A lack of skill or knowledge does not allow 
board members to evade their responsibility. For example, a lack of accounting 
knowledge does not free the board member of their liability to ensure regular ac-
counting (cf. Dilger, 2004, p. 444). In the case of “ARAG/Garmenbeck” the Federal 
Court of Justice (German) had in 1997 already made the decision (21.04.1997, Az: II 
zR 175/95, www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/im/docs/CG/arag.pdf) that claims 
regarding recourse for corporations against their negligently acting board mem-
bers are enforceable. only in particularly well-reasoned exceptional cases, can a 
deviation from this rule be applied (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 265). According to the 
ruling of the Federal Court of Justice (German) in the case of “ARAG/Garmenbeck” 
board members are liable to pay damages if: “…the boundaries of a corporate trans-
action made in a responsible manner, in view of the company’s best interest based 
eine Minderheit von Aktionären einen solchen Regress nach §§ 147 f. Aktiengesetz 
erzwingen“
17  „die vorstandsmitglieder bei ihrer Geschäftsführung die Sorgfalt eines or-
dentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters anzuwenden haben. Eine 
Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor, wenn das vorstandsmitglied bei einer unterneh-
merischen Entscheidung vernünftigerweise annehmen durfte, auf der Grundlage 
angemessener Informationen zum Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handeln. Über ver-
trauliche Angaben und Geheimnisse der Gesellschaft, die den vorstandsmitgliedern 
durch ihre Tätigkeit im vorstand bekannt geworden sind, haben sie Stillschweigen 
zu bewahren.“
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on diligent investigation of decision making facts must be clearly overstepped, the 
willingness to undergo a business risk unacceptably extreme or the behavior of 
the board members must be for other reasons contrary to duty”18 (translated in 
context by the author) (21.04.1997, Az: II zR 175/95, www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/insti-
tute/im/docs/CG/arag.pdf). The “ARAG/Germenbeck” ruling, for example, forces 
the supervisory board to assert corporate claims against board members should, 
after proper consideration, a claim appear promising. A message (letter or email) 
of a shareholder to a supervisory board member is sufficient to ensure that he/she 
must trigger an investigation and if applicable assert the claims, if he/she does not 
want to expose himself/herself to the danger of becoming liable (cf. hauschka, 
2004b, p. 257).
The supervisory board members liability is generally covered in § 116 of the 
German Stock Corporation Act, which refers to the duty of diligence § 93 of the 
German Stock Corporation Act. Due to the hierarchical positioning of a supervi-
sory board member, the specific tasks they perform cannot be compared to those 
of board members. The supervisory board members duties are regulated in § 111 
of the German Stock Corporation Act whereby their top priority is overseeing the 
management body (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 265). Concerning this aspect, the German 
Corporate Governance Codex follows the same direction as the German Stock 
Corporation Act. It also requests internal liability of board members for culpable 
breaches of duty. In point 3.8, which defines the working rules of the board and 
supervisory board member’s as follows “board and supervisory board members 
heed to the rules of proper business management. Should they be found guilty of 
breaching the proper conduct of a reputable and conscientious board or supervi-
sory board members role, they are liable to pay compensation to the company”19 
18  „…die Grenzen, in denen sich ein von verantwortungsbewußtsein getragenes, 
ausschließlich am Unternehmenswohl orientiertes, auf sorgfältiger Ermittlung 
der Entscheidungsgrundlagen beruhendes unternehmerisches handeln bewegen 
muß, deutlich überschritten sind, die Bereitschaft, unternehmerische Risiken ein-
zugehen, in unverantwortlicher Weise überspannt worden ist oder das verhalten 
des vorstands aus anderen Gründen als pflichtwidrig gelten muß.“
19  “vorstand und Aufsichtsrat beachten die Regeln ordnungsgemäßer 
Unternehmensführung. verletzen sie die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewis-
senhaften Geschäftsleiters bzw. Aufsichtsratsmitglieds schuldhaft, so haften sie 
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(translated in context by the author) (DCGk, 2013). 
The Act for Corporate Integrity and Modernization of the Right of Avoidance 
(Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts 
- UMAG) that implements “Point 1” of the Federal Government’s catalogue of 
measures dated 25 February 2003 follows the same approach. To which extent this 
applies will become clear in the following references to the most important sec-
tions of the act. The changes to the act were based on the recommendations of the 
“Corporate Governance” government commission from July 2001 as well as on the 
decisions made at the 63rd German Legal Colloquium. 
The Act for Corporate Integrity and Modernization of the Right of Avoidance 
came into effect on 1 November 2005. It continues the reform process of the past 
few years of the German Stock Corporation Act. Specifically, the rights of share-
holders in relation to their options to control breaches of duty made by board mem-
bers and illegal decisions made at shareholders’ meetings are strengthened. The 
ability of a minority shareholder group to force liability claims against the board 
and supervisory board members is made easier (§ 148 German Stock Corporation 
Act) and the action of voidance against unlawful decisions or decisions violating 
the articles of associations within shareholders’ meetings is made harder (§ 243 
(4) German Stock Corporation Act). The legislature strengthens the control rights 
of shareholders by lowering the thresholds for special audits of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (§ 142 (2) German Stock Corporation Act). In addition, it strength-
ens the communication possibilities by introducing a shareholders’ forum (§ 127 a 
German Stock Corporation Act). At the same time though, it also strengthens the 
rights of the Corporation’s executive body by safeguarding the board members’ 
freedom to take entrepreneurial decisions by introducing the so-called “Business 
Judgment Rule” (§ 93 (1), sentence 2, German Stock Corporation Act) (cf. Fleischer, 
2005, p. 3525, 3527).
Shareholders’ lawsuit: The recently passed §§ 147-149 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act grants the ability to undergo a general shareholders’ lawsuit to 
make liability claims against founding and board members within the German 
judicial system. Above all, the legislature wants to strengthen the rights of ac-
tion for minority shareholder groups. It will in future be made easier to start a 
judicial process for liability claims, especially those against board members for 
der Gesellschaft gegenüber auf Schadensersatz.“
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gross negligence of their duties. A shareholder minority who, at the time of appli-
cation, together hold more than one percent of share capital or a partial sum (not 
stock exchange value)20 of 100,000 euros are entitled to claim liabilities against the 
corporation in their own name. This considerably reduced quota leads to a situa-
tion where nearly every institutional investor but also many larger private inves-
tors can start a liability claim process against board members (cf. kPMG, Audit 
Committee quarterly, I/2004, p. 15). In contrast to kPMG, the German Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) rates the new thresholds as positive. Through this standard-
ized approach, a differentiation should be made based on economic importance 
between shareholders with a corporate interest and shareholders with a primarily 
investment orientation. Based on the new threshold of nominal 100,000 euros, this 
typological approach can be seen as meaningful differentiation criteria (cf. BR-Dr. 
3/05, p. 42).
In order to avoid hopeless or improper cases, a legal approval procedure was 
introduced. The respective state court gives a ruling on the application for a case 
to be heard. If it makes a favorable decision then, once the ruling has obtained le-
gal force, the lawsuit must be raised within 3 months. The lawsuit must be raised 
against the responsible board members or company founder while making the cor-
poration liable (§ 148 (2) and (4) of the German Stock Corporation Act). After legal 
admission of the lawsuit, the application for admittance as well as the end of the 
20  The UMAG government draft included a stock value threshold of Euro 100,000. 
The Act though – based on the results of the deliberations of the Committee of 
Legal Affairs of the German Federal Government (BT-Dr 15/5693, p. 17) – changed 
this to a nominal value of Euro 100,000. This makes the calculation of the thresh-
old easier. For a well established company with a normal share price development 
this means though that the threshold reduction is not that significant compared 
to the original approach. The quota was in effect reduced by one-fifth compared 
to the previous legal binding. The decision was justified by the argumentation 
that companies who become victims of fraudulent acts must live with the result-
ing sharp falls in market prices. Especially some scandalous companies who were 
listed on the so-called new markets often developed into “Penny-Stocks”. For mi-
nority rights having the threshold linked to share price value would have achieved 
the opposite of what the initiators of the changes to the Act wanted to achieve (cf. 
Seibert, 2005, p. 1457).
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process has to be posted without delay by the corporation in their company news 
or at least in the electronic Federal Gazette. This publication must detail the type 
of legal settlement in detail, the complete wording of all the relating agreements 
as well as the names of all affected parties (§ 149 of the German Stock Corporation 
Act).
The conditions subject to which a claim will be heard are fulfilled if: 
•	 Pursuant to § 148 (1), no. 1, of the German Stock Corporation Act, shareholders 
must prove that their shares were bought before the time when they should 
have been aware of the alleged breach of duties or the alleged damage.
•	 Pursuant to § 148 (1), no. 2, of the German Stock Corporation Act, shareholders 
must substantiate that the Company failed to make a claim for damages within 
an appropriate deadline set by the shareholder. 
•	 Pursuant to § 148 (1), no. 3, of the German Stock Corporation Act, a claim will be 
heard if the court, based on the principle of plausibility, comes to the conclusion 
that facts have come to light justifying the suspicion that the Company has 
sustained a loss as a consequence of dishonestly or flagrant breach of the law 
or of the Articles of Association. 
•	 Pursuant to § 148 (1), no. 4 of the German Stock Corporation Act, a claim will be 
heard if there are no prevailing interests on the part of the company providing 
grounds to prevent enforcement of the claim. 
The motivation of the legislative power that is behind these conditions is, on 
the one hand, to exclude shareholders who bought shares knowing that a possible 
breach of duty exists and thereby possibly acquired the shares for improper use 
from raising claims. Proof can be in form of a deposit statement from the credit 
institution or by showing the actual certificates. The intention is to avoid lengthy 
evidence gathering when clarifying whether a case will formally be heard (cf. BR-
Dr 3/05, p. 43). on the other hand, the corporation is to be given the chance to raise 
their own lawsuit in order to avert the damage to the corporation (for example the 
company’s public reputation) that can be caused by being sued by shareholders. 
A deadline of two months is reasonably assumed as adequate. The deadline is not 
required if a corporation can credibly declare that they do not want to sue (cf. BR-
Dr 3/05, p. 43 f). By limiting the claim options to the loss sustained to the company 
by the breach of loyalty or through gross violations of law or of the articles, the 
legislator is, on the one hand limiting the costs of the lawsuits to be progressed. In 
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addition, it demonstrates that the court will only give a case permission to proceed 
if the lawsuit has sufficient chances of success (cf. BR-Dr. 3/05, p. 44). having no 
claim limitation could also lead to an overburdening of the courts. on the other 
hand, the limitation of the claims limits the negative press for companies through 
the media. Frequent negative press reports can damage the economic efficiency 
of a company which in turn can have a negative impact on society as a whole. 
There is also the provision that to enforce the claim no prevailing interests that 
would damage the company’s welfare are allowed, which implies a tendency to 
protect corporations. It is emphasized that multiple claims must be allowed only 
in exceptional cases in order to protect companies from the financial impact. This 
is justified by the fact that individual claims of shareholders cannot be pursued us-
ing legal means but, only through application of a special regulation for minority 
shareholders, is it possible to make claims against companies using legal force (cf. 
BR-Dr 3/05, p. 45).
kPMG referring to the fourth point pursuant to § 148 (1) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act in their publication titled “obligation of the Supervisory Board – 
duty standards and responsibility”21 (literal translation by the author) (see kPMG, 
Audit Committee quarterly, I/2004, p. 16) speaks of “common good” instead of 
“welfare of the company”. They stipulate that the wording of the law means “com-
mon good” when it states “welfare of the company”. §148 (6) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act makes it clear though that it must mean the welfare of the corpo-
ration. This becomes clear through the formulation “based on reasons affecting the 
welfare of the company, which the company could have communicated ahead of 
raising a claim “22 (translated in context by the author). A company can ultimately 
only provide reasons for their own welfare themselves. That the term “welfare of 
the company” cannot mean “common good” also becomes clear in all the other 
formulations within the § 148 German Stock Corporation Act where it is clear that 
the word society actually refers to corporations. 
With respect to the decision on costs, the following rules apply: If a claim is 
allowed to be heard at court then the final decree decides which party is to carry the 
burden of the costs. This applies to the application of a claim and to the principal 
21  „haftung des Aufsichtsrats – Pflichtenmaßstab und verantwortlichkeit“
22  „auf entgegenstehenden Gründen des Gesellschaftswohls, die die Gesellschaft 
vor Antragstellung hätte mitteilen können“
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court case. Pursuant to the principles of §§ 91 and 92 of the code of civil procedure 
all shareholder costs have to be carried by the board member sued in the case of a 
successful claim. If a claim is rejected or partially rejected, then the costs are borne 
by the corporation. The corporation should not just profit from successful lawsuits 
but they must shoulder the risk of losing lawsuits. Under certain circumstances the 
shareholders can claim reimbursement of the costs occurred through application 
of a claim against the company. This does not apply if the claim was allowed to 
progress based on false pleadings (cf. kPMG, Audit Committee quarterly, I/2004, 
p. 17; Fleischer, 2005, p. 3527).
Special audit: For special audits pursuant to the law, the barriers for spe-
cial audits for minority requests have also been lowered. In line with § 148 (1), 
sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act the § 142 (2), sentence 1 of the 
German Stock Corporation Act allows shareholders who alone or jointly hold one 
percent of the stock capital or shares of a nominal value of 100,000 euros to raise 
the respective application. The rule of a minimum three-month ownership still 
applies. A special audit may be required to uncover events that could lead to a 
future claim or to enforce a claim with appropriate evidence. To avoid improper 
applications, the UMAG applies a different rule of cost distribution. The applicant 
must bear the costs of the special audit himself/herself if it turns out that he/she 
knowingly or grossly negligently made a false pleading. There must also be facts 
available that support the suspicion that there is a case for improprieties or gross 
violations of the law or the articles having occurred. Similar to the approach for 
declaration of admissibility for legal action pursuant to § 148 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act, the extent of the breach of duty and the consequential damage 
must be compared to the costs and the negative consequences of a special audit 
(cf. keunecke, 2006, p. 111 f; Fleischer, 2005, p. 3525, 3527). It is astounding that a 
court can rule, based on an application by a Supervisory Board, that certain facts 
should not be included in the special audit report. This can occur if the prevailing 
needs of a company demand this and it is not necessary to prove that improprieties 
have occurred (cf. kPMG, Audit Committee quarterly, Iv/2004, p. 21). According 
to Duve and Basak, the lowered threshold to start a special audit allows contro-
versial investment funds and major investors to assert the necessary pressure to 
protect their interests even if they hold only small stakes. This can lead to an in-
creased control of corporations through capital market oriented investors. Forensic 
science has shown that already there are more disputes between big investors and 
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management which end in court hearings. To attain a balance of interests between 
shareholders and corporations, it is worth taking preventive measures such as cul-
tivating a direct contact as well as ensuring a high level of transparency. Regular, 
intensive communication between shareholders and board members can reduce 
the number of conflicts. If companies’ follow-up internally on suspected impropri-
eties or gross violations of the law or the articles and inform the shareholders of 
the results in a timely manner, then the number of special audits can be contained 
(cf. Duve/Basak, 2006, p. 1350).
Shareholders’ forum: In December 2005 the shareholders’ forum was estab-
lished pursuant to § 127 a (5) of the German Stock Corporation Act as part of the 
Federal Gazette so that shareholders can find the necessary shareholder majority 
for special audits (§ 142 (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act), to undergo a 
lawsuit led by the shareholders (§148 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act) or to 
call in a shareholders’ meeting (§ 122 of the German Stock Corporation Act) (cf. BR-
Dr 3/05, p. 28). The form of the meeting is defined in detail by the decree of share-
holders’ forums (BGBI issue 2005, part I, p. 3193 ff). here the form, content and 
structure of the shareholders’ forum is defined and it provides direction for the 
regulation of registration, shareholder or shareholder association incitements, sug-
gestions to the corporations, inspections and data security. The reasoning behind 
the new procedure is to offer an internet platform for shareholders and shareholder 
associations where shareholders can ask other shareholders if they want to jointly 
or in representation raise a claim or pursue a demand according to the German 
Stock Corporation Act or want to use their voting power at a General meeting in a 
certain way. These requests must obviously adhere to § 127a of the German Stock 
Corporation Act and it is not allowed to include information or opinions which go 
beyond the lawfully prescribed content. Improper use also occurs when it contains 
advertisements for products or services which are not related to the implementa-
tion of the proposal. In such cases of improper use, the requests have to be deleted 
without delay by the operator. In addition, it is then not allowed to publish further 
rationalizations of the requestor. An internet link to your own homepage is how-
ever allowed. Corporations are also allowed to publish their statement on their 
homepage after a request has been published in the shareholders’ forum (§ 127a (4) 
of the German Stock Corporation Act) (cf. BR-Dr 3/05, p. 28 f; keunecke, 2006, p. 112 
f; Fleischer, 2005, p. 3525, 3527). 
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Jahn stresses that the usage of modern communication (internet) for ex-
changing information and for enacting one’s voting power is very useful, espe-
cially when certain statutory thresholds must be met. he assumes that the legisla-
tor is hoping to overcome in part the shortcomings of fundamental corporate and 
governance deficits, namely that of insufficient control of ownership. But he also 
views this situation critically and asks the question if this is not creating another 
means by which to name and shame companies if or unless they are willing to 
pay protection money in advance. This fear is founded on the fact that the Federal 
Ministry of Justice does not want to take responsibility for the content of the inter-
net platform. on the other hand he is aware that, according to the law, only neutral 
requests are allowed to be published (cf. Jahn, 2005, p. 12).
Board members discretion: As shareholders rights have been strengthened 
through the shareholder claim, the special audit and the shareholders’ forum 
processes, the rights of companies’ risk-taking board members have also been 
strengthened in order to balance this through § 93 (1), sentence 2 of the German 
Stock Corporation Act. According to this “There is no case for a breach of duty if 
the board member had reasonably believed, based on an appropriate level of infor-
mation, they were making a decision in the best interest of the company (§ 93 (1), 
sentence 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act)”23 (translated in context by the 
author). Regarding the objective justification of this so-called “Business Judgment 
Rule”, Fleischer highlights several aspects: “on the one hand it ensures that board 
members do not become too averse to risk which in turn would not be in the share-
holders’ interest and would also have a negative impact on the economy. Secondly, 
it pays tribute to the intricacies of company decisions as decisions are mostly taken 
under uncertain conditions and under time pressure. And thirdly it reduces the 
risk that courts, knowing the effects of decisions made, place excessive demands 
on the board members’ duty of care. From a technical viewpoint in Germany, the 
legislator uses the not widely known metaphor of a “safe haven” pursuant to § 93 I 
2 AktG (Stock Corporation Act). In order to encourage clear and calculable behav-
ioral requirements, it clarifies from the beginning under what circumstances there 
is absolutely no case for a breach of duty. This clarification is binding and blocks 
23  „Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor, wenn das vorstandsmitglied bei einer 
unternehmerischen Entscheidung vernünftigerweise annehmen durfte, auf der 
Grundlage angemessener Information zum Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handeln.“
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the recourse to apply § 93 I 1 AktG (Companies Act), even if the person applying 
the law thinks that, according to general law, there is a case for a breach of duty. 
Conversely, one cannot generally assume that there is a breach of duty if the pre-
requisites of § 93 I 2 AktG (Stock Corporation Act) are not fulfilled”24 (Fleischer, 
2005, p. 3527 f) (translated in context by the author).
All five of the following pre-conditions have to be fulfilled to be entitled to 
the so-called “Safe haven” pursuant to § 93 (1), sentence 2 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act, whereby the pre-conditions are not weighted equally within the 
legislature:
1. Corporate decisions
2. Acting in good faith
3. Acting without special interests and third-party influence
4. Acting in the company ś best interest 
5. Acting based on an appropriate level of information
(cf. BR-Dr. 3/05, p. 19)
Corporate decisions: Due to their forward-looking nature corporate deci-
sions, according to UMAG, are characterized on prognosis and evaluations. This 
24  „zum einen wirkt sie einer übertriebenen Risikoscheu der organmitglieder 
entgegen, die den Interessen der Aktionäre zuwiderliefe und auch volk-
swirtschaftlich schädlich wäre. zum zweiten trägt sie den Besonderheiten un-
ternehmerischer Entscheidungen Rechnung, die nahezu immer Entscheidungen 
unter Unsicherheit sind und nicht selten unter großem zeitdruck gefällt werden. 
zum dritten mindert sie die Gefahr, dass die Gerichte in kenntnis der später 
eingetretenen Tatsachen überzogene Anforderungen an die organschaftliche 
Sorgfaltspflicht stellen. Regelungstechnisch bedient sich der Gesetzgeber in § 93 
I 2 AktG der hierzulande noch wenig verbreiteten Figur des ‚sicheren hafens‘. 
Um die klarheit und Berechenbarkeit der verhaltensanforderungen zu fördern, 
legt er im vorhinein fest, unter welchen voraussetzungen auf keinen Fall eine 
Pflichtverletzung vorliegt. Diese Festlegung ist verbindlich und sperrt den 
Rückgriff auf § 93 I 1 AktG selbst wenn der Rechtsanwender meint, es liege nach 
allgemeiner Gesetzesauslegung eine Sorgfaltspflichtverletzung vor. Umgekehrt 
kann daraus, dass die voraussetzungen des § 93 I 2 AktG nicht erfüllt sind, nicht 
ohne weiteres darauf geschlossen werden, dass ein Pflichtverletzung vorliegt.“
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differentiates them from clearly defined legal, statutory or contractual duties with-
out leeway of judgement. That is why the “Business Judgment Rule” does not apply 
to misfeasance or breaches of legal, statutory or contractual duties without latitude 
(cf. hauschka, 2004a, p.66). hauschka finds this definition in terms of its results 
as correct. he does, however, not think it is meaningful to tie this definition of a 
commercial decision to release board members from their liability. The following 
example will help clarify this: If a board member buys a new factory property or 
establishes a branch abroad or hires a new senior auditor then these are all corpo-
rate decisions. This is still the case even if, at a later point in time, it becomes clear 
that in the case of property or overseas business or for hiring above a certain salary 
level one should have included a second board member in the decision-making 
process. An incorrectly made corporate decision can therefore not be retroactively 
turned into a corporate non-decision (cf. hauschka, 2004a, p. 66).
For Fleischer a corporate decision is characterized by its prognostic nature. 
For him it remains unclear to which extent the organizational, planning and con-
trol tasks have a corporate slant under stock corporation law. Without doubt he 
agrees that the board of directors have the following duties: they are responsible 
for proper corporate organization, planning and control. But in terms of the way 
in which the board of directors fulfill their duties, one must give them entrepre-
neurial discretionary latitude (cf. Fleischer, 2005, p. 3528).
Acting in good faith: Along with the other facts of the case, there is no auton-
omous meaning to the term “in good faith”. hauschka assumes that it does not ap-
ply to the good faith in terms of the German Civil Code. he prefers the following 
definition of “good faith” in line with the “Business judgment Rule”: uninfluenced 
by any consideration other than what they (the directors) believe to be in the best 
interest of the corporation (cf. hauschka, 2004a, p. 66).
Acting without special interests and third-party influence: This fact indica-
tor should demonstrate that the acting person was not affected by conflicting in-
terests, third-party influences and was not acting in their own interests. In other 
words he/she should be impartial and independent. Special factors outside of the 
company’s best interest are not allowed to affect their decision, whereby such de-
cisions made in one’s own interest or in the interest of people close to the Board 
Members or Partners are viewed as self-evident. The way in which the German 
Corporate Governance Codex handles such conflicts of interest follows the same 
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guideline (cf. hauschka, 2004a, p. 66).
Acting in the company’s best interest: This prerequisite is fulfilled if the de-
cision was made to retain long-term profitability and competitiveness of the com-
pany and its products or services. The question remains unanswered whether the 
criteria “long-term” relates to the strategy applied to attain quarterly results in 
some multinational companies or whether this means simply a general trend of 
sustainability (cf. hauschka, 2004a, p. 67).
Acting based on an appropriate level of information: This prerequisite is not 
intended to legalize or make corporate decisions objective. It wants to demonstrate 
that corporate decisions are also made based on instinct, experience, imagination 
and intuition for future developments and a feeling for the markets. The act does 
not want to take away the courage to take an entrepreneurial risk but it also does 
not want to foster imprudence and carelessness at the cost of the shareholders and 
employees. Therefore one assumes that a Executive Board Member sensibly applies 
an appropriate level of information in making his/her entrepreneurial decisions. 
This provides Board Members a substantial margin to operate within his/her care 
of duties. how much effort must be put into attaining information in relation to the 
prerequisite of “suitable information” is left to the Board Members to decide based 
on advance warning time, the impact and the type of decision to be made and 
under consideration of widely accepted economic behavioral standards without 
gross negligence of duty. The Executive Board should act according to corporate 
necessities as well as their own company’s capabilities and not according to formal 
hedging strategies (cf. BR-Dr 3/05, p. 20 f).
Fleischer highlights that, in relation to the pre-conditions that need to be 
fulfilled, there is no general duty to attain every possible piece of information but 
there is a duty to carefully prepare a decision and to thoroughly assess the poten-
tial risks. The act does not call for formal hedging strategies such as regular attain-
ment of expert valuation reports, consultants’ opinions or external market analy-
sis. The company’s own capabilities or rather the economic necessity should be the 
deciding factors if and to what extent external assessments must be obtained. § 93 
(1), sentence 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act sets the adequacy requirement 
into the right context through its assessment from the perspective of the acting 
person. This interpretation of the law is explained by the fact that an unbiased as-
sessment of the quality of the decision-making process is not always possible if one 
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is aware of the outcome (cf. Fleischer, 2005, p. 3528). 
hauschka has a slightly different viewpoint. he thinks that the Board 
Members have been given too much leeway in the boundaries of their care of duty. 
he/she should be expected to assess the need for information and be able to draw 
his/her own conclusions. Then it is at the Executive Board Member’s discretion to 
decide which information he/she attains as long as they do not undergo a gross 
breach of their duty. According to hauschka, it is often the intuitive performance 
decisions that cause companies to go bankrupt and for employees to lose their jobs. 
There are Sales Executives who trust their own experience more than that of their 
engineers and who meddle with construction technology. or Finance Executives 
who listen to their intuition instead of listening to the experts from the controlling 
department although already several project calculations have turned out to be op-
timistically calculated and therefore have been wrong. or Engineering Executives 
who, based on their own instincts, have made deals with foreign customers with-
out consulting their lawyers. Furthermore, one can often find structural weakness-
es. For example, the holzmann Group had developed a structure which down-
right forced a culture of being uninformed. There were 457 participating interests 
inland and abroad. Because of this vast number of participating interests, it was 
not possible for the Executive Board to attain an appropriate basis of information. 
In addition, there were weak and insufficient internal systems in the Controllers’ 
office, the Business Management and Risk Management departments. As such a 
blatant mistake was preprogrammed (cf. hauschka, 2004a, p. 67).
hauschka demands that decisions, which often are around multi-billion 
amounts or which affect thousands of jobs, are taken by the legislator placing more 
trust in the information and risk assessments through experts and staff. When 
making judgment calls for stock corporations in the 21st century, it is pertinent 
that they prefer to base decisions in the interest of their investors and employees on 
an “Informed Judgment” basis rather than on their intuition. Large stock corpora-
tions have more than sufficient capital reserves to enable them to hold enough in-
formation, know-how and resources over which the Executive Board can and must 
dispose of. All sensibly available entrepreneurial information should be evaluated. 
only then is it acceptable for a Executive Board to go against the internal and ex-
ternal entrepreneurial advice (cf. hauschka, 2004a, p. 67).
Past experience has shown that a lot of leeway in decision making leads to 
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dangers which should not be underestimated. The only requirement that needs to 
be fulfilled is an almost uncontrollable quality of abiding to a care of duty. Personal 
interests of Executive Board Members are not uncommonly placed in an unreason-
able or even criminal way above the business interests of the company. The exam-
ples shown prove this. The wish to lead the company better than the predecessor 
leads to cost-intensive changes without a guaranteed chance of success. This type 
of behavior can cause a company to incur high costs which could have been spent 
more sensibly. If there is a short-term success, then the modus operandi is contin-
ued as this guarantees continued high Executive Board salaries. At the time when 
the short-term nature of the positive trend becomes clear the Executive is already 
looking around for a new company in which they can try to apply the same proce-
dures to maximize their personal gain. 
The outcome of UMAG: The former media entrepreneur kirch was the first to 
test the new UMAG procedure for pursuance of liability claims in his dispute with 
the former chairman of the supervisory board of the Deutsche Bank AG. After the 
Federal Supreme Court had only partially allowed the claim kirch against Breuer 
to progress in January 2006 (verdict dated 24.01.2006 – xI zR 384/03, Notification 
of the Federal Supreme Court Press office, No. 13/2006), the former Managing 
Director from kirch, Dieter hahn, tried the following: he placed large advertise-
ments with the goal of soliciting Deutsche Bank shareholders to jointly press for a 
proceeding pursuant to § 148 of the German Stock Corporation Act. This was done 
in order to get the Deutsche Bank AG to enforce a regress against their former 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board for the already accumulated costs as well as 
for the future costs of a court case. on the one hand, hahn was successful in so-
liciting a sufficient number of shareholders to achieve the 1% threshold pursuant 
to § 148 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act. on the other hand this case also 
uncovers the problematic side of the new regulations. The fight between kirch and 
Breuer was titled by the observing press as a “campaign” or a “vendetta”. This does 
not lead to the presumption that the initiators of the lawsuit were acting primarily 
in the best interest of the company which in turn is the requirement for the fiduci-
ary nature of a claim pursuant to § 148 of the German Stock Corporation Act (cf. 
Duve/Basak, 2006, p. 1350).
Duve and Basak assume that the lowered threshold to initiate special audits 
and proceedings to force criminal prosecution provides controversial funds and 
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major shareholders even with small shares with additional leverage to pursue their 
interests. Capital market orientated investors now have more ability to control cor-
porations. In cases of contentious arguments, the company’s council should make 
sure that the courts do not allow too broad a definition of the threshold of suspi-
cion of improprieties or also of gross infringement of the law and the Articles (cf. 
Duve/Basak, 2006, p. 1350).
Seen in totality, the UMAG has led to significant procedural changes in the 
law on stock companies. But outside of the scope of the law on stock companies the 
situation has also changed. In hard economic times, mistakes made by corporate 
management as well as employee representatives are pilloried likewise. Insolvency 
administrators and empty-handed creditors are trying to claim back their enti-
tled capital by pursuing board members. The actual process of pursuing claims is 
being made easier through constantly changing and new laws. other factors are 
also making it easier to pursue claims. These are the improved information pro-
curement through the internet, specialized law firms, lawyer-led class action law-
suits, legal insurances which participate in successful claims as well as increased 
Shareholder-value-Awareness by stockholders (cf. hauschka, 2004b, p. 258).
The liability of Board and Supervisory Board members remains a controver-
sial topic. In the past, attempts by shareholders to make the Board and Supervisory 
Board members also liable for undesirable developments or even insolvencies of-
ten failed due to the high procedural obstacles. This is supposed to change with 
the Act for Corporate Integrity and Modernization of the Law of Avoidance. The 
Federal Government wanted to make it easier for shareholders to get the corpora-
tion to make a liability claim against its Board Members. Board and Supervisory 
Board Members should be made liable for wrong decisions if they were not com-
pletely aware of their duties or did not fulfil them properly. This is at least UMAG’s 
aspiration. 
The extension of possibilities for shareholders to raise claims for the previ-
ously named goals is to be rated as a positive development. Liability claims as 
well as special audits or the application to have a special auditor exchanged is now 
easier for minority shareholders to enforce with the less stringent prerequisites. 
The possibility of a joint internet forum makes it easier for shareholders to com-
municate, which in turn supports their ability to undertake joint actions against 
Board members’ fraudulent behaviour.
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on a critical note though, one has to say that, although the UMAG can help 
uncover blatantly grave cases, it has little influence over wrongdoings that are less 
obvious. As such, the potential delegation of liability is tied to the definition of 
an entrepreneurial decision which is broadly defined and can be subjectively dis-
played. hauschka assumes that, for example, large stock corporations have enough 
capital, information, expertise and resources to allow Executive Board Members 
to analyse entrepreneurial information correctly. Should a Board Member after 
such analysis decide to go against the recommendations from internal and exter-
nal sources then this can be justified as an entrepreneurial decision. If Board and 
Supervisory Board Members do not utilize the above mentioned possibilities then 
their decision cannot be classed as entrepreneurial. here the UMAG gives Board 
and Supervisory Board Members too much leeway. A strong restriction in ena-
bling claims to be raised is made on minority shareholders through the admission 
process by the courts. on the one hand the restriction to allow claims only for 
breaches of duty which border on the criminal and for flagrant breaches of the 
law or of the Articles of Association which was introduced to avoid hopeless or 
improperly used lawsuits plays a role. Another point is the fact that shareholders 
are potentially liable to bear the costs of losing a petition to claim. This could deter 
shareholders willing to sue from submitting an application to raise a claim at the 
court responsible as a conviction of the accused would merely benefit the corpora-
tion and a dismissal of the claim provides the risk of shareholders having to bear 
the accrued costs. 
3.1.2 Liability Towards to Shareholders
In the past the liability situation was as follows: Usually only the corporation 
was liable for third party liability. Board Members were only liable towards their 
corporation. The external liability of a corporation – for example for false “ad-hoc 
reports” – often came to nothing. The corporations were often already in insolven-
cy proceedings at the time legal proceedings were started so that the shareholder 
demands could not or only partially be met. on the other hand, the former Board 
and Supervisory Board Members often still had high personal fortunes even after 
the insolvency proceedings were finished. In the case of misconduct by Board and 
Supervisory Board Members they damaged not just their own corporation but pro-
portionately also each shareholder. That is why shareholder associations requested 
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that sustainable improvements to protect investors were to be made by allowing 
wronged shareholders direct access to the liable party (Board Members). This is the 
so-called “direct management liability”25 (translated in context by the author) (cf. 
hofmann, 2008. p. 268).
3.1.2.1 Infomatec-Decisions
In July 2004, the Federal Supreme Court (BGh) rulings in the case Infomatec 
made it clear for the first time that a personal liability of Board Members towards 
their shareholders was principally allowed pursuant to § 826 of the German Civil 
Code (BGB).26 The company was a corporation listed on the new market against 
which an insolvency proceeding was instigated in 2001. Following the two Board 
Members’ instructions, the corporation had published some ad-hoc announce-
ments, two of which were grossly false. In one ad-hoc announcement dated 20 May 
1999 a new major contract worth 55 million Deutschmarks was published when in 
reality the contract was only worth 9.8 million Deutschmarks. After being ques-
tioned at the shareholders’ meeting on 24 June 1999, the Chairman and his deputy 
were compelled to correct the false information. Despite this, the false information 
was published again in an ad-hoc announcement on 30 August 1999. only on 22 
August 2000, a whole year later, was the correction made in another ad-hoc an-
nouncement (cf. Sester, 2006, p. 3).
After the false announcement, the share price correspondingly soared. The 
Chairman and his deputy had accrued double-digit millions of profit through skil-
ful sales during this time. other investors who did not see through this fraud 
made corresponding losses (cf. Sester, 2006, p. 3). 
The claim of a shareholder, who was not aware of the happenings at the 
shareholders’ meeting, was ruled positively by the BGh. on 28 July 199927 the 
25  „direkte Managerhaftung“
26  In total there were three rulings on Infomatec made by the Federal Supreme 
Court (Rulings dated 19 July 2004 – II zR 217/03, II zR 218/03, II zR 402/02, 
Announcement by the press office of the Federal Supreme Court No. 87/2004).
27  Sester states that the date the shares were bought was 28 July 2004 (cf. Sester, 
2006, p. 3). This must be a mistake as the BGh’s ruling justification states 28 July 
1999 as the date of purchase and the pronouncement was already made on 19 July 
2004 (cf. Ruling dated 19 July 2004 – II zR 402/02).
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shareholder had bought, using his current-account overdraft facility, 230 shares of 
Infomatec AG for 40 euros per piece. The total cost plus charges amounted to DM 
90,945.70. The BGB ruled that there was a case for a claim for damages against the 
Board Members of Infomatic AG pursuant to § 826 BGB. It established that there 
was a case for intent and for violation of moral principles as the board members 
not only knew about the false nature of the ad-hoc announcement but had even 
published it twice. They had gained personally as they had sold their own shares 
after they had undergone their criminal act. The BGB ruled that the accused board 
members had to pay back the original share prices plus interest against the transfer 
of the shares. The claimant’s entitlement was thereby not limited to the so-called 
differential damage but he was also able to achieve the annulment of the purchase 
made thus restoring the original state upon proof of a direct causality (“restitution 
in kind” as understood by § 249 (1), 1 BGB). The BGh found that the two board 
members’ behavior went against the minimum requirements of legal dealings on 
the stock market to such an extent that they were liable to compensate individual 
shareholders for the financial losses occured (cf. ruling dated 19 July 2004 – II zR 
402/02; Sester, 2006, p. 4).
Regarding the causality between the false ad-hoc announcement, dated 20 
May 1999, and the order to purchase dated 28 July 1999, the Federal Supreme Court 
ruled this as given (cf. ruling dated 19 July 2004 – II zR 402/02; Sester, 2006, p. 4). 
In two further Infomatec cases, the claims of two plaintiffs were dismissed by the 
Federal Supreme Court. They had given their orders to buy shares approximately 
nine months (8 February 2000) and approximately twelve months (17 May 2000) 
after the first false announcement. The Federal Supreme Court wanted to avoid the 
danger of disappointed but not causally deceived investors from correcting their 
independently made investment decisions by making damage claims towards 
Board and Supervisory Board Members. The timeframe in which there is a causal-
ity between ad-hoc announcements and the decision to invest is rather short (cf. 
ruling 19 July 2004 – II zR 217/03). Ad-hoc announcements convey different to, for 
example, stock exchange listings, information which is situation-dependent and 
specific. here one cannot assume that there will be a long-term sustainable im-
pact on the shareholders. The Federal Court in its ruling against Infomatec did not 
however set a time limit. It justified this by maintaining that with the danger of ar-
bitrariness as setting a specific timeframe would be arbitrary and would therefore 
inevitably lead to significant injustices (cf. ruling dated 19 July 2004 – II zR 217/03; 
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Sester, 2006, p. 5).
The precedent-setting judgments by the BGh in the case of Infomatec give 
shareholders who have become victims of deliberate deceit by managers new cour-
age. Since the Infomatec rulings there have been several similar cases where share-
holders were awarded compensation for the damage suffered. 
3.1.2.2 The Cases Comroad and EM.TV
The rulings dated 17 March 2005 (higher Regional Court Frankfurt am 
Main, 17.03.2005 - 1 U 149/04) and 20 April 2005 (higher Regional Court Munich, 
7 U 5303/04 or Betriebs-Berater, 2005, p. 1651) found that Comroad AG’s Chairman 
was guilty of unethical and deliberate behavior pursuant to § 31 BGB. At the same 
time, the shareholders were freed of any contributory negligence and the company 
convicted to pay back the share purchase price. In connection with the previously 
described Infomatec case, the unethical acts by the Board of Comroad were even 
graver. While in the Infomatec case the business numbers were merely declared by 
a multiple higher then their actual value, in the Comroad case nearly all company 
data was freely invented. The stock exchange prospectus showed a detailed and 
lucrative business relationship with an electronics group situated in hong kong 
called vT Electronics Ltd. A special audit conducted in February 2002 uncovered 
that nearly all dealings with this company were fictitious as it did not exist. At the 
end of the day, only 1.4 percent of the shown 2001 turnover of 93.6 million euros 
shown could be proven. of every 1,000 euros company turnover only 14 euros 
was real. Also here there was a clear case of personal gain on the part of the Board 
Members so that the courts had no difficulty in confirming the unethical dealings 
of the Board Members (cf. Möllers, 2005, p. 1637).
As the claimants were requesting the payback of the buying price, the courts 
had to position themselves regarding the question whether the false information 
was a deciding causal factor for the decision to invest. here the courts came to dif-
ferent conclusions. The district court Frankfurt (28.04.2003 – 3 – 7 o 47/02, NJW-RR 
2003, p. 1049) and the higher Regional Court Munich (20.04.2005 – 7 U 5303/04, 
Betriebs-Berater 2005, p. 1651) assumed a so-called “buying mood”. This was based 
on the grounds that the false announcements made in the time from 1999 to early 
2002 had led to a high over-estimation. After all these euphoric announcements, 
the share price was listed between 10 and 20 euros. But after the true company 
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situation was announced the share price plunged to a few cents (cf. Möllers, 2005, 
p. 1638).
The higher Regional Court Frankfurt am Main (17 March 2005, 1 U 149 /04, 
hessenrecht Landesrechtsprechungsdatenbank) came to a completely different 
conclusion. It denied the “investment mood“ as the false stock exchange prospec-
tus was published one and a half years before the relevant share purchases and 
could therefore not be used as a reason for the buying mood. The court did how-
ever rule a direct causality as the claimant was successful in producing full evi-
dence. In conclusion, one can say that the question of causality must be answered 
on a case by case basis. 
In the case of EM.Tv there were claims by initially 59 and later another 44 
damaged investors against the two haffa brothers, the former Board Members of 
EM.Tv and against the corporation. In several ad-hoc announcements, EM.Tv had 
placed the acquisition of other companies in a too optimistic light. This was the 
case for the acquisition of the Jim henson Company in the ad-hoc announcement 
dated 21 February 2000 as well as the takeover of the SLEC Formula one Group 
ad-hoc announced on 22 March 2000. Furthermore an ad-hoc announcement dated 
22 September 2000 published EM.Tv’s mid-year figures which in this form were 
not correct. on 9 october 2000 a corrective announcement was made which in 
turn led to a steep plunge in the share price. In contrast to the rulings in the case of 
Comroad the Federal Supreme Court did not rule all issues in the case EM.Tv but 
deferred it back to the higher Regional Court Munich for further resolution. only 
the case for unethical behaviour was confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court (cf. 
Möllers, 2005, p. 1637 f).
3.1.2.3 External Liability of the Board Pursuant to § 826 BGB
Pursuant to § 826 of the German Civil Code (BGB) there is an obligation to 
compensate for damages, “who deliberately damages another person in an im-
moral way” 28 (translated in context by the author). This principle is applied by the 
Federal Supreme Court to solve the problem of manager liability for deliberately 
spreading false information about their company. Duve and Basak established that 
to fulfill the prerequisites pursuant to § 826 BGB “there must be a deliberate and 
28  „wer in einer gegen die guten Sitten verstoßenden Weise einem anderen 
vorsätzlich Schaden zufügt“
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unethical deed (1), that leads to a damage (2), and there must be a causality be-
tween deed and damage (3)”29 (translated in context by the author). They point out 
that the draft of the Act Governing Liability for Capital Market Information wants 
to make gross negligence already constitute as a liability, but that the ruling prac-
tice of the courts shows that this extension of scope is not really required (cf. Duve/
Basak, 2005, p. 2646).
Müller-Michaels and Wecker conclude that a special statutory regulation is 
missing, based on the fact that the Federal Supreme Court applies the over hun-
dred-year old § 826 BGB to solve a modern problem such as the liability in cases of 
false capital market information. Despite the fact that the Red-Green government 
under the German Federal Chancellor Schröder tried, in their last term of office, 
to implement the Act Governing Liability for Capital Market Information, the Act 
in a draft stage had already been put ad acta. The reasons provided were on the 
one hand massive criticism from the economy and on the other hand the current 
EU level plans for new directive proposals. A further reason, according to Müller-
Michaels and Wecker, for the Federal Supreme Court using § 826 BGB is the differ-
ent ways of calculating damages that this regulation allows. otherwise, according 
to German law, the principle applies, that damages can only be claimed in cases 
of bodily harm, damage to property or other absolute rights. But § 826 BGB also 
allowed the compensation of pure financial losses. Normally false information 
alone would not lead to a damage of absolute rights, for example, property dam-
age. Applying § 826 BGB allows not only the justification of a personal liability of 
Board Members but also via § 31 BGB the liability of the corporation. Admittedly 
the corporation could also be made liable for false ad-hoc announcements pursu-
ant to §§ 37 b and 37 c of the Securities Trading Act. According to these guidelines 
though, an investor could only claim compensation for the damage created by the 
difference in share prices but could not claim for the rescission of the total trans-
action. In contrast, pursuant to § 826 BGB the possibility exists to sue both Board 
and the corporation in parallel for the total damage created (cf. Müller-Michaels/ 
Wecker, 2007, p. 208).
To better understand the content of the law text there seems to be a need to 
29  „das vorliegen einer vorsätzlichen und sittenwidrigen handlung (1), die zu 
einem Schaden führt (2), sowie die kausalität zwischen handlung und Schaden 
(3)“
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clarify the meaning of the terms violation of moral principles, malice and causality 
in relation to false capital market information. According to Müller-Michaels and 
Wecker these terms can be given more meaning as follows:
violation of moral principles: Behavior is classified as immoral if it violates 
“common decency of all fair and equitable thinking people”30 (translated in context 
by the author) (Supreme Court of the (German) Reich 11.04.1901; decisions made by 
the Supreme Court of the (German) Reich in civil matters 48, p. 114, 124). In rela-
tion to the question how this viewpoint can be implemented in the modern capital 
market theory, Müller-Michaels and Wecker refer to the Federal Supreme Court. 
The Federal Supreme Court applies a surprisingly simple definition. The Federal 
Supreme Court established that taking a direct deliberate improper influence on 
the secondary market community through a grossly false ad-hoc announcement 
induces a violation of moral principles. In addition, the sentenced Board Members 
of Infomatec AG as well as EM.Tv – as founding members with substantial share-
holdings – had also acted in an objectively unfair way for their own use. They had 
acted knowing that their false announcements would lead to a substantial increase 
in their investments (cf. Müller-Michaels/Wecker, 2007, p. 208).
Malice: Conditional malice is sufficient for a liability pursuant to § 826 BGB. 
This means that the perpetrator was well aware about the damage that would oc-
cur and had approved of the consequences. Müller-Michaels and Wecker empha-
size that pursuant to the ruling by the Federal Supreme Court dated 19.07.2004 (II 
zR 402/02) the perpetrator does not need to know in detail who and how many 
people they damaged through their behavior (cf. Müller-Michaels/Wecker, 2007, 
p. 208).
Causality: § 826 BGB makes the condition that there must be a causal con-
nection between the damaging behavior and the subsequent financial loss. This 
means in relation to the information tort liability that there is only a case for li-
ability if the false information led the investor to buy, sell or hold his / her shares. 
The circumstances showing and proving a causality are the responsibility of the 
claimant. he / she must prove that their acting was based on the event causing 
such liability. There is no special burden of proof legislation for false information 
provided on the secondary market (cf. Müller-Michaels/Wecker, 2007, p. 208).
Müller-Michaels and Wecker emphasize in relation to the (German) Reich 
30  „gegen das Anstandsgefühl aller billig und gerecht Denkenden“
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Legislation dated 11.10.1912 (II 106/12) that the possibility for causality is already 
given if the investment community goes into a buying mood generated by a pro-
spectus and the purchaser is then lured into making a purchase. It is hereby of no 
relevance whether the buyer has read the prospectus. In the case of the Infomatec 
ruling, the German Federal Supreme Court denied the general applicability of the 
so-called buying mood of investors for the tort liability pursuant to § 826 BGB. 
In their opinion the buying decision of the claimant was always their own voli-
tion and required individual case-by-case investigation (BGh 19.07.2004 – II zR 
217/03). Müller-Michaels and Wecker also highlighted the fact that positive signals 
within ad-hoc announcements could lead to a buying mood for shares by inves-
tors. This was clarified by the Court. The German Federal Supreme Court pointed 
out during the proceedings that this would be dependant on the momentousness 
of the information. With increasing time distance to the publication the momen-
tousness decreases. It ends in any case at the point in time in which the evaluation 
of the value of the share would be determined by new company data. Also the 
German Federal Supreme Court ruling in the case of EM.Tv dated 09.05.2005 (II 
zR 287/02) negated that there is a blanket approach to the numerous individually 
made volitions by the claimants and as such denied the consideration of the invest-
ment mood. Nevertheless, it was mentioned in this case that, based on the fact that 
wrong mid-year numbers were published, the assumption of a buying mood was 
entirely conceivable (cf. Müller-Michaels/Wecker, 2007, p. 208 f).
Müller-Michaels and Wecker point out that the Federal Supreme Court in the 
case of Comroad (ruling dated 04.06.2007 – II zR 147/05) again clarified that waiv-
ing the concrete causality of capital market information and the decision to invest 
is in principle not considered. Disappointed general investor trust in the integrity 
of the price information on the market is not sufficient as a proof of causality. The 
Federal Supreme Court, in their ruling, explicitly declared themselves against the 
applicability of the US-American Securities Law based “fraud on the market theo-
ry”. According to this theory, there is a case for causality if the investor trusted the 
integrity of the share-price reflected information. The claimant must only prove 
that at the time of purchasing shares, the capital market was graded as efficient. 
According to the Federal Supreme Court if one only looks into the general market 
situation, which is portrayed in a false light due to widespread false information, 
then one dispenses with the need for proving a causality between deception and 
the decision to invest. This leads to an endless extension of the already broadly 
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defined case for liability pursuant to § 826 BGB. That is why one must always prove 
the concrete causality (cf. Müller-Michaels/Wecker, 2007, p. 209).
Provided that there is a case of causality, the question should now be an-
swered how the damage caused should be portrayed and calculated. Duve and 
Basak point to the fact that a damage pursuant to § 826 BGB can be portrayed in 
different ways. The claimant could either request the complete reverse transaction 
of the investment taken based on deception. on the other hand, they can only 
request the balance between the share price actually paid and the price of the in-
vestment structure if the false information had not been published. In this case one 
speaks of the so-called differential damage (cf. Duve/Basak, 2005, p. 2647).
Already in its Infomatec decisions, the Federal Supreme Court established 
that within the framework of § 826 BGB the damaged investor could demand a 
reverse transaction in form of a restitution in kind. This means a reimbursement of 
the purchase price against transfer of the shares or the offset against a meanwhile 
made sale proceedings. The prerequisites for the application of § 826 BGB would 
be given if the investor could prove that given correct information they would 
not have bought or sold the securities in question. Duve and Basak correspond-
ingly state that, for example, damaged shareholders of EM.Tv could request the 
purchase price against transfer of the shares or the offset of the sale proceedings 
realized. This case law poses numerous objections as the share price is established 
based on numerous highly diverse factors and not only on individual misinfor-
mation. The investor would then, if this were approved, have the possibility of a 
no-risk investment if their investment expectations were not met, they could then 
reverse the transaction at the cost of the share company or its Board Members (cf. 
Duve/Basak, 2005, p. 2648).
For this reason, Duve and Basak think that, in relation to the securities law, 
a limitation of liability to differential damages is absolutely appropriate. The dif-
ferential damage is made up of the difference between the actual share price at 
the time of the transaction and the actual warranted price. The person damaged 
has to therefore portray and prove what the price would have been if the market 
information had been correct. Duve and Basak substantiate their argumentation 
by pointing out that the German Federal Supreme Court in their EM.Tv ruling ref-
erenced that, also within the framework of cases applying the law of tort, only the 
differential damage and not restitution in kind could be claimed. These statements 
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complement the previous law. The differential damage should be concretized with 
the help of external experts applying the methods of modern financial manage-
ment. The Federal Supreme Court wants to use an appropriate proxy for establish-
ing the hypothetical price by looking at the share price changes directly after the 
announcement of the true state of affairs and then apply the process of backward 
induction to approximately establish the true value of the investment on the day 
of the business deal. Applying this process of backward induction, for example, 
the investors of EM.Tv could only claim the part of the losses incurred which can 
be placed directly in relation to the false information. The part of the losses which 
was created by the New Market bubble bursting would have to be carried by the 
shareholders themselves (cf. Duve/Basak, 2005, p. 2648).
3.1.2.4 Board Members’ Internal Liability Pursuant to Further Claims Based on Tort 
According to § 400 (1), 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act those people 
will be punished who as a member of the Board or the Supervisory Board portray 
the circumstances of the company in a wrong or obscured way, be this in repre-
sentations or overviews. Müller/Michaels and Wecker point out that the protective 
character of this directive in relation to the corporation and its current and potential 
shareholders pursuant to § 823 (2) of the German Civil Code is well known. That 
is why the Federal Supreme Court does not generally negate the applicability of § 
400 of the German Stock Corporation Act for cases of false ad-hoc announcements. 
The deciding factor is whether the contents of the ad-hoc announcement provides 
a complete overview of the economic situation and thus creates the impression of 
completeness. This was not the case in the lawsuit against Infomatec as here it was 
merely a case of incorrect announcements regarding individual business deals. In 
contrast, in the case of EM.Tv complete mid-year financials were published. That 
is why the Court assumed here that the announcement included a representation 
of the company’s wealth (BGh dated 09.05.2005. II zR 287/02; cf. Müller/Michaels/
Wecker, 2007, p. 209 f).
Duve and Basak highlight that protection acts - such as §§ 264a Criminal 
Code, 331 Code of Commercial Law, 400 German Stock Corporation Act - similarly 
the § 826 of the German Civil Code postulate willful intent of those responsible. 
Furthermore, Duve and Basak point out that by applying § 830 of the German Civil 
Code, Board Members who were not directly responsible for the fraudulent act but 
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who knew of and accepted it without taking appropriate action can be made liable. 
In the case of EM.Tv these circumstances applied for other Board members who, 
knowing of the faultiness of the quarterly reports, had willingly accepted their 
publication and had thereby aided through refusing to act (cf. Duve/Basak, 2005, 
p. 2650).
3.1.2.5 A Bill: the Act Governing Liability for Capital Market Information 
In the summer of 2004, the former Federal Government under helmut 
Schröder planned to strengthen the rights of damaged investors with the Act of 
Governing Liability for Capital Market Information. This is because, if the cas-
es are not obvious cases of fraud like with Infomatec, EM.Tv or Comroad, then 
damaged investors normally have no chance of reimbursement of the damages 
incurred if they want to make the Board Members liable pursuant to civil law for 
untrue statements made. The goal was to provide a statutory basis for increased 
liability rules for Board and Supervisory Board Members who publish false capital 
market information. The draft law was designed to make Board Members person-
ally liable towards investors if they provided the capital market with deliberate or 
grossly false information, for example, at a shareholders’ meeting. The amount of 
liability which could be claimed was to be limited to up to four annual salaries (cf. 
Drost, 2004b, p. 29).
The planned regulation of the Act of Governing Liability for Capital Market 
Information applied to the external liability of Board and Supervisory Board 
Members was to apply also for cases of gross negligence. This would have resulted 
in a high increase in managements’ liability.
In terms of calculating the damage incurred, the draft of the Act of Governing 
Liability for Capital Market Information oriented itself towards the differential 
damage approach. But it also generalized it. The differential value between the 
actual price of the questionable transaction and the weighted average share price 
during the first thirty days after the announcement of the correct facts was what 
claimants could request. Both parties were allowed to present their own dam-
age calculation. An example of this would be: The suing EM.Tv shareholders 
could have used their acquisition price and compared this to the average share 
price of the EM.Tv shares in the thirty days after 9 october 2000 to calculate the 
amount of damages they could claim. This was because on 9 october 2000 the false 
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information regarding the half-year results was corrected (cf. Duve/Basak, 2005, p. 
2647 ff).
Regarding causality, the draft of the Act of Governing Liability for Capital 
Market Information applied a three-month time assumption for causality. The 
draft law refutably assumed that transactions within a time frame of three months 
would be affected by a false or, contrary to duty, omitted information to the capital 
market. In the case of EM.Tv this would have meant that: All shareholders who 
bought their shares within three months after the false announcement of the mid-
year financials or the false revenue and result prognosis were liable for compensa-
tion. other buyers of shares would have had to carry the full burden of proof. 
The opinions regarding this draft law were in part very opposing. Therefore 
Jürgen kutz from the German Society for the Protection of Securities holders hoped 
that the act would close the current large gap in shareholder protection. To date, 
he did not see a possibility for shareholders to make managers and Supervisory 
Boards directly responsible for intentional and grossly negligent false statements 
regarding the company’s situation. Fraudulent people normally got away with 
their wrongdoings. Jan Wulfetange had a completely different view on the planned 
law. he was the capital market expert for the Federal Association of the German 
Industry and predicted that this act would lead to an increasing legalization of 
entrepreneurial decision making (cf. Drost, 2004a, p. 27).
In November 2004 – meaning only one month after the second draft bill 
was published on the 7th of october – the German Federal Government withdrew 
the draft for an indefinite period of time due to the harsh criticism from corpora-
tions and the German Bankers’ Association. The official explanation issued by the 
German Federal Government was that they wanted to wait for the initiatives being 
developed by the European Union. In addition, the Federal Ministry of Finance 
wanted to work through the objections raised by the associations in order to pass 
the law at a later point in time. A detailed time plan was not provided (cf. Drost, 
2004b, p. 29).
The reaction to the withdrawal of the draft act was also varied. Jürgen kurz 
from the German Society for the Protection of Securities holders thought that the 
German Federal Government had obviously become scared of its own courage. he 
still held the hope though that the law would not be completely overturned (cf. 
Dorst, 2004b, p. 29). his hope however was not fulfilled as after the planned bill 
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was withdrawn, the law was completely forgotten during the election campaign 
of 2005. In contrast, klaus Bräuning, member of the executive board of the Federal 
Association of the German Industry, was pleased about this decision. he thought 
it was a good sign that the government was rethinking the draft bill. The govern-
ment had unnecessarily put themselves in a position where their hand had been 
forced. In principle, he did not see it as proven that tightening liability rules was 
really necessary (cf. Drost, 2004b, p. 29). There was a similar reaction from Thomas 
Weisgerber, member of the board of the German Bankers’ Association. he thought 
that it was not in the interest of the financial markets in Germany if the German 
Federal Government implemented its own ruling. For foreign corporations listed 
on the German Stock Exchange this would be deterring if false information were 
to be handled differently in Germany from in their home country. At this point, 
European-wide regulations were simply indispensible. 
In the literature on the draft of the Act of Governing Liability for Capital 
Market Information this act was controversially discussed. Duve and Basak are of 
the opinion that the jurisdiction in the cases of Infomatec, EM.Tv and Comroad 
made it clear that the general norm of the law of torts is sufficient. For this reason, 
they do not think a new legal regulation in the area of external board member 
liability is necessary (cf. Duve/Basak, 2005, p. 2650). In contrast, Gerke assesses 
the situation as such that the existing cause of action according to civil law has 
not proven itself as suitable for providing effective help in claiming liability for 
damaged investors (cf. Gerke, 2004, p. I). hofmann explicitly agrees with Gerke 
and points out that the cases Infomatec, EM.Tv and Comroad have shown that 
the existing options under civil rights are altogether insufficient for damaged in-
vestors. Managers cannot be made “directly” liable for compensation. hofmann 
emphasizes that the causal correlation between false information and damaged 
investors is rightly titled as “muddy waters” in discussions around the securities 
law. he assumes that also in future it will not be possible to prove deliberate and 
unethical behavior of Board Members and that the rulings around compensation 
claims made by the BGh in the three described cases will likely mainly remain 
isolated cases (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 273 f).
The federal election in 2005 was won by the CDU and CSU parties. This 
meant that the former German Federal Government (SPD/Grüne) was replaced. In 
its place, the large coalition consisting of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
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came to power. The topic of manager liability was not part of the agenda of the coa-
lition agreement. It was, in view of the financial problems of the German Federal 
Government, not viewed as a priority. While hopes were dashed that the “last big 
gap” in investor protection would be closed borne by the people protecting in-
vestors, such as the German Society for the Protection of Securities holders, the 
Federal Association of the German Industry was satisfied. They think the intro-
duction of manager liability is absolutely unnecessary as the German Law accord-
ing to their view holds enough possibilities to make Board Members personally 
liable (cf. Meister, 2005, p. 29).
To date, the Act of Governing Liability for Capital Market Information has not 
been brought before the German Federal Parliament as a legislative initiative. This 
means that the large gap in investor protection has not been closed. So there is still 
no possibility for shareholders to make managers and Supervisory Board Members 
directly liable in cases of deliberate and grossly negligent false information regard-
ing the state of the corporation. The Federal Government has missed its chance to 
protect investors against fraudulent activities by managers. They could have taken 
a pioneering role at European level. The objection of Thomas Weisgebers from the 
Managing Board of the Association of German Banks that it would not fare well 
for the financial markets in Germany if the Federal Government formed its own 
regulation was not accepted. his opinion that foreign companies that are listed on 
the German Stock Exchange would be deterred if false information was handled 
differently in Germany compared to their home country is a statement that goes 
in a completely wrong direction. It cannot be viewed as positive for a country’s 
economy if companies are situated in it whose information policy is founded on 
false information. That such companies would be deterred cannot be viewed as a 
disadvantage. To the contrary, the financial market Germany would profit from 
such a regulation. The indefinite postponement of the Act of Governing Liability 
for Capital Market Information has made it clear that with regard to this, the pro-
tests made by company and bank associations wield more power than from the 
government’s intended legal protection of investors from fraudulent managers. 
3.1.2.6 The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) 
Although the draft bill of the Act of Governing Liability for Capital Market 
Information was pulled back after only a few months (cf. Meister, 2005, p. 29), a 
103CATALoGUE oF MEASURES
further draft bill which was aimed at reducing the deficits of the German Civil 
Procedure Law did not share the same fate. on 1 November 2005, the German 
Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) came into force. With this law, the 
Federal Government reacted to an increasing number of deficits occurring in re-
cent years regarding the legal regulation of the capital market. Especially the pro-
ceedings against Deutsche Telekom AG made it more than apparent that there is a 
necessity for extending the legal requirements. Falsified annual statements, false 
descriptions provided in the brochure for the initial public offering as well as false 
or not issued ad-hoc announcements had misled an enormous number of inves-
tors. In the legal proceedings against Telekom, around 17,000 small investors sued 
for compensation due to the alleged excessive evaluation of the Telekom’s property 
assets. They received on average 3,500 euros compensation (cf. hofmann, 2008, 
p. 275 f). The claimants accused Telekom of damaging the initial public offering 
through false real estate evaluations. The proceedings were led as a master law-
suit by the higher Regional Court in Frankfurt. Thereby it also became the most 
spectacular test case for the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG). 
According to Jahn, the German Federal Parliament created the kapMuG especially 
for these kinds of mass proceedings so that the judiciary system would not end up 
collapsing under a mountain of files (cf. Jahn, 2012, p. 11).
The act stipulates that a single model case lawsuit should be carried out rep-
resenting all claims. The ruling is then binding for all claimants. The legislator 
thereby reduces the costs for the claimants as the pursuance of compensation for-
merly did not work well from an economic perspective in relation to the expendi-
ture. Costly hearing of evidence and expert opinions drive the procedural costs up 
and often deter investors from suing. In addition, the legislator sees the German 
Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) as a way to speed up the proceedings 
against Telekom (cf. hussla, 2005, p. 37).
The focus of the claims in the case of Deutsche Telekom was to answer the 
question whether Deutsche Telekom had over-rated their properties ahead of the 
planned change to become a public holding company and had thereby deceived 
the investors in the initial public offerings. The corporation, situated in Bonn, had 
written off 2.8 billion euros for their properties in 2000 after the third tranche of 
public offerings. The special process (cluster process) in which Telekom had rated 
their properties in groupings was, according to the claimants, not rightful. This 
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was also the view of the presiding judge at the Regional Court in Frankfurt in his 
first statement. Telekom however pointed out that the evaluation process was legit-
imate. Also the depreciation of the property assets had had no effect on Telekom’s 
share price (cf. hussla, 2005, p. 37). It took ten years until the higher Regional 
Court in Frankfurt gave a ruling in the model case proceeding in May 2012. It dis-
missed the plaintiffs (cf. Jahn, 2012, p. 11).
The reasons for this were clearly and concisely summarized by the editorial 
staff of the journal “Wirtschaftsrecht und Insolvenzpraxis (zIP)” (Editorial Staff of 
zIP, 2012, p. 1236):
“1. The kapMuG is also applicable for cases where a part of the initial pro-
ceedings was pending prior to the commencement of the act on 01.11.2005.
2. The planned purchase of a stake in a company – based on the prevailing 
valid law in the year 2000 – is only then an obligatory item of the prospectus pur-
suant to § 111 (4), 2 AktG if the Supervisory Board has taken a decision on it. It is 
not of significant relevance that the negotiations between the parties involved in 
the investment have commenced. 
3. A 12% overrated value of the property assets by the corporation is within 
the allowed tolerance band and does not mean that the brochure is inaccurate.
4. In the opening balance sheet dated 01.01.1995 the Telekom was allowed to 
deviate from the principle of individual evaluation and portray the evaluation in 
their developed evaluation units (so-called cluster process).”31 (translated in con-
31  „1. Das kapMuG ist auch dann anwendbar, wenn Teil der Ausgangsverfahren 
bereits vor dessen Inkrafttreten am 01.11.2005 anhängig gemacht worden ist.
2. Der geplante Erwerb einer Unternehmensbeteiligung stellt – auf Basis des im 
Jahr 2000 geltenden Rechts – erst dann eine prospektierungspflichtige Tatsache 
dar, wenn der Aufsichtsrat hierüber nach § 111 Abs. 4 Satz 2 AktG entschieden 
hat; auf die verhandlungen zwischen den Partnern der Investition kommt es nicht 
maßgeblich an.
3. Eine um 12% zu hoch angegebene Bewertung des Immobilienbestands des 
Unternehmens hält sich innerhalb der zulässigen Schwankungsbreite und führt 
nicht zur Fehlerhaftigkeit des Prospekts.
4. Die Telekom durfte in ihrer Eröffnungsbilanz zum 01.01.1995 von dem Grundsatz 
der Einzelbewertung ihrer Immobilien abweichen und eine Bewertung anhand 
der von ihr gebildeten Bewertungseinheiten (sog. Clusterverfahren) vornehmen.“
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text by the author).
A second large court case in which a model case ruling was already made, 
is the proceeding against the MLP AG32 and its former chief executive officer. The 
model case ruling was made by the higher Regional Court in karlsruhe. MLP 
AG shareholders claimed damages against the company and partly against the 
former chief executive officer in 32 parallel court cases at the Regional Court in 
heidelberg. The charge was: The two defendants were guilty of deliberate immoral 
damage towards their shareholders based on the publication of false capital mar-
ket information in the years 1998 to 2002. The false capital market information was 
released in the form of ad-hoc announcements, company reports, press releases 
and interviews. The damages claimed amounted to altogether over 30 million eu-
ros. The plaintiffs raised model case applications according to the German Capital 
Markets Model Case Act. Based on this, the Regional Court in heidelberg raised 
an order for reference on 30.12.2008 and submitted to the higher Regional Court 
in karlsruhe several finding requests so that a uniform clarification of the condi-
tions of entitlement could be made. The higher Regional Court then nominated 
one plaintiff as the model case plaintiff (cf. higher Regional Court karlsruhe, 2012, 
p. 1).
The 17th Civil Chamber of the higher Regional Court in karlsruhe, respon-
sible for the proceedings pursuant to the kapMuG, obtained encompassing expert 
opinions to help clarify the circumstances (cf. higher Regional Court karlsruhe, 
2012, p. 2). on 16.11.2012 the court then determined mistakes made by two subsidi-
aries in the accounting of factoring and reinsurance business. The Civil Chamber, 
however, rejected the motion for a declaratory judgment that the former chief ex-
ecutive officer had condoned the publication of false capital market information 
relating to the company’s results and turnover. The Senate also rejected the motion 
for a declaratory judgment in relation to the former chief executive officer having 
acted in a deliberately damaging way and that the publication of false financial in-
dicators was unethical. The Senate based their decision on the fact that the extent of 
mistakes made and the fact that it was very hard to recognize the mistakes found 
in the annual financial statement spoke against a case of deliberate publication of 
32  The MLP AG is the management holding of the MLP Group which consists 
of several companies. The company is listed on the SDAx and provides financial 
services including bank and insurance services.
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manipulated indicators. only people who had to have substantial knowledge of 
financial accounting, as well as additional considerable actuarial knowledge, could 
have found the mistake after in-depth investigation. In addition, the effect on the 
financial results had been negligible (cf. higher Regional Court karlsruhe, ruling 
dated 16.11.2012 – 17 kap 1/09).
The following outline of the content of the German Capital Markets Model 
Case Act (kapMuG) dated 01.11.2005 is based on zypries’ description and positive 
assessment. This will be followed by the critical assessment of this act by hess. 
And finally the draft bill which was presented after the five-year development 
phase in the summer of 2011 will be compared to the currently applicable German 
Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) dated 01.11.2012.
The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) is aimed at improv-
ing the individual’s legal rights by introducing the collective form of legal protec-
tion. The Code of Civil Procedure viewed from a historic context is a proceeding 
based on individual rights and tailored to the enforcement of individual claims. 
In the arena of capital markets law, it often occurs, however, that the individual’s 
loss is fairly low but that the total damage could well be in the range of multi-digit 
millions. Compensation claims of these mass damages are often not financially li-
able for the individual small investor. The majority of the legal proceedings require 
extensive evidentiary hearings with expensive subject-matter experts in order to 
debate the complex problems related to the securities law. The individual investor 
is confronted with having to carry the high proceeding costs and risk. That is why 
the individual investor often loses interest in suing for compensation through the 
courts. As a result the liability provisions of the capital market legislation cannot 
fulfil their basic regulatory function (cf. zypries, 2004, p. 1).
Traditional ways of combining proceedings such as the joinder of parties, 
consolidation of proceedings or the stay of proceedings can only insufficiently 
manage mass claims. here the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) 
is trying to break the mold with the following goals: It attempts to group if possible 
all compensation claims relating to published false or misleading capital market 
information at the local and legally responsible District Court where the company 
is based. In addition, the disputed and similarly-based sample questions derived 
from individual claims are to be decided upon in a joint model case proceeding. 
The model case questions would include, for example, the correctness of an ad-hoc 
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announcement, a stock exchange prospectus or of an annual financial statement. 
The ruling made in the model case proceeding then forms the basis for the indi-
vidual lawsuits (cf. zypries, 2004, p. 1). 
The model case proceeding is based on the initiating lawsuit but is uncou-
pled from it and should be viewed as an independent hearing. Every damaged in-
vestor can apply for a model case proceeding to be initiated. The basis is merely the 
judicial enforcement of a compensation claim based on false or misleading public 
capital market information. By logging the application, the aim is to have a model 
question which was raised in various lawsuits uniformly answered. The trial court 
publishes the investor’s application in the specially developed Litigation Register 
within the electronic Federal Gazette. Should it then happen that more than ten 
such applications from different litigations ask for the same model question to be 
answered then the responsible trial court will request a model ruling with the 
higher Regional Court, i.e. the next higher authority. During the time it takes for 
the model case proceeding to progress, the individual litigations of the affected 
investors are suspended (cf. zypries, 2004, p. 1).
The higher Regional Court will appoint a plaintiff as a model plaintiff in 
order to complete a model case proceeding. The higher Regional Court assigns the 
model plaintiff at its own discretion. This should avert the danger of a so-called 
“run to the courtroom” as often occurs in class action lawsuits according to US 
law. In the USA, the group member who was first to request “class action” repre-
sents the whole group when applying for commencement of action. According to 
German jurisdiction it is not the first applicant who becomes the model plaintiff 
but the person who is claiming the highest damages and who can be expected to 
have an appropriate representation of interests for the proceedings. of course, the 
remaining plaintiffs are invited to the model case proceedings as intervening par-
ties. They play the role of intervener and can also actively take part in the model 
case proceedings’ hearing. In contrast to the US-American procedure of “class ac-
tion”, the model case proceedings’ hearing process allows all plaintiffs (through 
being invited as intervening parties) to have a right to be heard by the court (cf. 
zypries, 2004, p. 1).
The claimants are not in danger of having to pay additional court or legal 
costs. The costs created in the model case proceedings – often the costs for relevant 
expert opinions play a crucial role – are later apportioned to the individual court 
108 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
cases according to the value of the claims asserted. This immensely reduces the 
risk of bearing all the litigation costs for the individual plaintiff (cf. zypries, 2004, 
p. 1).
hess notes, however, that the German Capital Markets Model Case Act 
(kapMuG) does not solve the guiding principle issue of the discrepancy between 
the two-party process and the actual collectivization but merely excludes it. In 
practical terms, this deficit has the effect that the people participating in the model 
case proceeding do not take an active role but simply await the ruling. The inten-
tion of the legislator to allow joint plaintiffs to participate in the model case pro-
ceedings has not been accepted in judicial practice. A further note for concern ac-
cording to hess is that the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) has 
moved a long way away from the legal guiding principles. While in a general Civil 
Rights process the parties can jointly agree the start, content and the end of a hear-
ing, the procedural rights in a model case proceeding are literally suspended. The 
higher Regional Courts decide at their dutiful own discretion who should become 
model plaintiff. The desired outcome of the model case proceeding is established 
by the Regional Court responsible. The empowerment of the model plaintiff to end 
the proceedings through a settlement or acknowledgement is not permitted pursu-
ant to § 14 (2) kapMuG (cf. hess, 2011, p. 69).
The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) was initially sup-
posed to be restricted to a time period of five years. In this timeframe the leg-
islator wanted to test through practical experience if collective legal protection 
has its rightful place in the German civil rights and securities law. The validity of 
the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) was then extended to 31 
october 2012. An evaluation study requested by the Federal Ministry of Justice de-
termined that the German Capital Markets Model Case Act had in principle proven 
itself worthy. The only amendments that were required were changes to the detail. 
This could partly be achieved though through the appropriate juricature. In prac-
tical terms though this act is not viewed so positively. Judges, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
as well as investor representatives are of the opinion that the introduction of the 
German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) has not had the desired effect. 
During the model case proceedings, the proceedings turned into a “monstrosity”. 
one should let the act expire and allow the fact finding process to occur at the 
lower level courts in its established form. They view the German Capital Markets 
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Model Case Act (kapMuG) as unsuitable (cf. Schneider/heppner, 2011, p. 2947).
Since the introduction of the German Capital Markets Model Case Act 
(kapMuG) in 2005, there was really not even one legally binding ruling in a model 
case proceeding up until the end of 2011. Even the number of model case proceed-
ings which were registered in the specially created lawsuit register was very low33. 
Because of this, Schneider and heppner assume that the German Capital Markets 
Model Case Act (kapMuG) provided the solution only to an exceptional situation. 
The initial listing of Deutsche Telekom and the prevailing shareholder euphoria 
at that time created by the so-called new market and its miserable end which re-
sulted in thousands of investor claims will not find a fast repeat. Also in the sector 
of closed investments, it appears that model case proceedings are out of fashion 
which is probably, among other things, due to the developments of legislation re-
lated to liability for non public distribution fees and the lack of ability to apply the 
model case proceedings process to such type of claims (cf. Schneider/heppner, 
2011, p. 2947). The EU-Commission is also looking into the topic of collective legal 
protection and is observing the developments in Germany. 
In the summer of 2011, the German Federal Ministry of Justice published a 
draft bill for the reform of the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) 
but whilst it refrained from looking into a conceptually completely new approach, 
it did however draw on various results of the completed evaluation study. Changes 
to the enhancement were planned to extend the factual application section to in-
clude cases of broker and consultant liability within the securities law, and chang-
es to the prerequisites for starting and expanding the model case proceedings as 
well as to the individual cost regulations. In addition, it should be made easier to 
achieve a settlement in the model case proceedings. The legislator had planned 
to redesign the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) through a 
reworked principle regulation. Another proposal that planned to integrate the 
German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) into the code of civil proce-
dure was discarded at the draft stage of development. This led to the situation that 
the existing rules were modified in their detail without however changing the base 
structure of the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG). The new act 
was to come into effect without a new time limitation by latest 1 November 2012 (cf. 
Schneider/heppner, 2011, p. 2947 f; Shearman/Sterling, 2011, p. 1).
33  Up to 28.11.2011 (cf. Schneider/heppner, 2012, p. 2947).
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A following short overview will show, on the one hand, the draft bill of the 
most importantly potential changes to the German Capital Markets Model Case 
Act (kapMuG) and on the other hand show the actually implemented legal chang-
es to the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG): 
According to Shearman and Sterling, the applications covered by the 
German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) were to be extended. The 
German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) was in future to include all 
proceedings in which false, misleading or omitted public capital market informa-
tion played a decisive role. The act was therefore in future to be applicable for cases 
of investment consultant agreements as well as investment mediation contracts so 
that cases of so-called improper prospectus liability were taken into account in 
which the liability arising from the use of a faulty prospectus as part of a consulta-
tion or mediation can be legally pursued. The extension of the applicability could 
lead to claims against share issuers as well as investment consultants and invest-
ment brokers based on a faulty prospectus, being jointly heard in a model case 
proceeding (cf. Shearman/Sterling, 2011, p. 2). These changes were pursuant to § 1 
(1), 2 kapMuG legally implement on 01.11.2012. Bernuth and kremer however do 
not view this extension of applicability of the kapMuG as sensible. So the Federal 
Supreme Court ruled according to prevailing law that the faulty capital market in-
formation of a share issuer not necessarily implied the liability of a third party (in-
vestment consultant, investment broker) for a breach of their obligation to provide 
information and vice versa faulty capital market information does not necessarily 
exclude a case for liability to apply (BGh, NzG 2011, 151, speaker no. 16). Bernuth 
and kremer see in this new regulation the danger of plaintiffs being pulled into 
lengthy and cost intensive model case proceedings whose result do not influence 
their chance of winning their case (cf. Bernuth/kremer, 2012, p. 892).
According to Shearman and Sterling, a further goal of the reform should be 
to expedite the model case proceedings. This should be made possible, for exam-
ple, through a faster decision-making process for approving a request for a model 
case proceeding. The completed evaluation shows that in the past it mostly took a 
long time from the point of application to the ruling of the validity of a model case 
proceeding as well as the subsequent publication. These vast time-spans were sup-
posed to be shortened with the new regulation. The trial court should rule with-
in three months from the time of application, whether a model case proceeding 
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should take place or not (cf. Shearman/Sterling, 2011, p. 2). To speed up the model 
case proceeding, there were also changes made to the course of procedures within 
the law. Pursuant to § 3 (3) kapMuG, a required time-limit of six months34 is in-
troduced at the beginning of the proceeding for the publication of the model case 
proceeding application. Pursuant to § 15 kapMuG the responsibility for the exten-
sion of the content of the charges has been extended to include the higher Regional 
Court. Legal means are partially limited, so that, for example, pursuant to § 3 (1) 
kapMuG the ruling of the inadmissibility of an application for a model case hear-
ing is incontestable. 
Bernuth and kremer as well as Schneider and heppner have issues with 
the introduction of the six-month deadline for the announcement of the model 
case proceeding application. The deadline is regularly viewed as too tight as the 
trial courts do not have the required time to process the applications (cf. Bernuth/
kremer, 2012, p. 894; Schneider/heppner, 2011, p. 2947, 2948). In a statement made 
by the German Federal Council (Bundesrat) of Germany regarding the draft bill, it 
also pleaded for this requirement to be withdrawn (whilst the envisaged deadline 
in the draft bill was still three months) (RegE, BT-Dr 17/8799, p. 32 f).
one of the most important changes to the planned reform (draft bill) includ-
ed the possibility to end the model case proceeding and the main proceedings by 
reaching a settlement. The reaching of a settlement was up to that point in time 
based on the prevailing legal framework. This was a seemingly impossible task as 
the corresponding end to proceedings had to be agreed by the model case plaintiff, 
the model case defendant and all attending intervening parties. Now a judicially 
accepted settlement should be made possible between only two parties, namely 
the model case plaintiff and the model case defendant. A settlement reached in 
the model case proceedings should also reach an agreement over the claims raised 
in the main proceedings. The process of reaching a settlement should be made as 
follows: model case plaintiff and model case defendant can jointly agree the desire 
to reach a settlement to end the model case and the main proceeding and accord-
ingly inform the higher Regional Court in written form. A second possibility was 
also conceded, whereby the higher Regional Court can make a proposal for a set-
tlement to the model case plaintiff and the model case defendant (cf. Shearman/
Sterling, 2011, p. 4).
34  The government draft bill still assumed a time-limit of three months
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The settlement proposal should at least clarify the following aspects: It 
should include a coherent, understandable concept for distributing the promised 
payments to the wronged parties. The proposal for a settlement should, for exam-
ple, make a clear statement about how the exact distribution of the damages to 
each individual wronged party should occur. It should include agreements that 
can be implemented in the main proceedings without the need for new judicial 
clarification. In addition, the settlement proposal should clarify how the plaintiff 
has to verify the justification for receiving the agreed settlement payment and its 
exact amount towards the model case defendant. Also here the proof of entitlement 
should be organized in such a way that it does not require further judicial support. 
Furthermore, the regulation of how the costs of the model case proceeding are to 
be borne should be conclusively agreed upon. otherwise the legislature does not 
request any other content requirements to be agreed upon for a settlement pursu-
ant to statutory requirements (cf. Shearman/Sterling, 2011, p. 4 f).
The intervening parties should have the possibility as a last point to make a 
statement regarding the proposed settlement. The Court would then have to check 
whether the proposed settlement is appropriate and whether the interests of all 
parties are appropriately covered. If the Court found that the settlement can be 
seen as including an appropriate amicable agreement in relation to the suspended 
lawsuits then the settlement is approved as a final decree and legal certainty comes 
into effect (cf. Shearman/Sterling, 2011, p. 5).
The approved settlement is then to be served to all intervening parties. They 
should have the possibility within one month after receipt to proclaim in written 
form their wish not to be part of the settlement. The intervening parties who do not 
wish to take the settlement should have the possibility to continue their lawsuit 
following the ruling of the settlement. The lawsuit would then begin anew at the 
phase it was in before it was suspended. In order to keep as few intervening parties 
from exempting themselves from the settlement, it was viewed as sensible that a 
certain predetermined number of quorums as effectiveness requirement could be 
individually negotiated. otherwise many proceedings – like after a legally bind-
ing decision in a model proceeding – could be continued in individual lawsuits 
at the Civil Courts (District Courts). This could turn out to be very time and cost 
intensive for both parties (cf. Shearman/Sterling, 2011, p. 5).
The judicially approved settlement should lead to the end of the model case 
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hearing and be applicable to all involved after the period for not accepting the set-
tlement has expired (cf. Shearman/Sterling, 2011, p. 5).
Finally, the topic of ending a model case proceeding through agreeing a set-
tlement was regulated by the legislator in the following way: Pursuant to §§ 17-19 
and 23 kapMuG model case plaintiffs and model case defendants can agree upon a 
settlement that, to take effect, must be approved by the higher Regional Court. The 
Court will grant approval if it views the overall settlement proposal as appropri-
ate. In reaching this ruling pursuant to § 18 kapMuG, all affected parties must be 
heard. The approved settlement is binding for all parties affected. But pursuant to 
§ 19 (1) kapMuG the approved settlement is to be made available to all intervening 
parties. They in turn have the option within one month after receipt of the ruling 
to declare their wish not to participate in the settlement (§ 19 kapMuG). Should 
an intervening party not participate in the settlement, then the respective indi-
vidual hearing must continue. During the legislative process, the German Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) had suggested that should thirty percent or more of the inter-
vening parties not agree to the settlement then the settlement should not become 
legally binding (Statement by the German Federal Council (Bundesrat) in respect 
to RegE, BT-Dr 17/8799, p. 34). This thirty percent quorum was subsequently added 
to § 17 (1), 3 kapMuG.
Bernuth and kremer raise the objection that a settlement is only sensible 
for the defendant if the proceedings can finally be brought to closure through the 
settlement. however, this goal is endangered through the withdrawal option. In 
the worst case, a model case defendant would have to pursue a further model case 
proceeding with the same content with the remaining claimants. As such lawyers 
can only give their recommendation to their clients on the side of the defendants 
to take the settlement if there is a very high quorum – way higher than the legally 
required thirty percent – of claimants willing to agree to the settlement. Then there 
is the possibility to subsequently find separate compensation agreements for the 
remaining claimants (cf. Bernuth/kremer, 2012, p. 893).
A second important change that was introduced with the new German 
Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) from 01.11.2012 was to suspend the 
statutory limitation period through a simple claim registration process. Following 
background to this point: During the legislative process, especially through the 
statements made by the German Federal Council (Bundesrat) in respect to (RegE, 
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BT-Dr. 17/8799, p. 31), there were multiple attempts to discontinue the factual neces-
sity for raising a claim. According to halfmeier, this necessity for raising a claim 
leads to a certain awkwardness of the German Capital Markets Model Case Act 
(kapMuG). In addition halmeier states that because each model case hearing only 
applies to previously raised claims, each individual claimant who wants to firstly 
avoid the limitation of the claim and secondly wants to be included in the outcome 
of the model case proceedings must raise a conventional claim. This will more 
likely lead to an overloading of the Courts rather than an easing of the Courts. 
Also the claimant must ask himself whether the pursuance of the compensation 
claim due to the cost involved is economically feasible. Due to the current gen-
eral set-up, taking legal action does not make sense unless you are claiming much 
more than 5,000 euros as otherwise the cost risk is too high. But if raising a claim 
does not make sense for small investors due to the high cost risk and they sub-
sequently do not take legal action, then one can assume that the German Capital 
Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) will not help to achieve improved law enforce-
ment (cf. halfmeier, 2012, p. 2146). The Legal Committee of the German Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) based on the above-mentioned concerns but also other objec-
tions, subsequently introduced the option of the “Application for demands from 
a model case proceeding”35 (translated in context by the author) pursuant to § 10 
(2-4) kapMuG. According to § 10 (2) kapMuG, claimants who have not yet raised 
a claim can file a suit before the higher Regional Court. This must be in written 
form and entered into the lawsuit register within six months after the model case 
plaintiff is announced. Thereby they must, pursuant to § 10 (3) kapMuG, amongst 
other formalities (party representation) also provide the justification for the claim 
and the amount of damages claimed. The effect of this application is limited to 
the suspension of the period of limitation of the declared demand pursuant to the 
newly created § 204 (1), 6a BGB. The declared demand must be based on the same 
circumstances as the stated goals of the model case proceeding. The applicant does 
not however take part in the proceedings. The result of the model case proceedings 
cannot be used for or against him. After the model case proceeding is finished, the 
applicant must raise their own claim within three months or their suspension is 
no longer valid.
Pursuant to § 10 (2), 3 kapMuG the application for an enforcement of a claim 
35  „Anmeldung von Ansprüchen zum Musterverfahren“
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to have the statutory limitation period suspended needs to be made through a 
lawyer. The goal is to ensure appropriate consultation of the applicant. Despite 
the need to be represented by a lawyer, Bernuth and kremer warn that a largely 
risk-free participation in the tribunal system also holds a high potential for abuse 
similar to US-American class actions (cf. Bernuth/kremer, 2012, p. 891). The leg-
islator has also in principle realized that this is the case (BT-Dr. 17/10160, p. 25). 
Bernuth and kremer even assume that an application for an enforcement of a claim 
is possible without significant costs as only a half a percentage of the court fees 
and to their own lawyer an eigth of a percentage of the procedural fee accrue (cf. 
Bernuth/kremer, 2012, p. 891). This statement by Bernuth and kremer is only par-
tially correct according to halfmeier. It is true that the legal fees for the application 
pursuant to § 10 (2) kapMuG are slightly lower than the also applicable method 
of attaining the suspension of the statutory limitation period by using a default 
summons [an eigth of a percentage of the fees according to the legal counsel fees 
regulation (vv RvG No. 3338) compared with one percent of the fees for a default 
summons according to the legal counsel fees regulation (vv RvG No. 3305)]. But 
despite this, the costs of an application pursuant to § 10 (2) kapMuG are for exam-
ple approximately still 400 euros for a claimed amount of 5,000 euros, this is eight 
percent of the claimed damage and is split between 121 euros court fees and 240.80 
euros in lawyer costs plus turnover tax (cf. halfmeier, 2012, p. 2147). Also accord-
ing to Söhner the potential for misuse by the plaintiff similar to the US-American 
class actions is not discernable as the application to claim carries a cost risk and is 
in addition verified by professional judges (cf. Söhner, 2013, p. 12).
Bernuth and kremer, who seem to be more committed to supporting the 
rights of the model case defendant, criticize that, relative to the declared demands, 
a following examination of whether the conclusions based on the facts is warrant-
ed does not take place. They fear that many unsubstantiated and arbitrary claims 
could be handed in. But most of all they assume that the applicant, when register-
ing their application for a claim, will provide so little data that the model case de-
fendant will find it nearly impossible to evaluate the risks of the claims submitted. 
This in turn helps the plaintiffs and claimants as they can place vast pressure on 
the model case defendant through the amount of claims submitted (cf. Bernuth/
kremer, 2012, p. 891). Also Söhner raises the question how precisely the reason 
for the claim must be individualised. he assumes though, unlike Bernuth and 
kremer, that based on past jurisdiction by the German Federal Supreme Court the 
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claim, whose statutory limitation period is to be suspended, must be sufficiently 
individually portrayed. A distinction from other possible demands must be clear 
cut (cf. Söhner, 2013, p. 12). 
In the end Benuth and kremer come to the conclusion that it is appropriate to 
make mass trials more efficient and more cost effective. however, they see a one-
sided and unjustified advantage for the claimants in the possibility of being able 
to evoke the statutory limitation period by simply filing an application to claim. 
They also fear that this new regulation stands in opposition to other, in principle, 
endorsable changes such as the promotion of the model case proceedings for at-
taining settlements36 (cf. Bernuth/kremer, 2012, p. 892).
As already demonstrated, the new German Capital Markets Model Case Act 
(kapMuG) is leading to numerous changes. The Federal Government of Germany 
is of the opinion that the old kapMuG has proven itself worthy and as such the 
new kapMuG need not be limited from a time perspective. The German Federal 
Parliament (Bundestag) does not share the Federal Governments opinion and 
suggested that also the new German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) 
should undergo a pilot phase (cf. RegE, BT-Dr 17/8799, p. 16). At the end of the day, 
the new kapMuG was limited to eight years to 31 october 2020 (cf. BT-Dr 17/10160, 
p. 27). 
3.1.2.7 Conclusion
The second point of the catalogue of measures to strengthen companies’ in-
tegrity and to protect investors suggests that the commenced improvement process 
for investor claims for false information on the capital market (§§ 37b and 37c of 
the German Stock Corporation Act) as initiated with the fourth Financial Markets 
Improvement Act should be continued. In future, not just the issuer of shares 
should be liable towards investors but also in addition the Board and Supervisory 
Board Members responsible should be made personally liable (Catalogue of 
Measures, 2002, Point 2, p. 2). This recommendation made by the legislator has to 
36  The decision whether to agree to a settlement is made harder by the fact that in 
future it will be very hard to assess within model case proceeding if and to what 
extent the claimed damages are justified. This only applies however to a settlement 
that includes claimed damages through stipulation (cf. Bernuth/kremer, 2012, p. 
892).
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date not been implemented. An attempt hereto was made in the summer of 2004 
with the Act Governing Liability for Capital Market Information; the bill though 
quickly failed due to the resistance by lobbyist associations of the industry and 
banks. Currently, it is only possible to claim liability against Board Members and 
Supervisory Board Members pursuant to § 826 BGB. Prerequisites for being liable 
pursuant to § 826 BGB are the existence of a deliberate and unethical act that lead 
to damage as well as proof of causality between the fraudulent behaviour in form 
of a false statement and the damage occurred to the investor. 
By contrast, in the US the assumption of causality prevails, if the investor 
placed their trust in the integrity of the information reflected in the share price 
(fraud-on-the-market-theory). As such the burden of proof is reduced to having to 
assess the efficiency of the capital market at the time of share purchase. In order 
to avoid a boundless extension of claims, such an approach does not seem worth 
applying within German law. Müller-Michael and Wecker assume that the actual 
causality must be proved even in cases of extremely dubious capital market infor-
mation (cf. Müller-Michaels/Wecker, 2007, p. 209). one could counter that, based 
on the situation portrayed here, a strengthening of the rights of damaged investors 
seems to be required.
In this context, it should be noted positively that the legislature has tough-
ened the manager’s liability for capital market information. As such the Federal 
Supreme Court ruled in the case of the haffa brothers and the EM.Tv AG beyond 
the legal principles established in the case of Infomatec. It accepted the external 
liability of Board Members and pursuant to §§ 826 and 823 (2) BGB placed it on a 
broadened basis. The personal liability of Board Members pursuant to § 31 BGB 
was attributed to the enterprise; the requirements of proof of causality and dam-
age were lowered. here it becomes clear that the case-law is accommodating the 
objectives of the Federal Government in two central aspects. This is also expressed 
in the fact that the German Federal Supreme Court wants its Infomatec ruling to 
be seen as a “decision in principle” (cf. Möllers, 2005, p. 1642).
Furthermore, it was recommended to investigate in how far compensation 
claims should be allowed not just for false or omitted ad-hoc announcements but 
also for other falsely provided information, for example, through statements in 
the entity’s financial statements, status reports and interim reports or also for mis-
leading statements made in speeches or interviews (Catalogue of Measures, 2002, 
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Point 2, p. 2). To date, in relation to this specific recommendation there has been 
no bill enacted by the German Federal Government. Currently the only possibil-
ity is to pursue an action for liability according to § 823 (2) BGB in conjunction 
with § 400 of the German Stock Corporation Act. § 400 (1), 1 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act determines the punishment of those, who as member of the Board 
or Supervisory Board, provided untrue or obscured representations or summaries 
of the company’s financial situation.
The last recommendation in relation to the second point of catalogue of 
measures is to provide damaged investors with an improved methodology for 
enforcing a claim for damages. Enforcement of damages in individual hearings 
requires in most cases extensive evidentiary hearings with costly expert opinions. 
The individual investor is faced with high litigation risks and litigation costs which 
lead to the situation where damaged investors do not claim their damages in Court 
as the foreseeable economic disparity prevents them from taking this step. The 
result is that fraudulent behaviour is not punished and the person damaged does 
not receive justice. Even if the individual investor would only make a fairly small 
loss, the damages occurred in the capital market arena can be multi-digit million 
amounts. To change this situation, the catalogue of measures aimed for the in-
troduction of collective legal protection to ease the procedural implementation 
of substantive law within the capital market arena. The recommendation was to 
introduce a mechanism which offset the former deficits without leading to mass 
claims. There is to be no obligation to join a collective representation. Also a com-
mercialization of the claim law through, for example, multiple representation and 
success fees should not be possible. The underlying idea was: Firstly to introduce 
requirements that all claims of affected investors must be heard by the same court 
close to the entity’s place of business, so that all claims of affected investors are 
heard at the same court. The second point is the selection of a claim for use in a 
model case proceeding during which time the other proceedings are discontinued. 
In this model case proceeding, all claiming investors should get the important 
question clarified whether there really is a case based on a false or omitted ad-hoc 
announcement. The third point is the publication that a model case proceeding 
will take place so that further investors get the chance to raise their claims (cf. 
Catalogue of Measures, 2002, Point 2, p. 3). These recommendations found their 
first-time legislative implementation with the German Capital Markets Model Case 
Act (kapMuG) dated 01.11.2005. After a period of five years the Act was reviewed 
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once again. It was then, after a transition period of two years, re-published with 
some changes made on 01.11.2012 with a renewed time limitation of eight years. 
however this Act, whose term of validity has been extended until 31 october 2020, 
shows too many weaknesses to guarantee achievement of the intended goal. For 
example, since the Act came into effect in 2005 until the end of 2011 not one single 
enforceable ruling was made in a model case proceeding. The number of model 
case proceedings with only 15 listed model case proceedings in the lawsuit regis-
ter is extremely low37. Judges as well as lawyers that have come into contact with 
the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (kapMuG) think the process applied 
in these proceedings is “monstrous” (cf. Schneider/hepper, 2011, p. 2947). For the 
aggrieved shareholders, especially for the many small and minority sharehold-
ers, it is a shame that the legislator has not decided upon making a fundamental 
reform to the collective legal protection. It would have been possible, for example, 
to introduce into the Act a “simple participation”38/39 (literally translated by au-
thor) clause to the model case proceedings as already implemented in Denmark 
and Sweden. This means that the statement of participation is under the threshold 
of raising a claim. This would enable claimants to participate in the model case 
proceedings and its results with a calculable cost risk and also correspondingly 
low participatory rights (cf. halfmeier, 2012, p. 2146). This was however rejected by 
the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) because the participation in a positive 
model case ruling based on the low cost risk is problematical and could encourage 
many people to jump on the bandwagon (BT- Dr. 17/10160, p. 25).
As such, it can be noted that the planned improvements for the procedural 
enforcement of investor rights have not, to date, shown an overwhelming success 
and that the legal protection of the individual investor through the introduction of 
a collective legal protection process has not really be seen as strengthened. 
As such, it remains questionable if Schneider’s assumption of 2005 that re-
imbursement claims based on false or omitted publication of share price relevant 
facts pursuant to §§ 37b, c of the Securities Trading Act, which since its enforce-
ment through the 4th Financial Market Improvement Act has practically played 
no role, will attain more importance through its (at least from a legal perspective) 
37  Up to 28.11.2011 (cf. Schneider/heppner, 2012, p. 2947). 
38  This phrase was characterized by (Bergmeister, 2009, p. 330).
39  „einfache Teilnahme“
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collective enforceability in the model case proceeding process will in future be 
realised. he assumed that through the combination of slightly tougher rules on 
liability and easier legal enforceability, the risk of being sentenced would rise in 
total. Despite this optimistic assumption, one must criticize Schneider’s view if 
one believes that damaged investors, if they have the possibility to sue in the US, 
will not make use of this right. of course they will sue in the country where the 
chances for success are the greatest. As such Schneider views the kapMuG also in 
future as not competitive compared to the US (cf. Schneider, 2005, p. 2258).
on the other hand – when speaking of importance – one must consider that 
in principle one must assume that alone the theoretically higher chance of being 
sentenced for fraudulent behaviour could at least curb it. The fact remains that: The 
more likely it is for a manager to be made personally liable for the damage they 
created towards the aggrieved investors, the less they will behave in a deliberate 
and unethical and thereby legally punishable way. 
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3.2 germAn corporAte governAnce
Point three of the Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ Integrity 
and to Protect Investors refers to the further development of the German Corporate 
Governance Code. Particular focus is placed on the transparency of share or incen-
tive based payments to board members. It lists individual points that are suggested 
for inclusion into the Code or which could also be put into effect on a legislative 
basis. For this reason this section provides a short elaboration of the Corporate 
Governance in general, of the German Corporate Governance Code and the in-
fluence of the Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ Integrity and to 
Protect Investors. These initiatives will be illustrated and critically examined.
3.2.1 Corporate Governance
The term Corporate Governance has been defined in several different ways 
in the literature. The original definition came from a publication by Adolph A. 
Berle and Gardiner C. Means from 1932. Berle and Means focussed on the separa-
tion of ownership and control, the resulting incentive issues from this separation 
as well as the question about how one ensures that the management board of a 
company makes their decisions in favour of the shareholders or members and not 
in favour of their own personal interests (cf. Boecker, 2010, p. 240). 
In order to highlight the complexity of the term and the formulated under-
standing of the term Corporate Governance, a few examples will be briefly recalled 
at this point. hüffer understands the Corporate Governance as meaning the lead-
ership principles of board members. This concerns the quality of the management 
board in particular about sustainable and lawful value in the interest of the share-
holders, creditors, employees and last but not least of all the public. Apart from 
the principles of leadership, often the rights of shareholders and the lived trans-
parency are in the foreground (cf. hüffer, German Stock Corporation Act 2008, § 
76 AktG, see recital 15a, p. 370). For hilpisch all mechanisms that ensure that the 
shareholder receives a reasonable return on their invested capital define Corporate 
Governance. This includes, for example, markets, institutions, bodies, laws and 
contracts (cf. hilpisch, 2005, p. 26). For Picot, Corporate Governance encompasses, 
on the one hand, all rights, tasks and responsibilities of the corporate bodies, the 
shareholders, the employees and all other stakeholders. This refers therefore to the 
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rights of those that profit or stand to lose from the performance and success of a 
company. on the other hand, one can understand according to Picot that Corporate 
Governance means the transformation of social orders. here the goal is pursued to 
create a management and monitoring function that meets the interests of investors 
on the capital market in an efficient and reliable manner (cf. Picot, 2001, see recital. 
30). In total the guidelines of Corporate Governance can be viewed as a kind of 
principles of the company. 
Although the term Corporate Governance cannot finally be defined there are, 
however, similarities which can be seen across the different approaches. The lowest 
common denominator can be found in the structure of the relationship between 
management and control of a company as well as its relationship to the capital 
market. This is supported by the fact that the guidelines of Corporate Governance 
deal with the web of relationships between the board, the supervisory board and 
shareholders. The Berlin-based German Code of Corporate Governance Initiative 
supports this view of Corporate Governance meaning the lawful and factual regu-
latory framework that regulates the management and monitoring of companies (cf. 
Boecker, 2010, p. 242 f). The German Corporate Governance Code (DCGk) – which 
will be dealt with in the next chapter – orientates itself towards international and 
national standards of good and responsible management (cf. DCGk in the version 
dates 13.05.2013, Foreword).
Since with large companies the separation between management and those 
who carry the risk – for example the equity investors – is often inevitable, the main 
concern of Corporate Governance is to improve the management and monitoring 
structure (cf. Boecker, 2010, p. 243). Applying the principal-agent approach, there 
is a yawning information asymmetry between both groups that can lead, for ex-
ample, in the case of a corporation that the expectations of the shareholders can-
not be fulfilled by the board (cf. Chapter 2.4.2 of the investigation: Implications 
for company owners, investors and shareholders). The goal of effective Corporate 
Governance is thus to reduce substantial independence of the company manage-
ment from the owners, on the one hand, as well as, on the other hand, the moni-
toring supervisory board and final auditor to a reasonable level (cf. Boecker, 2010. 
p. 243). Affected by this are not only company internal structures, processes and 
people but also aspects of transparency and monitoring (cf. Wöhe, 2008, p. 70). 
These areas take different forms. Partly they are legally binding formulated as 
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legal regulations or they are noted as individual company or general regulations 
that companies can voluntarily apply (cf. Wöhe, 2008, p. 73). 
Many fundamental concepts of the German Corporate Governance owe its 
origin to the nineties of the last century. At this time there was a rapidly growing 
internationalisation and globalisation of markets and connected with this also an 
increase in the number of international investors in Germany. As the regulations 
for management were anchored in different parts of the German legislation, it be-
came necessary to bundle these. In addition, they were extended to include further 
customary international practices and summarised in the Code in order to provide 
foreign investors with an easier to understand overview of the prevailing regula-
tions in Germany (cf. Cromme, 2001, p. 2; Boecker, 2010, p. 244). Many of the rules 
that affect the rights and duties of individual company organs of a corporation40 
in Germany can be found in the Stock Corporation Act. hereby the emphasis is 
on the corporation as it is the focus of the Corporate Governance discussions and 
developments in Germany. A transfer to other legal forms is certainly possible. 
In addition, the German Commercial Code (hGB) includes detailed regulations 
that include mandatory provisions for corporations.41 Compared to the legal sys-
tems in other States, Germany has numerous regulations which define the tasks 
and responsibilities in more detail42 included in company law rather than in capi-
tal market legislation (cf. Boecker, 2010, p. 245). The capital market legislation in 
Germany mainly regulates the organisational structure of the capital market but 
does not include further detailed regulations regarding the organisational struc-
ture of companies that use this market. By summarizing the central regulations 
into one Code, it should be made easier for international market participants to 
understand the German system for corporate constitution and to balance their dif-
ferent interests in Germany (cf. Boecker, 2010, p. 245). This is one of the reasons 
that led to the development of the German Corporate Governance Code. The sense 
40  This includes the board of executive directors, the supervisory board as well as 
the general meeting of shareholders. 
41  one of these regulations, for example, is the in the German Commercial Code 
(hGB) standardized obligation for a legal representative of a corporation to pre-
pare the annual financial statement and the management report. 
42  herein details of the relevance of Corporate Governance for a company are 
justified.
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and purpose of the German Corporate Governance Code will be reviewed in more 
detail in connection with its depiction. 
First though, the concept of the DCGk will be highlighted. In particular the 
current version dated 13 May 2013 including the changes made in recent years 
will be considered43. This is followed by an examination as to if and to what ex-
tent the proposals made by the German Federal Government in its final version 
of the Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ Integrity and to Protect 
Investors – also known as the 10-Point-Program – published in February 2003 were 
applied in the further development of the German Corporate Governance Code. 
In a separate point, the changes to the version from 2009 to 2010 are listed as these 
changes as well as the design of the currently valid edition from June 2013 (here 
the publication by the DCGk was made through the Federal Gazette) highlight 
the current concerns of the German Federal Government over a longer period of 
time. The Commission for the German Corporate Governance Code has addressed 
also issues in its continuous recommendations and suggestions that, although they 
were not mentioned in the 2003 Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ 
Integrity and to Protect Investors they are in the meantime, however, statutory. 
These points shall be reviewed in the conclusion. 
3.2.2 The German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK)
In 2001 the former German Federal Government under Gerhard Schröder insti-
tuted the so-called Code Commission in order to establish a Corporate Governance 
Code for Germany. The Commission was given the task to formulate a voluntary 
code of conduct for Corporate Governance in Germany. The Code Commission 
presented its first discussion draft titled “German Corporate Governance Code”44 
(literally translated by author) on 18 December 2001. People interested in providing 
feedback were given the chance to state their opinion within a certain timeframe. 
43  The Code in its version dated 13 May 2013 was publicised in the Federal Gazette 
in June 2013 (German Federal Ministry of Justice BAnz AT 10.06.2013 B3). The 
changes made are not highlighted. A version with highlighted changes can be 
found on the internet page of the Code Commission www.corporate-governance-
code.de. There one can also find an archive with all previous editions.
44  „Deutscher Corporate Governance kodex“
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After this deadline had expired, the first German Corporate Governance Code was 
published on the homepage of the Code Commission on 26 February 2002 and on 
the Federal Gazette on 30 September 2002. Typically it is subjected to an annual 
review to ensure it is up-to-date with national and international developments and 
adjusted, if necessary (cf. Cromme, 2001, Internetresource). Currently the version 
dated 13 May 2013 is valid (cf. Commission of the German Corporate Governance 
Code, 2013, http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html).
The meaning and purpose of the DCGk is to make the German Corporate 
Governance system transparent and understandable. This is also done to promote 
the trust of international and national investors, customers and employees, and of 
the public in the management and monitoring of listed companies. It highlights 
the duties of the executive board and supervisory board to ensure, in line with the 
principles of the social market economy, the survival of the company and sustain-
able value creation (cf. DCGk, 2013, Foreword).
The requirements made by the Federal Ministry of Justice to the Commission 
to formulate a voluntary code of conduct, however, already highlights the fact that 
there was never the idea to create a legal framework for Corporate Governance 
principles in its entirety for Germany.
The German Corporate Governance Code was to constitute a short, precise 
and self-contained set of rules. Its main emphasis is on listed corporations and 
corporations with access to the capital markets pursuant to § 161 (1) sentence 2 of 
the Stock Corporation Act. It is, however, also recommended for non-listed cor-
porations to follow these regulations. It looks at the relationships between share-
holders, executive board and supervisory board and extends the already existing 
legal framework of Corporate Governance to include national and international 
best practices (cf. DCGk, 2013, Foreword; Wöhe, 2008, p. 74). In addition, it includes 
specific choices for company management and monitoring. The Code is struc-
tured in such a way that its content can be subdivided into three different levels 
of obligations. Firstly, the regulatory framework includes legally codified provi-
sions that are mandatory for companies. In addition, one can find recommenda-
tions and suggestions. The recommendations of the Code are marked by the use 
of the word “shall“. Companies can deviate from them, but are then obliged to 
disclose this annually and explain the deviations. This enables companies to cater 
for sector and enterprise-specific requirements. A well justified deviation from a 
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recommendation may be in the interest of good corporate governance. In this way 
the Code contributes to more flexibility and more self-regulation in the German 
corporate constitution. For suggestions the Code uses the term “should”. In con-
trast to recommendations, suggestions can be deviated from without disclosure 
(cf. DCGk version dated 13.05.2013, Foreword). The application of the standards 
beyond those that are legally binding is in any case principally voluntary.
With regard to the content of the German Corporate Governance Code it 
is to be noted that in relation to the executive board it goes beyond the legal re-
quirements in some points and concretises them. This applies, for example, to the 
reporting of the executive board members’ remuneration or the requirements re-
lating to compliance. The discussion over compliance has moved into public focus 
in Germany following the accounting scandals. Compliance does not just mean 
adhering to applicable law but also following all forms of rules and regulations. 
Compliance is an integral part of every form of management control. The empha-
sis here is on measures to ensure compliance to accounting, stock exchange and 
anti-trust rules as well as to fighting against corruption. hereby the scope of com-
pliance measures taken is dependent on the size of a company. In any event com-
pliance is a self-determined segment of a companies’ organisation. In accordance 
large companies and corporations have their own compliance departments. For 
credit institutions and investment companies, there are special obligations for the 
adoption of compliance regulations in Germany (§ 25 a German Banking Act and 
§ 33 German Securities Trading Act). The goal of compliance is to ensure that a 
company as a whole as well as its management and all employees in particular 
adhere to the law, provisions and regulations as well as to general business princi-
ples. Thereby ethical and moral standards such as honesty, fairness, transparency, 
decency and trust should shape the relationship of the company to external people. 
Compliance should make liability risks personally controllable for the company 
and its members of the management board and thereby claims for damages can be 
avoided. The German Corporate Governance Code has been addressing the topic 
of compliance since 2007 and thereby contributes to the promotion of compliance 
concepts in German enterprises. For instance, the Code requires that the executive 
board in line with compliance has to take steps to ensure that the legal require-
ments and company internal guidelines are being adhered to. Further, the execu-
tive board has to inform the supervisory board about all aspects of compliance. 
The Audit Committee which has to be formed by the supervisory board has to also 
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address the question of compliance. As a company can most likely prove its integ-
rity though social fairness and responsibility, compliance is of great importance. 
Breaches of the law and breaches against other regulatory norms can cause, apart 
from financial damage, also other serious consequences that can damage a compa-
ny’s reputation. If one succeeds through the application of compliance systems to 
ensure adherence to applicable laws and directives and to guarantee an ethical and 
morally unimpeachable conduct of a company, then this can be an effective contri-
bution towards the fight against unlawful acts in general and against accounting 
fraud in particular (cf. Boecker, 2010, p. 264 ff; for the definitions also refer to harz 
et al., 2012, p. 1-2; Rotsch, 2012, p. 47-50).
Instead of following the German Corporate Governance Code companies are 
also allowed to develop their own Corporate Governance Code (cf. Boecker, 2010, p. 
249). § 161 of the Stock Corporation Act obligates, however, the executive board and 
supervisory board of corporations listed on the capital markets to issue an annual 
declaration concerning conformance to the Corporate Governance Code (declara-
tion of compliance)45. This must be published in the official section of the electronic 
Federal Gazette. herein the executive board and supervisory board must declare 
to what extent they have followed the recommendations of the German Corporate 
Governance Code. If recommendations were or are not applied, the reasoning has 
to be provided. These are changes from the German Act to Modernize Accounting 
45  In § 161 of the Stock Corporation Act (Declaration in respect of the Corporate 
Governance Code) is stated that: „executive board and supervisory board of listed 
companies issue an annual statement that the company has been and is in conform-
ity with the recommendations of the Government Commission on the German 
Corporate Code announced by the Federal Ministry of Justice in the official sec-
tion of the electronic Federal Gazette were and are being complied with, or to list 
the recommendations which were or are not being explained and explain why 
not. The same shall apply to the executive board and supervisory board of a com-
pany which has exclusively issued securities other than shares for trading on an 
organised market within the meaning of § 2 (5) of the Securities Exchange Act and 
the issued shares of which shall, on the company’s own initiative, only be traded 
via a multilateral trading system within the sense of § 2 (3) sentence 1 No. 8 of the 
Securities Trading Act. The declaration shall be continuously available to the pub-
lic on the company’s internet page.”
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Law, article 8. Since this time, deviations from recommendations must not only be 
declared but also substantiated. A further change that resulted from the German 
Act to Modernize Accounting Law is also the change to § 161 (2) AktG which ex-
plicitly requests that the declaration of the Corporate Governance Code (declara-
tion of compliance) is continuously available to the public on the company’s inter-
net page. The role of the external audit of the annual financial statement is simply 
to check whether the respective details are available. The auditor must not evaluate 
whether the company management and monitoring systems are compliant with 
the regulations of the German Corporate Governance Code (cf. Cromme, 2001, p. 
2; Boecker, 2010, p. 250). Also Theisen and Raßhofer point out that, the declared ac-
ceptance to the Code by a company’s management does not necessarily mean that 
the rules of the Code are also lived out in practice. The declaration of compliance 
can therefore not unequivocally mean that the requirements are really being met. 
The declaration of good corporate governance therefore does not necessarily mean 
that there is factually good corporate governance (cf. Theisen/Raßhofer, 2007, p. 
1317 ff).
From a content perspective, the German Corporate Governance Code is di-
vided into seven chapters. These look at the subject areas of shareholders and the 
annual general meeting, the cooperation of the executive and supervisory board, 
the executive board, the supervisory board, transparency as well as accounting 
and the statutory audit. A further differentiation is made in individual points with 
regard to legal provisions as well as regarding nationally and internationally rec-
ognized best practices for a good and responsible company management and com-
pany monitoring.
Attached to the digital enclosure to this study is the full text of German 
Corporate Governance Code dated 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013 translated by the 
Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code into English.
3.2.3 Content and Changes Made to the German Corporate Governance Code (2013) 
due to the Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ Integrity and to Protect 
Investors
Firstly, for this study the relevant content of the German Corporate 
Governance Code and the changes that were made in the last decade based 
upon the suggestions made in Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ 
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Integrity and to Protect Investors from 2003 will be pointed out46. That means that 
individual points will be mentioned, its development presented and the quality 
of this development critically reviewed in relation to the goals of the DCGk as 
formulated in the foreword. What it said was: “Its purpose is to promote the trust 
of international and national investors, customers, employees and the general pub-
lic in the management and supervision of listed German stock corporations. The 
Code clarifies the obligation of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board 
to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and its sustainable creation of 
value in conformity with the principles of the social market economy (interest of 
the enterprise)” (English version of the DCGk, 2013, Foreword).
In the third point the 10-Point-Program deals with the “Further developed 
German Corporate Governance Code, especially relating to the transparency of 
share-based or incentive-based compensation (stock options) of board members”47 
(translated in context by the author).
To achieve further development relating to the named areas, further points 
are listed that are included in the recommendations of the Code and which could 
be laid down by the legislator.
Regarding the public disclosure of option programs, the proposal is to 
highlight the information pertaining to the possible volume of compensation of a 
planned option program prior to agreeing to the resolution at the annual general 
meeting through comparative calculations (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 
3, p.3).
The current version of the Corporate Governance Code applies this proposal 
in different parts. In point 2.2.1 it is noted that with regard to the annual general 
meeting there is the option to take the decision to approve of the system of com-
pensation for the board members (cf. DCGk, 2013). In point 4.2.5 it is stated among 
other things that: “A compensation report as part of the Management Report out-
lines the compensation system for Management Board members. The outline shall 
46  To ensure a better reading flow the following text with call out the Catalogue of 
Measures to Strengthen Companies‘ Integrity and to Protect Investors in its short 
form Catalogue of Measures or 10-Point-Program.
47  „Weiterentwicklung des Deutschen Corporate Governance kodex, insbeson-
dere zur Transparenz von aktienbasierten oder anreizorientierten vergütungen 
(Aktienoptionen) der vorstände“. 
130 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
be presented in a generally understandable way. The compensation report shall 
also include information on the nature of the fringe benefits provided by the com-
pany. In addition, for financial years starting after 31 December 2013, and for each 
Management Board member, the compensation report shall present:
•	 the benefits granted for the year under review including the fringe benefits, 
and including the maximum and minimum achievable compensation for 
variable compensation components
•	 …
The model tables provided in the appendix shall be used to present this in-
formation” (English version of the DCGk, 2013, emphasis added by author). In re-
spect of the model tables, it is stated that: “…the multi-year variable compensation 
granted in the year under review is broken down into different plans and the rele-
vant periods of time are stated. For subscription rights and other share-based pay-
ments, the fair value of the compensation at the time it is granted is calculated and 
reported as previously. If the multi-year variable components comprise non-share-
based payments, the target value or a comparable value for an “average probability 
scenario” must be stated at the time of confirmation (if available)” (English version 
of the DCGk, 2013, emphasis added by author). Additionally, under point 4.2.3 
the statement is made that “the chairman of the supervisory board shall outline 
once to the general meeting the salient points of the compensation and then any 
changes thereto” (English version of the DCGk, 2013). These are not legal require-
ments but recommendations that were partially newly taken up in the DCGk. 
In regard to the declaration of stock option programs, the Catalogue of 
Measures makes the proposal that the reporting company should declare the 
shareholdings, option rights and derivatives that members of the board own. The 
pertaining details can be made in the notes to the annual financial statement and 
in the notes to the consolidated financial statement – in the latter also insofar when 
the board members are not only members of the reporting company but also of an 
affiliate (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, p. 3). The Corporate Governance 
Code addresses this proposal albeit in weakened form. Under point 6.3, on the 
topic of transparency one can find the following recommendation: “Beyond the 
statutory obligation to report and disclose dealings in shares of the company with-
out delay, the ownership of shares in the company or related financial instruments 
by Management Board and Supervisory Board members shall be reported if these 
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directly or indirectly exceed 1 % of the shares issued by the company. If the entire 
holdings of all members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board exceed 
1 % of the shares issued by the company, these shall be reported separately for the 
Management Board and Supervisory Board in the Corporate Governance Report” 
(English version of the DCGk, 2013). As a result, there can be a situation whereby 
the full ownership of shares and derivatives of board members is not declared but 
only those who hold more than one per cent of the shares issued by the company. 
Supplementing this point, 7.1.5 states regarding the accounts that the consolidated 
financial statement should take note on the relationship with shareholders con-
sidered to be related parties pursuant to the applicable accounting regulations (cf. 
DCGk, 2013).
Regarding the “Declaration of Stock option Programs in the Notes” one can 
find in the third point of the Catalogue of Measures the following proposal. A gen-
eral description of the individual programs including key data might become pos-
sible. This includes in detail (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, p. 3 and 4): 
•	 the subscription price and if applicable performance targets, the number of 
stock rights, the time period, the blocking period, the vesting conditions as 
well as the mathematical value of the rights at the time granted; 
•	 the value of all accumulated commitments from programs in the period. If 
there is more than one program, then the information needs to be provided for 
each program separately; 
•	 for each program the number of option rights and its average subscription 
price must be stated separately from all outstanding, available, during the year 
granted, exercised and expired rights;
•	 the total value of all option rights granted within the year for the purpose of 
remuneration is to be declared. The value of the option rights that were given 
to the members of the board are to be declared separately. 
This suggestion was specifically taken onboard by the legislator and it added 
the following passage to the German Commercial Code (hGB) § 285 (other statu-
tory disclosures) number 9, 9a: “In addition the notes must include: for the mem-
bers of the board, the supervisory board, a council or a similar institution for each 
individual group of people, the received total remuneration (wages, profit-sharing, 
option rights and other share based remuneration, reimbursement of expenses, in-
surance premiums, commissions and fringe benefits of any kind) for the activities 
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performed in a fiscal year … option rights and any other share-based rights must 
be declared stating the number and the value at the time of being granted; later 
changes in value that are based on a change in the conditions applying must be 
considered. For a listed company in addition to naming the person, the remunera-
tion of each board member needs to be listed, divided according to non-result-
based and result-based components as well as components with long-term incen-
tive respectively …”48 (translated in context by author). 
The German Corporate Governance Code takes a stance on this under point 
7.1.3 accounting standards and recommends: “The Corporate Governance Report 
shall contain information on stock option programmes and similar securities-
based incentive systems of the company, unless this information is already pro-
vided in the Annual Financial Statements, the Consolidated Financial Statements 
or the compensation report.” (English version of the DCGk, 2013). 
Point 3 of the government‘s Catalogue of Measures lists further suggestions 
which could possibly become legislative measures relating to the remuneration 
of board members. here it is stated that also maximum limits, the so-called cap, 
could be recommended (cf. Catalogue of Measures, Point 3, p. 4).
The German Corporate Governance Code recommends in point 4.2.3 (execu-
tive board) “…all compensation components must be appropriate, both individu-
ally and in total, and in particular must not encourage individuals to take un-
reasonable risks. The amount of compensation shall be capped, both overall and 
48  „Ferner sind im Anhang anzugeben: für die Mitglieder des 
Geschäftsführungsorgans, eines Aufsichtsrats, eines Beirats oder einer ähnlichen 
Einrichtung jeweils für jede Personengruppe die für die Tätigkeit im Geschäftsjahr 
gewährten Gesamtbezüge (Gehälter, Gewinnbeteiligungen, Bezugsrechte 
und sonstige aktienbasierte vergütungen, Aufwandsentschädigungen, 
versicherungsentgelte, Provisionen und Nebenleistungen jeder Art). …
Bezugsrechte und sonstige aktienbasierte vergütungen sind mit ihrer Anzahl und 
dem beizulegenden zeitwert zum zeitpunkt ihrer Gewährung anzugeben; spä-
tere Wertveränderungen, die auf einer Änderung der Ausübungsbedingungen 
beruhen, sind zu berücksichtigen. Bei einer börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft sind 
zusätzlich unter Namensnennung die Bezüge jedes einzelnen vorstandsmitglieds, 
aufgeteilt nach erfolgsunabhängigen und erfolgsbezogenen komponenten sowie 
komponenten mit langfristiger Anreizwirkung, gesondert anzugeben. ….“.
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for individual compensation components. The variable compensation components 
shall be related to demanding, relevant comparison parameters. Changing such 
performance targets or the comparison parameters retroactively shall be excluded. 
For pension schemes, the Supervisory Board shall establish the level of provision 
aimed for in each case – also considering the length of time for which the individ-
ual has been a Management Board member – and take into account the resulting 
annual and long-term expense for the company. In concluding Management Board 
contracts, care shall be taken to ensure that payments made to a Management 
Board member on premature termination of his/her contract, including fringe ben-
efits, do not exceed the value of two years’ compensation (severance pay cap) and 
compensate no more than the remaining term of the employment contract. If the 
employment contract is terminated for a serious cause for which the Management 
Board member is responsible, no payments are made to the Management Board 
member. The severance payment cap shall be calculated on the basis of the total 
compensation for the past full financial year and if appropriate also the expect-
ed total compensation for the current financial year. Payments promised in the 
event of premature termination of a Management Board member’s contract due to 
a change of control shall not exceed 150 % of the severance payment cap” (English 
version of the DCGk, 2013, emphasis added by author).
The next aspect suggests that there is a better link of the performance targets 
to relative comparison parameters. They should not only be linked to a company’s 
share price but also to sector indices etc. (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, 
p. 4). 
There is no concrete reference made in response to this in the German 
Corporate Governance Code. In point 4.2.2 it is merely stated in regard to the exec-
utive board that: “…Criteria for determining the appropriateness of compensation 
are both the tasks of the individual member of the Management Board, his/her 
personal performance, the economic situation, the performance and outlook of the 
enterprise as well as the common level of the compensation taking into account the 
peer companies and the compensation structure in place in other areas of the com-
pany…”. Further in point 4.2.3 it is stated that “… the compensation structure must 
be oriented toward sustainable growth of the enterprise. The monetary compensa-
tion elements shall comprise fixed and variable elements. The Supervisory Board 
must make sure that the variable compensation elements are in general based on a 
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multiyear assessment. Both positive and negative developments shall be taken into 
account when determining variable compensation components. All compensation 
components must be appropriate, both individually and in total, and in particular 
must not encourage to take unreasonable risks” (English version of the DCGk, 
2013).
A further proposal is to make the declaration of individual’s compensation 
obligatory for board members (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, p. 4). The 
legislator reacted to this suggestion and formulated for members of the board of 
listed public limited companies pursuant to the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
§ 285 (9a) sentence 5 following legislative text: “listed companies must state sepa-
rately, in addition, the names of and remuneration paid to the individual members 
of the executive board divided into non-result-based and result-based components 
as well as components with long-term incentive effect respectively”49 (translated 
in context by the author). Furthermore § 286 (5) of the German Commercial Code 
(hGB) states that: “The disclosure required under § 285 No. 9 Letter a Sentence 
5 to 8 should not be made if this was decided at the Annual General Meeting. A 
decision which can be taken for a maximum of five years requires a majority that 
constitutes at least three quarters of the share capital represented at the time of 
adopting the resolution”50 (translated in context by the author). Also in the German 
Corporate Governance Code under point 4.2.4 one can find the following directive: 
“The total compensation of each one of the members of the Management Board is 
to be disclosed by name, divided into fixed and variable compensation compo-
nents. The same applies to promises of benefits that are granted to a Management 
Board member in case of premature or statutory termination of the function of a 
Management Board member or that have been changed during the financial year. 
Disclosure is dispensed with if the General Meeting has passed a resolution to this 
49  „Bei einer börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft sind zusätzlich unter 
Namensnennung die Bezüge jedes einzelnen vorstandsmitgliedes, aufgeteilt nach 
erfolgsunabhängigen und erfolgsbezogenen komponenten sowie komponenten 
mit langfristiger Anreizwirkung, gesondert anzugeben.“
50  „Die in § 285 Nr. 9 Buchstabe a Satz 5 bis 8 verlangten Angaben unterbleiben, 
wenn die hauptversammlung dies beschlossen hat. Ein Beschluss, der höchstens 
für fünf Jahre gefasst werden kann, bedarf einer Mehrheit, die mindestens drei 
viertel des bei der Beschlussfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals umfasst.“
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effect by three-quarters majority” (English version of the DCGk, 2013). 
For all board members and executive board members of non-listed compa-
nies or other companies this regulation does not apply. 
Furthermore, in point 4.2.5 it states that: “Disclosure shall be made in 
the Notes or the Management Report. A compensation report as part of the 
Management Report outlines the compensation system for Management Board 
members. The outline shall be presented in a generally understandable way. The 
compensation report shall also include information on the nature of the fringe 
benefits provided by the company” (English version of the DCGk, 2013). In 2013 
the German Corporate Governance Code was amended to include the following 
recommendation: “In addition, for financial years starting after 31 December 2013, 
and for each Management Board member, the compensation report shall present: 
•	 the benefits granted for the year under review including the fringe benefits, 
and including the maximum and minimum achievable compensation for 
variable compensation components;
•	 the allocation of fixed compensation, short-term variable compensation and 
long-term variable compensation in/for the year under review, broken down 
into the relevant reference years;
•	 for pension provisions and other benefits, the service cost in/for the year under 
review. 
The model tables provided in the appendix shall be used to present this in-
formation” (English version of the DCGk, 2013).
The next proposal suggests that the applicability of the key points for stock 
option programs under § 193 (2) of the Stock Corporation Act is to be extended to 
include programs with convertible bonds (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, 
p. 4). This proposal was taken on-board in the Stock Corporation Act in the section 
referring to conditional increases in capital. In § 192 (1) and (2) it says that: “The 
general shareholders‘ meeting can agree to an increase of share capital, that shall 
be implemented only to the extent that conversion or subscription rights (contin-
gent capital increase) are applied to the new shares. The contingent capital increase 
should only be decided for the following reasons: 1. For the purpose of granting 
the right to issue or to convert the convertible bonds into ordinary bearer shares to 
the creditors; …”51 (translated in context by the author). And in § 193 (1) sentence 
51  „Die hauptversammlung kann eine Erhöhung des Grundkapitals beschließen, 
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1 of the Stock Corporation Act: “The resolution on the conditional capital increase 
must be approved by a majority of at least three-quarters of the shares capital rep-
resented when the resolution is voted on”52 (translated in context by the author). 
Also the next proposed measure was incorporated into the legislative text. 
The program suggests an extension of § 87 (1) of the Stock Corporation Act. Incentive 
based compensation components should expressly be subject to the requirements 
for equitableness (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, p. 4). The current edition 
of the Stock Corporation Act under § 87 (1) states that the supervisory board has 
to ensure when determining the total amount of remuneration for each individual 
member of the executive board that it must be in reasonable proportion to the du-
ties and performance of the executive board and the company’s situation and may 
not exceed the normal level of remuneration unless there are special reasons.
The next aspect looks at the supervisory board. The point here is: “Provision 
should be made that the notes of the annual financial statement and consolidated 
financial statement include the details of the payments made or advantages ex-
tended for services provided personally by the supervisory board members of a 
company, parent company or affiliate, in particular advisory or agency services”53 
(translated in context by the author) (Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, p. 4). 
This proposal was addressed by the German Corporate Governance Code. Under 
point 5.4.6 regarding the supervisory board the following statement regarding 
remuneration and services provided personally can be found: “Compensation of 
die nur so weit durchgeführt werden soll, wie von einem Umtausch- oder Bezugsrecht 
Gebrauch gemacht wird, das die Gesellschaft auf die neuen Aktien (Bezugsaktien) 
einräumt (bedingte kapitalerhöhung). Die bedingte kapitalerhöhung soll nur zu 
folgenden zwecken beschlossen werden: 1. zur Gewährung von Umtausch- oder 
Bezugsrechten an Gläubiger mit Wandelschuldverschreibungen;…“.
52  „Der Beschluss über die bedingte kapitalerhöhung bedarf einer Mehrheit, die 
mindestens drei viertel des bei der Beschlussfassung vertretenen Grundkapitals 
umfasst.“
53  „Es sollte vorgesehen werden, dass im Anhang zum Jahres- (konzern-) 
Abschluss für die Mitglieder des Aufsichtsrats die von der Gesellschaft bzw. 
vom Mutterunternehmen und den Tochterunternehmen für persönlich erbrachte 
Leistungen, insbesondere Beratungs- und vermittlungsleistungen, bezogenen 
vergütungen oder vorteile anzugeben sind“
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the members of the Supervisory Board is specified by resolution of the General 
Meeting or in the Articles of Association. Also to be considered here shall be the 
exercising of the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in the Supervisory Board as 
well as the chair and membership committees. Members of the Supervisory Board 
receive compensation which is in an appropriate relation to their tasks and the 
situation of the company. If members of the Supervisory Board are promised per-
formance-related compensation, it shall be oriented toward sustainable growth of 
the enterprise. The compensation of the members of the Supervisory Board shall 
be reported individually in the Notes or the Management Report, subdivided ac-
cording to components. Also payments made by the enterprise to the members of 
the Supervisory Board or advantages extended for services provided individu-
ally, in particular, advisory or agency services, shall be listed separately on an 
individual basis” (English version of the DCGk, 2013; emphasis added by author). 
There is no legally binding codification supporting this recommendation. The en-
terprises can, therefore, deviate from these recommendations but are then obliged 
to declare this on an annual basis. 
The last recommendation included in the third point of the Catalogue of 
Measures is aimed at testing whether the D & o insurance 54(directors and offic-
ers liability insurance) of executive and supervisory board members should in-
clude deductibles mandatory by law (cf. Catalogue of Measures, 2003, Point 3, p. 4). 
Regarding this, there is a legal requirement pursuant to § 93 (2) sentence 3 of the 
Stock Corporation Act for the executive board in which is stated that, if a company 
takes out a D&o insurance for its executive board then they have to provide for 
a deductible of at least 10% of the loss up to at least the amount of one and a half 
times the fixed annual compensation of the respective executive board member. 
54  The directors- and officers liability insurance is a special form of financial loss 
insurance through which a company insures its board members against not only 
demands of the company itself (internal) but also against claims by third parties 
(external) for specific violations of due diligence. Depending on the form of insur-
ance one can be insured against:
•	 Internal claims, i.e. company claims against its board members. 
•	 Claims under private law. 
•	 Claims under public law. 
•	 Environmental and product liability cases (cf. Wirtschaftslexikon Gabler, 2011).
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Regarding the supervisory board the Code under point 3.8 merely provides a rec-
ommendation that a similar deductible shall be agreed upon in any D&o policy for 
the supervisory board (cf. DCGk, 2013). 
3.2.4 Important Changes Made in the German Corporate Governance Code Dated 
26.05.2010 Compared to the Version Dated 18.06.2009
In order to better demonstrate the accentuation of the Federal Government’s 
implementation of its Catalogue of Measures the changes made to the DCGk in 
2010 shall be reviewed. 
In the version dated 26 May 2010 there were changes made to the sections 
of shareholders and the annual general meeting, executive and supervisory board 
compared to the previous version dated 18 June 2009. A new suggestion was includ-
ed whereby the general meeting can approve the authorization of the remunera-
tion system for the members of the executive board (2.2.1). Relating to the conven-
ing of the shareholders’ annual general meeting it also specifies that the convening 
of a meeting, as well as the forms required by law for a postal vote together with 
the agenda are made accessible on the company’s internet site (2.3.1). The enterprise 
shall facilitate the personal exercising of shareholders’ voting rights. It shall also 
assist the shareholders in using postal votes and proxies (2.3.3) (cf. DCGk, 2010, 
version including highlighted changes, Points 2.2.1; 2.3.1; 2.3.3).
The recommendations regarding the management board were extended un-
der point 4.1.5 that states that when filling managerial positions in the company, 
the Executive Board shall take diversity into consideration and, in particular, aim 
for an appropriate consideration of women (cf. DCGk, 2010, version with high-
lighted changes, Point 4.1.5). This topic is also a current topic in other countries, 
however, in the Federal Republic of Germany it holds a special interest as the for-
mer Minister of Family Affairs kristina Schröder (CDU) and the former Minister 
for Employment Ursula von der Leyen (CDU) are discussing how to have senior 
management jobs in the hands of women with the executive boards of the com-
panies listed on the DAx. In the thirty German companies listed on the DAx the 
quota of women was 3.7 per cent in 2011, i.e. only seven out of 189 management 
board positions are occupied by women. According to the coalition agreement of 
27 November 2013, there will be a legal introduction of a gender equality code in 
executive boards and supervisory boards of companies at the beginning ot the 18 
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th electoral period of the German federal parliament. hereby especially compa-
nies listed on the stock exchange and companies obliged to worker participation 
are legally obliged to determine binding targets to increase the number of female 
employees in executive- and supervisory board and on top management level from 
2015 on. The public must be informed about that in a given measure of transpar-
ency (cf. coalition agreement CDU, CSU and SPD, 2013, p. 102).
In point 5.1.2 the recommendation is made to the supervisory board to respect 
diversity and, in particular, to aim for an appropriate consideration of women. The 
point 5.4.1 regarding the composition of the supervisory board was completely 
revised. here the following text can be found: “The Supervisory Board has to be 
composed in such a way that its members as a group possess the knowledge, abil-
ity and expert experience required to properly complete its tasks. The Supervisory 
Board shall specify concrete objectives regarding its composition which, whilst 
considering the specifics of the enterprise, take into account the international ac-
tivities of the enterprise, potential conflicts of interest, an age limit to be specified 
for the members of the Supervisory Board and diversity. These concrete objec-
tives shall, in particular, stipulate an appropriate degree of female representation” 
(English version of the DCGk, 2010, version with highlighted changes).
In a press release of 4 May 2011 the commission DCGk appointed by the 
German Federal Ministry of Justice stated that German based companies listed 
on the DAx have already been actively dealing with this topic. In the recent past 
there have already been many more women nominated for activities in the super-
visory board than previously. There are also further plans to have more women 
in these panels. As an example, twelve supervisory board positions were taken by 
women in the last one and a half years in the thirty DAx listed companies. This 
is a much higher number than in previous years. The commission assumed that, 
as part of the large wave of scheduled new elections in spring 2013, the number 
of women in the supervisory board will grow significantly (cf. Press release of the 
Government Commission DCkG, 2011). on 15 June 2013, a good two years later, 
the number of women in the supervisory boards of the 160 listed companies on 
the DAx, MDAx, SDAx and TecDAx was 17.2 per cent. Considering the number of 
board members it was a mere six per cent of females. In total the share of women in 
the board and supervisory boards is 11.6 per cent. The increase in women in board 
positions over the last two and a half years in the 160 companies belonging to the 
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above listed DAx groups is 5.1 percentage points (Status 15.06.2013) (cf. Frauen in 
die Aufsichtsräte (FidAR), 2013, p. 3). The coalition agreement of 27 November 2013 
also dealt with the topic of the percentage of women on supervisory boards. To 
this there is a statement that supervisory boards of companies listed at the stock 
exchange and companies obliged to full worker participation have to present a 
gender quote of at least 30 per cent from the year 2016 on. If the quote is not ful-
filled the positions on the supervisory board designated for the underrepresented 
gender are not occupied (cf. coalition agreement CDU, CSU and SPD, 2013, p. 102).
Furthermore, point 5.4.1 states that the “Recommendations by the Supervisory 
Board to the competent election bodies shall take these objectives into account. The 
concrete objectives of the Supervisory Board and the status of the implementa-
tion shall be published in the Corporate Governance Report. The members of the 
Supervisory Board shall on their own take on the necessary training and further 
education measures required for their tasks. They shall be supported by the com-
pany appropriately” (English version of the DCGk, 2010, version with highlighted 
changes, Point 5.4.1). There were also updates made pertaining to the number of 
supervisory board mandates or other similar roles. “Members of the Management 
Board of a listed company shall not accept more than a total of three Supervisory 
Board mandates in non-group listed companies or in supervisory bodies of com-
panies with similar requirements” (English version of the DCGk, 2010, version 
with highlighted changes, Point 5.4.5).
In 2011 the commission did not deem it necessary to make changes to the 
code. They generally assumed the principle to change as little as possible and as 
much as required by the code. Every adjustment has a significant impact on com-
panies and one should allow them an appropriate measure of time to adapt to the 
already made changes (cf. Press release Regierungskommission DCkG, 2011). The 
German Corporate Governance Code was only changed and adapted in 2012.
Further, the Government Commission plans, in future, to strengthen the in-
put of the stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers etc.) in the work of the 
German Corporate Governance Code. In line with this, planned changes are to be 
published on their homepage and the interested public asked to provide their feed-
back within an appropriate measure of time. The feedback provided should then 
form part of the consultation process. The commission assumed that taking such a 
step would support improved transparency and participation. It hoped that such 
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action would improve the debates and lead to an improved acceptance of the Code 
in all economic activities (cf. Press release Regierungskommission DCkG, 2011). 
This was implemented with the adaptions to the Code in 2012. 
3.2.5 Further Important Regulations of the German Corporate Governance Code 
The Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code also addressed 
in its recommendations and suggestions circumstances that were not mentioned in 
the federal government’s Catalogue of Measures. Conclusively, these points shall 
be reviewed. 
The DCGk views the following aspects of a company as belonging to the 
roles and responsibilities of the management board: to develop the enterprise’s 
strategy in coordination with the supervisory board and ensure its implementa-
tion and abidance to all provisions of law and the enterprise’s internal policies as 
well as in conformity with § 91 (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act to ensure 
appropriate risk management and risk controlling in the enterprise (cf. DCGk, 
2013, Points 4.1.2 to 4.1.4).These provisions are supplemented by the German Act 
to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG)55. Publicly traded corporations must de-
scribe the essential characteristics of their internal control and risk management 
system with regard to their accounting process. The focus is therefore on the pro-
cess of accounting but also on the organisational as well as control and security 
structures that ensure that business facts and figures are valued correctly in the 
balance sheet. This assumes that it is made available to the relevant parties as part 
of the external accounting. As a company must report externally, the legislator 
assumes that this creates the incentive to implement working internal control sys-
tems and to ensure their effectiveness. In any case, the documentation of existing 
55  The German Act to Modernize Accounting Law which came into effect in 2009 
will be reviewed in more detail in chapter 3.3.2 as it is the largest balance rights 
reform since 1985. It is the result of many years of discussion on the further devel-
opment of German accounting law and the convergence to international account-
ing principles. The BilMoG enables German companies to have a cost effective 
alternative to the complex international accounting principles. one of its goals is, 
as part of the realignment of the commercial balance sheet, to encompass the needs 
especially of small and medium sized companies. 
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processes has become more important through this. The key weaknesses of the 
internal control system forms part of the report presented by the independent au-
ditor in the supervisory board’s / audit committee’s financial statements meeting 
(§171 (1) page 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act) (cf. kPMG, 2011a).
A mere recital of the legislative regulations can be found in the Code with 
regard to the point of conflicts of interest for members of the management board 
as part of the non-competition clause. Every form of side-line activities like, for ex-
ample, taking over a supervisory board mandate in another corporation requires 
the approval of the supervisory board of the enterprise (cf. DCGk, 2013, Points 
4.3.1 and 4.3.5). In addition the German Corporate Governance Code refers to the 
prohibition for members of the management board to accept advantages or grant 
advantages. here the Code refers to several elements of an offence such as brib-
ery, breach of trust or embezzlement. In his or her decisions he/she is bound by 
the enterprise’s best interests and therefore the pursuance of personal interests is 
forbidden for members of the management board or for other employees. Every 
member of the management board shall disclose conflicts of interest to the super-
visory board immediately and then inform the other members of the management 
board (cf. English version of the DCGk, 2013, Points 4.3.1 to 4.3.5; Boecker, 2010, p. 
263, Footnote 1558).
“The task of the Supervisory Board is to advise regularly and supervise the 
Management Board in the management of the enterprise. It must be involved in 
decisions of fundamental importance to the enterprise” (English version of the 
DCGk, 2013, Point 5.1.1.). The supervisory board is the only body that has the pow-
er to appoint and dismiss members of the board (cf. English version of the DCGk, 
2013, Point 5.1.2).
“Depending on the specifics of the enterprise and the number of its mem-
bers, the Supervisory Board shall form committees with sufficient expertise. The 
respective committee chairmen report regularly to the Supervisory Board on the 
work of the committees” (English version of the DCkG, 2013, Point 5.3.1). In partic-
ular, the Supervisory Board shall establish an Audit Committee (5.3.2). This com-
mittee “handles the monitoring of the accounting process, the effectiveness of the 
internal control system, risk management system and internal audit system, the 
audit of the Annual Financial Statements, here in particular the independence of 
the auditor, the services rendered additionally by the auditor, the issuing of the 
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audit mandate to the auditor, the determination of auditing focal points and the fee 
agreement, and – unless another committee is entrusted therewith – compliance. 
The chairman of the Audit Committee shall have specialist knowledge and experi-
ence in the application of accounting principles and internal control processes. he 
should be independent and not be a former member of the Management Board of 
the company whose appointment ended less than two years ago” (English version 
of the DCkG, 2013, Point 5.3.2).
At least one independent member of the supervisory board or of the estab-
lished Audit Committee, should this be the case, must have the relevant expertise in 
financial reporting or statutory auditing (§100 (5) of the German Stock Corporation 
Act). This means that companies must place a special focus on the qualifications of 
its members with regard to financial reporting / statutory auditing as intended by 
the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) (cf. kPMG, 2011b).
With regard to the composition of the supervisory board the German 
Corporate Governance Code includes the following recommendations that go be-
yond the legal regulations:
“The supervisory board has to be composed in such a way that its mem-
bers as a group possess the knowledge, ability and expert experience required to 
properly complete its tasks” (English version of the DCGk, 2013, Point 5.4.1). The 
supervisory board shall specify concrete objectives regarding its composition that 
are important for formulating the selection criteria for suitable candidates. Thereby 
the international activities of the enterprise, potential conflicts of interest, the age 
limit to be specified for the members of the supervisory board and an appropri-
ate degree of female representation shall be taken into account. In addition, in its 
election recommendations to the General Meeting, the supervisory board shall 
disclose the personal and business relations of each individual candidate with the 
company, the executive bodies of the company and with a shareholder holding a 
material interest in the enterprise. In terms of this recommendation, shareholders 
holding a material interest are shareholders who directly or indirectly hold more 
than 10 per cent of the voting shares of the company (cf. English version of the 
DCGk, 2013, Point 5.4.1).
“The Supervisory Board shall include what it considers an adequate num-
ber of independent members. Within the meaning of this recommendation, a 
Supervisory Board member is not to be considered independent in particular if 
144 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
he/she has personal or business relations with the company, its executive bodies, a 
controlling shareholder or an enterprise associated with the latter which may cause 
a substantial and not merely temporary conflict of interests. Not more than two 
former members of the Management Board shall be members of the Supervisory 
Board and Supervisory Board members shall not exercise directorships or similar 
positions or advisory tasks for important competitors of the enterprise” (English 
version of the DCGk, 2013, Point 5.4.2).
It is encouraged that the elections to the supervisory board shall be made on 
an individual basis. Proposed eligible candidates for the supervisory board chair 
shall be announced to the shareholders (cf. English version of the DCGk, 2013, 
Point 5.4.3).
The German Corporate Governance Code recommends that management 
board members may not become members of the supervisory board of the compa-
ny within two years after the end of their appointment. This shall only be possible 
on an exceptional basis if they are appointed upon a motion presented by share-
holders holding more than 25% of the voting rights in the company and shall be 
justified to the general meeting (cf. English version of the DCGk, 2013, Point 5.4.4).
Being a member of a supervisory board requires time in order to fulfil the 
task of surveillance properly. For this reason every member must take care that he/
she has sufficient time to perform his/her mandate. When taking on the necessary 
training and further education measures the supervisory board members shall be 
supported by the company appropriately (cf. English version of the DCGk, 2013, 
Point 5.4.5).
It is important that each supervisory board meeting is always attended by all 
members. Exceptional regulations should only apply when ill or in other impor-
tant family matters. The attending members are noted in the minutes in line with 
§ 107 (2) sentence 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act. Pursuant to § 110 (3) sen-
tence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act listed companies must hold at least 
two supervisory board meetings per calendar half-year, i.e. four meeting per fiscal 
year. The German Corporate Governance Code recommends making a note in the 
report of the supervisory board if a member of the supervisory board took part in 
less than half of the meetings of the supervisory board (cf. English version of the 
DCGk, 2013, Point 5.4.7). It can be assumed that a frequently absent member of the 
supervisory board cannot properly fulfil his/her duties towards the enterprise (cf. 
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Boecker, 2010, p. 291).
The supervisory board members are bound by the enterprise’s best interests 
(cf. English version of the DCGk, 2013, Point 5.5.1). “No member of the Supervisory 
Board may pursue personal interests in his/her decisions or use business op-
portunities intended for the enterprise for himself/herself. Each member of the 
Supervisory Board shall inform the Supervisory Board of any conflicts of interest, 
in particular those which may result from a consultant or directorship function 
with clients, suppliers, lenders or other third parties. In its report, the Supervisory 
Board shall inform the General Meeting of any conflicts of interest which have 
occurred together with their treatment” (English version of the DCGk, 2013, Point 
5.5.1 to Point 5.5.3). The Code recommends that material conflicts of interest and 
those which are not merely temporary in respect of the person of a supervisory 
board member shall result in the termination of his/her mandate (cf. English ver-
sion of the DCGk, 2013, Point 5.5.3).
Based on the monitoring functions of the supervisory board, the independ-
ence of its members is of immense importance. Just as important, though, is the 
requirement for clear and structured implementation of his/her activities. The 
German Corporate Governance Code tries to meet these expectations by further 
specifying the many legally codified requirements. In line with the in § 161 of the 
German Stock Corporation Act every company must make a mandatory decla-
ration of compliance to the German Corporate Governance Code (declaration of 
compliance) whereby it must publish what recommendations of the Code it did 
not follow. Since 2009 the companies must also declare why they deviated from 
the recommendations of the Code. one can, therefore, speak of monitoring by the 
participants of the capital markets. The goal is to achieve a wider acceptance of the 
regulations of the German Corporate Governance Code and thereby also a more 
effective orientation of the overseeing boards (cf. Boecker, 2010. p. 292). With the 
German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) coming into effect, also the 
number of companies that need to make a declaration of compliance has increased. 
It does not only encompass listed corporations but also corporations that trade 
securities other than shares and that are admitted to trading on an organised mar-
ket. Whilst a company previously had to make the declaration of compliance only 
accessible to the shareholders on an on-going basis, it now has to be published by 
the management and supervisory board on the homepage on an on-going basis (cf. 
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Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, 2009, p. 43). 
In addition, a corporate governance statement (§ 289 (a) of the German 
Commercial Code) is to be disclosed. This so-called Corporate Governance 
Statement must include three key points. It includes firstly the declaration of com-
pliance. Secondly, the corresponding relevant information on the key corporate 
governance processes that go beyond the legal requirements. There must be an in-
dication made as to where this information can be publicly accessed. And thirdly, 
a description of the procedures of the management board and supervisory board 
as well as of the composition and modus operandi of their committees must form 
part of the Corporate Governance Statement (cf. kPMG, 2009). The corporate gov-
ernance statement was previously not regulated by law and was included into the 
German Commercial Code through the German Act to Modernize Accounting 
Law (BilMoG)56.
3.2.6 Consequences for Everyday Work
Before assessing the proposals made in the Catalogue of Measures as well as 
their implementation in the German Corporate Governance Code, one must take 
into account that it is exclusively the willingness of companies to follow the recom-
mendations and suggestions made that determines its effectiveness as long as they 
are not reflected in legislation.
In those cases where there has been an actual legal embodiment, one can as-
sume an effective impact. This is, for example, the case with the so-called Act on 
the Disclosure of Executive Board Remuneration (vorstoG) that came into force 
in 2005. It stipulates that listed corporations must declare the compensation paid 
to members of the management board in the notes to the annual and consolidated 
financial statements (§§ 285 Sentence 1 No. 9a, 314 (1) No. 6a hGB). one can also 
rate positively the legal regulations on the directors- and officers liability insur-
ance for members of the management board: “Should the company take out a D&o 
insurance to protect a member of its executive board against risks arising from his 
or her professional work then a deductible of at least 10 per cent of damages up 
to at least one and a half times the fixed remuneration of a board member must 
56  The German Act to Modernize Accounting Law is reviewed in more detail in 
chapter 3.3.2.
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be provided for”57 (translated in context by the author) (§ 93 (2) sentence 3 of the 
German Stock Corporation Act). Although this legislative measure, as such, can be 
assessed as positive there still remains the question whether the low deductible 
fulfils the deterrent function. These examples show, however, that at least the ac-
tions taken towards more transparency and to hinder fraudulent acts by deterrent 
means have fruited. The person who knows that being caught committing a crime 
will cost him or her dearly will act differently to a person who knows in advance 
that he/she does not need to fear punishment. 
As to the suggestions and recommendations one must note – as shown above 
– that there is a slight difference. In contrast to the recommendations, departures 
from suggestions are permitted without needing to be declared. This differentia-
tion is important in so far as deviating from a recommendation must be explained 
and thereby the danger of a recommendation going unnoticed is banned. one 
therefore speaks of a three-phased differentiation. The legal codification requires 
the fulfilment of the measure. The recommendation allows a deviation from the 
measure but this has to be justified. Suggestions, however, can be ignored without 
providing any form of rationale.
Because of this situation the German Corporate Governance Code is assessed 
as a “blunt weapon” (hofmann, 2008, p. 369) or a “toothless self-regulation” (zünd, 
2005, p. 8). As a consequence there are calls for unambiguous legislation and penal 
provisions that enforce adherence to ethical processes. Investors need enforceable 
laws (cf. hofmann, p. 369).
57 “Schließt die Gesellschaft eine versicherung zur Absicherung eines 
vorstandsmitglieds gegen Risiken aus dessen beruflicher Tätigkeit für die 
Gesellschaft ab, ist ein Selbstbehalt von mindestens 10 Prozent des Schadens bis 
mindestens zur höhe des Eineinhalbfachen der festen jährlichen vergütung des 
vorstandsmitglieds vorzusehen.”
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3.3 further development of Accounting stAndArds And 
its AdAption to internAtionAl Accounting principles
The EU standards for accounting are aimed at adapting the European ac-
counting principles to the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The decree passed in 2002 
obliges member states to ensure that all parent companies which are orientated 
towards the capital market to complete their group accounts according to the IAS/
IFRS standards as of 2005 or 2007. In line with point 4 of the Catalogue of Measures, 
issued by the German Federal Government, the adaptation of the German account-
ing principles towards international standards was implemented by the legislator 
in a two-stage process with the (German) Accounting Reform Act dated 15.12.2004 
(BGBl volume 2004 part I no. 65, page 3166 ff) and the German Act to Modernize 
Accounting Law dated 26.05.2009 (BGBl volume 2009 part I no. 27, page 1102 ff).
3.3.1 The (German) Accounting Reform Act
The content of the (German) Accounting Reform Act sets its priorities in the 
areas of accounting principles and the final audit58. Especially the accounting prin-
ciple section should implement the adaptation of the German accounting principles 
towards the IAS-decree of 2002. hereby, the primary goal is to ensure that member 
state options are exercised relating to the application of international accounting 
standards such as the IAS/IFRS in consolidated and separate financial statements. 
The scheme to adapt the German Commercial Code (hGB) to the IAS-decree forms 
the centre-piece of the act. In addition the (German) Accounting Reform Act im-
plements the compulsory elements of the fair-value, modernization and threshold 
directive (cf. hüttemann, 2004, p. 203; Wendlandt/knorr, 2005, p. 53).
At this point, it should be noted that many of the encompassing changes 
made to the (German) Accounting Reform Act were changed again with the intro-
duction of the (German) Act to Modernize Accounting Law. Consequently, some of 
the statutory provisions that are cited or explained in this section of the Accounting 
Reform Act in time no longer exist in the form cited at this point. Nevertheless, 
these legal changes within the Accounting Reform Act should be reviewed as part 
of this thesis, provided they were important steps in the path towards current 
58  For details on the subject of the final audit refer to point 3.4
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legislation.
3.3.1.1 Exercising the Decision Rights for the Separate Financial Statement 
Member states, pursuant to article 5 of the IAS-decree, are authorised to al-
low or even insist upon the application of the IAS also to the separate financial 
statement. This effects capital market companies as well as other companies. As 
such, the German Federal Government announced in its Catalogue of Measures 
from 2003, that the admission of the IAS for the separate financial statement is pro-
posed only in relation to its informational function, but would otherwise abide to 
the financial statement rules of the German Commercial Code (hGB). The separate 
financial statement does not just fulfil information purposes but is also the basis 
for measuring the distribution of dividends (cf. for example § 57 (3), § 58 (4) of the 
German Stock Corporation Act) and forms the basis for determining taxable earn-
ings (cf. § 5 (1), sentence 1 of the German Income Tax Act). The reasoning behind 
the restrictive implementation as provided by the German Federal Government is 
as follows (cf. draft bill of the German Accounting Reform Act/Federal Ministry of 
Justice, 2003, p. 50/6 f): 
•	 As the fair value notion is strongly emphasised within the IAS and therefore 
not yet realised profits have to be captured, an IAS-financial statement is 
hardly feasible as a basis for measuring the distribution of dividends. For the 
purpose of informational needs, this approach makes sense but it appears 
less appropriate to distribute not yet realised profit to the shareholder. As 
such, even the IASB note that the guidelines should only fulfil the purpose of 
providing information (cf. draft bill of the German Accounting Reform Act/
Federal Ministry of Justice, 2003, p. 51/7). 
•	 The upstream process for recognising gains, which does not fulfil the principle 
of a performance-related taxation, does not let the application of the IAS as a 
basis for taxation seem appropriate. A further crucially important factor is that 
the IAS is ruled by a private body, namely the IASB. The national legislator will 
hardly give up part of its legislative power relating to tax law and transfer its 
rights to a private body. Furthermore, the Federal Ministry of Finance needs 
planning security. For this reason, there is a vested interest to understand the 
foreseeable tax burden on the one hand and the State revenue on the other 
hand. Accounting according to the IAS principles, however, often leads to a 
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considerable fluctuation of results (cf. draft bill of the German Accounting 
Reform Act/Federal Ministry of Justice, 2003, p. 51/7).
•	 As decoupling the Tax from the Trade Balance by creating a separate Tax 
Accounting Law would mean an abrupt change to the current system, which in 
turn would put an un-proportionally high strain on companies, such measures 
should not be taken. In addition, it is not absolutely clear whether a separate 
Tax Accounting Law could be implemented at much lower cost (cf. draft bill of 
the German Accounting Reform Act/Federal Ministry of Justice, 2003, p. 53/9).
The implementation of voting rights occurs, pursuant to the German 
Accounting Reform Act, only on a voluntary basis and only for the purpose of dis-
closure (§ 325 (2a) and (2b) hGB). A company which publishes a separate financial 
statement for informational purposes pursuant to the IAS must still create an ad-
ditional hGB-financial statement for corporate law and tax purposes. § 325 (2a) of 
the German Commercial Code (hGB) specifically states that the following provi-
sions are to be made: sentence 1: instead of the obligatory publication of a German 
Commercial Code (hGB) separate financial statement, one can also publish a sepa-
rate financial statement pursuant to international regulations (IAS/IFRS). Sentence 
2 and § 325 (2b) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) designate the following 
five conditions:
•	 Full compliance with the International Accounting Standards.
•	 The management report must refer to the IAS separate financial statement in 
the required detail.
•	 An IAS separate financial statement auditor’s certificate must be published 
instead of the German Commercial Code (hGB) separate financial statements 
auditor’s certificate. 
•	 In addition, the separate financial statement pursuant to the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) along with the corresponding auditor’s certificate 
must be handed in to the Commercial Register. 
•	 The proposal for the distribution of profits as well as the decision for the 
distribution of profits must also be published.
Sentence 3 and 4 obligate a company preparing their annual accounts ac-
cording to IAS, to continue to use the following hGB norms analogical to § 315a (1) 
of the German Commercial Code (hGB), in particular, the regulations relating to 
the management report.
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The legislator therefore views the application of the IAS for separate finan-
cial statements as a solution that provides companies with a high degree of flexibil-
ity and at the same time integrates itself into the systematization of the prevailing 
accounting and company law (cf. draft bill of the German Accounting Reform Act/
Federal Ministry of Justice, 2003, p. 53/9).
3.3.1.2 Extended Detail of Notes
Through the implementation of the fair value directive, changes to the de-
tails of the notes were made. Pursuant to § 285 number 18 as well as § 314 num-
ber 10 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) the type and extent of derivative 
financial instruments per category as well as their fair value are to be provided. 
Derivative financial instruments are artificially created constructs whose value 
changes based on changes to a fixed interest rate, share price, price or interest 
index, credit rating or credit index or a comparable variable component. They re-
quire no or only a small initial net investment and are settled at a future date. In 
addition, the valuation technique and, if available, the existing book value of the 
derivative as well as of the balance sheet item are to be provided for the statements 
made (cf. Wendlandt/knorr, 2005, p. 54)59. 
3.3.1.3 Extended Management Report
§ 289 (1) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) was designed in such a 
way that the company results must be explicitly stated and that a balanced and 
comprehensive analysis of the business performance and the situation of the com-
pany must be portrayed. The degree of detail of this analysis is dependent on the 
magnitude and complexity of the business field in which the company operates. 
This analysis must include the relevant financial performance indicators for the 
business field and these must be explained referencing the declared amounts and 
information as provided in the annual statement of accounts. The legislator justi-
fies this with the rationale that the annual statement of accounts is in principle 
there for presentation reasons whereas the management report fulfils primarily 
59  Based on the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law these paragraphs 
have already been changed. In addition, the requirements for the derivative fi-
nancial instruments can now be found in § 285 number 19 hGB as well as § 314 
number 11 hGB.
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the purpose of analysis and elaboration of relevant key figures and issues (cf. draft 
bill of the German Accounting Reform Act, 2003, p. 63). 
Furthermore, the § 289 (1) sentence 4 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
states that: “Moreover the management report must show the foreseeable develop-
ment along with the assessment and explanation of key opportunities and risks; 
the relevant underlying assumptions must be disclosed”60 (translated in context 
by the author). The annual results should be explained and commented on by the 
executive board. The main premises that the forward-looking statements are based 
upon are to be made transparent by the board. This was supposed to fulfil the goal 
to increase the standard of information relevant for decision-making within the 
management report and to allow target versus actual comparisons to take place (cf. 
draft bill of the German Accounting Reform Act, 2003, p. 62). 
Pursuant to the § 289 (2), number 2 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
the management report should cater to “the risk management goals and method-
ologies of the company including its methods for securing all important types of 
transactions that are captured as part of the hedge accounting documentation, as 
well as the price, default and liquidity risks as well as the risks from cash flow 
volatility to which the company is exposed, interpreted in relation to the usage of 
financial instruments by the company and to its relevance for the situation or the 
foreseeable development of the company”61 (translated in context by the author). 
This version implements the requirements of the fair value directive for report-
ing the usage of financial instruments. The methods used to hedge the risk are 
predominantly hedge transactions. With this, when hedge transactions are under-
60  „Ferner ist im Lagebericht die voraussichtliche Entwicklung mit ihren wesen-
tlichen Chancen und Risiken zu beurteilen und zu erläutern; zugrunde liegende 
Annahmen sind anzugeben“.
61  „die Risikomanagementziele und –methoden der Gesellschaft einschließlich 
ihrer Methoden zur Absicherung aller wichtigen Arten von Transaktionen, die 
im Rahmen der Bilanzierung von Sicherungsgeschäften erfasst werden, sow-
ie die Preisänderungs-, Ausfall- und Liquiditätsrisiken sowie die Risiken aus 
zahlungsstromschwankungen, denen die Gesellschaft ausgesetzt ist, jeweils in 
Bezug auf die verwendung von Finanzinstrumenten durch die Gesellschaft und 
sofern dies für die Beurteilung der Lage oder der voraussichtlichen Entwicklung 
von Belang ist“
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taken, the underlying systematization and the type and category of the various 
different hedges must be reported in detail (cf. draft bill of the German Accounting 
Reform Act, 2003, p. 63).
Also § 289 (3) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) was amended in or-
der to implement the modernization directive. The reporting obligations of large 
limited liability companies (§ 267 (3) hGB) has been extended to include non-fi-
nancial performance indicators, such as information relating to environmental and 
employee matters, as long as it is relevant for understanding the business devel-
opment or the situation of the company. Small and medium sized limited liabil-
ity companies are freed from this reporting requirement. The legislator observes 
in its explanatory statement that the above mentioned matters of environmental 
protection as well as employee matters should not form an exhaustive list and 
should therefore not entail a corresponding strategic objective. The management 
report should include also other non-financial information if it is important for 
the valuation of the business development, the current situation or the foresee-
able development of the company. At this stage, it refers to the development of a 
core customers base, human capital, research and development as well as dona-
tions to charitable organisations and if applicable to sponsoring (cf. draft bill of the 
German Accounting Reform Act, 2003, p. 64).
3.3.1.4 Exercising the Decision Rights for the Group Accounts
Article 5 of the IAS-decree allows Member States to decide if the IAS should 
also be applied or even prescribed for the group accounts of companies which 
have not issued securities on the market. In line with the announcement in the 
Catalogue of Measures of 2003, the legislator gave all companies a comprehensive 
right to decide if they want to apply the IAS for their group accounts (cf. draft bill 
of the German Accounting Reform Act/Federal Ministry of Justice, 2003, p. 49/5).
For group accounts of capital market oriented companies, the § 315a (1) hGB 
regulates that such companies must complete their group accounts in line with 
the IAS/IFRS. Nevertheless, some of the German Commercial Code (hGB) guide-
lines, especially those relating to the management report (§ 315 hGB), must also 
be adhered to. Also companies which have applied for a listed security to trade 
on a regulated market pursuant to § 2 (5) of the German Stock Corporation Act, 
must, based on § 315 a (2) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) complete their 
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accounting according to the IAS standard. Companies which are not capital mar-
ket orientated are allowed to complete their group accounts pursuant to the IAS/
IFRS standards.
According to Wendlandt and knorr this gives such companies which would 
like to present their business partners with accounts which have been prepared ac-
cording to international standards a guaranteed flexibility (cf. Wendlandt/knorr, 
2005, p. 55 f).
3.3.1.5 Abolition of the Consolidation Prohibition Pursuant to § 295 HGB
Before 31 December 2004 there were situations where a subsidiary, due to 
the different nature of its activities, was prohibited from being included into the 
group accounts. This regulation was removed from the German Commercial Code 
(hGB) as it was not internationally recognized. The different areas of activities of a 
company are catered for through segment reporting according to the international 
accounting standards (cf. Wendlandt/knorr, 2005, p. 57).
3.3.1.6 Extension of the Items Within the Consolidated Financial Statements 
§ 297 (1) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) was re-designed 1 January 
2005; this states that: “The group accounts consist of the consolidated balance 
sheet, the consolidated income statement, the consolidated notes, the cash flow 
statement and the statement of changes in equity. It can be expanded to include 
segment reporting”62 (translated in context by the author). The cash flow state-
ment and the statement of changes in equity are therefore prescribed for all group 
accounts. The legislator justifies this on the grounds that both instruments are 
frequently used for analysis purposes. The segment reporting, which in some cir-
cumstances contains highly sensitive information, is therefore only an optional 
part of the group accounts. Capital market orientated companies that create their 
accounts according to the IAS/IFRS automatically underlie the duty of segment 
reporting (cf. Wendlandt/knorr, 2005, p. 56). 
3.3.1.7 Evaluation
62  „Der konzernabschluss besteht aus der konzernbilanz, der konzern-Gewinn-
und-verlustrechnung, dem konzernanhang, der kapitalflussrechnung und dem 
Eigenkapitalspiegel. Er kann um eine Segmentberichterstattung erweitert werden.“
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The dispute over the development of accounting principles has come to 
very opposing results. Ernst assumes that the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IAS/IFRS) are the accounting standards of the present-day and as well 
of the future. The only open question is whether it is the only method for mak-
ing all companies happy. According to his opinion, the current system should be 
maintained and then constantly updated. The German Commercial Code (hGB) 
should be developed further, reformed and adapted to current circumstances and 
conditions; one could not abolish the German Commercial Code (hGB) (cf. Ernst 
in Freidank, 2005, p. 4). 
According to the “External Corporate Accounting”63 working group (liter-
ally translated by the author); the German Commercial Codes’ (hGB) financial 
statement should include the distribution of profits, the taxation and a minimum 
of information, but not more than that. People requiring more information should 
refer to the IAS/IFRS (cf. Ernst in Freidank, 2005, p. 4 f).
Ernst raises the point that, in relation to this, the view also exists that the 
IFRS in its current form has no strong future. This type of market evaluation al-
ready existed 150 years ago and was stopped for good reason. As such the “IFRS-
spook” 64 (literally translated by the author) will pass just as quickly. Proposals that 
originate from this direction are therefore directed towards further developing 
individual sections of the German Commercial Code (hGB) – while fully keeping 
the important corner pillars (core points) unchanged (cf. Ernst in Freidank, 2005, 
p. 5).
Peemöller highlights the fact that the financial statements pursuant to IAS/
IFRS provide a vast amount of information with which one can form a good view 
of the economic situation of the company. According to him, this vast amount of 
information should be used and not discounted as “Information overflow” (cf. 
Peemöller in Freidank, 2005, p. 97).
The overall analysis, according to hofmann, sees the changes made to the 
Accounting Reform Act (BilReG) as appropriate for improving the meaningfulness 
of management reports. A more detailed view of a company results in a higher 
quality of financial communication and, as such, strengthens investor protection. 
however, hofmann points out that in relation to the actual reporting praxis, there 
63  „Externe Unternehmensrechnung“
64  „IFRS-Spuk“
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is skepticism whether it is really possible to develop the management report to 
become a “second pillar” along with the annual financial statement (cf. hofmann, 
2008, p. 284). This is supported by the fact that the application of the IAS/IFRS is 
seen less enthusiastically in present times compared to when it was published as 
part of the fundamental EU Regulation in 2002. An important reason for this is the 
lack of clarity of the set of regulations of the IAS/IFRS, that with its current scope 
of much more than 2000 pages is also still in a dynamic development evolution. 
A continuously growing and therefore for investors even more incomprehensible 
company reporting in turn works against investor protection. The critical analysis 
of the down-side küting states appropriately as follows: “We were all blinded by 
the statement that, once the international accounting standard is implemented, all 
things will improve”65 (translated by author in context) (cited in hofmann, 2008, 
p. 281).
Ernst reports on the internationally supported expert hearing in May 2005, 
where the following trend towards the assessment of the IFRS became clear: The 
IFRS in its current form is good for large companies but by far not so good for small 
and medium-sized companies. A further development of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB) should be welcomed but not a uniform accounting process pursuant 
to IFRS that is applicable for all companies per se (cf. Ernst in Freidank, 2005, p. 6). 
Following the views cited in various publications, it can be said that in rela-
tion to large companies, the application of IAS/IFRS is an improvement in the com-
parability of accounting on an international level. In Germany analysts are used 
to proceeding, according to the German Commercial Code (hGB). A changeover 
in accounting practices for the annual financial statements pursuant to IAS/IFRS 
therefore requires a high level of willingness to change existing habits und face 
new requirements. In comparison, in Great Britain where companies complete their 
accounts mainly pursuant to Uk-GAPP and IFRS, one must take into account that 
the tendency exists to portray companies in as positive a light as possible. Whereas 
in Germany, merchants traditionally follow the principle of caution. In relation to 
the application of IAS/IFRS one must also take into account that it does not only 
provide the possibility of decision rights but that this also means that bottom-line, 
all positions that exist at a certain point in time must be shown in its current value 
65  „Wir sind alle geblendet worden, als gesagt wurde, wenn die internationale 
Bilanzierung kommt, wird alles besser.“
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(for example, pursuant to IAS/IFRS all parts of an airplane – fuselage, nozzles, 
interior – must be individually written-off). The determining factor here is that 
key parts, with varying useful life, of a single asset are written-off differently (cf. 
IAS 16.43). In contrast, pursuant to the German Commercial Code (hGB) the plane 
would be written-off as one (§ 253 (3) hGB, in connection with § 255 (1) hGB). A 
(small) German company that does not have to create their accounts pursuant to 
IAS/IFRS but chooses to do so, will in all likelihood portray their annual financial 
statement in a better light than it actually is. The reason for this is the improved 
leeway of scope for portraying the accounts if accounting pursuant to IAS/IFRS. 
As such, one can conclude that for recognizing the actual commercial viabil-
ity of a company, the ability of the person analyzing the annual financial statement 
is the deciding factor. Specific positions of the annual financial statement pursuant 
to IAS/IFRS must be, as a minimum requirement, present in the statement of the 
financial position within the accounts (cf. IAS 1.54). The extension of these mini-
mum requirements – i.e. the segmentation of these items – can occur either in the 
balance sheet or the notes (cf. IAS 1.54). A qualified reader of balance sheets will 
take a close look at the structure of these items – especially of their segmentation – 
within the annual financial statement.
In relation to the possibility of discovering balance sheet manipulations one 
should note that with increasing complexity of the annual financial statement also 
the difficulty increases to discover manipulated items. Especially small and me-
dium-sized companies have the possibility to hide inaccuracies when accounting 
pursuant to IAS/IFRS, as its addressees are mainly small credit institutions and 
taxation authorities. Their employees normally do not have the competencies re-
quired to uncover cunningly hidden balance sheet violations. 
3.3.2 The German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG)
Whilst the German Federal Government announced in 2003 in its Catalogue 
of Measures its aim to modernise the German Commercial Code (hGB) and in a 
first step started to do this when the German Accounting Reform Act came into 
force in 2004, the actual submission of the announced draft bill addressing these 
issues was constantly deferred; it was finally published in November 2007. The 
draft bill of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law triggered a flood of 
comments which were partly considered in the revised draft bill dated 21 May 
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2008. on 26 March 2009 the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law was ap-
proved by the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and came into effect on 
29 May 2009. The primary goal of the German Act to Modernize Accounting 
Law – according to the Federal Ministry of Justice – was to advance the German 
accounting principles so as to become a lasting and fully-fledged alternative to 
the international accounting standards (IFRS). It should be a simpler and more 
cost-effective alternative that would provide especially small and medium-sized 
companies with the option of using modern accounting principles without hav-
ing to apply the IFRS. During this process, the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
was “cleansed” from outdated decision rights and the reverse authoritativeness 
principle of the tax law upon the commercial code was abolished. In addition, the 
German Act to Modernize Accounting Law wanted to implement a deregulation 
in order to free companies from unnecessary costs. Also in future the trade bal-
ance will play an important role for the assessment of distributions and for the 
determination of taxable income (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 6). The remainder of this chapter, 
based on the focus on accounting fraud, will initially refer to the changes which 
have no potential impact on stopping account manipulations or which even nur-
ture accounting manipulations. Following this, there will be a short description of 
further statutory updates through the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law.
The modernization of the German Commercial Law led to measures of cost 
relief. The German Act to Modernize Accounting Law supports the reduction of 
bureaucratic costs by freeing sole traders from the duty of bookkeeping and ac-
counting obligations according to the commercial law. In § 241a of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) it states in relation to the release from the duty of book-
keeping and for preparing the inventory that: “Sole traders who at the time of the 
financial reporting dates of two consecutive business years, have not more than 
500,000 euros turnover and 50,000 euros annual surplus do not need to apply § 
238 to 241 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) 66. In the case of start-ups the 
legal requirements already apply when the values do not exceed the values of the 
block 1 at the time of the start-ups first financial reports”67 (translated in context 
66  This relates to the release from the duty to do bookkeeping and for preparing 
the inventory. 
67  „Einzelkaufleute, die an den Abschlussstichtagen von zwei aufeinander folgen-
den Geschäftsjahren nicht mehr als 500.000 Euro Umsatzerlöse und 50.000 Euro 
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by the author). Pursuant to § 242 (4) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) the 
parties affected do not require a financial statement – consisting of a balance sheet 
and the profit and loss account – to be prepared in accordance with the German 
Commercial Code (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 7).
Bittmann’s view on the de-coupling of the bookkeeping and accounting re-
quirements from the (full) merchant status (§ 241a hGB) is of “deep systematic 
concern”68 (literally translated by the author). The explosiveness of the fact that 
retail traders are freed from the need to bookkeep or prepare inventory if their 
turnover is below 500,000 euros and their profit below 50,000 euros is self-explan-
atory. he raises serious questions in relation to the possibility of manipulating 
the accounts. This is, on the one side, the question how are threshold values de-
termined especially relating to when they are exceeded. Bittmann fears that such 
regulations will entice entrepreneurs to manipulate their profit assessment to 
be below the threshold, especially since there is no documentation requirement 
for the rationale provided. Another question raised by Bittmann is then how le-
gitimate the Accounting and Balance Sheet Criminal Law remains. § 331 of the 
German Commercial Code (hGB) as well as § 283 b (3) and 283 (1), number 5 and 7 
of the German Criminal Code base their penal code mainly on the identity of the 
qualification of a merchant on the one hand and the bookkeeping and accounting 
obligation on the other hand (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 444 f). one must agree with 
Bittmann when he states that a merchant who does not have the appropriate level 
of information can hardly manage a business effectively. If a merchant does not 
do exact bookkeeping, then he cannot know what the current financial status of 
the company is. he cannot, for example, based on missing calculations assess if 
he can accept a specific contract at the offered price. he is not in the position to 
define his assets and his liabilities and as such cannot assess his capital resources. 
In addition, he can neither calculate his customer nor creditor repayment periods 
and does not know how often the goods in his warehouse are handled. Without an 
appropriate level of bookkeeping, it is not possible to lead a solid operation. 
Jahresüberschuss aufweisen, brauchen die §§ 238 bis 241 hGB nicht anzuwenden. 
Im Fall der Neugründung treten die Rechtsfolgen schon ein, wenn die Werte des 
Satzes 1 am ersten Abschlussstichtag nach der Neugründung nicht überschritten 
werden.“
68  „stärksten systematischen Bedenken“
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Annual financial statement: A fundamental part of the German Act to 
Modernize Accounting Law is the modernization of the recognition and measure-
ment provision for all merchants. In addition, there are supplementary require-
ments for corporate enterprises which encompass not only a convergence towards 
international financial reporting standards but also the adoption of European re-
quirements (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 8).
For self-created intangible assets § 248 (2) the German Commercial Code 
(hGB) foresees a restricted option to capitalize these. Should one make use of the 
option to capitalize then one must, pursuant to § 285 number 22 of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB), declare in the notes the full year amount of research and 
development costs as well as the value of the self-created intangible assets. For 
trademarks, print titles, publishing rights, customer lists or comparable intangible 
assets which have not been purchased, there is a capitalization prohibition pursu-
ant to § 248 (2), sentence 2 of the German Commercial Code (hGB). The reason for 
this capitalization prohibition is that the production costs for the previously men-
tioned intangible assets cannot be clearly isolated from the expenditures for the 
development of the company as a whole – this refers to the self-created business 
and company value (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 12).
Bittmann views this restrictive capitalization prohibition of trademarks, 
print titles, publishing rights, customer lists or comparable intangible assets as a 
big issue for the person applying the law. The legislator does not provide more de-
tail what such or comparable items are. What, for example, is the view on patents, 
know-how or ideas? Should these items be categorized as exceptions then what 
could still be classified as a capitalized internally generated intangible asset? At 
least the rationale for the law provides some interpretation support. According to 
this, those self-created intangible assets can be capitalized where a cost of produc-
tion can reliably be determined (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 443).
Pursuant to § 255 (2a) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) “production 
costs of intangible assets are costs created during its development”69 (translated 
in context by the author). Development costs are not allowed to be included in the 
production costs pursuant to § 255 (2), sentence 4 of the German Commercial Code 
69  „herstellungskosten eines selbst geschaffenen immateriellen 
vermögensgegenstandes des Anlagevermögens die bei dessen Entwicklung an-
fallenden Aufwendungen“
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(hGB). only such expenditures are allowed to be capitalized that occur during 
the development phase. For this purpose, one can find a legal definition in § 255 
(2a), sentence 2 and 3 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) of what research 
and development is. It is stated that; “a development is the application of research 
results or of new knowledge used for further development of goods or processes or 
the advancement of goods or processes by making significant changes. Research 
is the independent and planned search for new scientific or technical insights or 
experiences of a general nature and to which no statement can be made as to their 
technical applicability or economic chances for success.”70 (translated in context by 
the author). It is not possible to reliably separate research and development and as 
a result one is not allowed to capitalize development costs pursuant to § 255 (2a), 
sentence 4 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 12 f). Also in re-
lation to this Bittmann critically states that for all practical purposes one can often 
not effectively distinguish between research and development costs. The point in 
time when the research phase of a project is finished and it goes into the phase of 
development cannot always be reliably determined. This in turn offers the possi-
bility of manipulation by capturing the costs as not to be capitalized research costs 
or as deductible development costs. According to Bittmann, the changes made to 
§ 255 (2a), sentence 4 of the German Commercial Code (hGB), whereby it is not 
allowed by law to capitalize development costs if they cannot be clearly differenti-
ated from the research costs, does not change anything relating to the actual op-
portunities to manipulate (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 442 f). 
For reasons of creditor protection there is a payout block for corporate enter-
prises. Pursuant to § 268 (8), sentence 1 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
profits up to the amount capitalized are only allowed to be paid out if the amount 
of available reserves remaining after the pay-out plus any profits carried forward 
and minus losses carried forward and minus accruals formed for deferred taxes 
70  „Entwicklung ist die Anwendung von Forschungsergebnissen oder von an-
derem Wissen für die Neuentwicklung von Gütern oder verfahren oder die 
Weiterentwicklung von Gütern oder verfahren mittels wesentlicher Änderungen. 
Forschung ist die eigenständige und planmäßige Suche nach neuen wissenschaftli-
chen oder technischen Erkenntnissen oder Erfahrungen allgemeiner Art, über 
deren technische verwertbarkeit und wirtschaftliche Erfolgsaussichten grundsät-
zlich keine Aussagen gemacht werden können“.
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is at least equal to this amount (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 13). As such the amount of payout 
blocked relating to self-created intangible assets is not based on the full amount of 
capitalized assets but is formed based upon the difference between the book value 
of self-created intangible assets and the related deferred tax assets (cf. küting et 
al., 2011, p. 3). Also according to Bittmann this payout block leads to the situation 
where the available distributable profits only consist of the surplus minus the capi-
talized self-created intangible assets and further blocked assets. The impact on the 
Criminal Law is not uniform but has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This 
can be seen in the following example: For making an assessment whether being 
over-indebted pursuant to § 263 of the German Criminal Code or a delay in filing 
for an insolvency pursuant to § 15a of the Insolvency Statute exists, the self-created 
intangible assets only recently have to be considered as assets. Depending on the 
situation, this can definitely lead to a major move in the timing of becoming insol-
vent. The time of insolvency will clearly occur at a later point in time. Consequently, 
there is a contrast between this regulation and the goals of the Insolvency Statute. 
This is aimed at initiating insolvency proceeding as early as possible in the interest 
of improving the chances for recovery (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 442).
A completely different effect has been made through the abolition of § 269 
of the German Commercial Code. In order to help with the balance sheets this 
paragraph also allowed the capitalization of expenses relating to start-ups and ex-
pansions, whereby these were also with a payout block. But since the German Act 
to Modernize Accounting Law came into force it is forbidden to capitalize start-
up and expansion investments. The delay in the timing of the over-indebtedness 
is therefore lessened by the fact that this form of capitalization is forbidden (cf. 
Bittmann, 2008, p. 442). 
The purchased (derivative) goodwill is a short-term useable asset which has 
to be capitalized pursuant to § 246 (1), sentence 4 of the German Commercial Code 
(hGB). It has to be amortized over the planned useful life. The erstwhile permitted 
fixed-rate amortization over four years under § 255 (4) of the German Commercial 
Code is now obsolete. If a company wants to capitalize a purchased goodwill over 
a planned period of more than five years, they must provide the rationale in the 
notes as to why the goodwill should be used for a period of more than five years 
(cf. BDI, 2009, p. 9). In addition § 253 (5), sentence 2 of the German Commercial 
Code prescribes that the lower amount stated for a purchased goodwill has to be 
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upheld. This restrictive directive is based upon the rationale that an occurring re-
versal after an asset is written down is related to the business and operating activi-
ties of a company and is therefore self-created. And that the self-created goodwill 
is not to be capitalized today or in the future (cf. Ernst/Seidler, 2007, p. 2558). From 
a taxation point of view, the purchased goodwill can be activated as an asset, as is 
current praxis. As a result, it is possible to have a discrepancy between commercial 
and tax balance sheets resulting from the different rules of write-downs. From a 
tax perspective, purchased goodwill must be amortized over a standard useful 
life of fifteen years. If, based on this directive, the situation should occur where 
the goodwill from a commercial law perspective has a shorter useful life than the 
term used in the balance sheet for taxation purposes, then one must possibly form 
deferred tax assets which must be commercially carried forward. In addition, the 
future commercial capitalization of goodwill can have an effect on the commercial 
equity ratio (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 9).
The duty to capitalize purchased derivative goodwill is viewed critically by 
Bittmann. In his opinion there is a scope of assessment when taking over compa-
nies that affects the value of the derivative goodwill, which in turn provides the 
opportunity to manipulate. Similar concern was already raised by Bittmann in 
regard to the capitalization of intangible assets. It is also questionable that self-
created goodwill should not be capitalized. If, for example, three years after takeo-
ver one finds an item of goodwill, then it must be clarified to which percentage it 
is derived and to which percentage it is self-created. This appears to be a difficult 
issue to solve for the person developing the accounts. At this point, Bittmann raises 
the question how one should proceed when the overall value of the goodwill does 
not decrease, but the derivative goodwill must be value-corrected due to continu-
ous reduction of its value whereby at the same time the self-created value of the 
goodwill increases by the same amount. Bittmann gives rise to concern that, given 
such complex scenarios, it is hardly possible to generally quantify the planned use-
ful life (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 443).
Another aspect is that the capitalization of the derivative goodwill poten-
tially leads to the over-indebtedness occurring at a later point in time and this 
therefore makes a mockery of the Insolvency Statute (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 443). 
A company which is in a state of crisis must, when creating the annual finan-
cial statements documentations, check if there is a case for over-indebtedness. 
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According to the definition of insolvency which prevailed until 2008, the assets 
had to outweigh the debts. If this was not the case, then you were over-indebted 
pursuant to the Insolvency Statute. From 2008 to the end of 2013 there was an in-
terim arrangement whereby, if you had a positive prognosis for the company, you 
were not over-indebted pursuant to the Insolvency Statute (§ 19 Inso). This regula-
tion was then indefinitely extended with the introduction of the Financial Market 
Stabilization Act and is thereby valid for an unlimited period of time. Should a 
company, however, become over-indebted without a positive prognosis, the goal of 
the Insolvency Statute is to bring forward an application of insolvency (cf. Steffen, 
2001, p. 7; Nickert, 2012, p. 1; German Federal Ministry of Justice (press report), 
2012, Neue Rechtsbehelfsbelehrung und Entfristung des Überschuldungsbegriffs 
beschlossen).
Pursuant to § 253 (1), sentence 2 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
provisions should be valued according to prudent commercial assessment of the 
required amount payable. Thus the valuation of provisions must take into account 
future price and cost relations at the time the obligation is to be settled. By contrast, 
the § 6 (1), number 3a, letter f of the Income Tax Act explicitly points out that for the 
purpose of determining taxable net income when assessing provisions, the condi-
tions prevailing on the reporting date are essential. For this reason future price 
and cost increases are not allowed to be considered. In the commercial balance 
sheet this can lead to a situation where, for the purpose of differentiation, deferred 
tax assets are established and have to be carried forward in the balance sheet (cf. 
BDI, 2009, p. 16).
Provisions must generally be discounted taking into account the individual 
evaluation principle. This applies for financial liabilities as well as for the obliga-
tion to supply goods. § 253 (2), sentence 1 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
states that provisions maturing in more than one year must be discounted using 
the average market interest rate of the past seven years, according to their remain-
ing maturities. By applying a market interest rate, the individual credit risk of the 
debtor is not considered within the interest rate. An average market interest rate of 
the past seven years is used in order to absorb elements of randomness in the inter-
est rate development. The required discount rates pursuant to § 253 (2), sentences 
4 and 5 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) are established by the German 
federal bank in line with legal regulations and are published on a monthly basis 
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(cf. BDI, 2009, p. 16). 
For pension provisions, special regulations were introduced. here no spe-
cific actuarial method of calculation is required. Pursuant to § 285, number 24 of 
the German Commercial Code (hGB) the actuarial method of calculation applied 
must be described in the notes and the basic assumptions of the calculation must 
be explained. When discounting pension provisions, one must generally apply, 
same as for all other provisions, the average market interest rate of the past seven 
years as determined by the German federal bank. however, pursuant to § 253 (2), 
sentence 2 and 3 of the German Commercial Code (hGB), there is a simplification 
rule. According to this, pension provisions can be generally discounted with the 
average market interest rate of the past seven years which results from the as-
sumed residual term of 15 years. This is a right that can be decided by the reporting 
entity (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 17).
Bittmann views the total procedure applied for valuating provisions pur-
suant to the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law slightly more critically. 
According to him, the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law provides two 
changes which go in opposing directions. he points out that, on the one hand, 
pursuant to § 253 (1), sentence 2 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) a valua-
tion of provisions by reasonable commercial assessment on the basis of the amount 
payable has come into effect replacing the previous rule of the current valuation 
cut-off-date principle. This leads to the situation where future price increases have 
to be projected and taken into account. This process provides the reporting en-
tity with significant leeway in which to operate. This rule is even more stringent 
when establishing the pension provisions. here one must not only take into ac-
count future wage increases but also the individual career development of employ-
ees. Bittmann is right to question whether this is reliably do-able. These adjustable 
components provide easy ways to manipulate balance sheets. These requirements 
will generally lead to a situation where increases in provisions will be made. But 
the reporting entity can determine the extent of provisions being made variably 
depending on the prevailing economic situation and objectives. on the other hand, 
pursuant to § 253 (2) of the German Commercial Code there is a compulsory re-
quirement to discount the provisions made. This reduces the value of these provi-
sions (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 443 f.). The aspects highlighted by Bittmann clarify that 
this provides a creative leeway in which one can conceal accounting fraud.
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According to Bittmann with the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law 
coming into effect one can expect to see the amounts of passivating provisions in-
creasing. This can generally lead to a pre-emption of the time companies apply for 
insolvency in the form of an earlier occurrence of over-indebtedness and thereby 
stands in contrast to the compulsory requirement to capitalize self-created intan-
gible assets and the derivative goodwill. however, it will probably rarely happen 
that these counteracting trends actually occur within one company. All in all, the 
valuation of the provisions can be viewed as being closer to reality compared to 
the former valuation methods (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 444).
Pursuant to § 340e of the German Commercial Code, credit institutions must 
capture the financial assets held for trading at fair value as recorded income. This 
regulation was initially to apply for all companies independent of their structure 
or legal form. The legislator distanced itself though from this directive due to the 
financial crisis. It was viewed as appropriate to limit the valuation to the banks’ 
trading books. A final definition of the term financial instruments is not planned 
as the market tends to be very fast-paced in this sector and there are constantly 
new creations being made. As such, one should assume a wide basis of applica-
tion, so that also all types of derivative financial instruments are included. The 
amount provided at fair value must have a so-called risk-discount applied to it. 
The risk-discount is established based upon the internal risk handling pursuant to 
banking regulatory specifications (value at risk). Pursuant to § 340e of the German 
Commercial Code a reclassification of financial instruments is prohibited unless 
unusual circumstances, in particular severe impairments to the free transferability 
of the financial instruments, lead to a stop in the intention to trade by the credit 
institution. Pursuant to § 340g of the German Commercial Code credit institutions 
are allowed to include the position “funds for general banking risks” on the liabili-
ties side of the balance sheet to protect against general banking risks as long as it 
is, after prudent commercial assessment, required due to the special risks of the 
particular credit institutions business sector. Pursuant to § 340e (4) of the German 
Commercial Code, this fund for general banking risks must have, in each business 
year, an amount of at least 10 per cent of the net earnings of the trading book added 
and this must be recognised separately. This position is only allowed to be liqui-
dated to compensate the net amount of the trading portfolio. or in the situation 
when the value is higher than 50 per cent of the average last five years net revenue 
of the trading portfolio (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 18 f).
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If a market value of a financial instrument exists then the valuation is admit-
tedly relatively simple. however, the explosive nature of this valuation process 
can be seen in the mortgage bank and fiscal crisis which to date still has not been 
entirely overcome. Banks and insurance companies had and still have to undergo 
massive value adjustments of their financial instruments (cf. Bittmann, 2008, p. 
444). The German Commerzbank, for example, lost in the period from January 2008 
till December 2011 more than 80 per cent of its share value. This is not just a result 
of the financial instruments purchased by the Commerzbank for trading purposes. 
But the financial instruments were part of the reason for the decline in value of 
the high street bank. For hypothetically major price falls it can, for example, hap-
pen that with a real-time valuation there is a faster reduction of hidden reserves 
as when there is a not such a real-time valuation. If there is no market value of 
the financial instruments, the valuation is much harder to complete. Then the so-
called general commercial measurement methods must be applied. Also pursuant 
to § 254 of the German Commercial Code another option is to create valuation 
units, whereby one is allowed to deviate from the principle of individual valuation. 
The correct valuation of financial instruments purchased for trading purposes is 
becoming increasingly more difficult due to the lack of straightforwardness and 
accounting fraud can probably, if wanted, be more easily carried out. 
After having reviewed changes made to the accounting principles, taking 
into consideration the question whether they are of interest in providing possibili-
ties to stop accounting fraud, the next section will briefly outline additional legal 
amendments triggered by the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law. Based 
on the wide spectrum of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law, the fol-
lowing outline will focus on major changes only. Areas which offer the possibil-
ity of manipulation of balance sheets will be highlighted accordingly. The basis 
for this outline is the publication of the Federation of German Industry (BDI) (cf. 
BDI - Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie and Ernst & Young, German Act to 
Modernize Accounting Law, 2009): 
Annual financial statement: valuation requirements for all merchants: 
1. Economic attribution: “The principle of the economic attribution of assets is 
clearly and explicitly stated in the law – no changes to the current legal situation 
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are planned. Debts need to be included in the balance sheets of the debtor”71 
(translated in context by the author) (§ 246 (1), sentences 2 and 3 hBG). 
2. Balancing of the debts against the planned assets: balancing decree of debts 
against plan assets. The approach is the present value with a pay-out and 
payment stop ((§ 246 (2), sentence 2 and 3 hGB; § 253 (1), sentence 4 hGB; § 268 
(8) hGB). 
3. Creation of special items with a reserve component: prohibited inclusion as a 
liability for special items with a reserve component.
4. Provision for expenses: prohibited inclusion as a liability for expense provisions 
which are not considered for tax purposes.
Annual financial statement: Measurement requirements for all merchants: 
1. Write-downs: Prohibition for unscheduled write-downs of fixed assets with 
only a temporary decrease in value. This does not apply to financial investments 
(§ 253 (3), sentence 4 hGB). value fluctuation write-downs of current assets 
are prohibited. Write-downs within the framework of reasonable commercial 
judgment are prohibited. The execution of write-downs only for tax admissible 
purposes is prohibited. 
2. Reinstatement of the original value: “Reinstatement of original value decree, 
except for goodwill”72 (translated in context by the author) (§ 253 (5) hGB).
3. valuation units: “Duty to create valuation units becomes defined by law”73 
(translated in context by the author) (§ 254 hGB).
4. Production costs: Minimum level is the direct costs, material and production 
overheads as well as the amortization of non-current assets (as long as they are 
related to the production). It is a prohibited to include distribution and research 
costs (§ 255 (2) hGB). 
5. Simplified valuation methods: The simplified valuation method is now only 
applicable to the valuation of the weighted average, LIFo (last in first out) or 
71  „Der Grundsatz der wirtschaftlichen zurechnung von vermögensgegenständen 
wird ausdrücklich im Gesetz verankert – keine Änderung der bestehenden 
Rechtslage beabsichtigt. Schulden sind in die Bilanz des Schuldners aufzunehmen“
72  “Wertaufholungsgebot, außer bei Geschäfts- oder Firmenwert”.
73  “Pflicht zur Bildung von Bewertungseinheiten wird gesetzlich verankert”.
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FIFo (first in first out) (§ 256 sentence 1 hGB).
Annual financial statement: Additional requirements for limited liability 
companies:
1. Cash flow statement and equity statement: “Preparation of the cash flow 
statement and equity statement also for the purpose of a separate financial 
statement as long as the capital market oriented limited liability company does 
not prepare group accounts”74 (translated in context to the author) (§ 264 (1), 
sentence 2 hGB).
2. Legally required method of itemization: Adding new positions, such as 
self-created intangible assets, deferred tax assets and liabilities, reserves for 
reinvestments, active difference resulting from asset offsetting (§ 266 (2) and 
(3) hGB).
3. Threshold values: Through the new regulation the old threshold values for 
small limited liability companies, medium sized limited liability companies 
and large limited liability companies were increased by 20 percent (§ 267 (1), 
(2), and (3) hGB).
4. Not called-in open deposits and own shares: These must be clearly 
distinguishable from the position “subscribed share capital” (§ 272 (1), sentence 
3 and (1a) and (1b) hGB).
5. Notes: Type and usage as well as risks and advantages of the off-balance-sheet 
transactions must be provided if they are required for the assessment of the 
financial situation (§ 285 (3) hGB). All companies must provide details of the 
auditor fees for the calculated total fees of the business year (§ 285 (17) hGB).75 
Non-market typical business with companies or people with which there is 
a close relationship must be declared. For market typical business providing 
this information is voluntary (§ 285 (21) hGB). This raises the question whether 
it is so simple to differentiate between market typical and market untypical 
74  “Aufstellung von kapitalflussrechnung und Eigenkapitalspiegel auch für 
zwecke des Einzelabschlusses, sofern kapitalmarktorientierte kapitalgesellschaft 
keinen konzernabschluss aufstellt“.
75  This will be explained in more detail in the next point relating to the publica-
tion of royalty information. 
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business. Under certain circumstances this creates a certain leeway so that 
certain business, which one does not want to declare, is not declared as it is 
declared as market typical business. The suspicion of certain possibilities to 
manipulate is obvious.
Management report: Regarding the regulations of the management report 
the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law has unconditionally taken-over 
the European legal requirements without requesting additional reporting duties. 
The legislator demands the duty to explain all key characteristics of the accounting 
related internal control and risk management system (§ 289 (5) hGB). It should be 
noted that not the complete internal control and risk management system is de-
scribed but only that part of the system relating to the accounts. The reason for this 
is that information relating to the non accounting part could get publically known, 
which in turn would conflict with the to-be-protected interests of the company. 
The legislator does not provide regulations for the establishment nor for the nature 
of the content of the internal control and risk management system. There is also 
no requirement to detail its effectiveness. The legislator hereby makes only a half-
hearted attempt, as a system without detailed requirements relating to the nature 
of its content cannot be effective.
In addition, the legislator requests a separate declaration of Corporate 
Governance in the management report or on the company’s homepage which con-
tains the statement of compliance, details on management practices and a descrip-
tion of the way in which the executive board and supervisory board behaves (§ 
289a hGB).76
The changes made to the annual financial statement and the group manage-
ment report will not be further reviewed in this paper due to the requirement to 
restrict its scope. Additional information can be found in the Federation of German 
Industry (BDI) printed matter number 425 dated April 2009 (see also the list of lit-
erature). The changes made to the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law in 
relation to Corporate Governance have already been described in chapter 3.2. The 
changes to the final audit will be described in much detail in the next chapter 3.4. 
In the summer of 2006 a written questionnaire was issued to approx. 4,000 
German companies by köhler and Martin in close collaboration with the auditing 
76  Further information relating to this topic can be found in chapter 3.2.5, last 
paragraph. 
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firm Deloitte & Touche. The goal of this study was to gauge the view of companies 
as to how they assess the reform proposals being made at that point in time, which 
were to be selectively applied by the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law. 
The companies who participated in this study can be generally classified as mittel-
stand. After the deadline had expired, 290 questionnaires which could be evaluated 
had been returned by supervisory boards and managing directors. Due to the low 
number of questionnaires returned, there was no claim to representativeness of 
the questionnaire results. After the analysis of the study was completed, one came 
to following results: Five of the total thirty-five proposals were rejected rather than 
welcomed by the companies who participated in the questionnaire. A particularly 
strong resistance was established in relation to three proposals relating to the abo-
lition of recognition and valuation options within the annual financial statement. 
This included specifically the prohibited inclusion as a liability for provisions of re-
quired maintenance expenses that are to be deferred to the following nine months 
of the next business year (§ 249 (1), sentence 3 hGB, which was abolished when 
the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law came into effect); the prohibition 
to include as a liability the provision for operating expenses (§ 249 (2) hGB, which 
was also abolished when the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law came into 
effect); and the prohibition to consider low values of current assets based on the ex-
pected value fluctuations in the immediate future (§ 253 (3), sentence 3 hGB, which 
was also abolished when the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law came into 
effect). All three recognition and valuation options, whose abolition was against 
the wishes of the companies questioned, were abolished in 2009 when the German 
Act to Modernize Accounting Law came into effect. In respect of the abolition of 
decision rights within the group accounts relating to the change proposals made to 
the obligation to include inappropriately high costs of information collection (§ 296 
(1), number 2 hGB) and the extension of the obligation to consolidate also special 
purpose entities, whose opportunities and risks mainly relate to the parent group 
and are not required for a participation (new: § 290 (1) in conjunction with (2), num-
ber 4 hGB), were more or less rejected. Regarding the inclusion of inappropriately 
high costs for information collection within the group accounts (§ 296 (1), number 
2 hGB), there was no change made by the German Act to Modernize Accounting 
Law. here the decision right still exists. however, the treatment of special purpose 
entities within the group accounts was changed according to the proposals made 
by the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law. Pursuant to § 290 (2), number 
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4 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) there is a case of a controlling influence 
exerted by the parent company “if, after economic evaluation, it carries the major-
ity of the burden of risks and opportunities that are required in order to fulfill a 
closely limited and clearly defined objective of the parent company (special pur-
pose entity).”77 (translated in context by the author) (cf. köhler/Marten/Schlereth, 
2006, p. 2301 ff).
only such proposals were rejected by companies which were based on the 
elimination of rights of choice. The rights of choice provided companies with sig-
nificant leeway in the way in which they could portray their assets, liabilities and 
financial position, even compared to appropriate IFRS regulations. of these five 
rights of choice four were abolished and only one was maintained. All in all there 
was a relatively high agreement in reply to the 35 questions regarding the formu-
lated possibilities to further develop the German Commercial Code, these were 
then implemented as part of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law in 
2009 (cf. köhler/Marten/Schlereth, 2006, p. 2302 ff). 
The introduction of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) 
changed the German Accounting Law considerably. It applies to firms of all sizes 
and legal forms. A survey of 211 companies in December 2010 by the audit firm 
pwc showed that, at that time, only 24 percent of the companies polled had im-
plemented the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law. For 66 percent of the 
polled companies the implementation was still underway and 10 percent had not 
even started with its implementation. As such, it is not fully possible to ascertain 
how considerable the effect of the BilMoG-changes will be. The opinions as to what 
the effect of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law will be on the systems 
used in accounting and for the annual financial statement are varied. A small ma-
jority of mid-sized companies view the impact of the German Act to Modernize 
Accounting Law on the closing processes and systems as more or less irrelevant. 
only in relation to municipal undertakings does this result look different. here 
47 percent perceive the changes to the closing processes and systems through the 
German Act to Modernize Accounting Law as substantial and only 43 percent as 
more or less irrelevant. Ten percent have not yet formed an opinion. The major 
77  „wenn es bei wirtschaftlicher Betrachtung die Mehrheit der Risiken und 
Chancen eines Unternehmens trägt, das zur Erreichung eines eng begrenzten und 
genau definierten ziels des Mutterunternehmens dient (zweckgesellschaft).“
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changes to the annual financial statement through the German Act to Modernize 
Accounting Law can be seen by companies in the area of general provisions and 
provisions for pensions (cf. pwc, 2011b, p. 2 ff). 
The introduction of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law led to 
changes in the requirements of internal processes and documentation. In addition, 
the new requirements (accounting rules) have and will change the structure of bal-
ance sheets and of the profit and loss accounts. The additional note and manage-
ment report particulars will impact company communication because the now nu-
merously required publication of particulars (key performance indicators) means 
that companies will have to become more transparent towards the public (cf. BDI, 
2009, p. 47).
The German Act to Modernize Accounting Law has taken a step in the right 
direction. The goal to provide a more simple and more cost effective alternative 
which should provide especially small and medium sized companies with the op-
portunity to make use of modern accounting principles without having to apply 
the IFRS, has been realized. As such the German Act to Modernize Accounting 
Law is to be rated positively. That these – as demonstrated by Bittmann – include 
aspects which can support balance sheet manipulations is undisputed. here it has 
weaknesses that also existed previously and which could not be eliminated by 
the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law. A stricter approach to stopping 
balance sheet manipulations would have been desirable. In view of preserving 
the existence of small and medium sized companies one can altogether positively 
highlight the fact that the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law can in any 
case lead to the strengthening of such companies.
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3.4 strengthening the role of the independent Auditor
People who manage someone else’s money are already obliged under civil 
law regulations to be accountable towards the holding parties for revenues and 
expenditures. The obligated party has to provide careful and complete details per-
taining to all revenue. The legislator prescribes for each individual type of company 
what the individual financial reporting must look like. When a limited company 
reaches a certain size then the company requires the attestation of an independ-
ent auditor (§ 316 hGB). The criteria by which the size of a company is classed is 
defined within § 267 of the German Commercial Code (hGB).
The independent auditor, pursuant to § 318 (1), sentence 1 of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) is elected by the shareholders. Then the independent 
auditor is commissioned under the law of obligations by the supervisory board. 
If there is no supervisory board, then the independent auditor is commissioned 
under the law of obligations by the legal representatives. The tasks of an inde-
pendent auditor are defined formally by the law. It has a monitoring obligation. 
Its control and confirmation function is specified through §§ 316 ff of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) and through the provisions of the Public Accountants 
Act (WPo) in conjunction with § 259 of the German Civil Law Code (BGB). As 
such, the annual financial statement must adhere to the statutory regulations as 
well as to the additional provisions of the partnership agreement or bylaws. The 
findings of the audit of the annual financial statement must be captured in the 
management report and an accurate insight into the situation of the company has 
to be ensured. The independent auditor has to report about the nature and extent 
of the audit as well as about the results with due clarity (§ 321 (1), sentence 1 hGB) 
and must provide an audit certificate summarizing the results of the audit (§ 322 
(1), sentence 1 hGB). The rights of the independent auditor to fulfil their tasks are 
defined through § 320 of the German Commercial Code (hGB), which defines the 
obligation of the company to provide information as well as the independent audi-
tor’s right to inspect and obtain information (cf. Budde/Steuber in Wollmert et al., 
2003, p. 135 f). It can be noted, therefore, that the independent auditor has the task 
within the system of accounting, auditing and disclosure to carefully test wheth-
er the annual financial statement which has to be developed by the management 
and for which it is accountable, has been made according to statutory regulations 
and in line with the Statute. With this the auditor also has the function of being 
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a warner against potential crisis situations. The public, the shareholders and the 
creditors must be able to rely on the auditor’s well-qualified work and the quality 
of the published attestation (cf. Munoz, 2008, p. 20).
The public’s trust in the accounting and quality of judgement of the auditors 
has dropped drastically due to major accounting scandals. The fact that compa-
nies which had received unrestricted attestation later came under public criticism 
for the annual financial accounts and the independent auditors report pushed 
this topic into the focus of public attention. Decisions made by financial analysts, 
investors and creditors are strongly influenced by the audited annual financial 
statements and the audit certificate. Despite being certified, false information can 
subsequently have dire consequences. Since 2002 there has therefore been an un-
precedented amount of discussion after the introduction of the statutory audit over 
the need for reforms in this sector (cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 181 
f).
The reaction of the German Federal Government to the increasingly impor-
tant need to reform was duly appropriated with the 10-Point-Program of measures, 
with the intent to strengthen the role of the independent auditor. This included full 
transparency of all services rendered by the independent auditor towards the su-
pervisory board and the detail of their actions in the independent auditor report. 
Further measures relate to the assurance of autonomy of the contracted services 
rendered by the auditor as well as provisions regarding personal interrelations 
and financial dependence of the auditor, but also relating to changing auditors, the 
publication of fees received, the extension of liability and the strengthening of the 
statutory audit profession. 
3.4.1 The Principle of Independence 
The original task of an independent audit is to provide a trustworthy judge-
ment regarding the formal and tangible correctness of the published annual fi-
nancial statement. The independent audit is an important step in securing and en-
suring trustworthiness of the published annual financial statement and therefore 
forms part of the protection for users of the annual financial statements. objectivity 
and professional integrity are the most important prerequisites of an independent 
auditor so that their judgement can be trusted by all parties alike. An independent 
auditor is viewed as being objective if they make their judgements independently 
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from all influences (independence of mind). In addition, their judgment is seen 
as trustworthy if the public is convinced of their independence (independence of 
appearance). The continuous accounting scandals have heavily shaken not only 
the independence of mind but also the independence of appearance (cf. Baetge/
Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 183 f).
In order to gain back the public’s trust in the independence of the independ-
ent auditor, it seems necessary to go back to the original, actual function of the 
independent auditor. The original understanding of what the role of the independ-
ent auditor is was initially not a service provided to companies but a review and 
confirmation of the formal and tangible correctness of the annual financial state-
ment with the goal of informing company shareholders and the financial markets 
about the results of the audit. That this requires a certain basic inner attitude of 
the independent auditor goes without saying. The problem is that such a basic at-
titude, whose main goal is to stay independent, cannot be forced or commanded 
(cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 184).
In addition to this problem, there is also the issue that the public gains from 
the activity of the auditor but does not pay for it; the financial compensation is 
made by the company being scrutinized. As such, strictly speaking even the most 
virtuous auditor, who is proud of his inner independence, is externally never com-
pletely independent of the company being scrutinized. The problem how an audi-
tor can retain his inner independency despite the unavoidable economic depend-
ency that is systemically preconditioned remains structurally insoluble and an 
ethically moral challenge that each new generation of auditors must face (cf. hagel, 
2002, p. 1356).
Pursuant to § 43 (1) of the Public Accountants Act, the financial auditor has, 
in any event, to exercise their profession independently, conscientiously, discreetly 
and autonomously. They have to refuse their services if pursuant to § 49 of the 
Public Accountants Act, they are rendered for undertaking an unlawful action or 
there is a concern of bias for the execution of a service provided. Pursuant to § 21 (2) 
of the statutes of the German Chamber of Public Accountants regarding the rights 
and duties of exercising the professions of a financial auditor and a chartered ac-
countant, that person is seen as unbiased: Firstly, “who makes judgements without 
being influenced by non-objective considerations. Secondly, the un-biasedness can 
be compromised in particular through own interests (§ 23), self-auditing (§ 23a), 
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representation of interests (§ 23b), as well as close personal relationships (§ 24). 
Thirdly, the existence of such circumstances does not lead to an impairment of un-
biasedness if the circumstances themselves for making judgments are obviously 
insignificant or, combined with safeguards (§ 22), are on the whole insignificant. 
Fourthly, circumstances referred to in Sentence 2 may arise in particular outside of 
business, financial or personal relationships”78 (translated in context by the author).
Pursuant to § 21 (3) sentence 1 of the Statutes of the German Chamber of 
Public Accountants about the rights and duties when pursuing the profession of 
a financial auditor and of a chartered accountant, there is a case for suspected 
bias where “circumstances as defined in Section 2 Sentence 2 occur, which in the 
view of a judicious third party may be deemed sufficient to influence judgement 
in a non-objective way. Secondly, suspected bias does not exist in cases where the 
threat to un-biasedness as defined in Section 2 Sentence 3 is insignificant”79 (trans-
lated in context by the author). When completing the statutory independent audit 
according to §§ 316 ff of the hGB the general standard pursuant to § 318 (3) of the 
hGB also applies. These state that a financial auditor cannot be an independent 
auditor if there is a case for suspected bias. According to veltins a “case for sus-
pected bias”80 (translated in context by the author) can have various reasons but 
can be justified, in particular, by business, financial and personal types of relation-
ships. hereby, it is not relevant whether the auditor is actually objectively biased. 
Decisive for a case of suspected bias is the view of a rational and objective third 
78  „wer sich sein Urteil unbeeinflusst von unsachgemäßen Erwägungen bildet. 2 Die 
Unbefangenheit kann insbesondere durch Eigeninteressen (§ 23), Selbstprüfung (§ 
23a), Interessenvertretung (§ 23b) sowie persönliche vertrautheit (§ 24) beeinträchtigt 
werden. 3 Das vorliegen solcher Umstände führt nicht zu einer Beeinträchtigung 
der Unbefangenheit, wenn die Umstände selbst für die Urteilsbildung offensi-
chtlich unwesentlich sind oder zusammen mit Schutzmaßnahmen (§ 22) insge-
samt unbedeutend sind. 4 Umstände nach Satz 2 können sich insbesondere aus 
Beziehungen geschäftlicher, finanzieller oder persönlicher Art ergeben“.
79  „wenn Umstände im Sinne von Absatz 2 Satz 2 gegeben sind, die aus Sicht 
eines verständigen Dritten geeignet sind, die Urteilsbildung unsachgemäß zu be-
einflussen. 2 Besorgnis der Befangenheit liegt nicht vor, sofern die Gefährdung der 
Unbefangenheit nach Absatz 2 Satz 3 unbedeutend ist“
80  „Besorgnis zur Befangenheit“
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party (cf. veltins, 2004, p. 448). In addition, § 319 of the German Commercial Code 
(hGB) lays out reasons for an exclusion. When these are applicable, then the bias-
edness of an auditor is deemed irrefutable. however, whether there is a case for 
biasedness must always be decided on a case-by-case basis by the courts. 
3.4.2 International Auditing Standard
In May 2009 with the introduction of § 317 (5) of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB), the legal basis was formed for the direct application of internation-
al auditing standards (ISA) for carrying out statutory audits as adopted in EU 
law. The ISA can only be adopted into European law after a formal process of 
the EU Commission has been completed and thereby becomes legally binding for 
Member States. The process is titled as the so-called comitology procedure. The 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), responsible for 
the development and adoption of ISA, subjected the ISA to a “clarity review”. In 
this process the level of liability of the individual regulations was firmed up and 
the terminology of the standards were standardized. Now it is up to the European 
Commission to approve the adoption of the ISA into the Community legislation (cf. 
BDI, 2009, p. 44). In the meantime though, many but not all of the German Auditing 
Standards (IDW PS) have been adjusted to ISA’s. Therefore, the process is not yet 
fully completed.
For the publication of professional notifications that regulate amongst other 
things the responsibility of the auditor to discover accounting fraud, several insti-
tutions come into consideration. on an international playing field, the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) as a private sector umbrella association for au-
diting professions is responsible. Under its control, one finds the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). The IAASB is an independent 
committee that, following a fixed process, develops and adopts the internation-
ally applicable International Standards on Auditing (ISA) (cf. Research Paper of the 
IDW, 2004, p. 1281). Currently the ISAs are directed at the Member organisations 
which are then tasked to implement these into national auditing standards. These 
national auditing standards are called IDW Prüfungsstandards (IDW Auditing 
Standards – IDW PS) in Germany. The goal is to develop a “common auditing 
language” in Europe. That is why the International Standards of Auditing (ISA) 
should be integrated into European jurisdiction. The ISA is to be understood as a 
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set of regulations that can be adapted to an individual situation and to which the 
proportionality principle applies (cf. heininger, 2010, p. 15 and 23). 
The uniform introduction of ISA as a directly applicable law for all Member 
States of the European Union would have been preferable as it would have helped 
to avoid balance sheet manipulations. All independent auditors would have to ap-
ply the same regulations throughout Europe. Auditors who review companies in 
different EU member States would know exactly what standards of auditing and 
regulations apply as they are the same across the EU. Due to the uniform EU regu-
lations, it would also be easier to ensure that companies which have affiliates in 
different EU Member States are following the same regulation. 
3.4.3 The Declaration of Compliance and Corporate Governance Statement
Both statements are based on the adoption of the changes made to the Audit 
Directive and, based on the similarity of content, they will be reviewed together. 
In the declaration of compliance (statement on the Corporate Governance Code) 
companies pursuant to § 161 (1), sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act 
must publish and explain any deviations to the recommendations of the German 
Corporate Governance Code. The number of companies that have to submit a 
Declaration of Compliance has been extended. When the German Act to modern-
ize Accounting Law (BilMoG) came into force not only publicly listed companies 
had to submit a Declaration of Compliance but also according to § 161 (1), sentence 
2 of the German Stock Corporation Act, companies listed on the stock exchange 
that deal with other papers apart from shares – for example debt securities – on an-
other organized market and at the same time whose issued shares are being traded 
on their own initiative on a multilateral trading facility pursuant to § 2 (3), sen-
tence 1 number 8 of the Securities Trading Act. Thereby the number of companies 
which have to submit a Declaration of Compliance is identical to those which have 
to submit a Corporate Governance Statement (§ 289a of the German Commercial 
Code). The Declaration of Compliance has to be part of the Corporate Governance 
Statement and to be published by the Management Board and Supervisory Board 
on the Company’s homepage pursuant to § 161 (2) of the German Stock Corporation 
Act (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 43).
Pursuant to § 317 (2), sentence 3 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) the 
Corporate Governance Statement is excluded from the examination proceedings. 
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It is also not subject to examination proceedings if the company makes use of its 
right of choice to include it in its Management Report and not to simply publish 
it on the company’s homepage. Based on this procedure, it is possible to have a 
Management Report consisting of parts which are subject to examination and 
parts which are freed from examination proceedings. In order to avoid misunder-
standings, the independent auditor must make note of the fact that the Corporate 
Governance Statement was not part of the independent audit proceedings in the 
introductory section of the audit certificate (cf. BDI, 2009 p. 44). 
3.4.4  The Responsibilities of the Group Auditor
Pursuant to § 317 (3), sentence 2 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
the group auditor must check the work and documentation of other audits should 
other auditors have completed checks of annual financial statements of affiliated 
companies. The area of responsibility of the group auditor is not changed by this as 
they already de lege lata carry the full responsibility for the qualified audit certifi-
cate on the group’s consolidated financial statement. Up to 2009, the group auditor 
could limit their auditing tasks to the verification that legal prerequisites exist if 
other auditors had already checked the annual financial statements of companies 
that should be included in the Group’s annual financial statement. This is now no 
longer possible (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 45). This regulation is also to be welcomed with 
regard to preventing and discovering accounting fraud. Through this regulatory 
change all individual financial statements of subsidiaries, if audited by an auditor 
other than the group auditor, are subject to in-depth scrutiny by two separate per-
sons. The four-eye principle leads to an improvement of control options. In cases 
where there is a case of fraud by means of a collusion of company management and 
the auditor, these would be forced to include a second auditor. This would lead to 
an extension of the group of confidants which in turn increases the danger of the 
offence being discovered. 
3.4.5 Separation of Independent Audits and Consultation 
Through the so-called “low-balling” 81 which refers to a practice whereby 
81  This model was first described in the chapter on auditing by Linda de Angelo 
(cf. De Angelo, 1981, p. 113-127).
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the fee of the prevailing auditor is undercut by the offer of another auditor, many 
auditing firms were put in a position where the costs of the independent auditing 
process were no longer covered. This harmful type of competition results from the 
special structure of the auditing sector. In contrast to other professions, it is near 
to impossible to manage the business through the reputation of an auditor. Baetge 
and Matena demonstrate the difficulty of the sector with an illustrative example: 
A patient being treated by a doctor can ascertain the performance of the doctor 
by whether his health has improved. The actual customer of the independent au-
ditor is the owner of the corporation and not the company’s management as is 
often falsely presumed. The shareholder, however, can often not make a statement 
about the quality of the work the auditor performed as the shareholder has not 
got the possibility to directly view and control the work of the independent audi-
tor. Mostly a lack of quality of the independent auditor’s work only comes to the 
shareholders’ attention if the independent auditor makes a false attestation over 
the formal and tangible correctness of the published annual financial statement. 
This then comes to light when a company files for insolvency in the following year 
despite of having received an unconditional audit certificate (cf. Baetge/Matena in 
Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 185).
Through the enormous price competition in the sector of annual financial 
statement audits, there has been a vast extension of the services offered to compa-
nies audited by a financial auditor. The costs of the auditing services which cannot 
be covered are subsidized by other services (cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 
2003, p. 185). however, between 2001 and 2005 due to the worldwide high num-
ber of cases of accounting fraud detected, many auditing firms either listed their 
consulting firms on the stock exchange or sold them off. The reason for this was 
the fear that the Securities and Exchange Commission could force them to rigor-
ously differentiate their auditing from their consultancy business. kPMG listed its 
consulting company on the stock exchange, Ernst & Young sold its consulting com-
pany to Capgemini for 11.5 billion euros, and pwc sold its consulting department 
to IBM for 3.5 billion dollars. But after the legislator then did not enforce a strict 
distinction between auditing and consulting after all, the auditing firms attempted 
to enter this lucrative market again. Due to the high profit margins that can be 
achieved in the consulting sector, this process of re-entering the market was not 
done gradually but as fast as possible (cf. Fink, 2005, p. k01). This is why nowadays 
many auditing companies are once again consulting conglomerates with multiple 
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service offerings. There is still a cross-subsidization of auditing services as the 
margins that can be attained through consulting services are much higher than 
the margins that can be attained through auditing. Therefore the danger exists, 
that by providing auditing services as well as audit related consultation to the 
same company, the auditor loses his independency and becomes a servant of two 
masters. on the one hand, he has to pursue the role of independent auditor in rep-
resenting the interests of the shareholders and creditors and, on the other hand, 
due to his offered consultation services he has to fulfill the wishes of the com-
pany’s management. As the consultation services offer higher profit margins, it 
can lead to a situation where the auditor is not orientated towards the expectations 
of the investors and shareholders but rather towards the demands and provisions 
of the company’s management. Baetge and Matena call this web of relationships 
of independent auditors, the shareholders and the company’s management a con-
structional flaw. The auditors, on the one hand, must scrutinize the actions of the 
company’s management whilst, on the other hand, for the consultation services the 
auditor must be the provider and the company’s management is the customer and 
the so-called customer is king. Baetge and Martena see two possibilities of correct-
ing this constructional flaw. one must clearly separate the auditing from simulta-
neous consulting services. If this does not happen, then an external auditor rota-
tion and an official scale of fees for services by auditors could at least substantially 
reduce the issue of dependency (cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 185 f).
A further advocate of a distinct separation between independent auditors 
and simultaneous consulting within the same company is Riecke. In his view the 
criminal acts of some auditors point to a cultural decline. The era of computers 
has dramatically changed the way in which the auditing sector works. The in-
come of the hourly paid auditors has come under increasing pressure. The au-
diting firms have reacted to this by increasing their portfolio of services offered. 
By taking over consulting activities relating to tax, organizational and strategic 
questions, they have doubled their income over the last ten years. As overly-strict 
bookkeeping could endanger their lucrative consulting orders, the auditors have 
become dependent on companies. This conflict is made worse due to the fact that 
the companies’ management is under extreme pressure to achieve growing share 
prices and therefore try to get the most out of their numbers. Riecke brings up the 
Enron-Andersen scandal to demonstrate this. here the auditing firm Andersen 
was evidently also, at the same time, an accomplice to accounting fraud. In his 
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assessment Riecker also refers to the former boss of the US central bank volcker 
who is a strong advocate for a fundamental change of this sector. The auditors 
must separate themselves from providing consultation services in order to avoid 
any conflict of interest. In addition, volcker requests that companies should be 
obliged to change their auditor after five years at the latest. only by doing this 
could the trust of investors in auditors be re-built (cf. Riecke, 2002, p. 9 f).
A strict opponent of the request to separate the services of auditing and con-
sultation is Ring. he views the general problem as being such that the auditors per 
se – meaning independently of whether they provide other services – are facing 
growing competition. This has resulted in the situation that independent audits 
are sometimes offered at a fee that can hardly cover costs if the audit is performed 
according to the regulations that apply. Ring sees as the logical consequence that 
the effort made in the audit – with corresponding consequences for the quality of 
the independent audit – orientates itself to the fees that are paid. he also doubts 
that consultation orders really have a significant impact on the quality of the inde-
pendent audit or that through low balling the auditing fees can be “bought”. Such 
tendencies are contrary to market mechanisms and economic incentives. his view 
is that a separation of consulting and auditing would damage the quality of the 
independent audit. When completing their audit, the auditor must have a high cer-
tainty of judgment. To be able to do this an in-depth background knowledge of the 
customer in question is needed that includes detailed knowledge about the char-
acteristics of the business activity, the economic and legal environment in which 
the company and the sector operates which the auditor can only have if they also 
do consultation work for the company. According to Rings, it is more important to 
work on appropriate and targeted measures that avoid negative repercussions on 
the quality of the audit. only by doing this, can one avoid an inevitable iteration of 
the crisis of confidence (cf. Ring, 2002, p. 1348 f).
According to Bauer the question, whether simultaneous audit and consultancy 
services endanger the independency of the auditor could not be proven as having 
a negative inter-dependency either on a scientifically empirical nor a scientifically 
theoretical basis (cf. Bauer, 2004, p. 184). quick comes to a similar result. he found 
that most empirical studies cannot prove that there is a negative impact of consulting 
services on the actual independency of the auditor (cf. quick, 2006, p. 56).
In Bauer’s view, a statutory requirement to disclose the auditing and 
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consulting fees would be sufficient to solve the issue. By doing this, the interested 
public has the necessary transparency and could form its own view on whether 
potential conflicts of interest exist. Bauer thinks that this way the balance can be 
made between the positive economic effects through the simultaneous demand of 
consulting services with the auditing firm and the negative effects under certain 
circumstances, of a possible limited independency of the auditing firm on a trans-
parent open market (cf. Bauer, 2004, p. 184).
Furthermore, Bauer states the auditor is consulted by third parties when ful-
filling auditing as well as consulting orders. here the regulatory body of a compa-
ny, for example, the supervisory board as contracting authority of the audit, needs 
to ensure that they obligate an independent auditor. If certain consultancy services 
are not compatible with simultaneous audit activities, then the auditor should be 
kept away from such assignments (cf. Bauer, 2004, p. 184).
one must note, in contrast to Bauer’s opinion, that the supervisory board 
has a high interest in attaining the most favourable audit result possible. This is 
not just because the remuneration of the board but also of the supervisory board 
is closely tied to the results and the success of a company. In addition, studies by 
Loebbecke / Eining / Willingham82 (1989) and Terlinde (2005) underline that also 
the supervisory board is, in a not insignificant number of cases, involved as pri-
marily responsible offender. 83 
The German regulations regarding the compatibility of simultaneous audit-
ing and consulting services provided by the independent auditor make the fol-
lowing provisions after the German Accounting Reform Act and the German Act 
to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) came into effect: Pursuant to § 319 (3), 
number 3 a “financial auditor or chartered accountant is especially not eligible as 
an independent auditor if he or a person he is working with has provided in addi-
tion to the auditing services with or for the company to be audited in the year of 
the audit taking place or up to the point in time when the audit certificate is issued:
a) has provided support with the bookkeeping or services related to the annual 
financial statement,
b) has taken part in a responsible position in the administrative audit of the client, 
82  10 per cent of offenders were members of the Supervisory Board or according 
to the US system part of the Board of Directors.
83  See point 2.3.3 of this paper.
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c) has provided management services or financial services to the client or
d) has provided actuarial or assessment services that have a significant impact on 
the annual financial statement to be audited,
provided these activities are of no minor nature”84 (translated in context by the 
author).
In addition, there are further special reasons for exclusion for companies of 
special public interest. In relation to this point, pursuant to § 319a (1), number 2 and 
number 3 of the German Commercial Code “a financial auditor is in addition to the 
points mentioned in § 319 (2) and (3) also to be excluded from the financial audit of 
a company which is capital market orientated within the meaning of § 264 d if he
2. has provided, in the financial year to be audited, in addition to auditing 
services, legal or tax services which go beyond simply pointing out alternative 
arrangements and which directly and not insignificantly influence the depiction 
of the situation of assets, finances and earnings in the year the annual financial 
statement is to be audited,
3. during the financial year under review has been involved, in addition to his 
auditing services, in the development, installation and introduction of financial 
reporting information systems, providing these activities are not of secondary 
84  „Wirtschaftsprüfer oder vereidigter Buchprüfer insbesondere von der 
Abschlussprüfung ausgeschlossen, wenn er oder eine Person, mit der er seinen 
Beruf ausübt, über die Prüfungstätigkeit hinaus bei der zu prüfenden oder für die 
zu prüfende kapitalgesellschaft in dem zu prüfenden Geschäftsjahr oder bis zur 
Erteilung des Bestätigungsvermerks 
a) bei der Führung der Bücher oder der Aufstellung des zu prüfenden 
Jahresabschlusses mitgewirkt hat,
b) bei der Durchführung der internen Revision in verantwortlicher Position 
mitgewirkt hat,
c) Unternehmensleistungs- oder Finanzdienstleistungen erbracht hat oder
d) eigenständige versicherungsmathematische oder Bewertungsleistungen 
erbracht hat, die sich auf den zu prüfenden Jahresabschluss nicht nur 
unwesentlich auswirken,
sofern diese Tätigkeiten nicht von untergeordneter Bedeutung sind.“
186 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
importance….”85 (translated in context by the author)
The regulations made by the German legislation are a step in the right di-
rection as the regulations affecting commerce were considerably reinforced in re-
gard to the separation of simultaneous auditing and consulting. however, many of 
these regulations are extremely imprecisely and vaguely formulated so that they 
provide companies with a wide creative leeway. For example, in § 319a (1), number 
2 it is stated: “… which directly and not insignificantly influence the depiction of 
the situation of assets, finances and earnings in the year of the annual financial 
statement to be audited.” however, what a direct and not insignificant effect ex-
actly depicts is not explained in more detail. The same applies to point 3 in the 
same paragraph: “…providing these activities are not of secondary importance”. 
When are services rendered of secondary importance? Also in this case the ques-
tion remains unanswered by the law. 
3.4.6 Appointing the External Auditor and Reporting of the Auditor
Since the Corporate Sector and Supervision Transparency Act (konTraG) 
came into force in 1998 the supervisory board, after having previously elected the 
auditors in the Annual General Meeting (§ 119 (1), number 4 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act), award the audit agreement to the auditors (§ 111 (2), sentence 3 of 
the German Stock Corporation Act). This regulation is intended to ensure a higher 
degree of independency of the auditor from the executive board. Pursuant to point 
85  „ein Wirtschaftsprüfer ist über die in § 319 Abs. 2 und 3 genannten Gründe 
hinaus auch dann von der Abschlussprüfung eines Unternehmens, das kapital-
marktorientiert im Sinne des § 264 d ist, ausgeschlossen, wenn er 
2. in dem zu prüfenden Geschäftsjahr über die Prüfungstätigkeit hinaus 
Rechts- oder Steuerberatungsleistungen erbracht hat, die über das Aufzeigen 
von Gestaltungsalternativen hinausgehen und die sich auf die Darstellung der 
vermögens-, Finanz- und Ertragslage in dem zu prüfendem Jahresabschluss un-
mittelbar und nicht nur unwesentlich auswirken,
3.  über die Prüfungstätigkeit hinaus in dem zu prüfenden 
Geschäftsjahr an der Entwicklung, Einrichtung und Einführung von 
Rechnungslegungsinformationssystemen mitgewirkt hat, sofern diese Tätigkeit 
nicht von untergeordneter Bedeutung ist….“
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5.3.2 of the German Corporate Governance Code (the “Code”): „The Supervisory 
Board shall set up an Audit Committee which, in particular, handles the monitor-
ing of the accounting process, the effectiveness of the internal control system, risk 
management system and internal audit system, the audit of the Annual Financial 
Statements, here in particular the independence of the auditor, the services ren-
dered additionally by the auditor, the issuing of the audit mandate to the auditor, 
the determination of auditing focal points and the fee agreement, and – unless 
another committee is entrusted therewith - compliance”86 (English version of the 
DCGk, 2013, p. 10).
In line with point 7.2.1 of the German Corporate Governance Code, the 
Supervisory Board and the Audit Committee shall attain a statement from the pro-
posed auditor before an auditor is proposed for election as independent auditor in 
the General Shareholders’ Meeting “whether, and where applicable, which busi-
ness, financial, personal and other relationships exist between the auditor and its 
executive bodies and head auditors on the one hand, and the enterprise and the 
members of its executive bodies on the other hand, that could call its independence 
into question. This statement shall include the extent to which other services were 
performed for the enterprise in the past year, especially in the field of consultancy, 
or which are contracted for the following year”87 (English version of the DCGk, 
86  „Der Aufsichtsrat soll einen Prüfungsausschuss (Audit Committee) einrichten, 
der sich insbesondere mit der Überwachung des Rechnungslegungsprozesses, der 
Wirksamkeit des internen kontrollsystems und des internen Revisionssystems, der 
Abschlussprüfung, hier insbesondere der Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers, 
der vom Abschlussprüfer zusätzlich erbrachten Leistungen, der Erteilung 
des Prüfungsauftrages an den Abschlussprüfer, der Bestimmung von 
Prüfungsschwerpunkten und der honorarvereinbarung sowie – falls kein anderer 
Ausschuss damit betraut ist – der Compliance, befasst“
87  „ob und gegebenenfalls welche geschäftlichen, finanziellen, persönlichen 
oder sonstigen Beziehungen zwischen dem Prüfer und seinen organen und 
Prüfungsleitern einerseits und dem Unternehmen und seinen organen ander-
erseits bestehen, die zweifel an seiner Unabhängigkeit begründen können. Die 
Erklärung soll sich auch darauf erstrecken, in welchem Umfang im vorausgegan-
genen Geschäftsjahr andere Leistungen für das Unternehmen, insbesondere auf 
dem Beratungssektor, erbracht wurden bzw. für das folgende Jahr vertraglich 
188 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
2013, p. 14). This point in the German Corporate Governance Code highlights the 
fact that it places emphasis on the independency of the auditor and that it has 
evidently realized that problems can arise when simultaneously auditing and con-
sulting services are carried out.
Through the introduction of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law 
(BilMoG), companies are faced with the following changes relating to their choice 
of auditor. If a company has an Audit Committee, then the proposal of the supervi-
sory board submitted to the Annual General Meeting for the election of the audi-
tor pursuant to § 124 (2), sentence 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act be based 
upon the recommendation of the Audit Committee. This requirement is inherently 
consistent as the Auditing Committee intensively shares information with the au-
ditors on an ongoing basis. The legislator stresses, when explaining its reasons, 
that the supervisory board holds the right in exceptional cases to deviate from the 
proposal made by the Audit Committee. A deviation from the proposal made by 
the Audit Committee must, however, be explained in detail by the supervisory 
board prior to the Annual General Meeting (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 42). 
In relation to the selection of the members of the Audit Committee, the sec-
ond last revision of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGk) in 2012 made 
the following changes. Before the second last revision, the criteria for the inde-
pendency of the corporation’s management were legally hardly realized through 
the requirements made in the DCGk. The German Corporate Governance Code 
only suggested that no former company board member whose term ended less 
than two years prior to a proposed nomination, should be allowed to become a 
member of the Audit Committee (cf. DCGk, 2010, p. 7). But as this was merely a 
suggestion and was not binding, the implementation was very questionable. Since 
the version of 2012, the German Corporate Governance Code has recommended 
that at least the chairman of the Audit Committee has to be independent and can-
not be a former member of the management board of the company whose appoint-
ment ended less than two years ago (cf. DCGk, 2012, p. 10). one must still critically 
note though that a time span of two years is not really sufficient to ensure that one 
achieves the desired distance.
According to German law, the supervisory boards of public companies are 
the receivers of the independent audit report ever since the introduction of the 
vereinbart sind“
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Corporate Sector and Supervision Transparency Act (konTraG) (§ 321 (5), sentence 
2 hGB in connection with § 111 (2), sentence 3 of the German Stock Corporation 
Act). At the same time, the same law stipulates that the board has to be given the 
opportunity to comment on the audit report before it is handed over to the super-
visory board (§ 321 (5), sentence 2 hGB). The possibility to make comments on the 
audit report can, in some cases, be used by the board to remove unwanted observa-
tions, reports and comments from the report in advance. In order to avoid this, the 
board should not receive a draft but finalized and signed audit report. The board 
can then provide its own individual observations separately but together with the 
audit report signed by the auditor to the supervisory board (cf. Baetge/Matena in 
Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 194).
After the Corporate Sector and Supervision Transparency Act (konTraG) 
came into force, the reporting duty of the independent auditor was repeatedly 
revised and newly regulated by the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law 
(BilMoG). Pursuant to § 171 (1), sentences 2 and 3 of the German Stock Corporation 
Act, the auditor reports to the plenary Supervisory Board or to the Audit Committee 
at the final review meeting of the Supervisory Board. The supervisory obligations 
of the auditor were extended with the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law 
(BilMoG) and the reporting duties were newly regulated. The independent auditor 
is required to report about the key results of his audit. When doing this, he must 
also report about any key weaknesses of the accounting-related internal control 
and risk management systems identified. In addition, he must bear witness as to 
whether circumstances exist which led him to believe that he was biased. There is 
an additional information requirement as to what services were provided to the 
company in addition to the auditing. All in all, the transparency of the relation-
ship between the supervisory board and the auditor needs to be increased (cf. BDI, 
2009, p. 43). This, for example, also can be seen by the fact that the supervisory 
board has the option to have specific parts of the accounts or of the audit report ex-
plained to them in detail with additional extensive background material provided 
(cf. Peemöller in Förschle/Peemöller, 2004, p. 31).
3.4.7 External Versus Internal Auditor Rotation 
In Germany, the internal auditor rotation was introduced with the Corporate 
Sector and Supervision Transparency Act (konTraG) in 1998 and changed in the 
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following years with the German Accounting Reform Act in 2004 and the German 
Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) in 2009. Pursuant to § 319a (1), sen-
tence 1 number 4 of the German Commercial Code (hGB), an auditor is not eligible 
as independent auditor of a company that is capital market orientated pursuant 
to § 264d if he “was responsible in seven or more cases for the independent audit 
of a company; this does not apply if, since his last participation in the compa-
ny’s audit, two or more years have passed” 88 (translated in context by the author). 
Furthermore, sentences 4 and 5 state that this regulation is applicable to auditing 
firms in the following way: That they are not allowed to be the independent audi-
tor if they employ an auditor while conducting the independent audit of a compa-
ny who, as responsible audit partner in line with the above mentioned regulations, 
is not permitted to be an auditor (cf. § 319a (1), sentence 4 hGB). “The audit partner 
is the one who signs the audit certification pursuant to § 322 or who has been 
elected as an auditor of an auditing firm to hold the main responsibility for car-
rying out the statutory audit”89 (§ 319a (1), sentence 5 of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB)) (translated in context by the author). This also applies, pursuant to § 
319a (2), sentence 2 of the German Commercial Code (hGB), for the audit partners 
in connection with the group audit that have been elected as primarily responsible 
for the independent audit of a significant subsidiary (cf. BDI, 2009, p. 45). 
The request to have an external auditor rotation was rejected by the legislator 
because of the danger of losing audit quality after a change in the auditing firm. 
Critics point out that the legislator has not provided proof for this reasoning (cf. 
Ruhnke, 2000, p. 91 f; Niehus, 2003, p. 1638). It is held against the legislator that 
common practice refutes this argument as there are successfully completed au-
dits after which the independent auditor was exchanged. Ballwieser and Dobler 
however note that, in this case, there is also no proof of the quality of such audits. 
They emphasize, however, that if it is about increasing public confidence of the 
88  „für die Abschlussprüfung bei dem Unternehmen bereits in sieben oder mehr 
Fällen verantwortlich war; dies gilt nicht, wenn seit seiner letzten Beteiligung an 
der Prüfung des Jahresabschlusses zwei oder mehr Jahre vergangen sind“
89  „verantwortlicher Prüfungspartner ist, wer den Bestätigungsvermerk nach § 322 
unterzeichnet oder als Wirtschaftsprüfer von einer Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft 
als für die Durchführung einer Abschlussprüfung vorrangig verantwortlich 
bestimmt worden ist“
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independency of the independent auditor and hence about the credibility of the 
accounts, then external rotation seems to be more appropriate than a shortening of 
existing internal rotation cycles. Even if by doing this the number of auditors that 
need to be replaced is increased, there remains a connection between the client 
and the auditing firm that could give rise to cause for concern regarding partiality 
(cf. Ballwieser/Dobler, 2003, p. 463 f). Baetge and Matena endorse a change of the 
external auditor every five to six years, whereby the auditing contract should be 
placed for the whole period of five or six years, so that the auditor has plenty of 
time to ensure a follow-on order. As a result of the long contract period, the auditor 
is under no pressure to fear that a difference in opinion with the board regarding 
an audit result could lead to a premature loss of the contract. In order to reduce the 
cost associated with regular rotation, Baetge and Matena suggest that the auditing 
firms make agreements in which the former auditor is obliged to provide the new 
auditor with all audit documentation (cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 
195 f). With regard to this proposal, Ballwieser and Dobler note critically that this 
plan has limitations due to the need for the client to give their approval. The former 
auditor could have reasons why he/she does not want to provide all information in 
order to protect his/her own interests. In addition, an audit which is based mainly 
on the knowledge gained by the predecessor could in turn lead to the unwanted 
issue of organizational blindness (cf. Ballwieser/Dobler, 2003, p. 464).
haller and Reitbauer assume that new auditors will also apply their own 
audit priorities, concepts and methods which in turn changes the horizon of the 
audit. When evaluating the effectiveness of the reasons provided in favor of a bind-
ing external rotation, they state one should however not forget that the danger 
of organizational blindness or of too much trust between auditors and company 
management can also be reduced by a regular change in the members of the audit-
ing team, especially of the audit leader for the purpose of internal rotation. They 
further raise the concern that a “rotation“, in practical terms, can also be under-
stood in such a way that a mandate can be exchanged in an agreed timing interval 
(possibly even shorter than the legally prescribed timing) between two of the same 
auditors. In such a case, the auditor would be part of a kind of “joint venture” 
with a varying time of being on the job. This would mean they could fulfill the 
legal requirements of the external rotation but at the same time would undermine 
the advantages of an external rotation in relation to organizational blindness and 
independency (cf. haller/Reitbauer, 2002, p. 2233). keeping in mind the possible 
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advantages of external rotation, haller and Reitbauer looked at the rotation regula-
tions which exist in Austria alone and investigated a series of negative effects and 
based on this background, came to the conclusion that it would be unwise for the 
Austrian legislator to hold on to its “isolated solution”. 
Weißenberger voices the concern that, with a forced external rotation, too 
little money and know-how would be invested in newly acquired mandates (cf. 
Weißenberger, 1997, p. 2319). At the beginning of an auditing assignment, the in-
dependent auditor must invest more auditing and information gathering time in 
order to gain sufficient knowledge about the company which is to be audited. That 
is why the costs of an audit are higher in the first two years than in the years to 
come. With constant audit fees the auditing firms could, in some cases, be in a posi-
tion where they have a negative contribution margin. one could counteract this, if 
a legislative requirement for external rotation is introduced, with higher audit fees 
in the first two years of a mandate. Baetge and Matena assume that this would be a 
supplementary fee of 25 per cent (cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 197 
f). Some opponents of the external rotation system raise the point that the auditors 
require several years to work their way into a new company. In response to this it 
should be mentioned that such an auditor should not be permitted in the first place 
as such an auditor would never be in a position to certify their first audit report (cf. 
Munoz, 2008, p. 28).
In contrast to Schruff, Peemöller and hofmann are of the opinion that an 
external rotation is an appropriate instrument for strengthening the trust in the 
integrity of the independent audit and in the fight against fraudulent account-
ing. Schruff, on the other hand, assumes that the introduction of external rota-
tion would provide criminal balance sheet manipulators a minimum two-year 
advantage. This is because: An auditor could not immediately have the required 
knowledge about the accounting practices of the new mandate when accepting the 
contract to complete a proper assessment. They need two to three years to familiar-
ize themselves until they have the same base of knowledge that their predecessor 
had. In the initial years, there is an increased risk for making auditing mistakes (cf. 
Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 199).90 one can, however, argue that, should there re-
ally be a distinct case of a danger of independency, then the exchange of individual 
90  Further argumentation as the pro and cons of an external auditor rotation can 
be found in Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 199 and Ballwieser/Dobler, 2003, p. 464.
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team members cannot be avoided through replacing individual employees. The 
new employees could be quickly instructed by the management of the auditing 
firm and by the colleagues already involved in the audit and therefore apply the 
same processes and methods as their predecessors (cf. Munoz, 2008, p. 29).
Ultimately, Döring’s proposal should be followed since he still sees the best 
form of control as auditors competing against each other. An obligatory change of an 
auditor and the whole auditing firm – and not just of a single audit team – should, 
in his opinion, occur every five years. Such action would not just retroactively help 
to uncover organizational blindness and entanglements between the auditor and the 
management but also help to prevent this from happening at all (cf. Döring, 2002, p. 
1). Based on the developments of the last few years where one has seen an increasing 
amount of fraudulent acts occurring in accounting (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 9), external ro-
tation, whereby a new auditor must familiarize himself with the company every five 
years, should not be viewed as a disadvantage but should be seen as an advantage in 
relation to stopping balance sheet manipulations from occurring.
A good example for the uncertainty created among shareholders is the gen-
eral meeting of shareholders of the Deutschen Lufthansa AG in May 2012. The last 
agenda point was the election of the independent auditor and of the auditor for the 
consolidated financial statement as well as of the auditor for the examination of the 
interim reports for the 2012 business year. The directors and supervisory board nom-
inated the continuation of work with pwc. The shareholders raised a countermotion 
for an exchange of the auditing firm. The reason given was the long period of time 
of over seven years while noting that a change would protect the company from 
organizational blindness. In addition, the shareholders had a reason to assume that 
pwc was not dutifully checking the false accounting policies of the company in rela-
tion to the provisions for frequent flier miles and was thereby not fulfilling the ac-
counting policies as stipulated by the German commercial law (cf. Lufthansa Group, 
2012a, Internet resource). The countermotion was rejected in the annual general 
meeting but the details of the results of the vote were not provided by the Deutschen 
Lufthansa AG on its website. What is relevant for the issues that are being discussed 
here is the fact that at this annual general meeting, attended by approximately 2600 
shareholders, the agenda comprising of seven points also included the motion for 
external rotation (cf. Lufthansa Group, 2012b, Internet resource).
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3.4.8 Public Disclosure of Fees
With the introduction of the Accounting Reform Act (BilReG), capital market 
orientated companies are obliged to publish the value of independent auditor fees 
for the business year and provide a detailed breakdown in the following four cat-
egories; independent audit, other confirmation services or audit work, tax advisory 
services and other services. This legal requirement was revised and changed with 
the introduction of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) in 
2009. In the current version it states in § 285, sentence 1, number 17 of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) that in the annex the total billed fees of the independent 
auditor for the fiscal year must be provided as well as “broken down into fees for 
auditing services, other confirmation services, tax consultancy services and other 
services, to the extent that the disclosures are not contained in the consolidated 
financial statements in which a company is already included”91 (translated in con-
text by the author). The regulatory requirements for the consolidated notes can be 
found in § 314 (1) number 9 of the German Commercial Code (hGB). The changes 
made by the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) relate to the 
previous financial disclosure requirements that were limited to companies that be-
long to an organised market as laid down by § 2 (5) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Since the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) came into force, the 
obligation to publish the breakdown of fees has been extended to all companies. 
The transparency created by the public disclosure of final auditor fees was received 
well by the public and strengthened the independence in appearance. But a further 
problem surfaced. Through the publication of fees, it was possible for the compa-
nies’ governing bodies to make comparisons. For example, whether the appointed 
auditor is getting a higher or lower fee compared to auditors of other companies. 
When receiving a high fee the auditor is in danger of having his fees lowered. But 
the opposite can also occur, meaning that an auditor with a comparatively low fee 
can receive an increase as the required quality of the audit appears not to be guar-
anteed at such a low price (cf. Nonnenmacher, 2003, p. 477). In order to keep the 
auditor fees within a reasonable limit, it could be necessary to legally regulate the 
91  „aufgeschlüsselt in das honorar für die Abschlussprüfungsleistungen, 
andere Bestätigungsleistungen, Steuerberatungsleistungen und sonstige 
Leistungen, soweit die Angaben nicht in einem das Unternehmen einbeziehenden 
konzernabschluss enthalten sind“
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maximum allowance of fees for the independent audit and other services provid-
ed. Such a stringent regulation would, however, strongly limit the independency of 
companies as it sometimes happens that a company requests special services from 
the auditing firm, such as placing a capital increase on the market or help with the 
introduction of the euro in 2002 or in 2000 with managing the changeover of com-
puter systems (cf. Nonnenmacher, 2003, p. 477).
The new legislation for disclosure and breakdown of the audit fees should 
definitely be welcomed as one must assume that the higher the fees for non-audit-
ing services are, the higher the dependency of an auditor on the company’s man-
agement is likely to be. Through the obligation of disclosure, one can see what the 
ratio is between auditing services and non-auditing services and whether the ratio 
of fees changes over time in the one or other direction.
In order to answer the question how the various services of the auditor are 
distributed across the four categories Lenz, Möller and höhn conducted a study 
with companies from the stock market segments DAx, MDAx, TecDAx and SDAx. 
They made the following findings: The first category of “independent auditing 
services” achieved 66.3 per cent of the average portion of the total fees. The second 
category “other confirmation services” was 12.2 per cent of the average portion of 
total fees. The third category of “tax consultancy services” was only 7.6 per cent 
of the average portion of fees. And the fourth and last category “other services” 
contained 13.9 per cent of the average portion of fees. All in all, one can note that 
the results of this study demonstrate that the reporting of the auditor’s fees to 
companies is very heterogeneous. If one divides the independent auditor fees for 
each one million euros of total assets over the four stock market segments under 
consideration then companies listed on the SDAx and TecDAx pay over 800 eu-
ros in auditing fees per one million of total assets, the MDAx companies pay 386 
euros per one million euros of total assets and the DAx companies pay only 214 
euros per one million euros of total assets. one must take into account though, 
that companies listed on the DAx have the highest amount of total assets followed 
by companies listed on the MDAx. The portion of fees for the independent audits 
amounts to two-thirds of the total fees and as such the importance of other con-
firmation services, tax consultancy services and other services can be considered 
to be relatively moderate. A not insignificant amount of the companies who par-
ticipated in the survey do not give these types of orders to independent auditors 
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at all. The tightened regulations of the German Accounting Reform Act and the 
following German Act to Modernize Accounting Law (BilMoG) have surely been 
part of this development (cf. Lenz/Möller/höhn, 2006, p. 1793).
3.4.9 Extension of Liability
After the many accounting scandals of the past 20th and new 21st century, 
there were not just calls for increasing the liability of company board members as 
the people responsible for the company but also for increasing the liability of the 
independent auditor for false certification. According to current law the independ-
ent auditor is liable to the company pursuant to § 323 (1) sentence 3 of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) which states that “who with intent or with gross negli-
gence violates his duties is obligated to compensate the corporation and if an affili-
ated company was damaged also this company for the resulting damage”92 (trans-
lated in context by the author). The auditor is only liable towards investors who 
placed their trust in the information provided by the auditor pursuant to the terms 
of the general tort law §§ 826 BGB and 823 BGB in connection with the Protection 
Act. The general liability in tort involves a set of problems for the investors which 
are difficult to solve. on the one hand, the investor must portray and prove in the 
case of an audit certificate with false content that the auditor being sued knew of 
this and at least wanted to conditionally deliberately damage investors. And on the 
other hand, the investor must prove that he purchased the security papers based 
on the fact that he trusted the correctness of the audit certificate. It is hardly possi-
ble for an investor to prove this. For this reason claims made by investors regularly 
fail (cf. Baums/Fischer, 2003, p. 14).93 In the case Refugium AG in which a false an-
nual financial statement was published with an unqualified audit certificate, the 
District Court in Bonn dismissed the case amongst other reasons because the dam-
aged shareholder could not convincingly present when and from which source he 
had received the annual financial statement and where he had attained the specific 
knowledge for analyzing it [LG (regional court) Bonn, 15.05.2001 - 11 o 181/00]. 
Ultimately the difficulties which the investors are faced with are comparable with 
92  „Wer vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig seine Pflichten verletzt, ist der 
kapitalgesellschaft, und wenn ein verbundenes Unternehmen geschädigt worden 
ist, auch diesem, zum Ersatz des daraus entstandenen Schadens verpflichtet.“
93  See point 3.1.2.3 and 3.1.2.4 of this paper
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those when they sue board or supervisory board members of a corporation. In 
order to reduce this problem and to be able to make the independent auditor more 
liable, Baums and Fischer propose to make changes to the §§ 37c to 37g of the 
Securities Trading Act. Pursuant to § 37d of the Securities Trading Act the changes 
to the liability of the independent auditor would then read:
“Who as an independent auditor of an issuer of securities pursuant to § 20a 
(1) sentence 2 willfully or with gross negligence contributes to making false state-
ments according to §20a (1), especially if he issues an incorrect audit certificate for 
the group accounts or in the absence of a group account for the annual financial 
statement or provides an incorrect interim report over the audit review is liable 
pursuant to § 37c. This § 37c (4) is also applicable to independent auditors who 
are not natural persons”94 (translated in context by the author) (Baums/Fischer, 
2003, p. 19). In § 37c (4) of the Securities Trading Act it would then state that the 
liability of a natural person that acted in a grossly negligent way to pay damages 
would be limited to one million euros (cf. Baums/Fischer, 2003, p. 18 f). With this 
proposal, Baums and Fischer want to make sure that the independent auditors are 
liable towards investors if they publish incorrect annual financial statement cer-
tificates. Their proposals are in line with the intent of the Act Governing Liability 
for Capital market Information which was to be introduced in 2004 but was then 
subsequently recalled.95 
The liability and sanctions against managers and auditors is more diligent 
and harder in other countries which can be seen, for example, in the US. According 
to the Sarbanes-oxley-Act (SoA), managers that against their better knowledge 
make false statements regarding assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or 
loss are faced with monetary fines of up to 5 million US dollars and prison terms of 
94  „Wer als Abschlussprüfer des Emittenten eines Wertpapiers im Sinne des § 20a 
Absatz 1 Satz 2 vorsätzlich oder grob fahrlässig an unrichtigen Angaben im Sinne 
des § 20a Absatz 1 mitwirkt, insbesondere indem er einen inhaltlich unrichti-
gen Bestätigungsvermerk zum konzernabschluss oder, in Ermangelung eines 
konzernabschlusses, zum Jahresabschluss erteilt oder eine inhaltlich unrichtige 
Bescheinigung über die prüferische Durchsicht eines zwischenberichts ausstellt, 
haftet entsprechend § 37c. § 37c Absatz 4 ist auch auf Abschlussprüfer, die nicht 
natürliche Personen sind, anzuwenden“
95  See point 3.1.2.5 of this paper. 
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up to 20 years. In addition, indemnity payments can be frozen and the repayment of 
variable salaries achieved from stock option plans can be requested. For independ-
ent auditors there is a catalogue of sanctions that foresees monetary punishments 
of up to 15 million US dollars (cf. Ballwieser/Dobler, 2003, p. 460). Nonnenmacher 
asks himself if and to what extent the liability as it exists, for example, in the US 
helps to strengthen the independent audit. According to current legislation, the 
liability of an auditor towards a company is limited to one million euros per audit 
pursuant to § 323 (2) of the German Commercial Code (hGB). For the audit of a 
stock company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market, the 
liability is limited to the obligation to compensate for persons who have acted in 
a grossly negligent way to 4 million euros per audit. As already stated, a liability 
towards third parties can only be considered for tort claims and in exceptional 
cases based on a contract containing protection. According to Nonnenbacher, the 
application of the various proposals regarding the extension of the civil liability of 
an auditor can be measured by whether the proposed changes can contribute to an 
improved quality of the independent audit and to strengthening the trust in the 
audited annual financial statements. one must consider that the damage caused to 
investors through an incorrect audit can only be calculated based on the evaluation 
of more or less plausible assumptions as the share price is influenced by many dif-
ferent factors. Should the situation occur where damages need to be compensated 
for then this must be provided to all the shareholders suing in the same way. It is 
also difficult to calculate the factually correct and proportionally correct share of 
the damage caused in relation to the responsibility of the board and supervisory 
board for the liability of an auditor for investor damages occurred. At the end of 
the day, the board and supervisory board are the leader and head of the company. 
They hold the power within the company and carry the responsibility for a correct 
corporate reporting. The independent auditor has only the task of checking the 
correctness of this information. The actual fraudulent behavior, i.e. the manipula-
tion and forging of the annual financial statement occurs, with few exceptions, at 
the top management level (cf. Nonnenmacher, 2003, p. 478).
3.4.10 Changes to the Professional Supervision
An intact and nationally as well as internationally recognized auditor over-
sight system is not just very important for the profession but also for the German 
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economy. The Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) is responsible for the over-
seeing of accountant societies, chartered accountants and for auditing companies. 
Its responsibility also encompasses the system of external quality control. Up until 
2004 they were in turn monitored by the – in 2001 introduced – advisory board 
for quality control which was made up of members who were not members of this 
profession. That up to 2004 they were also already obligated to public authorities’ 
procurement is reflected in the organizational form of a public sector entity and 
its being placed under the legal supervision of the Federal Ministry of Economy. 
Although this supervisory system was shaped by detailed legislative regulation it 
still showed some weaknesses. This led to the situation where it was criticized by 
the public as a pure model of self-regulation (cf. Marten, 2006, p. 1123 f). In parallel 
there was and today still is the special professional jurisdiction.96 
The legislator reacted to this situation by introducing the Independent 
Auditor Supervision Act (APAG) that came into force in January 2005. With the 
introduction of this act the first meaningful supplement and further develop-
ment of already existing structures was created. Marten summarizes this chosen 
path under the catchphrase “monitored self-regulation”. The Chamber of Public 
Accountants (WPk) is now also subject to close monitoring of its overseeing func-
tion through a new, from the profession unrelated, committee: under the oversight 
96  Pursuant to § 68 (1) of the Public Accountants Act (WPo) professional law pro-
ceedings can be brought to the division for audit affairs of the Regional Court in 
Berlin and following sanctions can be imposed against an auditor: In case of a 
warning the court accepts the committed breach of duty but at the same time is-
sues a strong warning of reoccurrence. In the case of an admonition the breach of 
duty is already considered to be significant. A fine pursuant to § 68 (1) number 1 of 
the Public Accountants Act (WPo) can be imposed to up to 500,000 euros. In case 
of a temporary suspension the professional person is not allowed to pursue his 
profession for a limited amount of time. This prohibition can be from certain types 
of activity or a complete employment ban from the profession. In case of a final ex-
clusion from the profession there must have been a case for a grave breach of duty 
in conjunction with a high level of guiltiness by the professional. Elements of an 
offence are in this case often embezzlement, fraud, breach of trust and falsification 
of documents (cf. Marten/köhler/Paulitschek, 2006, p. 27)
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of the Auditors’ Supervision Commission (APAk).
The Auditors’ supervision Commission (APAk) consists of six to ten honor-
ary members. They are not allowed to have been a member of the Chamber of 
Public Accountants (WPk) for five years prior to their appointment. Before be-
ing appointed, they should have been experts in the area of accounting, finance, 
economy, science or law. They are appointed by the Federal Minister of Economy 
and Technology. Furthermore, they are independent and not subject to directives 
(cf. heiniger/Bertram, 2004, p. 1738; Marten/köhler/Paulitschek, 2006, p. 28).
The APAk’s role is to oversee all areas that in a broad sense belong to the 
system of professional supervision. To this, amongst other tasks belong (cf. Baetge/
Lienau, 2004, p. 2280): 
•	 overseeing the quality control of the independent audit
•	 the public profession related supervision of the tasks of the Chamber of Public 
Accountants (WPk)
•	 cooperation with relevant institutions of other Member States.
The APAk can be understood as a further development of the commission 
for quality control. Their area of responsibility as external monitoring instance 
is extended to encompass all areas that in a broad sense can be part of the sys-
tem of professional supervision. Thereby their supervision responsibilities relate 
to the whole array of activities which the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) 
directly exercises in its role of public administration. In addition, the role of the 
APAk is not solely limited to tasks of pure system control. The APAk is directly 
involved in the system of professional supervision in which it has the full powers 
to make decisions as to how specific individual matters of professional supervision 
should be handled. This also includes the right to participate in Chamber of Public 
Accountants (WPk) meetings, to have access rights to information and to inspec-
tion and can request representatives of the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) 
to participate in their meetings. The Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) is also 
explicitly obligated to report in a timely and appropriate form to requests from 
the APAk regarding individual matters for supervisory purposes. The APAk can 
reject decisions made by the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) and request 
them to re-review based on reasons provided and if not corrected can annul the 
decision. With these regulations, the legislation has reacted to the public pressure 
that the professional association should not be allowed to decide upon measures of 
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professional supervision. The public and international recognition of professional 
supervision in relation to the independent auditor has thereby had its main obsta-
cles removed. The professionally unrelated APAk is the actual professional super-
vision organ, whilst the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) is subordinated 
to it and therefore does not play a critical role but rather a role of execution and of 
laying the groundwork (cf. heininger/Bertram, 2004, p. 1739; Baetge/Lienau, 2004, 
p. 2279; Marten, 2006, p. 1124).
With the introduction of the Independent Auditor Supervision Act (APAG), 
the German Federal Government, in line with the 10-Point-Program from 2003, 
implemented an independent commission for the supervision similar to that of 
the American regulatory authority Public Company Accounting oversight Board 
(PCAoB). Through the extensive responsibilities of the supervisory commission, 
the public has access to a more transparent resolution or punishment of breaches of 
duty by auditors. however, Baetge and Lienau rightly give rise to concern that the 
possibilities of the Auditors’ Supervision Commission are also tightly constrained. 
The reason for this is the fact that the commission consists of only a limited num-
ber of members who are also supposed to be working on a voluntary basis. Finding 
the appropriate people for this honorary post who are or were actively engaged 
in accounting, finance, economy, science or law and who five years prior to their 
appointment were not a personal member of the Chamber of Public Accountants 
(WPk) may be difficult (cf. Baetge/Lienau, 2004, p. 2281).
A complete recognition of the German supervisory system will be hard to 
achieve without considering a set of tools similar to those in America. The willing-
ness of the PCAoB to pass on own inspections for German auditing firms, how-
ever, presupposes this. As the prevailing quality control system in Germany did 
not meet the requirements of the PCAoB and the EU-Commission did not view 
the German supervisory system as totally conforming to the requirements of the 
8th directive, the legislator prompted a further bill. The Professional Supervision 
Act that came into force in September 2003 was targeted at closing the remaining 
gaps (cf. Marten, 2006, p. 1124).
The Professional Supervision Act created the new instrument for special ran-
dom as well as scheduled inspections. According to the mandate of the PCAoB, the 
special random inspections relate solely to the auditors of capital market orientated 
companies. one can monitor all professional duties which need to be completed in 
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line with the legal annual financial statement audit. The randomly selected audi-
tors that are required to undergo special investigations cannot plead professional 
confidentiality obligation towards the company. This ensures that the Chamber of 
Public Accountants (WPk) gets access to documented internal documents of the 
company being audited. To protect the interests of the company, this information 
is only allowed to be used for professional supervisory proceedings against the 
auditor (prohibition of use). Auditors are generally obliged to provide information, 
files and other documentation that is relevant for the assessment of a supervisory 
or appeal proceeding to the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) upon demand. 
If a professional refuses to cooperate, then employees of the Chamber of Public 
Accountants (WPk) are allowed to access the grounds and business premises of 
the professional affected during normal business hours. They are allowed to view 
documents and make copies in order to start and complete the required investiga-
tion (cf. Marten, 2006, p. 1125; Marten/köhler/Paulitschek, 2006, p. 28). The rights 
of the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) were extended to allow them to start 
independent investigations in cases of medium severity. In connection with this, 
the sanction possibilities were extended in so far as that they can, for example, im-
pose a written complaint connected with a fine of up to 50,000 euros (cf. hofmann, 
2008, p. 320). In parallel there is, in addition to this, the special professional juris-
diction that can impose fines up to 500,000 euros, temporary suspensions or also 
an independent disbarment for breaches of duty. 97 Possibilities to sanction fraudu-
lent behaviour are therefore sufficiently provided for.
Even though the new statutory framework conditions are initially targeted 
at capital market orientated companies and their independent auditors, criticism 
has been voiced that the changes relating to the professional practice are often 
disproportionate and impractical for medium sized auditing firms. In contrast, the 
legislator assumes that the balance of legislation also caters for the requirements of 
smaller firms. In an investigation in 2011 that looked at the effects of the normative 
changes on medium sized auditing firms, haßlinger noted a significant impact. 
This includes, for example, the newly introduced external quality control that car-
ries significant organisational and auditing costs. haßlinger states that the norma-
tive changes tend to incur additional costs. As a result of this, the cost-benefit-ratio 
97  The possible measures were already described in detail at the beginning of this 
paper under point 10 (see footnote 96).
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of conducting such business in general and of conducting the independent audit 
in particular has worsened. The intensity of the impact can be seen in relation to 
the size of the firm and to the scope of activity. Smaller firms and firms with a low 
scope of activity are partially more impacted than larger firms with a high scope 
of activity. Based on the given developments, haßlinger concludes that it will be 
increasingly harder, especially for smaller auditing firms to fulfil the increasing 
functional, professional and mandate requested requirements. As a consequence 
of international harmonisation tendencies, further changes in the professional 
framework would further exacerbate the situation. In this context especially, the 
set-up of the professional supervision would play an important role in the future. 
The legislative activities would continue to lead to an increased versatility of the 
auditing sector. Based on the current state and the foreseeable developments one 
cannot assume that there will be a noticeable reduction of burden for medium 
sized firms in this competitive environment. Auditing firms which place their fo-
cus on strategic work could possibly have an advantage according to haßlinger (cf. 
haßlinger, 2011, p. 781 f).
3.4.11 Conclusion
The goal of the reform measures, in relation to the strengthening of the role 
of the independent auditor, was to rebuild the trust in the quality of the expertise 
of independent auditors which had been lost through the large accounting scan-
dals. This was to be achieved through the complete transparency of all services 
provided by the independent auditor, the ensuring of his independency, the audi-
tor rotation, the public disclosure of fees, the extension of their liability as well as 
the strengthening of the professional supervision. In conclusion, one can summa-
rize that the legislator has strengthened the role of the auditor through the reform 
measures implemented but not to the extent which would have been needed to 
achieve its designated purpose. As such, for example, the increasing expansion 
of the product range harbours significant problems for the legally required inde-
pendency of the independent auditor because – as illustrated – the high profit mar-
gins in the consultancy business have led to a cross-subsidisation of the auditing 
services. By not enforcing a clear distinction between auditing and consulting, the 
danger that the auditor can lose his independence due to his dual responsibility 
of auditing and consulting has not been averted. In its ruling regarding the basic 
204 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
compatibility of auditing and consultancy, the Second Civil Senate of the Federal 
Court of Justice (BGhz 135, 260; confirmed through BGhz 153, 32 and BGh WM 
2004, p. 1491 (1493) f) pointed out the criteria for a functional decision-making com-
petence. Munoz correctly points out that time will tell whether the instrument of 
functional decision-making is really suitable to balance the sensible compatibility 
of auditing and consultancy with the protection of independency. The functional 
right to make decisions allows the auditor to show alternatives in the preparation 
of the annual financial accounts; it does not, however, allow him to make deci-
sions for the client. Consulting services conducted by the auditor beyond those of 
portraying the alternative scenarios would be impermissible participation when 
compiling the annual financial statement. At the point in time when a client makes 
his own independent decision, the auditor is testing not his own decision but that 
of the client. Munoz raises the concern that proving whether an auditor has over-
stepped his authority as an auditor is difficult to do. he strengthens this point with 
the comment that support from the supervisory board to solve whether or not the 
auditor was involved at an inadmissible level in the creation of the annual finan-
cial statement cannot be expected. According to Munoz, whether the tool of func-
tional responsibility is really applicable for balancing auditing and consultancy 
services with an effective assurance of independency is also dependant on how the 
jurisdiction will in future apply the blanket clause of the § 319 (2) of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB). According to this, an auditor should be excluded if there 
are objective reasons, especially those of business, financial or personal nature, 
that raise cause for concern of independency. For determining whether there is 
a case for a conflict of interest, it will always have to be reviewed on a case-by-
case basis. Thereby the legislator has passed a part of its responsibility over to the 
courts. Munoz assumes that also in future one will have to rely, on the one hand, 
on the fact that the named company board members act pursuant to § 318 (3) sen-
tence 1 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) will become involved as soon as 
they become aware of reasons that could support a concern that the auditor has a 
conflict of interest. And on the other hand one must place trust in the honesty of 
the auditor. Munoz views the fact that several leading auditing firms have stopped 
their association with law firms in Germany as giving reason for hope – assuming 
that this is done not just to keep up appearances (cf. Munoz, 2008, p. 30 ff).
At the end of the day, the legislator’s chosen solution in relation to the inde-
pendency of the auditor appears to be unsatisfactory. Likewise the decision to only 
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have an internal rotation appears unsatisfactory. A compulsory exchange of the 
complete auditing firm and not just of an individual auditing team could not only 
help to stop organisational blindness and interrelations between auditors and the 
company’s management team but could also help to avoid this from even occur-
ring. The argumentation that an auditor requires a two-year period to be fully up 
to speed can be counteracted that exactly this period of adjustment provides the 
opportunity for a new, neutral view of the company. 
one concluding criticism is that the auditor cannot properly fulfil his re-
quired advisory and warning function as his rights to scrutinize company activity 
and to obtain information are really quite limited. In relation to this point, Budde 
and Steuber have demanded that auditors should be given all the rights necessary 
in order to provide them with the ability to access all required information and 
to dig into the realms of the supervisory board members (cf. Budde/Steuber in 
Wollmert et al., 2003, p. 142).
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3.5 monitoring the legAlity of specific compAny 
Accounting by An independent source (“enforcement“)
Business asymmetries and corporate collapses, errors in the accounts of 
large, multi-national corporations and accounting fraud have led the European 
Commission to make the future strategic approach to accounting a subject of 
discussion. This happened already on 13 June 2000 with a communication to the 
Council and to the European Parliament. Whilst other industrial nations have had 
institutions responsible for the monitoring of reporting of information of listed 
companies in place for many years98, Germany lacks such controlling institutions. 
The German system for enforcing the accounting regulations has been primar-
ily the audit by the independent auditor and the Supervisory Board. The need to 
improve the German enforcement system is indisputable and well known in pub-
lic discussions and in particular by all parties with a vested interest in company 
accounting; the specific implementation, however, was controversially discussed. 
Nevertheless there was overwhelming consensus regarding the fact that external 
financial reporting within the context of corporate governance plays a very im-
portant role for a functioning and efficient capital market. This was declared as 
indispensable for the international competitiveness of the German capital market. 
Whilst there was agreement over the need for a German enforcement institution, 
views differed notably on questions whether such institutions should be estab-
lished on a national or European level and whether they should be privately or 
publicly organised (cf. Naumann/Tielmann in Wollmert et all., 2003, p. 161; vater, 
2004, p.3). These questions were answered on 15 December 2004 with the German 
Federal Parliament passing the bill on the German Law on Financial Reporting 
Compliance (BilkoG) which came into force on 1 July 2005 (BGBl volume 2004 
Part I No. 69, Page 3408 ff). This act introduced a two-stage enforcement proce-
dure, in the first stage organized under private law and by the Federal Ministry of 
Justice and in agreement with the Federal Ministry of Finance recognized German 
Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (DPR or FREP) applying §§ 342b – 342e 
98  The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States of America, 
the Commission Nazionale de le Societa e la Borsa in Italiy as well as the Autorité 
des Marchés Financiers in France are completely organized by the state. The 
Financial Reporting Review Panel in Great Britain is a privately organised institu-
tion (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 323).
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of the German Commercial Code (hGB) comes into play. In the second stage the 
German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) acts pursuant to §§ 37a – 37u of 
the German Securities Trading Act (WphG) which has sovereign rights. The pro-
cess is structured in such a way that in the first phase of enforcement most cases 
are taken care of and closed by the DPR. With this regulation the German legisla-
tor has opted for a broad control under private law (cf. Scheffler, 2007, p. 209).
As such, the German Law on Financial Reporting Compliance (BilkoG) 
complies only in part with the opinion of the work group for external company 
accounting of the Schalenbach-Association for Business Administration (AkEU) 
which had proposed a purely official system (cf. AkEU, 2004, p. 329). Reasons for 
a state solution were amongst other things the extensive rights of information and 
presentation, a comprehensive sanctioning toolbox, a true enforcement of resolv-
ing found and not mutually agreed accounting violations as well as the unlimited 
acceptance and authority of a state-owned enforcement institution (cf. Peemöller/
hofmann, 2005, p. 231).99 
The BilkoG implements the requirements of point six of the government’s 
Catalogue of Measures to Strengthen Companies’ Integrity and to Protect Investors 
from 2003 onwards (cf. Maßnahmenkatalog der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung 
der Unternehmensintegrität und des Anlegerschutzes, 2003, p. 9 f). The goal of this 
act is to prevent irregularities within the accounts and to renew and strengthen 
investors trust in the capital market.
3.5.1 The German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (DPR/FREP)
In May 2004, economic organisations such as the Federation of German 
Industry (BDI), the Bank Association, the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) 
and the German Trade Union Association (DGB) founded an association called 
the DPR e.v. that was to takeover the sponsorship for the independent inspec-
tion authority. By the acknowledgement agreement dated 30 March 2005 this au-
thority was instituted as establishment by the enforcement panel of the German 
Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ) pursuant to § 324b of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB). The association’s Nomination Committee selects the (currently 15) 
99  Further arguments for and also against a State solution can be found in 
Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, p. 231.
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members of the enforcement panel who are appointed with the agreement of the 
German Federal Ministry of Justice and the German Federal Ministry of Finance 
(BMF). The members of the enforcement panel are all full-time personnel and must 
conduct their jobs in a professional, independent and neutral manner. A prereq-
uisite for this is that they have in-depth knowledge about the capital market with 
regard to accounting standards. At the head stand the president and vice-president 
(cf. Scheffler, 2007, p. 209). There is a framework agreement with 9 auditing firms 
that arranges a fast supply of further professionals on a fee basis when required. In 
2008 the number of accredited people was approximately 180 (cf. hofmann, 2008, 
p. 326)
The German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel oversees the legality of 
the accounting of listed companies100. It checks whether the last submitted annual 
financial statement and management report and the last consolidated financial 
statements and consolidated management report of a company are in line with 
legal requirements. The legal requirements also encompass the standard account-
ing principles and other legally allowed accounting standards. These are, amongst 
others, the international accounting standards such as the IFRS and the US-GAAP. 
Rules of procedure as published on the FREP/DPR website regulate its approach. 
organisation and execution of the inspection process as well as the required inde-
pendence and responsibilities of the people part of the inspection process are also 
regulated here (cf. Scheffler, 2007, p. 210).
The FREP/DPR only audits if the company to be inspected agrees to sup-
port the audit. In this case the legal representatives of the company are obliged 
to provide correct and complete information and to provide the corresponding 
documentation. If a company refuses to participate, then this is reported by the 
FREP/DPR to the BaFin. The BaFin can then instigate their own inspection without 
having to fulfil any further requirements (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 326).
An audit is instigated when there is a reason (examination with cause). There 
is a reason for cause when there are concrete indications for a violation of the ac-
counts. Indications for erroneous accounting that would support an examination 
with cause could be tips from concerned people, for example, from shareholders or 
100  In 2005 of the over 1200 companies that use the capital markets and were 
admitted to trading on a German stock exchange approximately 250 companies 
were also admitted on a foreign stock exchange (cf. Scheffler 2007, p. 210).
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creditors but also from third parties or press reports. These kinds of tips, however, 
have so far only very rarely been submitted to the independent audit body. Most of 
the examinations with cause undertaken have been based on own research made 
by the FREP/DPR (cf. Scheffler, 2006, p. 16; Scheffler in Freidank/Altes, 2007, p. 211).
If the reviews of the published annual financial statements show possible 
violations against accounting standards, the Chamber of Public Accountants in-
forms the enforcement panel. If there are indications for major breaches, the en-
forcement panel initiates an examination with cause. Normally the examination 
with cause encompasses only a review of the facts related to the specific issues 
raised. The enforcement panel, however, can extend the scope of the audit if it finds 
further indications of accounting standard breaches during its audit (cf. Scheffler, 
2006, p. 16; Scheffler in Freidank/Altes, 2007, p. 211). 
With regard to the sample checks, the FREP/DPR developed general princi-
ples covering the process for the selection of sample checks and implemented these 
on 5 September 2005 after attaining the approval of the Federal Ministry of Justice 
and the Federal Ministry of Finance. The goal is to sample audit every company 
admitted to the stock exchange over a certain period of time. As such, companies 
listed on the larger stock exchanges DAx, MDAx, TecDAx and SDAx should be 
audited every four to five years. The remaining capital market orientated compa-
nies should be audited every eight to ten years. Companies that were audited must 
additionally assume that they will be audited again in the following year. The sam-
ple check selection consists of a statistical random selection and a risk oriented ap-
proach. The enforcement panel selects 15 to 20 per cent of the sample checks based 
on risk criteria. This aims at capturing current and critical accounting standard 
problems or also critical company situations without companies showing indica-
tions for erroneous accounting. This includes factors such as first time admittance 
to the stock exchange, critical developments of an industry sector or of a company 
as well as changes of the business sector in which a company operates or changes 
to a company’s organizational structure. The sample check audit is not a full audit 
pursuant to § 317 of the German Commercial Code (hGB). Accounting and risk 
management are not audited. The audit is restricted to the selected fields of con-
cern. The focus is on criteria for success or risky situations that are fundamentally 
important for the economic situation and business development of the companies 
involved. In other words, it is about information which is critical for the decision 
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making of the people being addressed by the accounts (cf. Scheffler, 2006, p. 16; 
Scheffler in Freidank/Altes, 2007, p. 211 f). 
In order to complete the audit, the enforcement panel requests for each ex-
amination with cause as well as for each sample audit that the company to be 
audited sends financial statements or consolidated financial statements together 
with the management reports as well as the corresponding audit reports of the 
independent auditor. hereby the independent auditor’s audit reports are the key 
files used to determine the focus of the audit. Also any interim reports that were 
published after the reporting date are requested. The audit of the DPR is focused 
on individual items or end-of-year items as well as selected accounting problems. 
The focus of the audit is determined autonomously by the auditor in charge of the 
case. The scope of the individual audit depends on the capacity of the enforcement 
panel. The capacity of the enforcement panel is determined, on the one hand, by 
the goal to audit all capital market orientated companies and, on the other hand, 
by the available budget. The audit of the DPR has to therefore focus on individual 
key items. As a consequence this means that the scope of the legal annual financial 
statement audits is significantly wider than the audit through the DPR (cf. Gahlen/
Schäfer, 2006, p. 1620). The results of the DPR audits have to be documented in an 
audit report stating whether the accounts are in line with the applicable account-
ing standards or whether they are erroneous (§ 342b (5) hGB). Mistakes in the 
accounts are declared as breaches against the individually applicable legal require-
ments, accounting standards, binding interpretations or standard accounting prin-
ciples. The accounts are seen as erroneous if these breaches individually or in their 
totality are significant. however, mistakes are not only significant if they affect 
the results or show end-of-year items falsely (cf. Scheffler, 2006, p. 17 f; Scheffler 
in Freidank/Altes, 2007, p. 212 f). But also when a mistake which does not impact 
the results, for example, the non-publication of unpleasant information such as 
the compensation of the Board of Executives, purchase prices in relation to com-
pany take-overs or the risk reporting in the management report can influence the 
economic decision making of the addressees of the accounts and is therefore also 
a reason for a case of erroneous accounts. Facts which lead to a suspected crime 
in relation to the accounts of a company are furthermore reported by the DPR to 
the responsible authorities for further persecution. Facts that suggest that auditors 
have neglected their professional duties are reported to the Chamber of Public 
Accountants (§ 342b (8) hGB) (cf. Gahlen/Schäfer, 2006, p. 1621 f). People entrusted 
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with the audits have to maintain the confidentiality over the company and busi-
ness secrets as well as the company knowledge attained during the audit (§ 342c 
hGB). This does not apply when there is an obligation to testify towards investigat-
ing authorities relating to tax-related crimes (cf. Scheffler, 2006, p. 18 f; Scheffler in 
Freidank/Altes, 2007, p. 213 f).
After completing the audit, the DPR informs the company of the results 
whereby the DPR needs to provide an explanation to the company of the mistakes 
found by the DPR. Should such a case occur, then the DPR request the audited 
company’s agreement, within a reasonable deadline, to the audit findings. The au-
diting process is closed with a notice of the president of the DPR to the BaFin. This 
includes the audit results and in case of erroneous accounts with the information 
whether the company has agreed to the auditing results (cf. Gahlen/Schäfer, 2006, 
p. 1620).
If a company agrees with the auditing results, then it is up to the BaFin to 
decide whether the findings must be published. If the company does not agree 
with the audit findings, then the BaFin decides whether there is a case of erroneous 
accounting or not. Erroneous accounting is thus supposed to have sanctions im-
posed by the company publishing the identified mistakes and the relevant parts of 
the explanation. In addition, established mistakes can lead to the invalidity of the 
annual financial statement if they specifically do not fulfill the rules for protecting 
creditors (§ 256 German Stock Corporation Act) (Scheffler in Freidank/Altes, 2007, 
p. 214).
Based on the activity reports of the DPR from 2010 and 2011, the following 
can be summarized: In 2010 the DPR completed 118 audits and in 2011 110 audits. 
of these audits, 106 and 90 were sample checks in 2010 and in 2011 respectively. 
Thereby both years comply with the ground rules of the sample check audit pro-
cess set by DPR whereby all index listed companies are audited every four to five 
years and all other capital market orientated companies every eight to ten years. 
overall the number of companies that are subject to the German enforcement reg-
ulations has reduced by more than thirty per cent between 2005 and 2011. Apart 
from the sample checks, there were six examinations with cause and fourteen au-
dits conducted upon requests by the BaFin (cf. Activity Report FREP, 2011, p. 3; 
Activity Report FREP, 2012, p. 3). In 2011 the average error rate was twenty-five per 
cent and as such on the same level as the last average four years. The error rates are, 
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as can be expected, significantly higher in the examinations with cause (100 per 
cent) and the audits upon request (64 per cent) as with the sample check audits (13 
per cent). After establishing erroneous accounts, the DPR seeks to speak with the 
affected company whereby the company is asked if they agree with the findings. 
The quota of agreements continues to be on a high level with eighty-one per cent 
in 2011. All cases found with accounting mistakes are forwarded by the DPR to the 
BaFin, whereby the cases without the affected company’s agreement are subject to 
a second audit conducted by the BaFin themselves (cf. Activity Report FREP, 2012, 
p. 4 ff). 
In 2011 the most frequently found mistakes in the accounts were:
•	 Mistakes in the details of reports, 
•	 Mistakes in accounting company acquisitions and disposals,
•	 Mistakes in general information provided in the notes,
•	 Mistakes with the realization of income,
•	 Mistakes with the disclosure and details of financial instruments and
•	 Mistakes with the cash flow statement.
The reasons for the mistakes were, on the one hand, insufficient disclosures 
in the management report and notes. here it was mainly the case of wrongly por-
trayed potential effects of the financial and economic crisis on the company. on 
the other hand, the reasons for mistakes were the immense scope and the difficul-
ties with applying the IFRS accounting principles to the financial statements (cf. 
Activity Report FREP, 2012, p. 7 f). 
Detection of accounting fraud by the DPR: Although the DPR only had a 
budget of six million euros and was staffed only with a president, vice president 
and fifteen full-time auditors to complete the auditing procedures for 873 compa-
nies in 2011 (cf. BaFin, 2012, p. 230), it was possible to uncover at least two major cas-
es of accounting fraud. The DPR uncovered in the case of the Landesbank Sachsen 
AG (Sachsen LB) that, in the 2006 financial statement, billions-worth of speculation 
with US credit papers were incompletely portrayed. In 2007 the Sachsen LB could 
only be saved through an emergency sale of the bank to the Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg. In August 2008, based on investigations by the Federal Criminal 
Police office and the Public Prosecutors office in Leipzig, offices and apartments 
of five former directors of the bank were searched. After analysis of the confis-
cated documents, three former directors and three senior managers were charged 
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in 2011. The defendants were either accused of incorrect portrayal of the annual 
financial statements and embezzlement, or aiding and abetting. During the inves-
tigation, the investigators found settlements of accounts running into hundreds 
of millions of euros whose origin could not be traced. The amounts between 142.7 
million euros and 155.6 million euros were found between 2003 and 2006 in the 
Deutsche Bundesbank but also as cash reserves or credit balances with central 
banks and also as receivables from customers. value adjustments running into 
hundreds of million euros would have been a disaster. In addition, the Sachsen LB 
paid performance-based compensation which meant for the three directors pre-
mium payments between 68,000 and 142,000 euros in 2003 and 60,000 and 134,000 
euros in 2004. The State guaranteed for losses of up to a total of 2.75 billion euros. 
Up until September 2011 the State transferred approximately 170 million euros to 
creditors of the Sachsen LB (cf. Der Spiegel, 2008, Issue 32; Der Spiegel, 2011, Issue 
37; Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, 2011a, Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, 2011b; internet 
resources). 
In 2008 the DPR discovered that the reputable auditing firm Pricewaterhouse 
Cooper (pwc) had signed-off the 2006 annual financial report of the Sachsen LB 
which had to be sold under distress and in which the risks of the speculation 
with US credit instruments worth billions of euros were incompletely portrayed. 
Investigations into this company were also initiated (cf. Der Spiegel, 2008, Issue 32; 
internet resources). 
The second large case of accounting fraud was uncovered by the DPR in 2007. 
This involved the Tec-Dax listed hamburg-based “Conergy” company dealing in 
photovoltaic systems. Until october 2007, the company Conergy was viewed as a 
prospering showpiece company on the capital market. But on 25 october 2007 the 
former Board of Directors unexpectedly issued a profit warning based on delays 
in delivery of solar modules which could lead to substantial losses in sales for the 
third quarter. After this disastrous notification, the share price of Conergy sud-
denly collapsed. As recently as March 2007, the former Board of Directors had sold 
substantial company share packages and had made tens of millions of euros. In 
2007, BaFin requested the DPR to include Conergy in its auditing processes. The 
DPR found that Conergy had in multiple cases breached accounting standards in 
2006 and 2007 so they could show higher results. These findings were passed on to 
the Public Prosecutor of hamburg. Investigations into the company were initiated 
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and in 2009 24 offices and apartments were searched and evidence collected. In 
2011 the hamburg prosecutor’s office brought charges against six former board 
members of Conergy for suspected market manipulation, accounting fraud as well 
as forbidden insider trading. It was suspected that there was a deliberate case of 
manipulation of the accounts as otherwise the company would have had to an-
nounce a loss of two million euros. The former supervisory board had confirmed 
the financial accounts; as well as the auditing firm who had issued an unqualified 
audit report. The Public Prosecutor’s office initiated an investigation into the au-
diting firm (cf. Spiegel online, 2011; Der Westen, 2011; Rotter Rechtsanwälte, 2010; 
internet resources). 
As there have been no rulings in either case, these examples should merely 
highlight the fact that the enforcement establishment DPR is able to find mistakes 
in the accounts and has thereby proven its worthiness.
3.5.2 The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
The BaFin requests the DPR to instigate an audit if they have substantial 
indications that there has been a breach of accounting rules (§ 37p (2) Securities 
Trading Act). The BaFin as such only gets active if 
(1) The company refuses to participate in the audit by the DPR (§ 37p (1) number 1 
Securities Trading Act)
(2) The audited company does not agree with the auditing results presented by the 
DPR (§ 37p (1) number 1 Securities Trading Act)
(3) There are serious doubts about the correctness of the DPR audit results or 
about the conformity of the audit conducted by the DPR (§ 37p (1) number 2 
Securities Trading Act).
If both DPR and BaFin conclude that the accounts are faulty, then the BaFin 
asks the affected company if there are serious grounds that would justify why, on 
an exceptional basis, one should not publicize the errors found (§ 37q (2) sentence 
3 Trading Securities Act). 
Forgoing publication of faulty accounts based on the justified interest of the 
company affected should be an exception. The clear goal of the enforcement-proce-
dure is to strengthen the trust of the investors in the capital market. For this reason 
the interests of the investors and of the capital market should weigh more heavily 
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than the interests of affected companies (cf. Gahlen/Schäfer, 2006, p. 1621).
Should there be a case of no forgoing publication of the errors found, then 
the BaFin requests the company to promptly publish the mistakes found as well as 
all substantial parts of the reasoning in the electronic Federal Gazette as well as in 
either a multiregional stock exchange gazette or an electronic data dissemination 
system. If the audits conducted by the BaFin show no grounds for objection, then it 
informs the affected company of its findings (cf. Scheffler, 2006, p. 19). In 2010 the 
BaFin completed a total of thirty audits, whereby in twenty-four cases they found 
mistakes and ordered a subsequent injunction to publish the mistakes found: 
Therefore, the BaFin ordered all companies with errors found to publically disclose 
these errors. Also there were fewer cases than in previous years when companies 
presented reasons against a publication of the errors found. In only one case did 
the BaFin have to enforce the correct publication of the errors through adminis-
trative enforcement. A faster process of publicizing errors found was supported 
by the ruling of the higher regional court Frankfurt am Main (oLG Frankfurt, 
31.08.2010 – WpÜG 3/10) whereby the publication of the errors was ruled as part of 
the next step in the process of finding errors and downplaying, relativizing or even 
inaccurate additions or making comments relating to the error publications is not 
in the interest of the information requirements of the capital markets and is there-
fore forbidden. Already in 2009 the higher regional court Frankfurt am Main (oLG 
Frankfurt, 22.01.2009 - WpÜG 1/08, WpÜG 3/08) had noted that the publication of 
the errors found was the main element of assertion in the enforcement process (cf. 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), 2011, p. 228 ff).
In a case where a publication of errors is requested by order of the BaFin, 
then this has various possible consequences (cf. Gahlen/Schäfer, 2006, p. 1622 f):
•	 Through the disclosure in different media a wider public is informed about 
the fact that a certain company has significant errors in its annual financial 
statement. Thereby the company is proverbially in the pillory. The people 
addressed and people participating in the capital market can now decide if, 
in their view, the uncovered mistakes are essential and if it is therefore worth 
imposing sanctions. 
•	 one can assume a preventative effect on other companies. The quality of the 
annual financial statements of companies listed on the capital markets is very 
likely to improve as the companies will try to avoid negative public perception 
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through the publication of mistakes found in its accounts.
•	  Ultimately, after a publication of found errors is made it is, however, up to 
the participants of the capital market to decide if and how they will impose 
sanctions on the affected company. The DPR and BaFin have no further means 
to influence the company once they have ordered and enforced the publication 
of the errors found. Should potential investors find that the mistakes made by 
the company are worthy of imposing sanctions, then they can react by refusing 
to buy the shares of the affected company. If many investors react in the same 
way, then this can lead to share prices falling which in turn can also impact 
the income of executive and supervisory boards especially those parts of the 
salary which are stock-performance related. 
•	 Separate financial statements with substantial mistakes can be null and void 
pursuant to § 256 of the Stock Corporation Act. This only applies, however, 
for separate financial statements pursuant to the German Commercial Code 
(hGB) and not for consolidated financial statements. Published error reports if 
they affect a separate financial statement pursuant to the German Commercial 
Code (hGB) can lead to shareholders raising an action for annulment. Reasons 
for an action for annulment can be mistakes in the valuation of positions 
in the affected separate financial statement or the infringement of creditor 
safeguards or a breach against regulations over the structure of the annual 
financial statement. 
•	 In the Annual General Meeting the executives or individual members can be 
refused the ratification of actions based on the found errors in the accounts. 
This does not have any direct legal consequences but can under circumstances 
lead to the career end of one or more affected board members or damage their 
reputation. Also the Supervisory Board must answer to the shareholders in 
the Annual General Meeting. The Annual General Meeting appoints and 
dismisses the Supervisory Board. If the majority finds that the Supervisory 
Board should have noticed the uncovered errors as part of its auditing activity 
then the voting capital (shareholders) can refuse to ratify the Supervisory 
Board or individual members of the Supervisory Board and thereby enforce 
the disqualification of a member for the upcoming reelection. The independent 
auditor is also appointed at the Annual General Meeting. Also here the Annual 
General Meeting can impose sanctions upon the work of the current auditor by 
appointing a different independent auditor. 
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3.5.3 An Evaluation of the German Enforcement System
The role of the German enforcement system pursuant to § 342b (2) of the 
German Commercial Code (hGB) is to audit the annual financial statements and 
management reports and the consolidated financial statements and management 
reports of companies listed on the capital markets. All these accounts were already 
audited by independent auditors pursuant to §§ 316ff of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB). DPR and BaFin should neither replace these legally required inde-
pendent audits nor repeat them. Rather the enforcement process was established 
to look into selected audit areas or individual accounting questions. As such, 
the enforcement process should help through its preventive effect to secure and 
strengthen the independent audits. The preventive character is created by the fact 
that not only based on concrete evidence for a breach against accounting standards 
or upon request by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) audits are 
made but also randomly selected without any due reason (cf. Borcherding/kleen 
in Freidank, 2005, p. 174). The question rises whether there is even a sufficient prob-
ability of detecting mistakes through the enforcement process. here it would ap-
pear that it is of great importance that the DPR and BaFin are put in a position 
where they can gain knowledge over irregularities and breaches. As soon as the 
BaFin or the DPR see first signs of conspicuities, they should start the process of 
gathering further targeted information about the company, the management and 
the market environment. Audits based on due reason are always preferable to ran-
domly selected audits without due reason as the probability of detecting mistakes 
is much higher. Random audits have more of a proactive nature as the probability 
of detecting faulty accounts is fairly low. The DPR has restricted headcount and 
financial resources. Apart from the available resources, the probability of detect-
ing mistakes or irregularities is influenced by the applied selection procedure. If 
a company is subjected to a random audit, then it is possible that under certain 
circumstances the company is subjected to a further audit in the following year. 
As such, there is a risk for all capital market orientated companies to be audited 
again in the following year to ensure that the preventive effect of the possibility 
of being audited is maintained (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 340 f; Baetge/Thiele/Matena, 
2004, p. 212 f).
The probability of detecting accounting manipulations is not just dependent 
on the amount of cases analysed but also by the intensity in which each individual 
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financial statement is investigated. As the annual financial statements are only 
posted to the DPR for analysis and the DPR does not get actively involved on site, it 
can only ascertain whether the documents provided are complete and do not con-
tradict each other. But it can only complete a very limited analysis on whether the 
real facts have been appropriately portrayed. Wilful and grossly negligent incorrect 
balance sheets can hardly be recognised. Accounting fraud which the independent 
auditor was not able to discover will not be detectable by the DPR or the BaFin as 
the accounting documents submitted show, especially in these cases, no clues for 
violations. If the DPR wants to detect such fraudulent accounting practices, then 
it needs to distance itself from the superficial reviews of the documentation and 
invest more in an in-depth audit of the company whereby additional company 
internal documents are needed. In order to make the most use of the capacity of 
the enforcement team, the audit scope must be limited in lieu of the audit depth. 
here it seems appropriate that the DPR limits its proactive audits to a very closely 
defined audit scope which is defined internally and which changes each year. In 
addition, the employees of the DPR should be able to complete a business analysis 
and have extensive knowledge of management and financial accounting. one can 
assume that proactive audits have a preventative effect but this effect should not 
be overemphasized. Accounting manipulations will only rarely be detected by the 
enforcement team (cf. Baetge/Thiele/Matena, 2004, p. 213 f).
In order to deter or prevent perpetrators from undertaking accounting ma-
nipulations, the DPR would have to be able to implement sanctions against the com-
panies. This is, however, not given and only the BaFin has limited abilities to sanc-
tion by informing the public of the accounting irregularities discovered. Further 
possibilities to influence the situation are, however, not provided. At this point one 
must ask the question if this is enough to “deter black sheep” or if it would not be 
more appropriate to introduce harsher penalties?101 Finally, the enforcement estab-
lishment and its employees should also be independent. Financial independency 
is achieved by distributing the costs of the accounting controls pursuant to § 17d of 
the law of supervision of financial service. Pursuant to the stipulations in § 17d (1) 
sentence 1 and (4) of the law of supervision of financial service, the apportioning 
101  This was a question raised by Gerke to the BaFin President Sanio on the 
German Business Management Day in 2005, cited by hofmann, 2008, p. 342.
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of the costs of the Federal Institute and the Audit Authority are only the expenses 
incurred by the Federal Institute and the Audit Authority for a fiscal year. The al-
located amount pursuant to § 3 of the law of supervision of financial service is the 
portion of apportionable costs that a contribution-liable company has to make. It is 
calculated based on § 6 of the law of supervision of financial service on the amount 
of all accrued inland stock exchange turnover of securities of a contribution-liable 
company in a fiscal year and is pursuant to § 7 of the law of supervision of finan-
cial service between a minimum of 250 euros and a maximum of 40,000 euros. 
The personal independency of members of the enforcement establishment is to be 
guaranteed through § 342b of the German Commercial Code (hGB). 
hofmann views the DPR with an annual budget of 5 million euros (2008) 
as facing a herculean task. he points out that, according to the 2005 annual state-
ment, only the auditing fees of the independent auditors of Daimler Chrysler AG 
alone amounted to 42 million euros and that of the E.oN AG to 26 million euros 
(cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 343). Also with an annual budget of 7.8 million euros (2011) 
for the two stage enforcement – 6 million euros of which was for the DPR – the en-
forcement panel is faced with a huge task to generate appropriate auditing quality 
and intensity. That the DPR can partly carry-out this task successfully can be seen 
in the cases where it was able to detect irregularities of the accounts and account-
ing fraud.
however, the point raised by Baetge, Thiele and Matena is not unfounded 
that there is only a limited possibility to assess if real facts are appropriately shown 
in the accounts if one can only access the documents provided by the companies. 
In such cases it is hardly possible to detect wilful or grossly negligent inaccuracies 
of the accounts. But especially wilful breaches of accounting principles that were 
not found by the independent auditor will not be found by the enforcement panel 
as the accounts especially in these cases did not include any indications of the 
breach of law (cf. Baetge/Thiele/Matena, 2004, p. 213).
Nevertheless, all in all one must agree with hofmann when he states that the 
German creation of the enforcement establishment is a step in the right direction 
as securing the correctness of reliable accounting is not only in the hands of the su-
pervisory board and independent auditor. one must also agree with his point that 
it will take years to build up the reputation of the German enforcement establish-
ment (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 343). hereby one should note though that the detection 
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of the cases Sachsen LB and Conergy has already helped significantly. 
Finally, one should note two complementary aspects. They highlight what 
the directional development is of the enforcement system in Germany as well as 
on a European level. 
Since November 2009 companies have the option to provide the DPR in writ-
ten form with individual pre-clearance requests in relation to specific accounting 
problems. The questions must relate to a given, clearly defined matter and must 
be provided in written form. In addition, the company must provide their own 
proposal on how to resolve the issue and add the view of the independent auditor 
to this specific question. on behalf of the companies, the option of pre-clearance 
is, however, only sparsely used. In 2010 there were 6 cases of specific pre-clearance 
requests to the DPR, whereas in 2011 there was just one (cf. Activity Report FREP, 
2011, p. 11; Activity Report FREP, 2012, p. 12).
Based upon the European financial market reforms, some changes were made 
effective 1 January 2011 to the enforcement of accounts. The European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) replaced the Committee of European Regulators 
(CESR) which was active on a consultant basis and responsible for the coordination 
of the enforcement of accounts in the European Union as the European Securities 
and Markets Authority. It was also given additional rights. The role of the ESMA 
is to develop binding technical standards for the preparation and delivery of the 
enforcement audits which are to replace the previous non-binding CESR standards 
(cf. Activity Report FREP, 2011, p. 13; Activity Report FREP, 2012, p. 13). A poten-
tial problem could be the aforementioned fact that strongly differing enforcement 
structures across Europe exist. In Italy and France, for example, there is an exclu-
sive state solution, in Germany a combined privately-owned and state institution 
and in Great Britain an exclusively privately-owned system. The different systems 
are subject to national law that lead to different processes and requirements of the 
control of financial statements. In order to achieve a greater European convergence 
also in this case, a working group was formed which includes also the DPR and 
the BaFin (cf. Activity Report FREP, 2011, p. 13). one should take note that in Great 
Britain the experience of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) has shown 
that in over eighty per cent of all cases mistakes were able to be corrected by mu-
tual agreement. The strategy pursued is to find a formal balance that counters any 
potential tensions between the auditing institution and the company in question. 
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This is to nurture the willingness to cooperate during and especially after the au-
dit has been conducted to correct the mistakes found by the auditing institution (cf. 
hommelhoff/Mattheus, 2004, p. 94). This approach only works if the accounting 
errors and manipulations did not occur deliberately. Companies who deliberately 
manipulate numbers can be expected to undertake every possible action to ensure 
that its acts are not uncovered. one cannot assume that they will really work with 
the DPR in the required way. They might pretend to be collaborating but not con-
tribute towards anything that might uncover their manipulations.
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3.6 electronic publicAtion of A compAny’s Accounts
Prior to 1 January 2007, many companies in Germany did not adequately 
fulfil the required publication requirements. According to statistical data less than 
five per cent of the companies required to declare their annual financial statements 
regularly fulfilled their declaration obligations pursuant to § 325 of the German 
Commercial Code. The reason for this behaviour was seen mainly in the fact that 
non-compliance led to a mere sanctioning of the body authorised to represent a 
limited shares company102 (managers of a private limited company (Gmbh), execu-
tive boards of a corporation) in form of a fine that in line with § 335 sentence 8 of 
the German Commercial Code was not allowed to exceed 10,000 Deutsche Mark 
(cf. Weyand, 2007, p. 935; hofmann, 2008, p. 343). The registry court, however, only 
intervened up until 2000 if a member or creditor of a company and the central 
works council, or if they did not exist, then the works council of the corporation 
requested this (§ 335 sentence 2 of the German Commercial Code). In 2000 the law 
pertaining to limited liability partnerships (kapCoRiLiG) decided when the reg-
istry court, upon request, had to intervene. Ebenroth, Boujong and Joost explain 
in their comments on the German Commercial Code that in this way the very re-
stricted target population that could potentially raise an application was annulled; 
this means everyone is now permitted to raise applications (cf. Ebenroth/Boujong/
Joost, 2001, § 335a, Rn. 1). The process of penalty payments was changed to a pro-
cess of administrative fines. In line with § 335 (a) of the German Commercial 
Code executive board members and managers of a corporation are liable to pay 
an administrative fine if they do not meet their obligation to publically declare 
the annual financial statement, the management report, the corporate financial 
statement, the corporate management report and other documents pertaining to 
the accounts in line with § 325 of the German Commercial Code. The administra-
tive fine was set at a minimum 2,500 euros and as a maximum 25,000 euros (§ 335 
(a) sentence 4 of the German Commercial Code). Schmittmann stresses that the 
key is that the administrative fines are not imposed against the corporation but 
102  The person to whom the penalty payment process applies is always a nat-
ural person and not a legal person. In accordance with § 335 sentence 1 of the 
German Commercial Code the circle of addressees is specifically limited to the 
members of the representative organs (executive board and management mem-
bers) of the respective corporation (cf. Glanegger et al., 1999, p. 838). 
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personally against a member of management. The executive board or management 
member affected is, therefore, personally liable to pay the fine (cf. Schmittmann, 
2004, p. 1064). one should also take note of the fact that the registry court only 
takes action upon receipt of a corresponding application, which can now be made 
by everyone (§ 335 (a) sentence 3 hGB). The legal changes made up to that time did 
not, however, lead to a significant increase in the publication quota (cf. hofmann, 
2008, p. 343). The German legislator had to react as other European countries – for 
example Great Britain – already had a long standing tradition of extensive obliga-
tions in regard to the electronic publication in business registers (cf. Weyand, 2007, 
p. 935). on 1 January 2007 the German Act on Electronic Commercial and Co-
operative Registers and the Company Register (EhUG) came into force. This law 
enabled worldwide electronic access to all key corporate information. It led to three 
significant changes in Germany:
1. The changeover to an electronically operating system of the companies, 
cooperatives and partnerships registers.
2. Accounting information is now not published in the Commercial Register but 
in the electronic federal gazette.
3. The creation of a business register.
of significant importance for everyday application is that in future it will no 
longer be possible, without repercussions, to ignore the legal obligation to publish. 
In the following section, the key changes of the law will be reviewed with the goal 
of highlighting its impact on practical appliance (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 343 f; cf. see 
also Meyding/ Bödeker, 2006, p. 1009; Schlotter, 2007, p. 1).
With the EhUG coming into force, commercial registers must be pub-
lished electronically. For some time there were even discussions about having the 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry manage the commercial register due to their 
allegedly better efficiency. But in the end this shift appeared not to be a real alter-
native compared to the registers managed by the courts so that the responsibility 
stayed with the local courts. Documents can only be submitted to the commercial 
register in an electronic format. As applications to register still require an official 
certification, notaries must convert the documents that are to be submitted into 
files with an electronic signature so that it can then be submitted to the court. 
one can still inspect the Commercial Register free of charge at the office of the 
register court in charge or via the homepage (www.handelsregister.de). Entries are 
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publicized only in electronic and not in paper form any more (cf. hofmann, 2008, 
p. 344 f).
The annual financial statement and consolidated financial statements, man-
agement report and other accounting documents that are subject to disclosure are 
not any more submitted to the Commercial Register but are electronically passed 
on to the German Federal Gazette. Companies which are required to publically 
disclose are mainly limited liability companies and commercial partnerships with-
out a natural person as personally liable shareholder (such as, for example, German 
limited commercial partnership consisting of a general partner and a limited part-
ner (Gmbh & Co kG)). The need to publically disclose, though, is also dependent 
on the size of the company (§§ 326, 327 hGB). Small companies pursuant to § 326 
of the German Commercial Code must only submit a condensed balance sheet and 
the notes and not the profit and loss account. Medium sized companies are obliged 
to publicize the annual financial statement (balance sheet, profit and loss account, 
notes), the management report and the independent auditor’s certificate. however, 
there are also size-related simplifications possible for medium sized companies 
pursuant to § 327 of the German Commercial Code. When the BilMoG came into 
effect in 2009 the thresholds were significantly increased so that from that point 
onwards many more companies were able to profit from the simplified rules (cf. 
Schlauß, 2010, p. 153; Buchheim, 2010, p. 1135). 
These simplifications are not extensive enough according to many small and 
medium-sized companies (SMEs). For example, Andres together with a group of 
equally minded calls for “an appeal for fact oriented corporate publicity”103 (trans-
lated in context by the author) and is requesting the European parliament to ap-
prove a new size regulation for micro-enterprises that would then allow member 
states to decide whether to relieve these types of companies from the regulations 
of the fourth European Union guideline and thereby in Germany from the §§ 264-
288 of the German Commercial Code. Micro-enterprises are defined as such com-
panies that do not exceed the following criteria on two consecutive balance sheet 
dates (cf. Andres, 2011, p. 1; Buchheim, 2010, p. 1135):
•	 An annual turnover of 1 million euros
•	 A balance sheet total of 500,000 euros
•	 An average annual number of 10 employees.
103  „Apell für eine sachorientierte Unternehmenspublizität“
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Furthermore, they are requesting the EU Parliament, the parliaments of 
member states as well as the German federal parliament to review further meas-
ures to relieve the burden of regulation for SMEs and to, where applicable, expe-
dite its implementation. They demand that the way in which the duty to publicize 
is applied, since the introduction of the EhUG in Germany, urgently requires over-
hauling. This can be seen, amongst other facts, by (cf. Andres, 2011, p. 1):
•	 the concentration of proceedings on one Federal Authority and one court being 
responsible throughout Germany has led to mass processing in lieu of doing 
justice for each individual case, 
•	 the lack of legal hardship provision,
•	 the legal provision for fines is based on continuous case-law interpreted 
(wrongly) as a fine with a fixed lower limit,
•	 the need to publicize twice now that the EhUG has been introduced leads to 
disproportionate additional costs,
•	 the free of charge and anonymous access – also for commercial purposes – 
provides an unjustified benefit for third parties at the expense of companies 
which are obliged to disclose their financial statements, 
•	 driven by the EhUG publicity, SMEs suffer an unjustifiable competitive 
disadvantage compared to large companies which are better equipped to 
handle competitive battles.
In response to Andres‘ request, Buchheim notes critically that the real effect 
of workload reduction is not real for the majority of German micro-enterprises 
which must anyway prepare, next to the normal “standard balance sheet”, an an-
nual financial statement for tax purposes and to secure loans with banks and sav-
ings banks. Also lots of regulations of the company and insolvency law such as, 
for example, dividend provisions are affixed to the annual financial statements 
prepared in according to the German Commercial Code. Even if the fourth EU 
guideline is amended by the EU parliament, one must wait and see whether the 
German legislator will codify this exception regulation for micro-enterprises in 
German law (cf. Buchheim, 2010, p. 1135). Bräuer also takes a critical stance towards 
the requests raised by Andres. In his opinion the informational needs of current 
and potential creditors is also great for small companies and is more important 
than the interests of micro-enterprises to, if possible, not publish their annual fi-
nancial statement information. Even if microenterprises state that the proportion-
ality based on the high costs is not given, the European Commission assumes that 
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there is only a net savings potential of 1169 euros for each individual company. 
Bräuer substantiates his point of view with the amount of people who have access 
to the electronic Federal Gazette. In 2010 there were 2.6 million monthly accesses to 
the electronic Federal Gazette of which 2.1 million were to the financial reporting 
site. over eighty per cent of these accesses were on small companies. Therefore, 
the interest with regard to information about small companies appears to be large 
and, even if not all requests are from potential creditors of the companies being 
accessed, one can say that the right for freedom of information for all should out-
weigh the interests of the few who do not want to share information (cf. Bräuer, 
2011, p. 54, 56).
Thiele and Nitsche advocate that at least small private companies should 
be able to avoid altogether the obligation to publish. In their view, there is no 
large public interest in the annual financial statements of these types of compa-
nies so that an abolition of the duty to disclose would be a useful act of deregula-
tion which, however, does require a legal agreement at European level (cf. Theile/
Nitsche, 2006, p. 1151).
Especially for companies with a small group of partners, Brete sees consider-
able disadvantages as competing companies can gain access to company data. And 
since the annual financial statement is compiled for company management and, in 
addition, normally only for shareholders and company creditors, electronic publi-
cation is not required. The meaning of the annual financial statement is limited to 
its informational function for the company’s creditors with regard to the protection 
of creditors as well as the fact that there must always be sufficient equity capital 
available (cf. Brete, 2009, p. 617 f). The protection for creditors which Brete defines 
as ensuring that repayment and interest is paid to the creditors is already covered 
by the legislator by multiple creditor protection regulations within and outside of 
accounting law. As such, German accounting law is characterised by the principles 
of prudence, realisation and imparity that should, amongst other things, stop the 
disclosure and distribution of unrealised profits to the shareholders. In addition, 
there are extensive protective regulations for creditors to safeguard credits such as 
guarantees, land charges, mortgages and retentions of title. In case of insolvency, 
they have rights of segregation and separation, the right of preferential claims as 
well as the legal mechanisms of challenging insolvency proceedings. Company 
employees are entitled to financial compensation for lost wages as well as, if 
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necessary, to raise claims on the pension insurance association. The provision for 
the protection of creditors also include rules on criminal matters that are governed 
by trade law (§§ 396 ff of the German Stock Corporation Act) as well as criminal 
law (§§ 283 ff German Code of Penal Procedure). Brete concludes that disclosure 
does not promote creditor protection as the disclosure itself does not actually pro-
tect a creditor from losses of receivables (cf. Brete, 2009, p. 620 f). In his view one 
must ensure that a company’s share capital is turned into a real liability fund. The 
alternative to disclosure, according to Brete, is the obligation to pay the primary 
deposit or at least an appropriate part of it on to a separate account which is not 
accessible to the company and company shareholders. he compares his proposal 
to the obligation of a lessor to invest the tenancy security deposit to bear interest 
(cf. Brete, 2009, p. 623).
The way in which the documents are submitted must be in an electronic 
format such as, for example, via email with attachments in standard data formats. 
This can be done via the service platform of the electronic Federal Gazette un-
der https://publikations-plattform.de. The submitted financial information is then 
published under www.ebundesanzeiger.de and can be accessed by everyone free-
of-charge and is subsequently passed on to the 2007 newly created business regis-
ter. The required documents must be submitted to the electronic Federal Gazette 
within twelve months after the end of a fiscal year. Listed companies pursuant to 
article 4 (1) of the Transparency Directive must publish their annual financial state-
ment within four months after the end of a fiscal year. As such there is a shortened 
time limit for submission for these companies (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 346, Schlauß, 
2010, p. 153, Schlotter, 2007, p. 3, Weyand, 2007, p. 936). Schmittmann points out 
that it is not sufficient to submit the annual financial statement electronically. It 
is the responsibility of the company to monitor the actual disclosure which is al-
ways possible at any time on the platform www.unternehmesregister.de. If, for 
example, submitted documents were lost within the remit of the operators of the 
electronic Federal Gazette, the company is obligated to repeat its disclosure (cf. 
Schmittmann, 2009, p. 544). 
Since the implementation of the EhUG it has not led to any changes to the 
scope of the rules of disclosure. The transparency requirements remain at their 
current level. only for micro-enterprises there is relief for the financial filing and 
disclosure which has been effective since the Act Amending Accounting Law as 
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Regards Micro-entities (MicroBilG) came into force in December 2012. Micro-entities 
according to § 267a of the German Commercial Code are defined by them not be-
ing allowed to exceed two of the three following characteristics: After deduction of 
the declared deficit on the asset side, total assets exceeding 350,000 € are not per-
mitted (§ 267a (1) number 1 of the German Commercial Code (hGB)). In the twelve 
months leading up to the reporting date companies are not allowed to generate 
more than 700,000 € sales revenue (§ 267a (1) number 2 of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB)). Companies are not to employ more than ten employees over the aver-
age for the year (§ 267a (1) number 3 of the German Commercial Code (hGB)). With 
regard to disclosures, micro-entities have the option to fulfil their obligations from 
§ 325 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) pursuant to § 326 (2) of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) by submitting their accounts in electronic form with the 
operators of the electronic Federal Gazette for permanent disclosure and to place 
with them a disclosure contract. According to § 326 (2) sentence 2 of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) they are obliged to inform the operator of the electronic 
Federal Gazette that they do not exceed the size categories. Following this process, 
third parties can only gain access to the accounts pursuant to § 9 (6) of the German 
Commercial Code (hGB) by submitting a request to attain a copy. Schmittmann 
points out that in regard to disclosure, it is harder for interested competitors who 
wish to engage in a contractual relationship with the micro-entity to get informa-
tion on the economic status of the company. Requesting a copy takes much more 
effort as the previous process of simple accessing www.unternehmesregister.de. 
Taking into consideration the aspect of transparency, Schmittmann also sees here 
a reason for being sceptical (cf. Schmittmann, 2013, p. 5). 
The legal requirements of the EhUG led to a situation whereby companies 
that wanted to avoid publication of their company results tried harder to find pos-
sibilities to restrict the amount of information requiring disclosure. For example, 
there is the possibility of relief pursuant to § 264 (3) of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB) to be relieved of the duty to declare if the corporation is a subsidi-
ary of a parent company that is obliged to declare its consolidated financial state-
ment. There is also the possibility for companies to influence the size categories 
pursuant to § 267 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) by reducing the total 
assets, sales revenue and the number of employees through skilful means. There 
is a further opportunity especially for German limited commercial partnerships 
consisting of a general partner and a limited partner (Gmbh & Co. kGs). here a 
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natural person can be placed as general partner along with the Gmbh. Thereby the 
Limited Commercial Partnership (kG) as a partnership is not required to apply §§ 
264 ff of the German Commercial Code (hGB). here one must however take into 
consideration, for example, that pursuant to §§ 159 ff of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB) especially when a corporation is dissolved, there are liability dangers 
with regard to the five year continuing liability of the partner or when the per-
sonally liable partner leaves (cf. Deilmann, 2006, p. 2349 ff; Schlotter, 2007, p. 3 f; 
hofmann, 2008, p. 348 f; Dietrich, 2010, p. 114).
Dealing with breaches: In § 329 (1) of the German Commercial Code, it is 
stated that the operator of the electronic Federal Gazette checks whether the docu-
ments which are to be submitted are submitted in a timely and complete manner. 
If the operator concludes that this is not the case, then he is obliged pursuant to 
§ 329 (4) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) to inform the Federal office of 
Justice that in turn then officially initiates fine proceedings in accordance with § 
335 of the German Commercial Code (hGB). The Federal office of Justice then is-
sues a written warning to the corporation or to the members of those authorized 
to represent organs that, if the missing documents are not submitted within six 
weeks, they are liable to pay at least 2,500 euros up to a maximum of 25,000 eu-
ros104. Thereby it has the free choice of deciding whether to initiate steps against 
the company or organ separately or to take action against both. If the documents 
are then submitted within the given time-frame, the company only has to pay 
50 euros for the procedural costs. If the documents are not submitted then the 
amount of the fine is determined and a new warning with a further fine is issued. 
By this process of cumulating fines, there should be no final way of buying oneself 
free from the obligation to disclose (cf. Weyand, 2007, p. 936 f; Schmittmann, 2008, 
p. 692; henselmann/kaya, 2009, p. 498; Buchheim, 2010, p. 1134; Lüdenbach, 2010, 
p. 468; Dietrich, 2010, p. 113).
As such, for example, the Federal office of Justice initiated 460,000 fine pro-
ceedings for the fiscal year 2006. In 2009 for the fiscal year 2007 it was only approx-
imately 120,000 fine proceedings and in 2010 for the fiscal year 2008 it was 144,000 
fine proceedings. Approximately fifty per cent of the companies affected in the 
104  Lüdenbach speaks here of a maximum amount of 50.000 euros (cf. 
Lüdenbach, 2010, p. 468); as he thereby refers to § 335 of the German Commercial 
Code (hGB) this could be an error. 
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fiscal year 2006 submitted the required documents within the given six-week time 
limit; in 2007 it was forty-five per cent. The amount of appeals went down from 
105,000 in the fiscal year 2006 to less than 15,000 in the fiscal year 2007. The sharp 
decline in appeals can be accounted to the fact that the regional court in Bonn – 
since mid-2008 with several new chambers for Commercial Affairs – made over 
15,000 decisions regarding complaints against the fines issued (cf. Buchheim, 2010, 
p. 1134; cf. hereto also Schlauß, 2010, p. 154 f; Schlauß, 2011, p. 805). So, for example, 
a financially difficult company situation, referring to the delinquency of the tax 
consultant, lack of liquidity, waiting for the results of the audit, insufficient staff-
ing or knowledge of the accounting department or the seizure of accounting docu-
mentation by the Public Prosecutor are not seen as reasons for raising an objection 
against the threat of being fined (cf. Schmittmann, 2009, p. 543; Lüdenbach, 2010, p. 
469). From a content point of view nearly all normal objections have court rulings 
which only in rare cases were ruled in favour of the party raising the objection. 
The concentration of jurisdiction at the regional court in Bonn leads to noticeable 
uniform judicature (cf. Buchheim, 2010, p. 1134; cf. hereto also Schlauß, 2010, p. 154 
f; Schlauß, 2011, p. 805). 
From a constitutional point of view, this way of proceeding has also proved 
its worth. The Federal Constitutional Court took several decisions on constitutional 
complaints against fine proceedings of the Federal office of Justice and referring to 
§ 335 of the German Commercial Code (hGB) did not accept the complaints for ad-
judication. It clarified that there are no constitutional objections to the § 325 of the 
German Commercial Code (hGB) or to the sanctioning proceedings (cf. Schlauß, 
2011, p. 805).
Concerning the culture of disclosure, one can note that in 2007 only 450,000 
companies disclosed their accounts for 2006. here one could still see the wait-and-
see attitude of many companies who hoped that the new fine proceedings would 
not work properly. In the meantime, for the financial year 2006 over 940,000 com-
panies have fulfilled their obligation to declare. For the financial year 2008, the 
number of declared accounts exceeded the one million mark for the first time so 
that in the meantime approximately one million annual financial statements have 
been disclosed. As such, the level of publicity is at over ninety per cent. Every year 
the high level of publicity is achieved earlier so that the initial reluctance to declare 
also by smaller companies is increasingly giving way to an automated routine of 
231CATALoGUE oF MEASURES
annual disclosure (cf. Schlauß, 2010, p. 153 f; Schlauß, 2011, p. 805 f).
The third improvement of the EhUG was the creation of a central electronic 
Business Register. here all company data should be bundled in one central place 
and be made available to everyone through online access. People seeking informa-
tion do not need to collect key company data from a variety of sources but can call-
up the required, bundled information via the website www.unternehmensregister.
de. Pursuant to § 8b (2) of the German Commercial Code (hGB) the following data 
can be accessed: 
•	 Entries in the Commercial Register, the Cooperative Register and the Partner 
Register
•	 Documents of the accounts pursuant to § 325 of the German Commercial Code 
(hGB)
•	 Pursuant to § 127a of the German Stock Corporation Act the published entries 
in the shareholder’s forum 
•	 Ad-hoc announcements and announcements regarding the changes in 
shareholdings 
•	 Company law announcements in the electronic Federal Gazette (especially 
those pursuant to the law governing limited liability companies and those 
pursuant to the German Stock Corporation Act) 
•	 Announcements, pursuant to capital market law publications, made to the 
BaFin (worthwhile mentioning are the announcements according to § 15a of 
the Securities Trading Act – the so-called “directors dealings”). 
Every person who is interested can gain access to the business registers as 
well as the commercial register. Calling-up data is principally free of charge. It is 
managed by the Federal Ministry of Justice and the scope of accessible data has 
increased over the last few years. For example, all financial reports that require 
disclosure pursuant to §§ 37v ff of the Securities Trading Act must be relayed to the 
business register. It follows that insight can be gained into the accounting docu-
ments of both domestic and foreign issuers via the business register (cf. Schlotter, 
2007, p. 5; hofmann, 2008, p. 346; Schlotter, 2008, p. 124).
Conclusion: Before the EhUG was passed many companies did not, or only 
after being requested to do so by the registry court, fulfill their obligations to de-
clare. Moreover, such a request was only issued on rare occasions. Apparently 
companies were afraid that sensitive data could fall into the hands of competitors 
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or other third parties. In order to protect investors but also in the interest of all 
stakeholders, transparent information that can be accessed worldwide and at any 
time by companies is vital (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 348).
When the EhUG came into force on 1 January 2007, the existing disclosure 
requirements were significantly improved. With the information being transferred 
from the commercial register to the business register a one-point-of-call access for 
company-related data was created via a uniform portal. Those who want to quick-
ly and effectively inform themselves about German companies via public registers 
need not travel far but with help of the internet can gain access at any time and 
place to the information required. The law does not only simplify the work for 
the law enforcement officers and register courts but is also of great interest for 
the social economy as a whole. Important information in international as well as 
local business transactions can be called-up in an affordable and reliable manner 
in regard to the security of the transaction (cf. Meyding/ Bödeker, 2006, p. 1012). 
Schmittmann and Böing also point out that a person seeking information must 
not reveal himself by having to request access with the Commercial Register but 
can complete researches in comfort via the internet. All this leads one to expect 
that especially competitors, customers, suppliers, employees and other interested 
parties can gain access to the annual financial statements (cf. Schmittmann/Böing, 
2008, p. 5).
As breaches against the disclosure requirements can be sanctioned since 
the EhUG came into force, the publication quota with the electronic Federal 
Gazette has improved in the meantime to over ninety per cent. Before the EhUG 
was passed less than five per cent of companies required to disclose their docu-
ments handed these to the commercial register. If one wants to improve the ac-
tual adherence to the deadline in Germany, then one should take a look at Great 
Britain. here as early as 1992 sanctioning actions were taken against companies 
with delayed disclosures so that already in 1994 the disclosure percentage was 
ninety-five per cent. In Great Britain a fine must be paid after the first day of being 
late whereby the amount of the fine is clearly below 2,500 euros and is related to 
the length of delay. The fines are between 150 pounds for a one-month delay and 
1,500 pounds for a delay of over six months. If the documents are submitted late 
again in the subsequent year, the fine doubles (cf. Buchheim, 2010, p. 1141). For an 
English limited company non-adherence to the disclosure requirements can lead 
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to forced dissolution and related to this an asset transfer to the English Crown 
(cf. Schlotter, 2007, p. 5). This comparison is the reason for Buchheim to request 
improved German administrative offense proceedings that should include a stag-
gered system for minimum fines in line with accounting law size classes as well as 
extent and frequency of the failure to meet deadlines (cf. Buchheim, 2010, p. 1141).
In summary, it can be emphasized that through the EhUG the public re-
leases of companies has increased significantly. Before 2007 it was less than five 
per cent and in the meantime it is over ninety per cent. With the possibility of be-
ing able to access company data and information everywhere and at any time via 
the internet, there has been an improvement in the transparency in economic life 
from which the market can only profit. More than ten thousand hits a day on the 
portal of the business register is clear evidence of this (cf. Schlauß, 2010, p. 156). If 
one wants to effectively detect and avoid balance sheet manipulations then newly 
created transparency through the EhUG is indispensible. Deception and manipu-
lations are naturally easier to detect if the company accounts are given maximum 
public releases. Maximum transparency is important in stopping perpetrators (cf. 
hofmann, 2008, p. 349).
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3.7 enhAncing the protection of investors 
The condition for an efficient capital market requires the trust of the mar-
ket participants. This includes not only professional dealers or speculators on the 
Futures Exchanges but also private investors. The trust of the wider population in 
a functioning capital market is especially important when taking into account the 
important role that it plays nowadays with regard to pension plans (cf. Schröder, 
2007, p. 47). In order to improve investor protection, the eighth point of the 10-Point-
Program was implemented by the German Federal Government in october 2004. 
The Investor Protection Improvement Act (AnSvG) from 2004 resulted mainly in 
significant improvements in the arena of the Securities Trading Act. These altera-
tions had a direct relevance especially for companies listed on the stock exchange 
and its board members as well as for shareholders. The new law requested amongst 
other things the introduction of an obligation to publish a prospectus for invest-
ment products on the so-called “grey capital market”, changed reporting obliga-
tions for all director’s dealing and changed requirements for the monitoring of the 
prohibition of rate and market price manipulation as well as reorganization of the 
insider trading legislation and the ad-hoc public release legislation (cf. hofmann, 
2008, p. 349 f).
3.7.1 Insider Trading Legislation Pursuant to the Investor Protection Improvement Act 
Pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Trading Act insider securities are financial 
instruments that:
•	 are firstly admitted to listing on a domestic stock exchange or on a regulated 
market or on the over-the-counter market,
•	 are secondly admitted to listing on a regulatory market of another Member 
State of the European Union or on another signatory state to the European 
Economic Area Treaty or
•	 thirdly whose price is directly or indirectly dependent on the financial 
instruments listed above.
The Investor Protection Improvement Act newly defines the term inside in-
formation. In line with this, § 13 of the Securities Trading Act states: “Inside in-
formation is any specific information about circumstances which are not public 
knowledge relating to one or more issuers of insider securities, or to the insider 
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securities themselves, which, if it became publicly known, would likely have a sig-
nificant effect on the stock exchange or market price of the insider security. Such 
a likelihood is deemed to exist if a reasonable investor would take the informa-
tion into account for investment decisions…”105(http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/
Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetz/wphg_101119_en.html, accessed on 20.12.2013).
The term “circumstances” includes forecasts and value judgments such as 
statements of opinion, personal views and other subjective evaluations. Through 
this extension of the meaning of the term inside information, issuers of financial 
instruments pursuant to § 15 (1) sentence 1 of the securities Trading Act are forced 
to immediately publish inside information that directly affects them. It can be 
inferred from this that, based on the Investor Protection Improvement Act, it is 
principally required to publish data as soon as possible. This obligation for ad-hoc 
reporting is an important measure against the misuse of inside information (cf. 
hofmann, 2008, p. 350 f).
Before the Investor Protection Improvement Act came into force, issuers 
only had to publish information requiring ad-hoc disclosure. With the Investor 
Protection Improvement Act this duty was extended to third parties. In § 15 (1) 
sentence 4 of the Securities Trading Act it is stated that: “Any issuer or person 
acting on behalf or for the account of an issuer, who as part of his function com-
municates or grants access to inside information to a third party, must at the same 
time publish the information… unless the third party is legally obliged to observe 
confidentiality”106 (http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetz/
105  „Eine Insiderinformation ist eine konkrete Information über nicht 
öffentlich bekannte Umstände, die sich auf einen oder mehrere Emittenten von 
Insiderpapieren oder auf Insiderpapiere selbst beziehen und die geeignet sind, 
im Falle ihres öffentlichen Bekanntwerdens den Börsen- oder Marktpreis der 
Insiderpapiere erheblich zu beeinflussen. Eine solche Eignung ist gegeben, wenn 
ein verständiger Anleger die Information bei seiner Anlageentscheidung berück-
sichtigen würde…“
106 „Wer als Emittent oder als eine Person, die in dessen Auftrag oder 
auf dessen Rechnung handelt, im Rahmen seiner Befugnis einem anderen 
Insiderinformationen mitteilt oder zugänglich macht, hat diese gleichzeitig… 
zu veröffentlichen…, es sei denn, der andere ist rechtlich zur vertraulichkeit 
verpflichtet“.
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wphg_101119_en.html, accessed on 20.12.2013). In this context it relates to cases of 
not passing on information in a confidential manner as well as the passive dis-
closure of inside information. Lawyers, financial auditors and tax consultants are 
basically not bound to the publication obligation if they receive inside information 
within the realms of their professional duty of confidentiality. only if they pass 
this confidential information on to other people or give other people access to this 
information who are not legally bound to the professional duty of confidentiality, 
are they obliged to immediately publish the inside information. The logic of this 
regulation is to prevent advance knowledge from occurring (cf. Rodewald/Tüxen, 
2004, p. 2249 f).
In accordance, many companies had to enforce comprehensive control meas-
ures in order to avoid the uncontrolled flow of information. The access to inside 
information is limited to people that need to deal with this sensitive data. For this 
purpose companies created so-called “Chinese Walls” 107. In addition, one must 
ensure proper storage of inside information. This applied not only for proper data 
security in the offices but also outside the offices. Likewise, one had to create ac-
cess restrictions within the internal data network. It was equally important to 
undertake measures to ensure that data was also protected outside the offices. 
Careless handling of inside information in public places, for example, on the train 
or on the plane could involuntarily lead to a breach of inside information trading 
regulations (cf. Rodewald/ Tüxen, 2004, p. 2252).
According to § 15b of the Securities Trading Act issuers of financial instru-
ments and any person acting on the issuer’s behalf are obliged to keep a list of insid-
ers. The people that need to be included in this list are, amongst others, members of 
107  Chinese Walls should enable companies, in context with the compliance 
measures, to establish boundaries to maintain confidentiality. Based on depart-
mentally different needs of information this should enable departments to have 
operational differentiation. The Chinese Wall should prevent that information 
is shared in order to avoid conflicts of interest. The term was coined during the 
global economic crisis when the US government requested banks to split the in-
vestment banking from the securities issuing business. The term Chinese Wall 
was derived from the actual Chinese Wall (cf. www.boersennews.de/lexikon/be-
griff/chinese-wall/1205; http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Archiv/5015/chinese-
walls-v8.html; accessed on 20.05.2013)
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the management board and supervisory board, employees of the legal department 
and of the controller’s office as well as employees of staff functions. In addition, 
the scope of parties obligated to maintain such a list must be determined. hereto 
belong people that act in the interest of the issuer or act in other areas for the issuer 
and come into contact with inside information. These can be, for example, lawyers, 
consultants, tax consultants, investor relations agencies or also external account-
ants (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 115 f).
These registers must list people that are working for issuing corporations 
and are working on their behalf or for their accounts and according to regulations 
have access to inside information. The registers must be kept on a current level and 
must be sent to the BaFin upon request. The issuers have the duty to instruct the 
people on the list of their legal duties that evolve from their access to inside infor-
mation as well as to inform them about the legal consequences in case of breaches 
(cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 115 f). 
The measure regulating the need to maintain insider lists follows two impor-
tant objectives. on the one hand, the preventive effect on the people listed, as these 
must specifically be instructed of the general business related confidentiality obli-
gations. The possible consequences of a violation are explained to them explicitly 
so that they are sensitized to treat inside information with appropriate care. on the 
other hand, issuers and other people obliged to maintain lists are able to monitor 
the flow of inside information and can thereby fulfill their confidentiality obliga-
tions. Should there be a concrete case of suspicion, the lists help the BaFin in their 
investigation as the circle of suspects can be limited with the help of the insider 
lists (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 115 f). 
Schröder noticed that maintaining lists of insiders has an effect of the evalu-
ation of problems of intent. Due to the listed people being instructed about their le-
gal duties and through the clarification of the legal consequences in case of breach-
es it is highly unlikely that a perpetrator could successfully appeal to § 17 of the 
German Criminal Code by maintaining that it was a case of a mistake regarding 
prohibition108 (cf. Schröder, 2007, p. 94). 
108  Pursuant to § 17 of the Criminal Code a case for a prohibition error ex-
ists when the perpetrator when committing the crime lacked awareness of doing 
something wrong. So he agitates without guilt, if he could not avoid this error. In 
such a case, where the mistake could have been avoided the punishment can be 
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hienzsch notes that in very few cases the lists of insiders include every-
body who has access to concrete inside information, just as one cannot expect that 
the registers only name people that knew of the information in question. That 
is why the BaFin needs to make use of their general right of access to the data 
which was measurably expanded with the introduction of the Investor Protection 
Improvement Act (cf. hienzsch, 2006, p. 68). 
Listed companies are legally obliged to counter insider trading. In a study 
on white collar crime in 2009 regarding the security situation of large sized com-
panies in Germany, the auditing firm pwc looked into how companies focused 
their efforts. For this representative survey on the security situation of German 
large sized companies, five hundred standardized computer supported telephone 
interviews were conducted. For this purpose people responsible for crime preven-
tion and education were questioned. The results of the study relating to this topic 
were that a mere forty per cent, so less than half, had targeted preventive measures 
for insider offenses. Whistleblowing systems that should help discover an insider 
offence in context with a functioning informal social control system were only 
in place in fifty-five per cent of companies polled. As a consequence, less than 
half of the companies protect themselves against breaches in this sector. A reason 
for companies underestimating the possible consequences of such an offence is 
explained by the authors of this study by the so-called “control paradox”109 (see 
chapter 2.3.1). Based on the existing inadequacies to discover an insider offense 
and the corresponding low number of cases discovered, the risks are not recog-
nized and the number of unknown cases is high. Lack of control and preventive 
measures in companies and shortcomings in the public prosecutor’s office as well 
as partly with the BaFin mislead people into making judgments which do not re-
flect reality. As such only two per cent of listed companies in Germany see the risk 
of being directly damaged by breaches against the prohibition of insider trading as 
high. only five per cent think the risk is possible, twenty-four per cent think it is 
unlikely and sixty-nine per cent even rate it as highly unlikely. The authors of the 
study point out after evaluating the results that an effective prevention of insider 
trading would not only form an important role in protecting the company against 
damage but could also, considering the current financial market crisis, lead once 
reduced according to § 49 (1) of the Criminal Code. 
109  „kontrollparadox“
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again to an increase in trust in the capital markets (cf. pwc, 2009, p. 39 f). 
3.7.2 Ad-hoc Public Releases According to the Investor Protection Improvement Act 
The Investor Protection Improvement Act led to a significant extension of 
ad-hoc public releases (§ 15 of the Securities Trading Act). It is a core part of the 
Securities Trading Act. Pursuant to these domestic issuers of financial instruments 
are obliged to publish inside information that is directly relevant to them immedi-
ately. Ad-hoc public releases aim at trying to get a uniform level of information to 
all people participating in the markets by informing the market quickly and in a 
widespread manner. They are trying to avoid inappropriate developments of mar-
ket or share-prices based on faulty or incomplete information reaching the market. 
Through their transparency ad-hoc public releases ensure that the capital market 
can function effectively and create more equality in terms of equal chances for all 
investors. The obligation to ad-hoc public releases also protects against the misuse 
of inside information. Ascertaining whether there is a need to publish or not is 
based upon the actual circumstances and must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
If uncertain, it should always be decided in favour of what best fulfils the require-
ments of the law – “Prevention of insider trading and creating maximum equal 
opportunity and transparency”110(translated in context by the author) (cf. BaFin’s 
guide for issuers, 2009, p. 47).
Pursuant to § 15 (1) of the Securities Trading Act only such kind of inside 
information requires publishing that effects the issuer directly. The requirement 
makes it clear that general information does not require publication within the 
guidelines of ad-hoc public releases. In addition, the information to be published 
must affect the issuer directly and not only the financial instruments it has issued 
(cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 53). If the inside information affects the issuer 
only indirectly, then it is not required to be disclosed but triggers the prohibition 
of insider trading pursuant to § 14 of the Securities Trading Act. The issuers must 
assess and decide themselves whether there is a case of inside information requir-
ing disclosure (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 55).
§ 15 (1) sentence 4 of the Securities Trading Act requires issuers to publically 
110  „Prävention von Insiderhandel und herstellung größtmöglicher 
Chancengleichheit und Transparenz“
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disclose inside information at the same time as this information is being passed on 
or shared with others except if the other party is legally bound to a confidentiality 
obligation. A person who is acting in his name or for his account is bound by the 
same legal requirements (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 57 f). In BaFin’s view 
also forecasts pursuant to § 15 of the Securities Trading Act can require public 
disclosure. In order for the prerequisites of a disclosure obligation to be fulfilled, 
there must be appropriately high chances of the forecast coming true. These do not 
include generally-worded expectations or longer term planning on behalf of the is-
suer as these often do not allow sufficiently concrete conclusions to be taken on the 
true future development of the company (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 60).
however, the issuer also has the possibility to postpone the publication of 
inside information pursuant to § 15 (3) of the Securities Trading Act. In order to do 
this certain prerequisites must be fulfilled (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 65).
“Prior to claiming an exemption, an issuer must carefully assess whether 
protecting its legitimate interests outweighs the interest of the capital markets in 
complete and prompt disclosure, there is no risk of misleading the general pub-
lic, and the issuer is able to guarantee the confidentiality of such information”111 
(English version of BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 63). A case for a legitimate 
interest of the issuer can be, for example, newly developed products, patents or 
inventions that if realised can have a significant impact on price (cf. BaFin’s guide 
for issuers, 2009, p. 66). 
The issuer must, however, inform the BaFin on his own account of the rea-
sons for exemption and the date on which the decision regarding postponement 
was taken. The extent to which the entirety of the decision needs to be shared is 
done on a case-by-case basis. The BaFin does not accept general justifications. The 
BaFin must be put in a position to assess interests and understand what grounds 
exist for assuming that the issuer has a legitimate interest. After the end of the ex-
emption period the publication must be carried out immediately (cf. BaFin’s guide 
for issuers, 2009, p. 65 f).
111  „vor Inanspruchnahme einer Befreiung muss der Emittent abwä-
gen, ob der Schutz seiner berechtigten Interessen gegenüber dem Interesse des 
kapitalmarktes an einer zeitnahen und vollständigen veröffentlichung überwiegt, 
keine Irreführung der Öffentlichkeit zu befürchten ist und er die vertraulichkeit 
der Information gewährleisten kann“
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A postponement of a publication does bear certain risks for the issuer. If an 
issuer does not issue an ad-hoc disclosure although the prerequisites for an exemp-
tion did not or do not longer exist, then this is a breach of § 15 (1) of the Securities 
Trading Act with all its legal consequences. In light of the fact that the number of 
mandatory ad-hoc announcements has experienced a high increase over the past 
years, the potential person obliged to publish is not faced with an easy task (cf. 
Schneider/Gilfrich, 2007, p. 53).
The expansion of the scope of § 15 (1) of the Securities Trading Act inevita-
bly caused a flood of new ad-hoc disclosures. Spindler and Speier see this as an 
increasing danger as an investor can lose the overview with the many additional 
ad-hoc disclosures and lose sight of the really important news. This was not the 
intention of the legislature when the disclosure requirement came into force with 
§ 15 (1) of the Securities Trading Act. The aim is to ensure the best possible mar-
ket transparency so that all market participants are informed as early as possible 
about all market-relevant information and to thereby put them in a position to take 
appropriate investment decisions (cf. Spindler/ Speier, 2005, p. 2034). Also Nietsch 
elaborates on this danger by referring that firstly there must be a very high degree 
of care taken when formulating the disclosures. It must be clear whether it is a 
fact or an assessment or forecast. Secondly, when publishing ad-hoc forecasts it is 
key to point out that despite the probability being high that this will occur there is 
some uncertainty as it refers to a future event. Thirdly, one must state if the issuer 
views himself as directly or indirectly impacted. In the case of an indirect concern 
– in order to ensure the completeness of the disclosure – the basis must be stated 
on which the assessment is based (cf. Nietsch, 2005, p. 789).
A further complication is that many companies use their obligation of ad-hoc 
public releases as a marketing tool in order to attract the attention of public opin-
ion. The cases of Infomatec, EM.Tv or Comroad show clearly how company’s mis-
used ad-hoc public releases for targeted public relations work (cf. hofmann, 2008, 
p. 353). The article Iv.4.3 of the BaFin’s guide for issuers (2009) attempted to stop 
this kind of misuse. here it is stated that the use of ad-hoc public releases may not 
be used for the purpose of public relations. If the elements published are evidently 
not in line with § 15 of the Securities Trading Act, then the ad-hoc announcement 
is, according to the BaFin, a misuse of ad-hoc public releases. Public release behav-
iour of this kind makes it harder for the public to quickly identify and process the 
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truly important information (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 70).
As demonstrated, the Investor Protection Improvement Act extended the du-
ties with regard to ad-hoc announcements. The question that follows is whether 
the Investor Protection Improvement Act also brought an extension of liability 
for untruthful and omitted ad-hoc disclosures. Pursuant to §§ 37b and 37c of the 
Securities Trading Act, issuers are liable for omitted and false inside information 
that impacts them directly. In this context it is important to mention that also in fu-
ture only the incorrectness or incompleteness of facts are acts for which one can be 
held liable. Irregularities of forecasts or of a value judgment are not included. This 
means that ultimately the Investment Protection Improvement Act did not extend 
liability (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 356).
Issuers have the chance for a discharge in the case of being liable for false 
inside information if they can prove that they were not aware of the incorrectness 
of the inside information and that this unawareness is not due to gross negligence. 
In the case of a failure to publish inside information, they can avoid liability if 
they can credibly prove that the failure to disclose was not intentional or grossly 
negligent (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 355 f). In order for the issuer to not be made liable 
for published ad-hoc disclosures which are untrue the issuer must take great care 
when formulating the disclosures. he must firstly clearly state whether it is a fact 
or an assessment or forecast. For a forecast or assessment, which is seen as having 
a high probability of occurring, the starting position which forms the basis for the 
assessment must be shown. Under no circumstances should the impression be cre-
ated that this is a real fact. Secondly, a forecast must include a reference stating that 
despite the high likelihood of occurrence, this is an uncertain future event. Thirdly, 
the issuer must state whether he thinks he is directly or indirectly affected as well 
as the reasoning for his assessment (cf. Nietsch, 2005, p. 789). Should the case occur 
where untrue information is published, then pursuant to § 15 (2) sentence 2 of the 
Securities Trading Act in connection with § 4 (3) of the Regulation to concretize 
the disclosure, notification and disclosure duty as well as the duty to issue a list of 
insiders pursuant of the Securities Trading Act (WpAIv) is to be clarified imme-
diately in a further ad-hoc public release (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 72).
The ad-hoc public release requiring disclosure must be published imme-
diately. The issuer is required to publicize regardless of stock exchange trading 
hours. In addition, the published inside information pursuant to § 15 (1) sentence 
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1 of the Securities Trading Act must be provided to the business registers immedi-
ately after – however, not before – publication. Pursuant to § 15 (5) sentence 2 of the 
Securities Trading Act at the time of publication a proof of actual publication needs 
to be passed to the executive boards of domestic stock exchanges to which finan-
cial instruments are admitted to trading and to the BaFin. Should there be a wilful 
or reckless breach of duties when publishing, then this can be punished with a 
fine of up to 200,000 euros. In contrast should there be a case of wilful or reckless 
breach of duties with regard to the actual publication, this can be punished with a 
fine of up to one million euros (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 80 ff). “A breach 
of duty has been committed where the notification or publication
•	 has not been made,
•	 was made incorrectly,
•	 was made incompletely,
•	 was not made within the prescribed period, or
•	 was not made in the prescribed form”112 (English version of the BaFin’s guide 
for issuers, 2009, p. 79).
3.7.3 Transaction Reporting Requirements for Members of the Management Pursuant 
to the Investor Protection Improvement Act 
Among other things § 15a of the Securities Trading Act states that persons 
performing management functions for an issuer of shares, who trades with the 
issuer’s shares or with related financial instruments must accordingly inform the 
issuer and the BaFin within 5 working days. 
People that hold managerial duties are: “The members of the management 
(usually the management board), the members of the administrative body, the 
members of the supervisory body, personally liable partners, and any other per-
sons with managerial responsibilities who are authorised to decide on material 
corporate matters on behalf of the issuer and who regularly have access to inside 
information”113 (English version of the BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 82). The 
112  „Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt vor, wenn die Mitteilung oder veröffentlichung 
- nicht, - nicht richtig,- nicht vollständig,- nicht rechtzeitig oder - nicht in der 
vorgesehenen Weise erfolgt.“
113  „Mitglieder des Leitungsorgans (in der Regel der vorstand), Mitglieder 
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circle of persons under the obligation to notify is extended to include those that 
are closely connected to members of the management board (cf. BaFin’s guide for 
issuers, 2009, p. 85 f). 
Issuers are required to report transactions in shares and in financial instru-
ments in related shares belonging to the issuer, notably derivatives. All transac-
tions as laid down in § 15a (1) sentence 1 of the Securities Trading Act fall under 
the notification obligation if these exceed in total the amount of 5,000 euros at the 
end of a calendar year. When calculating the 5,000 euro limit, one must take into 
account the transactions of the executive management as well as people closely re-
lated to the management personnel in total. Transactions which cannot be valued 
can be calculated in favour of the persons under the obligation to notify with 0 
euros when calculating the de minimis limit. Therefore no notification is required 
as long as these people undergo no further transactions. If these people, however, 
undergo transactions which lead to the de minimis limit of a calendar year being 
exceeded then all transactions of these people – independent of their value – are 
subsequently bound by the obligation to notify (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, 
p. 88 f).
The German share issuer must immediately publish information after re-
ceipt of the notification. Normally the publication should follow one working day 
after receipt of the notification. Pursuant to § 3a (1) of the regulation to concretize 
the disclosure, notification and publication duty as well as the duty to issue a list 
of insiders pursuant of the Securities Trading Act (WpAIv) the information requir-
ing publication must be passed on to those media for publication which may be 
presumed to distribute the information throughout the European Union and in the 
other countries party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. hereby it 
is not sufficient to provide the information to only one medium but rather different 
types of media must be used (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 93 f). In addi-
tion, the notification once published must be transmitted to the business register 
promptly (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 98).
The proposal to extend the obligation to notify not only after the transaction 
des verwaltungsorgans, Mitglieder des Aufsichtsorgans, persönlich haftende 
Gesellschafter und sonstige Führungspersonen, die befugt sind, wesentliche un-
ternehmerische Entscheidungen des Emittenten zu treffen und regelmäßig zugang 
zu Insiderinformationen haben“
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has been made but also before the time of transaction to ensure transparency was 
not taken into account. This proposal was already rejected during the legislative 
procedures for the fourth Financial Market Promotion Act (cf. hienzsch, 2006, p. 
99).
3.7.4 The Prohibition of Rate and Market Price Manipulation Pursuant to the Investor 
Protection Improvement Act 
The prohibition of rate and market price manipulation pursuant to § 20a of 
the Securities Trading Act was already reorganized as part of the fourth Financial 
market Promotion Act and was further developed with the introduction of the 
Investor Protection Improvement Act. At the same time as the introduction of the 
Investor Protection Improvement Act the Market Abuse Directive came into force 
and thereby the German prohibition on engaging in market manipulation was 
aligned to the European Directives (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 105).
The prohibition of rate and market price manipulation is directed at all of 
the issuer’s company employees. But also external people who have been tasked 
with the outside representation of the company must take care not to pass on false 
or misleading information. In the end, everything will depend on who carries the 
responsibility for the false or misleading information. There is a case of a manipu-
lation having occurred if false or misleading information regarding circumstances 
that are of crucial importance for the valuation of financial instruments or such in-
formation of crucial importance for the valuation of financial instruments in con-
travention of statutory provisions is withheld and if the information provided or 
withheld has the potential to have an impact on the stock exchange or market price 
of the financial instrument (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 106 f). As such, for 
example, fabricated rumors without factual substance, recommendation or warn-
ings made with respect to financial instruments do not represent false information 
since they lack a factual basis. Nevertheless, they are deemed as other deceptive 
acts and are prohibited pursuant to § 20a (1) sentence 1, number 3 of the Securities 
Trading Act (cf. BaFin’s guide for issuers, 2009, p. 112). To avert market manipula-
tion a company must pay attention whether and if necessary how it transfers infor-
mation (cf. BaFin ś guide for issuers, 2009, p. 105). 
With regard to the “grey capital market” the following should be noted: on 
16 February 2011 the German Ministry of Finance published a discussion draft of 
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the act on the amendment of the financial investment intermediaries and invest-
ment law. This discussion draft is supposed to combat untrustworthy issuers on 
the “grey capital market” by expanding the duties already applied to the regulated 
market also to the grey market sector. This includes, among others, a consumer 
orientated advice approach, the disclosure of fees paid and the documentation 
through the use of protocols of the advisory discussion (cf. Schmittmann, 2011, p. 
3). on 27 october 2011 the German federal parliament passed the federal govern-
ment’s proposed bill for the act on the amendment of the financial investment 
intermediaries and investment law (BT-Drs. 17/6051) dated 6 April 2011. In its final 
version dated 6 December 2011 the act was announced on 12 December 2011 (BGBl 
2011 Part No. 63) and came into force on 1 June 2012. The information obligations of 
providers of the so-called “products of the grey capital market” must be designed 
to allow investors to make an improved assessment of the product risks for shares 
in closed investments and other non-fungible forms of investments. The law ex-
tends the duties that were already in force on the regulated markets for banks and 
savings banks to include the “grey capital market”. This includes, amongst other 
things, the obligation based on civil and regulatory law for specific finance and 
investment advice, the disclosure of provisions and the creation and hand-over of 
a written consultation protocol. In addition, the existing requirements for publicly-
offered investments were increased. Sales prospectuses for investments must fulfil 
additional content requirements. The potential investor should be able to assess the 
integrity of the initiators by means of the sales brochures. In addition, the provid-
ers of investment products should provide standardised short information leaflets 
that inform investors in a precise and understandable form about the investment 
products offered. For the issuers of investment products stricter accounting regu-
lations were introduced. Moreover, the legal prospectus special limitation peri-
od was abolished and the final deadline on raising liability claims was extended 
from six months to two years. This resulted in a toughening of prospectus liability. 
Intermediaries and consultants in the area of finance investments must provide 
a certificate of competence and must hold a personal liability insurance to attain 
commercial permission (cf. www.der-betrieb.de/content/dft,199,461641, accessed 
on 20.05.2013; Novellierung_Finanzanlagevermittler_vermoegensanlagerecht_ 
0312.pdf, in: www.cms-ks.com, accessed on 20.05.2013). 
The previous deliberations show that when the Investor Protection 
Improvement Act came into force, new regulations with regard to their preventive 
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function complemented each other. As such, for example, the obligation for ad-hoc 
public releases ensures that information with inside information characteristics 
can no longer be disseminated as all information must be provided to all capital 
market participants at the same time. Information asymmetry is therefore a thing 
of the past which according to hofmann will lead to a strengthening of the capital 
markets. With the introduction of the many new rules, it will not be as easy in fu-
ture to commit balance sheet manipulations without undergoing a higher risk of 
being discovered (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 356). 
however, hientsch raises the question whether the Investor Protection 
Improvement Act has maintained or strengthened the trust of investors in the 
German capital market and comes to the conclusion that with regard to the pro-
hibition for insider trading this has, to date (2006), hardly had an effect. This can, 
amongst other issues, be traced back to the enforcement of insider standards. The 
difficulties could be seen in the inadequacies of uncovering insiders on the part 
of the Public Prosecutors and the BaFin. In addition, it is difficult to prove non-
compliance regarding the prohibition of insider trading. Further, European and 
national legislature has defined, without apparent reason, the scope of this crime 
very broadly and has thereby created uncovering of the crime being very hard 
to prove. hientsch sees the following as a reason for the results of his study: “If 
insider punishable offenses are expanded to areas which are practically not en-
forceable then the investors lose trust in the government’s ability to enforce legal 
propositions and thereby ultimately the trust in the capital market.”114 (hienzsch, 
2006, p. 195). 
Schröder stresses that insider legislation is focussed on protecting the assets 
of those people who invested their capital in organised markets. Individuals are 
expected, based on the gradual separation of the state from the social provision 
of subsidies, to make their own provisions for old age. This requires as far as pos-
sible capital markets that are fair, trustworthy and transparent as the majority of 
the money set aside for pensions flows into the capital markets. The state should 
not just be focussing on the reduction of social welfare legislation. It should, at the 
114  „Wenn Insiderstrafbarkeiten auf Bereiche ausgeweitet werden, in denen 
die Durchsetzung der Norm faktisch unmöglich ist, verlieren die Anleger ihr 
vertrauen in die staatliche Fähigkeit, den Rechtssatz durchzusetzen und damit 
letztlich das vertrauen in den kapitalmarkt.“
248 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
same time ensure it creates legal conditions that allow the individual person to 
make provisions for old age in a trustworthy legalised framework (cf. Schröder, 
2007, p. 47 f).
In summary, it can be said that the Investor Protection Investment Act forms 
at any rate an important step in strengthening anti-fraud management. 
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3.8 point nine And ten of the government’s cAtAlogue 
of meAsures 
The ninth point which ensures the reliability of company valuations by fi-
nance analysts and credit rating agencies requires, among other things, the further 
development and expansion of the best practice and compliance rules for finance 
analysts and the review of the possibility of best practice rules for credit rating 
agencies. The tenth point concerns the toughening of penal provisions for frauds 
on the capital market and requires a review of the offenses relating to misinforma-
tion by members of the board and the independent auditor regarding the state of 
the company or in the accounts (especially §§ 400, 403 of the Stock Corporation Act 
and §§ 331, 332 of the German Commercial Code) (the Government’s Catalogue of 
measures to strengthen companies’ integrity and to protect investors, 2003, p. 9 f). 
With regard to point nine the European Commission committed itself in 
April 2002 to intensively work on the topic of credit rating agencies. In February 
2004 the European Parliament requested the European Commission to inves-
tigate the need for legislative measures in this area. After the Italian Parmalat 
scandal came to light in March 2004, the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Member States jointly launched an investigation into the main 
regulatory issues of concern with regard to credit rating agencies. In July 2004, the 
Commission asked the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) to 
assess the need for introducing European legislation or if other solutions should 
be taken into account. In March 2005 the CESR presented its proposals to the 
European Commission. Meanwhile, the International organization of Securities 
Commissions (IoSCo) published its Code of Conduct Fundamentals for credit rat-
ing agencies which takes account of the results of the CESR investigation. IoSCo 
resolved that a meaningful improvement would be that credit rating agencies must 
base their ratings on a diligent analysis of the available information. In addition, 
they must continuously control the integrity of their information sources. If re-
quired the ratings must then be updated. Credit rating agencies should be more 
open about the way in which they made their assessments. It is important to guar-
antee the independence and objectivity of the approach that credit rating agencies 
take. Close contact to issuers should be avoided. Also access to inside information 
of issuers is viewed as critical. They should be hindered from using this informa-
tion for other purposes (cf. Mitteilung der kommission über Rating-Agenturen, 
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2006, Internet Source). With the measure that issuers need to maintain registers 
for insiders, German legislation has already successfully reacted to this problem 
(cf. Chapter 3.7.1). Furthermore, the European Commission is concerned about the 
high degree of consolidation (oligopoly) in this sector and the corresponding unfa-
vorable consequences on competition (cf. Mitteilung der kommission über Rating-
Agenturen, 2006, Internet Source). however, the German Federal Government has 
not passed any comprehensive legislative initiatives with regard to point nine of 
the Catalogue of Measures.
With regard to point 10 there are no plans for independent legislative initia-
tives (hofmann, 2008, p. 263).
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4 structure of the reseArch design
After the theoretical part of this study has now been concluded, the next part 
is to review the empirical study. The companies listed on the market indices DAx, 
MDAx, SDAx and TecDAx were questioned using a standardized questionnaire. 
This encompassed 160 companies of which 30 are listed in the largest capital mar-
ket segment the DAx. The companies next in size are the 50 companies listed in the 
capital market segment MDAx. This is followed by a further 50 companies listed 
on the SDAx and 30 companies listed on the technological orientated TecDAx that 
developed from of the new market capital market segment. In order to become part 
of any one of these DAx segments companies must fulfill certain criteria. They 
must be listed in the Prime Standard Segment of the German capital market and 
demonstrate a free float of at least ten per cent. “The Prime Standard is a sub-seg-
ment of the European Regulated official and regulated market segments and is the 
access portal for companies that want to position themselves towards international 
investors. In addition to fulfilling the requirements of the General Standard, which 
constitutes the statutory minimum standard of the Regulated Market, companies 
admitted to the Prime Standard must meet high international standards of trans-
parency. These standards are:
•	 carrying-out quarterly reporting in German and English,
•	 applying international accounting standards (IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP),
•	 publishing a financial calendar,
•	 conducting at least one analyst conference per year,
•	 publishing ad-hoc releases in English, too”115 (translated in context by the 
author).
(http://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/de/wissen/marktsegmente/
prime+standard, accessed on 16.01.2013)
These companies were selected as they must fulfill the statutory regulations 
that were introduced through the Catalogue of Measures. If one had, for example, 
115  „Der Prime Standard ist ein Teilbereich der EU regulierten Marktsegmente 
Amtlicher und Geregelter Markt und ist das zulassungsportal für Unternehmen, 
die sich auch gegenüber internationalen Investoren positionieren wollen. 
Sie müssen über das Maß des General Standard hinaus, der die gesetzlichen 
Mindestanforderungen des Regulierten Marktes stellt, hohe internationale 
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based the study on smaller medium-sized companies, then they would not have 
been accountable to the German enforcement procedures (point 6) due to their 
size. 825 companies were subject to the German enforcement procedures in 2012 
(cf. BaFin, 2012, p. 200). Including all of these 825 companies would go beyond the 
scope of this project. As such the 160 largest companies listed in Germany were 
selected as they can be clearly determined and separated according to the market 
segment to which they belong. 
At this point a possible methodological problem shall be discussed briefly, 
the so-called “Non Response Bias”. The “Non Response Bias” refers to the distor-
tion of statements that is linked to the response rate. For example, it is possible that 
companies who do not see any sense in the questionnaire or the statutory regu-
lations do not react and consequently do not return the questionnaire. In order 
to minimize the distortion within reason, on the one hand, contact people were 
identified and, on the other hand, regular contact was maintained by checking 
the status of the return several times. A “Non response Bias” can be defined as 
follows: “NoN-RESPoNSE BIAS refers to the mistake one expects to make in es-
timating a population characteristic based on a sample of survey data in which, 
due to non-response, certain types of survey respondents are under-represented” 
(Berg, 2005, Internet resource). For a deeper insight into the field refer to Berg, 2005, 
Non Response Bias, Internet resource.
The German survey was conducted between May and December 2012. 
The goal of the survey was to, 
•	 determine how companies rate the effectiveness of the German government’s 
2003 10-Point-Program (Catalogue of Measures) with regard to the disclosure 
and prevention of balance sheet manipulations;
•	 determine to what extent companies assume that the legal implementation 
of the government’s 10-Point-Program is sufficient for their own company in 
Transparenzanforderungen erfüllen. Im Einzelnen sind das:
•	 quartalsweise Berichterstattung in deutscher und englischer Sprache,
•	 Anwendung internationaler Rechnungslegungsstandards (IFRS/
IAS oder US-GAAP),
•	 veröffentlichung eines Unternehmenskalenders,
•	 Durchführung mindestens einer Analystenkonferenz pro Jahr,
•	 Ad-hoc-Mitteilungen auch in englischer Sprache.“
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terms of the disclosure and avoidance of balance sheet manipulations;
•	 gain insight into the companies assessments as to the appropriateness of 
possible measures with regard to the disclosure and avoidance of balance sheet 
manipulations; 
•	 determine how companies assess the cost-benefit ratio for the implementation 
of the legislative measures that were initiated by the Catalogue of Measures 
for the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations for their own 
company.
The questionnaire was targeted at board members, area directors, depart-
ment chiefs or specialists working for companies listed on the German capital mar-
kets of all four DAx segments. of the 160 companies contacted, 50 answered. The 
return rate is therefore 31.25 per cent. As such the representativeness of this sur-
vey and the applicability of most testing and estimating procedures of statistical 
analysis was fulfilled. The minimum requirement of 30 answered and evaluable 
questionnaires was achieved (cf. Raab-Steiner/Benesch, 2010, p. 20). 
The study is subdivided as follows: first the methodology applied to the em-
pirical study is described. Then there is a depiction of the evaluation of the regula-
tions by the companies polled. After the evaluation of possible concrete measures 
by the polled companies has been reviewed there follows the assessment of the 
cost-benefit ratio by the companies polled. And in conclusion, the final results are 
evaluated. 
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4.1 methodology Applied to the empiricAl study
The following study results are based on the analysis of the questionnaires 
that were sent to 160 companies of the four DAx segments between the end of April 
2012 and the beginning of December 2012. Companies who did not respond to the 
initial survey request were sent a reminder a couple of weeks later. Companies 
who still did not respond after being contacted twice were asked a third time to 
participate in the survey.116 
116  Companies are placed in the segments/indices which they belonged to 
at the time the survey commenced. Following companies were listed in the indi-
vidual DAx segments: Listed in the DAx 30 were Adidas, Allianz, BASF, Bayer, 
Beiersdorf, BMW, Commerzbank, Daimler, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Börse, 
Deutsche Lufthansa, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, E.oN, Fresenius Medical 
Care, Fresenius, heidelberg Cement, henkel, Infineon Technologies, k+S, Linde, 
MAN, Merck, Metro, Munich Re, RWE, SAP, Siemens, Thyssen krupp and 
volkswagen. 
The MDAx included the companies Aareal Bank, Aurubis, Axel Springer, BayWa, 
Bilfinger Berger, Brenntag, Celesio, Continental, Deutsche Euroshop, Deutsche 
Wohnen, Deutz, Douglas holding, Dürr, EADS, Elring klinger, Fielmann, Fraport, 
Fuchs Petroclub, GAGFAh, GEA Group, Gerresheimer, Gerry Weber International, 
Gildemeister, GSW Immobilien, hamburger hafen und Logistik, hannover 
Rückversicherung, hochtief, hugo Boss, kabel Deutschland, klöckner & Co SE, 
krones, kUkA, Lanxess, Leoni, MTU Aero Engines holding, ProSieben Sat.1 
Media, Puma, Rational, Rheinmetall, Rhön-klinikum, Salzgitter, SGL Carbon SE, 
Sky Deutschland, STADA Arzneimittel, Symrise, Südzucker, TUI, vossloh, Wacker 
Chemie and Wincor Nixdorf. 
The SDAx was comprised of the following companies: Air Berlin plc, Alstria office 
REIT, Amadeus Fire, Balda, BAUER, Bertrandt, Biotest, C.A.T. oil, CENTRoTEC 
Sustainable, CeWe Color holding, Comdirect bank, Constantin Medien, CTS 
Eventim, Delticom, Deutsche Beteiligung, DIC Asset, Gesco, Gfk SE, Grammer, 
GRENkELEASING, h & R, hAMBoRNER REIT, hawesko holding, heidelberger 
Druckmaschinen, highlight Communications, hornbach holding, Indus holding, 
IvG Immobilien, Jungheinrich, koenig & Bauer, kWS SAAT, MLP, Mvv Energie, 
NoRMA Group, PATRIzIA Immobilien, Praktiker, Prime office Reit, SAF-
hoLLAND SA, Schaltbau holding, Schuler, Sixt, SkW Stahl Metallurgie holding, 
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of the 160 companies contacted, 50 companies responded. Two companies 
listed on the DAx 30 replied to the questionnaire with an individual statement but 
did not answer the questionnaire itself. These versions could not be used for the 
analysis of the questionnaires so that in the end 48 completed questionnaires were 
evaluated. The return rate was therefore 31.25 per cent and the rate of evaluable 
questionnaires was exactly 30 per cent. The return rate of answered and completed 
questionnaires was highest from the DAx 30 with 36.67 per cent. This was fol-
lowed by the MDAx with a return rate of 32 per cent. Then came the TecDAx with 
a return rate of still 30 per cent and the lowest return rate was from the SDAx with 
still some 24 per cent. 
The following tables 1 to 4 represent the individual segments (DAx, MDAx, 
SDAx and TecDAx) of the companies polled using important key figures. To en-
sure the accountability of the analysis, a syntax file is included in the appendix 
(CD RoM).
For the 30 DAx companies the comparison of the characteristic companies 
who answered and did not answer shows that no clear statement can be made as 
to whether there is an interdependence between the willingness to participate and 
the size of the company. The eleven companies who responded had an average 
turnover of 49 488 million euros in 2011 whereas the corresponding key number of 
the 19 companies that did not respond was 40 693 million euros117. however, the 
picture is completely different with regard to the number of employees. Whilst in 
2011 the average number of employees of the companies who did not respond was 
132 832, the average number was merely 122 835 employees with the companies 
Ströer out-of-home Media, TAG Immobilien, TAkkT, Tipp 24 SE, Tom Tailor 
holding, vTG, Wacker Neuson and zooplus. 
The TecDAx included the companies ADvA optical Networking, Aixtron, Bechtle, 
CANCoM, Carl zeiss Meditec, Centrotherm photovoltaics, Drägerwerk, Drillisch 
Telekom, Euromicron, EvoTEC, Freenet, Gigaset, Jenoptik, kontron, MorphoSys, 
Nordex, Pfeiffer vacuum Technology, PSI, qiagen, qSC, Sartorius, Singulus 
Technologies, SMA Solar Technology, Software, Solar World, STRATEC Biomedical, 
Süss Micro Tec, United Internet, Wirecard and xING. 
117  When calculating the arithmetic mean and the standard deviation for 
turnover the banks were not included due to their special way of accounting. For 
the DAx 30 companies this affected the Deutsche Bank and the Commerzbank.
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who did respond. In terms of market capitalization the situation in December 2012 
was such that the companies who answered had an average market capitalization 
of 35 238 million euros and the companies who did not respond only an average 
market capitalization of 22 582 million euros. 
Comparison of companies that answered and those that did not answer (split 
into groups of companies)
Spreadsheet 1: DAX
The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 
2011. The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012. The source 
of the data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe (see enclosures) (www.
finanzen.net).
For companies listed on the MDAx, the comparison of the characteristic 
companies who answered and did not answer shows that there is a negative in-
terdependence between the willingness to participate and the size of a company. 
The 16 companies who answered in 2011 had an average turnover of 4 679 million 
euros whereas the 34 companies who did not answer had an average turnover in 
2011 of 6 714 million euros118. The average number of employees of the companies 
who responded was 11 819 compared to 24 936 with the companies who did not 
respond. Also the average market capitalization of the companies participating in 
the survey was far lower with 2 799 million euros compared to that of the compa-
nies who did not participate where it was 3 358 million euros.
Comparison of companies that answered and those that did not answer (split 
118  When calculating the arithemtic mean and the standard deviation for 
turnover the banks were not included due to their special way of accounting meth-
ods. For the MDAx listed companies the Aareal Bank was affected.
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into groups of companies)
Spreadsheet 2: MDAX
The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 
2011. The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012. The source 
of the data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe (www.finanzen.net).
The comparison of companies listed on the TecDAx of the characteristic 
companies who answered and did not answer shows a different result. A posi-
tive interdependence exists between the willingness to participate and the size of 
the company. The nine companies who answered achieved an average turnover 
of 1 208 million euros in 2011 whereas the corresponding key number for the 21 
companies who did not respond was only 608 million euros. The average number 
of employees at the companies that responded was 3 962 compared to 2112 with 
the companies who did not respond. Also the average market capitalization of the 
companies who participated was much higher with 1172 million euros than that of 
those who did not participate which accounted to 696 million euros.
Comparison of companies that answered and those that did not answer (split 
into groups of companies)
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Spreadsheet 3: TecDAX
The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 
2011. The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012 respectively 
January 2013. The source of the data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe 
(www.finanzen.net).
For SDAx companies, the comparison of the characteristic companies who 
answered and did not answer shows a similar result to that of the TecDAx com-
panies. The interdependence between the willingness to participate and the size 
of a company is positive. The twelve companies who answered had an average 
turnover of 1151 million euros in 2011 whereas the key number with regard to the 
thirty-eight companies who did not respond was only 788 million euros119. The 
average number of employees of the companies who responded was 4 416 com-
pared to 3 435 with the companies who did not respond. Also the average market 
capitalization of the companies participating was much higher with 527 million 
euros compared to the companies who did not participate where it was 447 million 
euros. 
Comparison of companies that answered and those that did not answer (split 
into groups of companies)
119  When calculating the arithmetic mean and the standard deviation for 
turnover the banks were not included due to their special way of accounting meth-
ods. For the SDAx listed companies the comdirect Bank was affected.
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Spreadsheet 4: SDAX
The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 2011. 
The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012. The source of the 
data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe (www.finanzen.net). 
Spreadsheet 5 shows the positions the people who responded held in their 
respective companies. Two people did not provide the data as to their position 
within the company. other papers were marked by several people in different po-
sitions and they were, therefore, subsequently questioned by telephone, who of 
them had responded to the main part. of the remaining forty-six people, nearly all 
hold a managerial position within the company. 
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Spreadsheet 5: Position of the responding company representative
Spreadsheet 6 shows the functional areas of the people who responded. 
Some companies did not provide concrete information or marked several func-
tional areas and were, therefore, subsequently questioned by telephone. In the end 
there was only one company left which did not provide the relevant information 
pertaining to this question. The main emphasis of the company representation is 
in the areas of accounting, legal department and others. of the sixteen company 
representatives that fall into the category of other areas, eleven people were from 
the investor relations department. The representatives from this area, therefore, 
form the third key area. other areas mentioned in the category of other depart-
ments were corporate communication, compliance, finance and treasury.
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Spreadsheet 6: Functional area of the responding company representative
In some cases the position respectively the functional area of the responding 
company represenative could be derived from a written reply via email.
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4.2 Assessment of the regulAtions by the compAnies 
polled
The companies participating were asked in the questionnaire under point 
1 to provide a view on the effectiveness of the government’s 10-Point-Program 
(Catalogue of Measures) with regard to the disclosure and prevention of balance 
sheet manipulations. Point nine “Ensuring the reliability of company ratings made 
by finance analysts and rating agencies” and point 10 “Tightening of penal provi-
sions for offenses within the capital market sector” of the 10-Point-Program were 
omitted from the questionnaire as at the time of the survey the German govern-
ment had made no comprehensive legislative measures with regard to point nine 
and there were no independent legislative measures planned with regard to point 
ten.
To answer the questions, four categories were applied from “not at all help-
ful” (=1) over “somewhat helpful” (=2) and “helpful” (=3) to “very helpful” (=4). 
The value of 2.5 can be interpreted as a “value of indifference”. The answers were 
then aggregated to average levels of endorsement. 
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Spreadsheet 7: Effectiveness of the new legal regulations
The results were summarized in the above chart. The chart shows that the 
company representatives view the legislative measures with regard to the dis-
closure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations in total as rather helpful. 
only three values are below the value of indifference of 2.5. The majority of values, 
namely five, are above the value of indifference of 2.5. The least helpful measure 
to disclose and prevent balance sheet manipulations is seen in the German Capital 
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Markets Model Case Act with an average score120 of merely 2.21 per cent. This act 
is about the introduction of a legal test case whereby the requirement for the high 
court to take a decision on the exemplary hearing keeps the trial courts occupied. 
The standard deviation121 is with only 0.570 the smallest of all eight questions. The 
net result means that the answers rather lie closely around the average value so 
that there are rather only a few outliers in the one or other direction. This question 
was answered by thirty-nine of the total forty-eight companies who responded. 
Another measure which is seen by companies as being only somewhat help-
ful for disclosing and preventing balance sheet manipulations is the German 
Corporate Governance Codex (DCGk) with an average value of 2.30. In particu-
lar, this involved the transparency of share-based and incentive-based compensa-
tion of board members. The standard deviation is with 0.866 the second largest of 
all eight questions. This means that the arithmetical mean is not typical for the 
distribution as there are rather high or numerous divergences from the average 
value. This question was answered by forty-six of the forty-eight companies who 
responded to the survey. 
With an average value of 2.34 the Law on Corporate Integrity and 
Modernization of the Right of Avoidance (UMAG) is also seen as not very helpful 
120  “The arithmetic mean is the average distribution. This would be the val-
ue of each statistical unit if all distribution values were the same meaning that 
the total value of the statistical units was distributed evenly across all statistical 
units“(translated in context by the author) (zwerenz, 2001, p. 131). “The arithmetic 
mean is the best-known measure of central tendencies and is often used as a syno-
nym for the average value. In everyday language one often speaks of the average 
value. Calculating the arithmetic mean: Addition of all measured values. Dividing 
the resulting measured value by the number of measured values (=n)“ (translated 
in context by the author) (Raab-Steiner/Benesch, 2010, p. 96). 
121  “The variance (or the standard deviation) is the average division of a distri-
bution. It expresses how different or how similar the values are among themselves. 
It describes the average distance of the individual values to the arithmetic mean” 
(translated in context by the author) (zwerenz, 2001, p. 131). “The standard devia-
tion is a measure for the dispersion of the measurement values, it is the square root 
of the variance. It has the initial unit of the variable“ (translated in context by the 
author) (Raab-Steiner/Benesch, 2010, p. 101).
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for the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations. This law is 
amongst other things about the introduction of a general derivative action (§§ 147-
149 of the German Stock Corporation Act). Integrated into this is the obligation to 
file damage claims against founding members and administrative officials (§147 
of the German Stock Corporation Act) as well as the admissibility of legal action 
(§148 of the German Stock Corporation Act). Furthermore, it is about lowering 
thresholds for special audits (§ 142 (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act), the 
introduction of a shareholders’ forum for communication purposes (§ 127 (a) of the 
German Stock Corporation Act) and the introduction of the “Business Judgement 
Rule” (§ 93 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act). The standard deviation is the 
second smallest with 0.617 - so fairly low. This means that the arithmetic mean is 
rather typical for the distribution as the individual values are fairly similar and do 
not deviate strongly from the average value. These questions were answered by 
forty-one of the forty-eight companies who responded to the survey. 
The highest level of approval with regard to the effectiveness of the legal 
regulations for the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations was 
given with an average value of 2.79 to the German Law on Financial Reporting 
Compliance and closely followed by the German Act on Electronic Commercial 
and Co-operative Registers and the Company Registers with an average value of 
2.77. 
The German Law on Financial Reporting Compliance stands for monitor-
ing the legality of specific annual financial statements by an independent party 
(Enforcement). The goal of this act is to prevent irregularities in the accounts and to 
rebuild and strengthen the trust of investors in the capital market. Pursuant to § 342 
(2) of the German Commercial Code (hGB), the role of the German Enforcement is 
to audit the annual financial statements and the management report or the consoli-
dated financial statements and the consolidated management report. The stand-
ard deviation for the question relating to the German law on Financial Reporting 
Compliance is 0.771. This can be seen with regard to the standard deviation of 
all eight questions as a medium-sized standard deviation. This question was an-
swered by all forty-eight companies who responded to the survey. 
The German Act on Electronic Commercial and Co-operative Registers and 
the Company Registers (EhUG) led to three significant changes:
1. The changeover to an electronically operating system of the companies, 
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cooperatives and partnerships registers.
2. Accounting information is now not published in the Commercial Register 
but in the electronic federal gazette.
3. The creation of business registers.
With the introduction of the EhUG, the public releases of companies have 
significantly increased. Before 2007 the rate was less than five per cent whereas in 
2010 it increased to over ninety per cent. With the possibility to access company 
data and information at any time and from everywhere via the internet, there has 
been an immense improvement in the transparency of economic activity. This is 
viewed similarly by the 48 companies who responded to the survey. This point 
received the second highest level of consent with 2.77 with regard to the effective-
ness of legal regulations for the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet ma-
nipulations. An increase in the transparency of the economy leads at the same time 
to a higher rate of disclosure and prevention of accounting crimes and thereby 
strengthens investor trust. It must be stated though in this context that there was 
also the highest standard deviation with 0.973. This is the highest value of all eight 
questions and means that there are numerous and/or large variations from the 
arithmetic mean. These variations go in both directions from “very helpful” to 
“not at all helpful”. 
A similarly high level of consent with 2.72 was given to the effectiveness 
of the legal regulations in view of the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet 
manipulations for the strengthening of the role of the independent auditor. This 
was implemented with the German Accounting Reform Act, the Final Auditor 
Supervision Act, the Professional Supervision Reform Act and the German Act to 
Modernize Accounting Law. The questionnaire touched mainly on the extension 
of the auditing activities of the group’s independent auditor (§ 317 (3) sentence 2 
hGB, BilMoG), the extension of the grounds for exclusion of an independent audi-
tor (§ 319 (3) hGB and § 319a hGB, BilReG/BilMoG), the binding of the proposal 
regarding the appointment of the independent auditor to be put before the Annual 
General Meeting to the recommendation of the Auditing Committee (§ 124 (2) sen-
tence 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act, BilMoG), the extension of auditing 
requirements of the independent auditor through the new regulation of reporting 
duties (§ 171 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act, BilMoG), the disclosure of the 
fees for auditing the annual financial statements (§ 285 sentence 1 number 17 hGB, 
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BilReG/ BilMoG), placing the German Chamber of Public Accountants (WPk) un-
der the supervision of the independent Auditors’ Supervision Commission (APAk) 
and the introduction of special random and scheduled inspections (Professional 
Supervision Reform Act). The standard deviation is rather small with 0.655 which 
means that the individual assessments are rather close to the average value.
With regards to the effectiveness of the legal regulations for the disclosure 
and prevention of balance sheet manipulations, the slightly worse level of agree-
ment with 2.64 was achieved regarding the further development of accounting 
standards and the adoption to international accounting standards. This was put 
into effect with the introduction of the German Accounting Reform Act and the 
German Act to Modernize Accounting Law. one of the main areas of focus of the 
German Accounting Reform Act was the adaptation of the German Accounting 
Law to the IAS Regulation of 2002. This was primarily about the option given to 
Member States with regard to the application of international accounting stand-
ards such as the IAS/IFRS for the consolidated financial statements and separate 
financial statements. The regulation to adopt the German Commercial Code (hGB) 
in line with the IAS regulation constitutes the centerpiece of the law. The primary 
goal of the German Act to Modernize Accounting Law was to further develop 
German accounting law to become a long-term and fully fledged alternative to 
international accounting standards (IFRS). It was to be a simpler and more cost ef-
fective alternative that was to offer especially small and medium-sized companies 
the possibility to apply modern accounting law without having to make use of the 
IFRS. Also here the standard deviation is rather small with 0.673, which in turn 
means that the individual measurements (answers) lie rather close to the average 
value. This question was answered by forty-seven companies.
A more average agreement level of 2.57 was given for the Investor Protection 
Improvement Act and the Issuer Guide of the German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority. This touched on the topics of, for example, realignment of insider trad-
ing (§ 13 WphG), the requirement to maintain insider registers (§ 15b WphG), 
changes to the reporting requirements disclosing transactions of senior executives 
(§ 15a WphG) or the changes to the requirements for the supervision of the ban 
on market price manipulations (§ 20a WphG) and the extension of ad hoc public 
releases (§ 15 WphG). The introduction of the Investor Protection Improvement 
Act brought above all substantial changes in the area of the Securities Trading 
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Act. These innovations were especially of direct relevance for listed corporations 
and their board members but also for their shareholders. Also this question was 
answered by forty-six companies. The standard deviation was relatively high with 
0.834 which means that the average value was not necessarily typical as there can 
exist numerous or also large deviations from the average value. 
In conclusion, it can be noted that, according to the results of the question-
naire, company representatives rate the legal regulations with regard to the im-
plementation of the German government’s 10-Point-Program with regard to the 
disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations as somewhat helpful.
With regard to point II of the survey, participants were asked as part of the 
questionnaire to provide their level of acceptance to following statements: “The 
legal implementation of the government’s 10-Point-Program is sufficient for our 
company in terms of the disclosure and avoidance of balance sheet manipulations”. 
This statement could be rated using a four-point scale from “I totally disagree” to 
“I fully agree”. Subsequently the answers were coded (“I totally disagree” = 1; “I 
rather disagree” = 2; “I rather agree” = 3; “I fully agree” = 4) and summarized as 
average levels of agreement. An agreement level of 2.5 can be rated as indifference 
by the participants with regard to the question concerned. This question attained 
an average agreement level of 2.71. This means that the companies who respond-
ed just assume that for themselves the legal implementation of the government’s 
10-Point-Program with regard to the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet 
manipulations is sufficient. The standard deviation is 0.782 and therefore in the 
middle range of the standard deviations so far. 41 out of 48 companies responded 
to this question. The following chart provides a view of the level of agreement in 
percent.
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Spreadsheet 8: Assessment of the 10-Point-Program regarding your own 
company
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4.3 evAluAtion of the usefulness of possible concrete 
meAsures by the compAnies polled 
The discussed thesis in this chapter looks at the usefulness of possible con-
crete measures with regard to the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet ma-
nipulations. These theses are more or less being publicly discussed in context with a 
tightening of the government’s Catalogue of Measures. The thesis could be ranked 
using a four-stage index from “I totally disagree” to “I fully agree”. Subsequently 
the answers were encoded (“I totally disagree” = 1; “I rather disagree” = 2; “I rather 
agree” = 3; “I fully agree” = 4) and summarized as average levels of agreement. An 
agreement level of 2.5 can be rated as indifference by the participants with regard 
to the question concerned. The answers were then aggregated to average levels of 
agreement. The results are summarized in the following chart.
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Spreadsheet 9: Views on the desirability of possible measures
The first thesis states that entrusting the German Financial Reporting 
Enforcement Panel with sanctioning rights is deemed appropriate for the disclo-
sure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations. This was rated with an arith-
metic mean of 3.09 and was by far the most positively rated result. In addition, this 
was also the only of the five theses that got more agreement than disagreement in 
the first place. All other four theses were more or less refused. The standard devia-
tion is 0.830 and is in the lower range of the five calculated standard deviations 
with regard to the five theses. All in all, forty-four of the forty-eight companies 
who responded to the survey provided a rating to this statement.
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The second thesis stated that it would also be appropriate in Germany, as 
already in practice in Great Britain, to impose fines from the very first day of delay 
in disclosure. The arithmetic mean at a mere 1.89 shows a strong resistance to this 
thesis. The standard deviation is 0.840 and is, therefore, in the lower area of the 
five calculated standard deviations with regard to the five theses. Altogether forty-
seven companies provided an opinion on this thesis.
The third thesis said that personal liability of board and supervisory board 
members towards investors for providing deliberate or grossly negligent false in-
formation to the capital market should be ensured by extending the appropriate 
liabilities. With an arithmetic mean of 2.3 this thesis showed a low level of rejection 
as a mere 0.2 percentage points are missing to meet the value of indifference. The 
standard deviation was relatively high with 0.916 and additionally highlights the 
rather high spectrum of answers provided by the respondents. Forty-six compa-
nies responded to this thesis. 
The fourth thesis was that the introduction of an external independent audi-
tor rotation should be put on a legal footing. The majority of the survey partici-
pants rejected this with an arithmetic mean of 2.00. This question scored the high-
est standard deviation with 0.933 in relation to all five theses. This means that the 
arithmetic average is rather not very typical for the distribution because there is a 
rather large or numerous divergence from the average value. Forty-seven compa-
nies provided a statement to this thesis. 
The fifth thesis read that the introduction of the separation of consulting 
and independent auditing services should be put on a legal footing. The arithmetic 
mean of 2.43 shows a more or less indifferent position of the survey participants 
towards this thesis. The standard deviation is also the smallest calculated standard 
deviation with regard to the five theses with 0.827. The above finding would sug-
gest that the answers are rather towards the average value and that there are rather 
no large spikes either up- or downwards. To this last of the five theses forty-seven 
of the forty-eight companies who participated responded. 
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4.4 the polled compAnies’ evAluAtion of the cost-benefit 
rAtio 
With the so-called 10-Point-Program to strengthen companies‘ integrity and 
to protect investors, the German Federal Government wanted to counteract the nu-
merous cases of balance sheet fraud in Germany. Their goal was, on the one hand, 
to achieve an improvement in the general framework to strengthen self-regulation 
of the capital market and, on the other hand, to prevent behavior that damages the 
capital market through direct intervention. The implementation of these measures 
occurred in different, separate legislative procedures. The additional requirements 
that were regulated through the new legislation had to be implemented by affected 
companies. This in consequence led to additional costs for the respective compa-
nies. That is why in the questionnaire undertaken the companies contacted were 
asked to provide an assessment of the cost-benefit ratio with regard to the legisla-
tive regulations that were initiated in response to the Catalogue of Measures to 
disclose and prevent balance sheet manipulations.
In order to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio, the companies were asked to re-
spond making use of a five-point scale from “the benefits clearly outweigh the 
costs” =1; “the benefits slightly outweigh the costs” = 2; “costs and benefits balance 
out” = 3; “the costs slightly outweigh the benefits” = 4; “the costs clearly outweigh 
the benefits” = 5. The result is shown in the following illustration. 
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Spreadsheet 10: Assessment of the cost-benefit ratio in respect to varied aspects 
regarding all measures
The result is fairly conclusive in its statement. Nearly 65 per cent of the com-
panies who responded thought that the costs outweighed the benefits; nearly 24 
per cent thought even that the costs clearly outweighed. 19 per cent of the ques-
tioned companies saw the cost-benefit ratio as balanced. And only 2.4 per cent are 
of the opinion that the benefit clearly outweighs the costs. 
The answer to the first question was targeted at the general cost-benefit ratio 
for all measures. The answers to the three following questions were aimed at as-
certaining the cost-benefit ratio specifically in relation to concrete legislative regu-
lations. The first of the following questions was aimed at the cost-benefit ratio with 
regard to the monitoring of the legality of actual financial statements by an inde-
pendent institution (DPR/BaFin). The result is shown in the following illustration. 
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Spreadsheet 11: Assessment of the cost-benefit ratio in respect to varied aspects 
regarding the monitoring of the legality of actual financial statements by FREP/
BaFin
The result for this question is not as clear as the one with regard to all meas-
ures. only a good 55 per cent of the respondents saw a domination of costs com-
pared to the benefit. on the other hand, also over 31 per cent of the companies 
questioned saw the benefit outweigh the costs; nearly 18 per cent of the company 
representatives viewed the benefit as clearly outweighing the costs.
The second question was targeted at the cost-benefit ratio with regard to the 
electronic publication of company accounts. here the answer shows a completely 
different picture to that of the first general cost-benefit ratio question. Nearly 58 
per cent of the companies which responded assume that the benefit of the legisla-
tion regarding the need to electronically publicize outweighs the costs. 20 per cent 
of the participants believe that the benefits and the costs balance out and only 22 
per cent of the survey participants see the costs outweigh the benefits. The corre-
sponding results are depicted in the following chart.
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Spreadsheet 12: Assessment of the cost-benefit ratio in respect to varied aspects 
regarding the electronic publication of company accounts
The third question was aimed at the cost-benefit ratio regarding the extend-
ed company obligations made by the Investor Protection Improvement Act. The 
result is depicted in the following chart.
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Spreadsheet 13: Assessment of the cost-benefit ratio in respect to varied aspects 
regarding the extended company obligations made by the Investor Protection 
Improvement Act
It has become apparent that just over 52 percent of the polled companies see 
a domination of the costs over the benefits. Almost 29 percent of the attendants 
believe that costs and benefits balance out. 19 per cent of the participants see the 
benefits slightly outweigh the costs and what is noticeable is that nobody views the 
benefits as clearly outweighing the costs. 
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4.5 Assessing the outcomes 
With regard to assessing the effectiveness of the new legislative regulations 
regarding the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations the com-
panies polled view the German Law on Financial Reporting Compliance from 2005 
to be most suiteable closely followed by the German Act on Electronic Commercial 
and Co-operative Registers and the Company Registers from 2007. All forty-eight 
responding companies provided an assessment on these two legislations. This fact 
alone can lead to the conclusion that this question with regard to the context of the 
prevention and disclosure of balance sheet manipulations can be viewed as well 
classified. The high level of agreement by companies towards the German Law 
on Financial Reporting Compliance is in line with hofmann’s assessment who 
said that the German enforcement (DPR and BaFin) was a step in the right direc-
tion (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 343). The formulated criticism raised through external 
publications towards the German Law on Financial Reporting Compliance and 
which questions its effectiveness (cf. Baetge/Thiele/Matena, 2004, p. 231 f) is a view 
which is not shared or seen in this way by the companies polled. As a result of 
the German enforcement policy having uncovered, however, already at least two 
cases of balance sheet manipulations in which the annual financial statement of 
2006 included an incomplete portrayal of speculation with US credit instruments 
(Sachsen LB) (see chapter 3.5.1) or where the own company share packages were 
sold with a million two-digit profit before the sudden fall in price (Conergy) (see 
chapter 3.5.1) one can – despite all criticism raised – be of the opinion that this is 
a step in the right direction. The positive acceptance of the legislation relating to 
the Electronic Commercial and Co-operative Registers and the Company Registers 
from 2007 by the companies surveyed is also in line with the views raised in ex-
ternal publications in which above all the need and importance of transparency 
as well as facilitating the work of law enforcement officers and register courts is 
highlighted (cf. Meyding/Bödeker, 2006, p. 1012).
The German Corporate Governance Code which is reworked on an annual 
basis as needed is, however, according to the opinion of the companies surveyed 
not a suitable contribution towards disclosing and preventing accounting fraud. 
This seems somewhat surprising given that the commission is formed by eminent 
representatives of the economy and politics. A possible explanation for the assess-
ment made by the companies is that the German Corporate Governance Code, 
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apart from statutory provisions, includes mainly recommendations and sugges-
tions. one can deviate from recommendations if one provides a rationale and sug-
gestions can be deviated from without providing a rationale. For this reason one 
can call this a weapon without ammunition in the fight against accounting fraud. 
External publications support this view, for example, through zünd (cf. zünd, 
2005, p. 8) and hofmann (cf. hofmann, 2008, p. 369). The question of the effectiv-
ity of the German Corporate Governance Code with regard to the disclosure and 
prevention of balance sheet manipulations was answered by forty-six of the forty-
eight companies who responded. one can therefore assume also in this case that 
the respondents were well able to place this question into the context of disclosure 
and prevention of balance sheet manipulations.
Also the Law on Corporate Integrity and Modernization of the Right of 
Avoidance from 2005 and German Capital Markets Model Case Act from 2005122 
are not very helpful in disclosing and preventing accounting fraud according to 
the survey participants. here it is particularly noticeable that, only thirty-nine or 
forty-one of the forty-eight companies answered both of these questions. Possible 
reasons for the fact that nine respectively seven participants did not answer this 
question could be that the survey participants do not know this legislation in detail 
or that they do not make the connection between this legislation and accounting 
fraud. This presumption is based on the fact that from all questionnaires returned, 
eleven were answered by members of the legal department whereas thirty-seven 
questionnaires were answered by members of other departments such as, for ex-
ample, accounting or investor relations. 
question II “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ment: The legal implementation of the government’s 10-Point-Program is sufficient 
for our company in terms of disclosure and avoidance of balance sheet manipula-
tions“ was clearly answered in favor of the legal framework. over sixty per cent of 
the survey participants assume that the existing legislative measures are sufficient 
for their company to successfully disclose and avoid balance sheet manipulations. 
This view is strengthened by a survey conducted in the summer of 2012 by the 
auditing firm kPMG that was targeted at German medium-sized companies. This 
study clearly showed that concerning companies affected by white-collar-crime 
122  This legislation had a time limit and was re-evaluated in 2011 and then re-
adopted in 2012 with some changes made with a new time limit of 2020. 
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the number of falsifications of financial information and annual financial state-
ments declined from thirteen per cent in 2010 (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 8 f) to three per 
cent (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 11).
The answers received to question III asking for the views on the desirability 
of possible measures relating to the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet ma-
nipulations showed that the majority of the survey respondents are of the opinion 
that it is appropriate to entrust the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel 
(DPR) with sanctioning rights. heretofore the DPR had absolutely no sanctioning 
rights. only the German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) which stands 
above the DPR has such rights but also only in a restricted form. If the DPR had 
similar rights as the BaFin, then it would also have more opportunities to influence 
fraudulent companies. In this case the legislator could at least investigate whether 
giving the DPR sanctioning rights would lead to improved power and efficiency 
and would then also be taken more seriously by companies as an official inspec-
tion agency. External publications demand that enforcement bodies should in prin-
ciple be given sanctioning rights. The limited rights of BaFin whose possibility to 
exert influence ends when they inform the general public would have to be appro-
priately extended (cf. Baetge/Thiele/Matena, 2004, p. 208; hofmann, 2008, p. 342).
With regard to the thesis that fines should be imposed from the very first day 
of a delay in disclosure, the result of the analysis showed disapproval by the com-
panies polled. The negative stance towards being sanctioned from the very first 
day of a delay can possibly be seen in the fact that companies, in general, adhere 
to the required period of notice of disclosure and therefore view a fine being im-
posed from the very first day of a delay as being too severe. With the German Act 
on Electronic Commercial and Co-operative Registers and the Company Registers 
(EhUG) coming into force the rate of publication by companies has increased sig-
nificantly. In the financial years leading up to 2007 it was less than five per cent but 
for the financial year 2008 it rose to over ninety per cent (cf. Schlauß, 2010, p. 153 f; 
Schlauß, 2011, p. 805 f). Against this background, it also does not seem appropriate 
to put much effort into the daily documentation of missing disclosures.
Extending the personal liability of board and supervisory board members 
for providing deliberate or grossly negligent false information to the capital mar-
kets was rejected by the narrow majority of the company’s questioned. This is in 
line with external publications in which, on the one hand, an extension of personal 
281STRUCTURE oF ThE RESEARCh DESIGN
liability is desired but in which there is also the thesis that the statutory regula-
tions are sufficient for the question of personal liability. For instance, Jürgen kurz 
from the German Protection Association for the ownership of Securities hoped 
that a corresponding extension of the cases for liability, for which he sees cur-
rently a large gap in investor protection, would be closed (cf. Drost, 2004a, p. 27). 
Also Wolfgang Gerke evaluates the situation as such that the existing civil liability 
foundation of claims has not proved itself as unsuitable with regard to helping ag-
grieved investors effectively make their claims for compensation (cf. Gerke, 2004, 
p. I). Jan Wulfetange, a specialist in capital market law of the Federation of German 
Industries, holds a completely different view. he expects that a related expansion 
of the prerequisites for liability will lead to an increasingly legal nature of entre-
preneurial decisions (cf. Drost, 2004a, p. 27). Also according to klaus Bräuning, 
member of the executive board of the Federation of German Industries, there is no 
need to strengthen the rules governing liability (cf. Drost, 2004b, p. 29). And also 
Duve and Basak are of the opinion that the jurisprudence in the cases of Infomatec, 
EM.Tv and Comroad have clearly demonstrated that the general standards of tort 
law are sufficient (cf. Duve/Basak, 2005, p. 2650).
A legal anchoring of the introduction of external independent auditor rota-
tion was largely refused by the companies questioned. The legislator also refused 
the request for an externally enforced rotation, the reason provided being that there 
is a danger of loss in the quality of the audits after a change of auditing firms. The 
reaction of external publications to the reason provided is to state that the legisla-
tor has failed to provide proof that its point of view is correct (cf. Ruhnke, 2000, p. 
91 f; Niehus, 2003, p. 1638). Also the question of having internal and external inde-
pendent auditor rotations received mixed views as found in external publications. 
For instance, Baetge and Matena are in favor of an external independent auditor 
rotation every five to six years (cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 195 f). 
And also Peemöller and hofmann are of the opinion that an external rotation can 
be an appropriate instrument for strengthening the trust in the integrity of the 
statutory audit and for combating fraudulent accounting. But Schruff maintains 
that the introduction of external rotation would give criminal preparers of balance 
sheets a constant head start of at least two years (cf. Peemöller/hofmann, 2005, 
p. 199). Weißenberger raises the concern that if there was a forced external rota-
tion then too little money and know-how would be invested into new mandates 
(cf. Weißenberger, 1997, p. 2319). The results of the survey would indicate that the 
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companies who responded also mainly follow the reasoning of the people oppos-
ing enforced external rotation. 
The controversy surrounding the thesis that the introduction of the sepa-
ration of consulting and independent auditing services should be put on a legal 
footing on behalf of the companies polled is also reflected in external publications, 
where this topic is also the subject of controversial debate. From the standpoint 
of a supporter of the separation of consulting and independent auditing, one can 
refer to Baetge and Matena. In their opinion the danger exists that, by providing 
auditing services as well as audit related consultation to the same company, the 
auditor loses his independency and becomes a servant of two masters. on the one 
hand, he has to pursue the role of independent auditor in representing the interests 
of the shareholders and creditors and, on the other hand, due to his consultation 
services he has to fulfill the wishes of the company’s management. As the consul-
tation services promises higher profit margins, it can lead to a situation where the 
auditor is not orientated towards the expectations of the investors and sharehold-
ers but rather towards the demands and provisions of the company’s management 
(cf. Baetge/Matena in Wollmert et al, 2003, p. 185 f). A further advocate of a distinct 
separation between independent auditors and simultaneous consulting within the 
same company is Riecke. In his view the criminal acts of some auditors point to a 
cultural decline (cf. Riecke, 2002, p. 9 f). A strict opponent of the request to separate 
the services of auditing and consultation is Ring. he views the general problem as 
being such that the auditors per se – meaning regardless of whether they provide 
other services – are facing growing competition. This has resulted in the situation 
that independent audits are sometimes offered at a fee that can barely cover costs 
if the audit is performed according to the regulations that apply (cf. Ring, 2002, p. 
1348 f).
Considering the result of the survey it can be noted that, beyond the context 
of assertion of each assessment, four of the five suggestions that had been refused 
by the participants possibly received a negative rating because they might limit the 
power of the board of the company and also the power and personal influence of 
individual managers.
The last set of questions in part Iv are about assessing the cost-benefit ratio 
for the implementation of the legislative measures for your company that were ini-
tiated by the Catalogue of Measures for the disclosure and prevention of balance 
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sheet manipulations. The overall assessments of the measures of the 10-Point-
Program that have been implemented to date show a clear result. According to 
the company representatives, the costs clearly outweigh the expected benefit. The 
assessment questions the desired effectiveness of the 10-Point-Program as one can 
assume that companies only follow the legislative changes that resulted from the 
Catalogue of Measures where they must. 
As part of the questions on individual points of the Catalogue of Measures 
with regard to the cost-benefit ratio, it could be established that, with a view to the 
monitoring of the legality of actual financial statements by an independent institu-
tion (DPR/BaFin) and with a view to the extended company obligations made by 
the Investor Protection Improvement Act, the costs were still seen as outweighing 
the benefits but to a lesser extent than the overall assessment. With respect to the 
electronic publication of company accounts, on the other hand, one can state that 
companies clearly see that the benefits outweigh the costs. This result corresponds 
with the assessment of the effectiveness of the new statutory regulations with re-
gard to the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipulations addressing 
the issue of whether they are helpful or not. The highest level of agreement was 
given to monitoring the legality of actual financial statements by an independ-
ent institution closely followed by the electronic publication of company accounts. 
The result of the first measure is valued at 2.79 and the result of the second meas-
ure is valued at 2.77. Although these values are nearly identical one can, however, 
notice that with regard to the question of the cost-benefit ratio they differ. here 
the electronic publication of company accounts clearly achieves the higher level of 
consent meaning that the benefit is seen as outweighing the costs. So it is reason-
able to assume that the electronic publication of company accounts can provide 
great benefit to companies from a competitive point of view. As part of this study, 
160 of the largest companies in Germany were questioned. These companies have 
the most capital and highly experienced employees and therefore hold the market 
power. Through the electronic publication of competitor’ and smaller companies 
company’ accounts they can access information that can be useful to them for in-




A study conducted by kPMG in 2010 concluded that concerning companies 
affected by white-collar-crime between 2006 and 2010 falsifications of annual fi-
nancial statements and financial information increased from six to thirteen per 
cent. Furthermore, in the same time-frame there was a strong shift in the white-
collar crime sector towards the areas of finance and accounting as well as the lend-
ing business according to this study. Based on these findings kPMG concludes that 
white-collar crimes are being committed by people in increasingly higher hierar-
chical positions (cf. kPMG, 2010, p. 8 f). This study was a joint survey conducted 
by the auditing firm kPMG and the social science institute TNS Emnid who have 
been conducting such studies at irregular intervals since 1999. The study conduct-
ed in 2012 was already the fifth. The three-hundred and thirty-two medium-sized 
companies chosen, based on being representative by sector and size, were ques-
tioned as to their experiences with white-collar crime. 
In their study from 2012, kPMG found out that concerning companies affect-
ed by white-collar-crime between spring 2010 and the summer of 2012 the number 
of falsified annual financial statements and financial information decreased from 
thirteen to three per cent. Whilst the study conducted in 2010 focused only on me-
dium-sized companies, the study conducted in 2012 also included the top hundred 
companies in Germany by size of which thirty-two participated in the study. Even 
if the result of this study shows that the manipulation of information relevant to 
the annual financial statements occurs relatively rarely compared to other types of 
crime, kPMG stresses that with regard to the damage caused and the reputational 
loss of the companies affected it is considerable (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 11, 24). The de-
tails of this study were reviewed in detail as part of this study (see chapter 2.4.1). 
The decline in manipulations of information relevant for annual financial state-
ments within this short time-frame of ten per cent seems to be significant. 
A study conducted in regular intervals in Germany by the TNS Emnid on be-
half of pwc and the University of halle-Wittenberg also reinforces this trend. The 
result of this study showed that the number of incorrect balance sheets declined 
from three per cent in 2011 to two per cent in 2013. In this study 603 companies 
with over 500 employees were questioned (cf. pwc, 2013, p. 12, 13 and 17).
The statutory as well as company-internal provisions for the prevention of 
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accounting fraud appear to be working. The company survey conducted especially 
for this study also goes in the same direction. The majority of the companies polled 
agreed with the statement that the implementation of the government’s 10-Point-
Program is sufficient for the disclosure and prevention of balance sheet manipula-
tions within their company. 
however, it must be borne in mind that accounting fraud still exists and 
must continue to be addressed. The study conducted by kPMG in 2012 came to 
the result with regard to white-collar criminals that in medium-sized companies 
every third case involved management or top management. In regard to the top 
100 companies, the study concluded that the percentage affected was even higher 
(cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 7). Furthermore, the study draws attention to the fact that the 
higher the number of employees, the higher the risk for the company of white-
collar crimes occurring (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 24). Nearly every fourth medium-sized 
company in Germany was victim of white-collar crime over the two years from 
2010 to 2012. With regard to the top 100 companies, even more than half were af-
fected (kPMG, 2012, p. 6).
If one asks medium-sized companies about the risk of becoming a victim of 
the white-collar crime of manipulation of information relevant to the annual finan-
cial statement, the following picture emerges. only four per cent of the companies 
see a very high risk. Thirty-three per cent see a high risk. Fifty-four per cent see 
a low risk and nine per cent see only a very low risk (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 16). With 
regard to the top 100 companies here only twenty-five per cent assume that there 
is a high or very high risk of them becoming a victim of white-collar crimes in the 
area of manipulation of information relevant to the annual financial statement (cf. 
kPMG, 2012, p. 27). It therefore appears that the medium-sized companies as well 
as the top 100 companies questioned have an adequate awareness of the risk as the 
perception of risk specific to an offence corresponds with the actual risks in the 
area of manipulations of annual financial statements. here the risk of becoming a 
victim of such an act is seen as low and the overall damage is actually the lowest 
of all types of offences (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 17 and 28).
White-collar crime can be prevented in many ways. Based on the survey con-
ducted, the most important sources of detecting an offense are indications from 
within the company or incidental discoveries. But also indications from outside 
of the company or also anonymous tips are important. The last two of these types 
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of sources of indications have increased in priority since the last time the study 
was conducted (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 18). The fact that the types of indications have 
increased may be related to the changed disclosure requirements in Germany. 
on January 1 2007 the German Act of Electronic Commercial and Co-operative 
Registers and the Company Registers (EhUG) came into force. The act allowed 
for electronic access to all relevant company information. Consequently, also com-
pany external or otherwise interested persons attain information regarding spe-
cific companies and thereby also contribute to the detection of accounting crime. 
The higher the transparency of the business practices of individual companies, the 
harder it is for fraudulent managers to cover their wheelings and dealings. Also 
the company survey conducted solely for this study concluded that, with regard 
to the electronic publication of company accounts, the benefits outweigh the costs.
Concerning companies affected by white-collar-crime the indications of 
economy fraud having occurred in the annual audit declined from eleven to five 
per cent in 2011 compared to the previous study (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 18). These 
indications were provided by auditing firms as part of their yearly annual audit. 
here one has to raise the question as to what is the reason for this positive trend. 
As one can assume that the auditing firms have not changed their approach, one 
must assume that there are fewer cases of balance sheet manipulations in compa-
nies. An explanation for this can be the legal implementation of the points raised 
in the government’s Catalogue of Measures. Point 5 (Strengthening the Role of the 
Independent Auditor) of the Catalogue of Measures could have contributed to this 
improvement. Through the implementation of the planned measures of point 5 
there were, for example, a multitude of statutory changes such as the implemen-
tation of international auditing standards (§ 317 (5) of the German Commercial 
Code), an increase in the responsibility of the group auditor (§ 317 (3) sentence 2 of 
the German Commercial Code), changes in the reports of the independent auditor 
(§ 171 (1) sentences 2 and 3 of the German Stock Corporation Act), a disclosure of 
auditors’ fees (§ 285 sentence 1 number 17 of the German Commercial Code) and 
changes to professional supervision (Final Auditor Supervision Act). however, it 
should be noted that the demands raised in the Catalogue of Measures have been 
interpreted too loosely and/or have not been implemented such as, for example, 
the separation of simultaneous auditing and consultancy functions or the exten-
sion of an auditor’s liability. The results of the present study whereby 160 com-
panies from different DAx segments were questioned shows that the companies 
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which responded are satisfied with the scope of the legal implementation of the 
points raised in the government’s Catalogue of Measures. As such, for example, 
the separation of simultaneous auditing and consulting services by the same au-
diting firm was rejected by the companies. The assessments with regard to this 
question were widely scattered. In summary, a small majority of companies voted 
against the separation of simultaneous auditing and consulting services.
Concerning companies affected by white-collar-crime also the indications 
through law enforcement agencies or supervisory authorities declined from thirty-
five to thirteen per cent compared to the previous study from 2010 (cf. kPMG, 
2012, p. 18). here it is also likely that the work of law enforcement agencies has 
not significantly changed. In this respect, it should also be considered that in gen-
eral the prosecutors working the cases of economic crime are also responsible for 
small-scale crime (cf. hienzsch, 2004, p. 126 f). hienzsch points out that even if a 
case were to be handled by specialized public prosecutors, one could still not al-
ways guarantee proper handling as also specialized public prosecutor offices have 
difficulties keeping up with the level of education that a very highly equipped 
lawyer has compared to that of their public prosecutors. Especially the BaFin took 
a critical stance towards the often low level of professional qualifications held by 
public prosecutors. The low number of public prosecutor personnel, too, is a cause 
for concern. The result of the labor shortage is an extremely high workload for 
the individual public prosecutor who demonstrates a great willingness to take the 
path of least effort when handling white-collar crimes. With all goodwill in the 
world, the shortage of labor is often the root cause for the failure to follow criminal 
procedural processes properly as it results in a time-lag. A time-lag in turn makes 
it harder to clarify and assess the actual facts. In summary, Germany’s public pros-
ecutors are also financially ill equipped to prosecute white-collar criminals (cf. 
hienzsch, 2004, p. 126-129). 
An explanation for the decline from thirty-five to thirteen per cent with 
regard to the indications through law enforcement agencies and supervisory au-
thorities can also be found in the legally implemented points of the government’s 
10-Point-Program. Point 6 (Monitoring the legality of actual financial statements by 
an independent institution) of the government’s Catalogue of Measures could have 
contributed to this improvement.
The German Law on Financial Reporting Compliance introduced a two-stage 
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enforcement procedure in which in the first stage the German Financial Reporting 
Enforcement Panel (DPR or FREP) organized under private law according to §§ 
342b – 342e of the German Commercial Code takes action. In the second stage the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) becomes active pursuant to §§ 
37a – 37u of the WphG and which holds sovereign rights. The DPR audits are not 
only based on concrete evidence for a breach against accounting standards or upon 
request by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) but also on a ran-
dom basis without any due reason. Based on the results of the survey conducted 
solely for this study, the companies surveyed are in favor of the DPR (FREP) having 
sanctioning rights as this is seen as important for the prevention of balance sheet 
manipulations. The DPR to date has, however, not got the possibility to impose 
sanctions. here, the legislator has failed to date to tackle this issue.
To prevent and disclose balance sheet manipulations and, therefore, for the 
protection of society, the safeguarding of functioning capital markets and to pro-
tect investors there is, however, a need to fight fire with fire. Effective legislation 
as well as speedy, functioning criminal prosecution is required. It also requires, 
apart from financial resources, the need for support from specialists in the public 
prosecutor offices for the sector of company annual financial statement analysis. 
Also the kind of punishment could lead to a reduction in balance sheet fraud. here 
one can refer to henzler to the procedures applied in the US against balance sheet 
offenders. Members of company management, who can expect a sentence of up to 
twenty years for making false statements in the annual financial statements, must 
add a declaration to the financial statements in which they personally declare that 
it does not include any untruths and that they convey an accurate image in line 
with the actual condition of the assets, financial position and earnings. henzler 
stresses that this does not only make a valuable contribution to the prevention of 
accounting fraud but also strengthens the trust in the correctness of company fi-
nancial statements and therefore also in the capital market (cf. henzler, 2006, 134). 
Point ten of the Catalogue of Measures addresses this issue. here it is not 
only suggested that the version of the elements of criminal offenses are checked for 
gaps and unclarities but that one also considers increasing the range of sentences 
for the basic facts of offence as well as for the cases where there was an intent to 
realize a profit. however, there are no legislative measures planned for point ten 
of the Catalogue of Measures by the Federal Government.
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The thesis that the personal liability of board and supervisory board mem-
bers towards investors for providing deliberate or grossly negligent false informa-
tion to the capital market should be ensured by extending the appropriate liabili-
ties was, despite broad divergences in the assessments received, rejected by a slight 
majority of the companies questioned as part of this study. It can thus be conclud-
ed that a slight majority of 160 DAx companies also see no need for further action 
with regard to the legal implementation of point ten of the Catalogue of Measures. 
The question as to how medium-sized companies sanction fraudulent be-
havior was investigated by kPMG. They found that, in ninety-six per cent of the 
cases companies took appropriate action when discovering a crime. In seventy-
five per cent of the cases, there are adjustments made to the corporate structure, 
in seventy-one per cent there are changes made to the preventative measures and 
in sixty-nine per cent there are steps taken against the person who committed the 
fraud. With regard to the people who committed the fraud, the measures taken 
are mostly of a labour-law nature, in nearly every second case of a penal nature 
and in every third case of a civil law nature. All in all the legal measures taken 
have declined compared to preceding years (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 20 f). The top 100 
companies take labour-law related action and penal action much more frequently 
against fraudulent action which has caused them damage. As such, medium-sized 
companies take labour-law action in sixty-four per cent of the cases and in forty-
nine per cent there are penal consequences, whereas with the top 100 companies 
it is eighty-three and sixty-seven per cent (cf. kPMG, 2012, p. 20 und 30). The num-
bers highlight that action against fraudulent behaviour under both civil and penal 
law is taken relatively seldom by medium-sized companies. If one does not have 
to fear being taken to civil or criminal court, then one cannot expect an effective 
preventative effect. 
Ruter points out that world-wide a mere forty per cent of white-collar crimes 
discovered have led to disciplinary action, less than a quarter of the cases claims 
for damages have been raised and only six per cent of the cases have ended up in 
court. As white-collar crimes are mostly not communicated and often not even 
employees are informed, one can assume that inconspicuous economic perpetra-
tors use this lack of communication as well as insufficient sanctioning for their 
own benefit. This is relevant with regard to plans to take preventative measures as 
seventy-seven per cent of the cases never reach the public (cf. Ruter, 2012, Internet 
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Source). There is no deterrent effect on the potential offender as he sees neither a 
danger for himself to be pilloried nor a danger of losing his financial and social 
status. 
In conclusion, it is safe to say that the gradual legal implementation of the 
government’s 10-Point-Program is a step in the right direction for prevention and 
disclosure of accounting fraud. This is also borne out of the figures that show the 
regressive nature of manipulations of information relevant to the annual finan-
cial statements as shown in the study conducted by kPMG and NMS-Emnid in 
2012. The effectiveness of the legal implementation depends not least on compa-
nies’ behavior. If companies fully exhaust their means to prevent and disclose bal-
ance sheet manipulations, then white-collar crime could be even more effectively 
combated.
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I	   Die	   folgenden	   Fragen	   beziehen	   sich	   auf	   die	   Umsetzung	   des	   10-­‐Punkte-­‐
Programms	   (Maßnahmenkatalog)	   der	   Bundesregierung	   von	   2003.	   Dabei	   geht	  
es	   zunächst	   um	   die	   Frage,	   wie	   Sie	   die	   Wirksamkeit	   der	   neuen	   gesetzlichen	  
Regelungen	   im	   Hinblick	   auf	   die	   Aufdeckung	   und	   Verhinderung	   von	  
Bilanzmanipulationen	  einschätzen.	  
1 Gesetz	   zur	   Unternehmensintegrität	   und	   Modernisierung	   des	  
Anfechtungsrechts	  (UMAG)	  von	  2005.	  
Zum	   Beispiel:	   Einführung	   einer	   allgemeinen	   Aktionärsklage	   (§§	   147-­‐
149	   Aktiengesetz),	   darin	   die	   Verpflichtung	   zur	   Geltendmachung	   von	  
Ersatzansprüchen	   gegen	   Gründungs-­‐	   und	   Verwaltungsmitglieder	   (§	  
147	   Aktiengesetz)	   als	   auch	   das	   Klagezulassungsverfahren	   (§	   148	  
Aktiengesetz);	   	  Senkung	  der	  Schwellenwerte	   für	  eine	  aktienrechtliche	  
Sonderprüfung	   (§	   142	   Abs.	   2	   Aktiengesetz);	   Einführung	   eines	  
Aktionärsforums	   zu	   Kommunikationszwecken	   (§	   127	   a	   Aktiengesetz);	  
Einführung	   einer	   „Business	   Judgement	   Rule“	   (	   §	   93	   Abs.	   1	  
Aktiengesetz).	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  




2 Kapitalanleger-­‐Musterverfahrensgesetz	  von	  2005.	  
Einführung	   einer	   Musterklage,	   die	   gemäß	   §	   16	  
Kapitalanlegermusterverfahrensgesetz,	   die	   Prozessgerichte	   bindet.	  
Deren	   Entscheidung	   hängt	   von	   der	   im	   Musterverfahren	   getroffenen	  
Feststellung	   oder	   der	   im	   Musterverfahren	   zu	   klärenden	   Rechtsfrage	  
ab.	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  
	  	  sehr	  hilfreich	  
	  
3 Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz	   von	   2004	   und	  
Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz	  von	  2009.	  
Fortentwicklung	   der	   Bilanzregeln	   und	   Anpassung	   an	   internationale	  
Rechnungslegungsgrundsätze.	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  
	  	  sehr	  hilfreich	  
	  
4 Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz	   von	   2004,	   Abschlussprüferaufsichtsgesetz	  
von	   2004,	   Berufsaufsichtsreformgesetz	   von	   2007	   und	  
Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz	  von	  2009.	  
Zum	   Beispiel:	   Ausweitung	   der	   Prüfungshandlungen	   des	  
Konzernabschlussprüfers	   (§	   317	   Abs.	   3	   Satz	   2	   HGB,	   BilMoG),	  
Erweiterung	  der	  Ausschlussgründe	  des	  Abschlussprüfers	  (§	  319	  Abs.	  3	  	  
HGB	   und	   §	   319a	   HGB,	   BilReG/	   BilMoG),	   Bindung	   des	   Vorschlags	   der	  
Hauptversammlung	  zur	  Wahl	  des	  Abschlussprüfers	  an	  die	  Empfehlung	  
des	  Prüfungsausschusses	   (§	  124	  Abs.	   2	   Satz	   2	  Aktiengesetz,	   BilMoG),	  
Erweiterung	   der	   Prüfungsplichten	   des	   Abschlussprüfers	   durch	   die	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Neuregelung	  der	  Berichtspflicht	   (§	   171	  Abs.	   1	  Aktiengesetz,	   BilMoG),	  
Offenlegung	   der	   Abschlussprüferhonorare	   (§	   285	   Satz	   1	   Nr.	   17	   HGB,	  
BilReG/	   BilMoG),	   Unterstellung	   der	   Wirtschaftsprüferkammer	   unter	  
die	   Aufsicht	   der	   neuen	   berufsstandsunabhängigen	  
Abschlussprüferaufsichtskommission	   (APAG),	   Einführung	   der	  
anlassabhängigen	   und	   anlassunabhängigen	   Sonderuntersuchungen	  
(Berufsaufsichtsreformgesetz).	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  
	  	  sehr	  hilfreich	  
	  
5 Bilanzkontrollgesetz	  von	  2005.	  
Überwachung	  der	  Rechtmäßigkeit	  konkreter	  Unternehmensabschlüsse	  
durch	  eine	  unabhängige	  Stelle.	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  
	  	  sehr	  hilfreich	  
	  
6 Gesetz	  über	  elektronische	  Handelsregister	  und	  
Genossenschaftsregister	  sowie	  das	  Unternehmensregister	  von	  2007.	  
Elektronische	  Offenlegung	  der	  Unternehmensrechnungslegung.	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  
	  	  sehr	  hilfreich	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7 Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz	   von	  2004	  und	  Emittentenleitfaden	  
der	  BaFin	  von	  2009.	  
Zum	  Beispiel:	  Neuordnung	  des	  Insiderrechts	  (§	  13	  WpHG),	  Führen	  von	  
Insiderverzeichnissen	  (§	  15b	  WpHG),	  Ausweitung	  der	  Ad-­‐hoc-­‐Publizität	  
(§	  15	  WpHG).	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  
	  	  sehr	  hilfreich	  
	  
8 Überarbeitete	  Fassung	  des	  DCGK	  von	  2010.	  
Weiterentwicklung	   des	   Deutschen	   Corporate	   Governance	   Kodex,	  
insbesondere	   zur	   Transparenz	   von	   aktienbasierten	   oder	  
anreizorientierten	  Vergütungen	  der	  Vorstände.	  	  
	  	  gar	  nicht	  hilfreich	  
	  	  wenig	  hilfreich	  
	  	  hilfreich	  








II	   Inwieweit	  stimmen	  Sie	  folgender	  Aussage	  zu:	  Die	  gesetzliche	  Umsetzung	  
des	  10-­‐Punkte-­‐Programms	  der	  Bundesregierung	  reicht	  für	  unser	  Unternehmen	  
zur	  Aufdeckung	  und	  Verhinderung	  von	  Bilanzmanipulationen	  aus.	  
	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  überhaupt	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  voll	  zu	  
	  
	  
III	   Stellungnahmen	  zur	  Zweckmäßigkeit	  möglicher	  Maßnahmen	  im	  Hinblick	  
auf	  die	  Aufdeckung	  und	  Verhinderung	  von	  Bilanzmanipulationen:	  
1 Die	   Betrauung	   der	   Deutschen	   Prüfstelle	   für	   Rechnungslegung	   mit	  
Sanktionsrechten	   ist	   im	   Hinblick	   auf	   die	   Aufdeckung	   und	  
Verhinderung	  von	  Bilanzmanipulationen	  zweckmäßig.	  
	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  überhaupt	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  voll	  zu	  
	  
2 In	   Großbritannien	   wird	   bereits	   ein	   Bußgeld	   am	   ersten	   Tag	   der	  
Verspätung	  der	  Offenlegung	   fällig.	  Die	  Einführung	  dieser	  Maßnahme	  
ist	  auch	  in	  Deutschland	  zweckmäßig.	  
	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  überhaupt	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  voll	  zu	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3 Die	  persönliche	  Haftung	  von	  Vorstands-­‐	  und	  Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern	  
gegenüber	   Anlegern	   für	   vorsätzliche	   oder	   grob	   fahrlässige	  
Falschinformationen	   des	   Kapitalmarkts	   müsste	   durch	   eine	  
entsprechende	   Erweiterung	   der	   Haftungstatbestände	   gesichert	  
werden.	  
	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  überhaupt	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  voll	  zu	  
	  
4	   Die	  Einführung	  der	  externen	  Prüferrotation	  sollte	  gesetzlich	  verankert	  
werden.	  
	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  überhaupt	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  voll	  zu	  
	  
5	   Die	  Einführung	  der	  Trennung	  von	  Beratung	  und	  Abschlussprüfung	  
sollte	  gesetzlich	  verankert	  werden.	  
	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  überhaupt	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  nicht	  zu	  
	  	  Ich	  stimme	  eher	  zu	  







IV	   Wie	  beurteilen	  Sie	   für	   Ihr	  Unternehmen	  das	  Verhältnis	   von	  Kosten	  und	  
Nutzen	   der	   Umsetzung	   der	   gesetzlichen	   Regelungen,	   die	   durch	   den	  
Maßnahmenkatalog	   zur	   Verhinderung	   und	   Aufdeckung	   von	  
Bilanzmanipulationen	  initiiert	  wurden?	  
	  
	  	  Der	  Nutzen	  überwiegt	  eindeutig	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  des	  Nutzens	  
	  	  Kosten	  und	  Nutzen	  gleichen	  sich	  aus	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  der	  Kosten	  
	  	  Die	  Kosten	  überwiegen	  eindeutig	  
	  
a	   Im	  Hinblick	  auf	  die	  Überwachung	  der	  Rechtmäßigkeit	  konkreter	  
Unternehmensabschlüsse	  durch	  eine	  unabhängige	  Einrichtung	  
(DPR/BaFin)?	  
	  	  Der	  Nutzen	  überwiegt	  eindeutig	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  des	  Nutzens	  
	  	  Kosten	  und	  Nutzen	  gleichen	  sich	  aus	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  der	  Kosten	  
	  	  Die	  Kosten	  überwiegen	  eindeutig	  
	  
b	   Im	  Hinblick	  auf	  die	  elektronische	  Offenlegung	  der	  
Unternehmensrechnungslegung?	  
	  	  Der	  Nutzen	  überwiegt	  eindeutig	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  des	  Nutzens	  
	  	  Kosten	  und	  Nutzen	  gleichen	  sich	  aus	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  der	  Kosten	  
	  	  Die	  Kosten	  überwiegen	  eindeutig	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c	   Im	  Hinblick	  auf	  die	  erweiterten	  Unternehmenspflichten	  durch	  das	  
Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz?	  
	  	  Der	  Nutzen	  überwiegt	  eindeutig	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  des	  Nutzens	  
	  	  Kosten	  und	  Nutzen	  gleichen	  sich	  aus	  
	  	  Es	  herrscht	  ein	  leichtes	  Übergewicht	  der	  Kosten	  
	  	  Die	  Kosten	  überwiegen	  eindeutig	  
	  
V	   Zur	  Position	  und	  Funktion	  des	  antwortenden	  Unternehmensvertreters:	  
Position:	  
	  	  Vorstandsmitglied	  
	  	  Bereichsleiter	  
	  	  Abteilungsleiter	  
	  	  Fachreferat	  
	  	  Sonstige	  Position:____________________________________	  
	  
Funktionsbereich:	  
	  	  Interne	  Revision	  
	  	  Rechnungswesen	  
	  	  Controlling	  
	  	  Rechtsabteilung	  
	  	  Sonstiger	  Bereich:___________________________________	  
	  








I	   The	   following	   questions	   relate	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   German	  
government’s	   10-­‐Point-­‐Program	   (catalogue	   of	   measures)	   from	   2003.	   The	   first	  
concern	   is	   with	   identifying	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   new	   legal	   regulations	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  disclosure	  and	  prevention	  of	  balance	  sheet	  manipulations.	  
1 Law	   on	   Corporate	   Integrity	   and	   Modernization	   of	   the	   Right	   of	  
Avoidance	  (UMAG)	  from	  2005.	  
For	  example:	  Introduction	  of	  the	  general	  derivative	  action	  (§§	  147-­‐149	  
German	   Stock	   Corporation	   Act),	   included	   in	   the	   obligation	   to	   assert	  
damage	  claims	  against	  founding	  members	  and	  administrative	  officials	  
(§	   147	   German	   Stock	   Corporation	   Act)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   admissibility	   of	  
legal	   action	   (§	   148	   German	   Stock	   Corporation	   Act);	   	   lowering	   the	  
thresholds	  for	  special	  audits	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Stock	  Corporation	  
Law	   (§	   142	   (2)	   German	   Stock	   Corporation	   Act);	   introduction	   of	   a	  
shareholders’	   forum	   for	   communication	   purposes	   (§	   127	   a	   German	  
Stock	  Corporation	  Act);	  introduction	  of	  the	  “Business	  Judgement	  Rule“	  
(	  §	  93	  (1)	  German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act).	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  
	  	  Helpful	  




2 German	  Capital	  Markets	  Model	  Case	  Act	  from	  2005.	  
Introduction	   of	   an	   exemplary	   hearing	   that	   pursuant	   to	   §	   16	   of	   the	  
German	  Capital	  Markets	  Model	  Case	  Act	  is	  binding	  for	  the	  trial	  courts.	  
Their	   ruling	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   statements	   made	   in	   the	   exemplary	  
hearing	  or	  the	  legal	  questions	  clarified	  in	  the	  exemplary	  hearing.	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  
	  	  Helpful	  
	  	  Very	  helpful	  
	  
3 German	   Accounting	   Reform	   Act	   from	   2004	   and	   German	   Act	   to	  
Modernize	  Accounting	  Law	  from	  2009.	  
Further	   development	   of	   accounting	   regulations	   and	   adaptation	   to	  
international	  accounting	  standards.	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  
	  	  Helpful	  
	  	  Very	  helpful	  
	  
4 German	  Accounting	  Reform	  Act	   from	  2004,	  Final	  Auditor	  Supervision	  
Act	   from	   2004,	   Professional	   Supervision	   Reform	   Act	   from	   2007	   and	  
German	  Act	  to	  Modernize	  Accounting	  Law	  (BilMoG)	  from	  2009.	  
For	   example:	   Extension	   of	   the	   auditing	   activities	   of	   the	   group’s	  
independent	  auditor	  (§	  317	  (3)	  sentence	  2	  HGB,	  BilMoG),	  extension	  of	  
the	   grounds	   for	   exclusion	   of	   an	   independent	   auditor	   (§	   319	   (3)	   HGB	  
and	  §	  319a	  HGB,	  BilReG/	  BilMoG),	  binding	  the	  proposal	  regarding	  the	  
appointment	  of	  the	  independent	  auditor	  to	  be	  put	  before	  the	  Annual	  
General	   Meeting	   to	   the	   recommendation	   of	   the	   Auditing	   Committee	  
(§	   124	   (2)	   sentence	   2	   German	   Stock	   Corporation	   Act,	   BilMoG),	  
extending	   the	   auditing	   requirements	   of	   the	   independent	   auditor	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through	   the	   new	   regulation	   of	   reporting	   duties	   (§	   171	   (1)	   German	  
Stock	  Corporation	  Act,	  BilMoG),	  disclosure	  of	  the	  fees	  for	  auditing	  the	  
annual	   financial	   statements	   (§	   285	   sentence	   1	   number	   17	   HGB,	  
BilReG/	  BilMoG),	  placing	   the	  German	  Chamber	  of	  Public	  Accountants	  
(WPK)	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  independent	  Auditors’	  Supervision	  
Commission	   (APAK),	   	   introduction	   of	   special	   random	   and	   scheduled	  
inspections	  (Professional	  Supervision	  Reform	  Act).	  	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  
	  	  Helpful	  
	  	  Very	  helpful	  
	  
5 German	  Law	  on	  Financial	  Reporting	  Compliance	  from	  2005.	  
Monitoring	  the	  legality	  of	  specific	  annual	  financial	  statements	  by	  an	  
independent	  party.	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  
	  	  Helpful	  
	  	  Very	  helpful	  
	  
6 German	  Act	  on	  Electronic	  Commercial	  and	  Co-­‐operative	  Registers	  and	  
the	  Company	  Registers	  from	  2007.	  
Electronic	  publication	  of	  a	  company’s	  annual	  financial	  statement.	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  
	  	  Helpful	  
	  	  Very	  helpful	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7 Investor	  Protection	  Improvement	  Act	  from	  2004	  and	  the	  issuer’s	  guide	  
published	  by	  BaFin	  in	  2009.	  
For	  example:	  Realignment	  of	   insider	   trading	   legislation	   (§	  13	  WpHG),	  
requirement	  to	  maintain	  insider	  registers	  (§	  15b	  WpHG),	  extension	  of	  
ad	  hoc	  publicity	  (§	  15	  WpHG).	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  	  
	  	  Helpful	  
	  	  Very	  helpful	  
	  
8 Revised	  version	  of	  the	  DCGK	  from	  2010.	  
Further	   development	   of	   the	   German	   Corporate	   Governance	   Codex,	  
especially	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   transparency	   of	   share	   based	   or	   incentive-­‐	  
based	  compensation	  of	  board	  members.	  	  
	  	  Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
	  	  Somewhat	  helpful	  
	  	  Helpful	  








II	   To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  
The	  legal	  implementation	  of	  the	  government‘s	  10-­‐Point-­‐Program	  is	  sufficient	  
for	  our	  company	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  disclosure	  and	  avoidance	  of	  balance	  sheet	  
manipulations.	  
	  
	  	  I	  totally	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  agree	  
	  	  I	  fully	  agree	  
	  
	  
III	   Views	  on	  the	  desirability	  of	  possible	  measures	  relating	  to	  the	  disclosure	  
and	  prevention	  of	  balance	  sheet	  manipulations:	  
1 Entrusting	   the	   German	   Financial	   Reporting	   Enforcement	   Panel	   with	  
sanctioning	  rights	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  disclosure	  and	  prevention	  of	  
balance	  sheet	  manipulations.	  	  
	  
	  	  I	  totally	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  agree	  
	  	  I	  fully	  agree	  
	  
2 In	  Great	  Britain	  fines	  are	  imposed	  from	  the	  very	  first	  day	  of	  a	  delay	  in	  
disclosure.	   The	   introduction	   of	   such	   a	   measure	   would	   also	   be	  
appropriate	  in	  Germany.	  
	  
	  	  I	  totally	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  agree	  
	  	  I	  fully	  agree	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3 Personal	   liability	   of	   board	   and	   supervisory	   board	   members	   towards	  
investors	   for	   providing	   deliberate	   or	   grossly	   negligent	   false	  
information	  to	  the	  capital	  market	  should	  be	  ensured	  by	  extending	  the	  
appropriate	  liabilities.	  	  
	  
	  	  I	  totally	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  agree	  	  
	  	  I	  fully	  agree	  
	  
4	   The	  introduction	  of	  external	  independent	  auditor	  rotation	  should	  be	  
put	  on	  a	  legal	  footing.	  
	  
	  	  I	  totally	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  agree	  
	  	  I	  fully	  agree	  
	  
5	   The	  introduction	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  consulting	  and	  independent	  
auditing	  services	  should	  be	  put	  on	  a	  legal	  footing.	  
	  
	  	  I	  totally	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  disagree	  
	  	  I	  rather	  agree	  







IV	   How	  do	  you	  assess	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  ratio	  for	  the	   implementation	  of	  the	  
legislative	  measures	  for	  your	  company	  that	  were	  initiated	  by	  the	  catalogue	  of	  
measures	  for	  the	  disclosure	  and	  prevention	  of	  balance	  sheet	  manipulation?	  
	  
	  	  The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  
	  	  The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
	  	  Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
	  	  The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  	  
	  	  The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
	  
a	   Regarding	  the	  monitoring	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  actual	  financial	  statements	  by	  
an	  independent	  institution	  (FREP/BaFin)?	  
	  	  The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  
	  	  The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
	  	  Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
	  	  The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  	  
	  	  The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
	  
b	   Regarding	  the	  electronic	  publication	  of	  company	  accounts?	  
	  	  The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  
	  	  The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
	  	  Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
	  	  The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  	  
	  	  The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
	  
c	   Regarding	  the	  extended	  company	  obligations	  made	  by	  the	  Investor	  
Protection	  Improvement	  Act?	  
	  	  The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	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	  	  The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
	  	  Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
	  	  The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  	  
	  	  The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
	  
V	   Regarding	  the	  position	  and	  function	  of	  the	  responding	  company	  
representative:	  
Position:	  
	  	  Board	  member	  
	  	  Area	  Director	  
	  	  Department	  Chief	  
	  	  Subject	  Specilization	  
	  	  Other	  position:____________________________________	  
	  
Functional	  Area:	  
	  	  Internal	  Auditing	  Department	  
	  	  Accounting	  Department	  
	  	  Controlling	  
	  	  Legal	  Department	  
	  	  Other	  area:___________________________________	  
	  







Part	  S:	  General	  Information	  concerning	  Companies	  	  









9 Deutsche	  Bank	  
10 Deutsche	  Börse	  
11 Deutsche	  Lufthansa	  
12 Deutsche	  Post	  
13 Deutsche	  Telekom	  
14 E.ON	  
15 Fresenius	  
16 Fresenius	  Med	  Care	  
17 Heidelberg	  Cement	  
18 Henkel	  
19 Infineon	  Technolo	  









29 Thyssen	  Krupp	  
30 Volkswagen	  
31 Aareal	  Bank	  
32 Aurubis	  
33 Axel	  Springer	  
34 BayWa	  




39 Deutsche	  Euroshop	  
40 Deutsche	  Wohnen	  
41 Deutz	  
42 Douglas	  Holing	  
43 Dürr	  
44 EADS	  
45 Elring	  Klinger	  
46 Fielmann	  
47 FraPort	  
48 Fuchs	  Petroclub	  
49 GAGFAH	  
50 GEA	  Group	  
51 Gerresheimer	  
52 Gerry	  Weber	  international	  
53 Gildemeister	  
54 GSW	  Immobilien	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55 Hamburger	  Hafen	  &	  Logistic	  
56 Hannover	  Rückersicherung	  
57 Hoch	  Tief	  
58 Hugo	  Boss	  
59 Kabel	  Deutschland	  





65 MTU	  Aero	  Engines	  Holding	  






72 SGL	  Cabon	  	  
73 Sky	  Deutschland	  





79 Wacker	  Chemie	  
80 Wincor	  Nixdorf	  
81 Adva	  Optical	  Networ	  
82 Aixtron	  N	  
83 Bechtle	  
84 CANCOM	  
85 Carl	  Zeiss	  Meditec	  
86 Centrotherm	  photovoltaics	  
87 Drägerwerk	  	  
88 Drillisch	  
89 euromicron	  	  
90 Evotec	  






97 Pfeiffer	  Vacuum	  Tech	  
98 PSI	  
99 Qiagen	  	  
100 QSC	  
101 Sartorius	  
102 Singulus	  Technologies	  
103 SMA	  Solar	  Tech	  
104 Software	  
105 Solarworld	  
106 STRATEC	  Biomedical	  
107 Suess	  Microtec	  	  
108 United	  Internet	  
109 Wirecard	  
110 XING	  
111 Air	  Berlin	  
112 alstria	  office	  REIT	  




117 Biotest	  	  
118 C.A.T.	  Oil	  
119 Centrotec	  Sustain	  
120 CEWE	  Color	  Hold	  
121 Comdirect	  bank	  
122 Constantin	  Medien	  
123 CTS	  EVENTIM	  
124 Delticom	  	  
125 Deutsche	  Beteiligung	  
126 DIC	  ASSET	  





132 Hamborner	  REIT	  
312 ThoMAS MYSLISCh
133 HAWESKO	  Holding	  
134 Heidelberger	  Druckm	  
135 Highlight	  Communica	  
136 Hornbach	  Holing	  	  
137 INDUS	  Holding	  
138 IVG	  Immobilien	  
139 Jungheinrich	  	  
140 König	  &	  Bauer	  
141 KWS	  SAAT	  
142 MLP	  
143 MVV	  Energie	  	  
144 NORMA	  Group	  	  
145 Patrizia	  Immo	  	  
146 Praktiker	  
147 Prime	  Office	  REIT	  
148 SAF	  Holland	  
149 Schaltbau	  Holding	  
150 Schuler	  
151 Sixt	  
152 SKW	  Stahl-­‐Met	  	  
153 Stroeer	  out-­‐of-­‐h	  
154 TAG	  Immobilien	  
155 TAKKT	  
156 Tipp	  24	  
157 Tom	  Tailer	  
158 VTG	  
159 Wacker	  Neuson	  
160 zooplus	  
	  
s002:	  company	  group	  
1 DAX	  (Update:	  18.04.2012)	  
2 MDAX	  (Update:	  26.08.2012)	  
3 TecDAX	  (Update:	  14.09.2012)	  
4 SDAX	  (Update:	  16.09.2012)	  
	  
s003:	  market	  capitalization	  of	  the	  company	  in	  Mio.	  €	  	  
Source:	  finanzen	  net	  GmbH	  (Update:	  December	  2012)	  
	  
s004:	  turnover	  of	  the	  company	  in	  Mio.	  €	  	  
Source:	  finanzen	  net	  GmbH	  (Update:	  Accounting	  Year	  2011)	  
	  
s005:	  number	  of	  employees	  




s006:	  Fill	  out	  the	  form	  	  
1 yes	  
2 no	  
Part	  A:	  The	   following	  questions	   relate	   to	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  German	  gov-­‐
ernment’s	  10-­‐Point-­‐Program	  (catalogue	  of	  measures)	   from	  2003.	  The	  first	  concern	  
is	  with	   identifying	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  new	  legal	  regulations	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  
disclosure	  and	  prevention	  of	  balance	  sheet	  manipulations.	  
a001:	   Law	   on	   Corporate	   Integrity	   and	   Modernization	   of	   the	   Right	   of	   Avoidance	  
(UMAG)	  from	  2005.	  
For	  example:	  Introduction	  of	  the	  general	  derivative	  action	  (§§147-­‐149	  German	  Stock	  
Corporation	  Act),	  included	  in	  the	  obligation	  to	  assert	  damage	  claims	  against	  founding	  
members	  and	  administrative	  officials	  (§	  147	  German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act)	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  admissibility	  of	   legal	  action	  (§148	  German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act);	   	   lowering	  the	  
thresholds	  for	  special	  audits	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Stock	  Corporation	  Law	  (§142	  (2)	  
German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act);	  introduction	  of	  a	  shareholders’	  forum	  for	  communi-­‐
cation	  purposes	   (§	  127	  a	  German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act);	   introduction	  of	   the	  “Busi-­‐
ness	  Judgement	  Rule“	  (	  §	  93	  (1)	  German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act).	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
a002:	  German	  Capital	  Markets	  Model	  Case	  Act	  from	  2005.	  
Introduction	   of	   an	   exemplary	   hearing	   that	   pursuant	   to	   §	   16	   of	   the	  German	  Capital	  
Markets	  Model	  Case	  Act	   is	  binding	  for	  the	  trial	  courts.	  Their	   ruling	   is	  dependent	  on	  
the	  statements	  made	  in	  the	  exemplary	  hearing	  or	  the	  legal	  questions	  clarified	  in	  the	  
exemplary	  hearing.	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	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a003:	  German	  Accounting	  Reform	  Act	  from	  2004	  and	  German	  Act	  to	  Modernize	  Ac-­‐
counting	  Law	  from	  2009.	  
Further	   development	   of	   accounting	   regulations	   and	   adaptation	   to	   international	   ac-­‐
counting	  standards.	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
a004:	  German	  Accounting	  Reform	  Act	  from	  2004,	  Final	  Auditor	  Supervision	  Act	  from	  
2004,	  Professional	  Supervision	  Reform	  Act	  from	  2007	  and	  German	  Act	  to	  Modernize	  
Accounting	  Law	  (BilMoG)	  from	  2009.	  
For	  example:	  Extension	  of	  the	  auditing	  activities	  of	  the	  group’s	  independent	  auditor	  
(§	  317	  (3)	  sentence	  2	  HGB,	  BilMoG),	  extension	  of	  the	  grounds	  for	  exclusion	  of	  an	  in-­‐
dependent	  auditor	  (§	  319	  (3)	  HGB	  and	  §	  319a	  HGB,	  BilReG/	  BilMoG),	  binding	  the	  pro-­‐
posal	   regarding	   the	   appointment	   of	   the	   independent	   auditor	   to	   be	   put	   before	   the	  
Annual	  General	  Meeting	   to	   the	   recommendation	  of	   the	  Auditing	  Committee	   (§	  124	  
(2)	   sentence	   2	   German	   Stock	   Corporation	   Act,	   BilMoG),	   extending	   the	   auditing	   re-­‐
quirements	  of	  the	  independent	  auditor	  through	  the	  new	  regulation	  of	  reporting	  du-­‐
ties	   (§	   171	   (1)	   German	   Stock	   Corporation	   Act,	   BilMoG),	   disclosure	   of	   the	   fees	   for	  
auditing	  the	  annual	  financial	  statements	  (§	  285	  sentence	  1	  number	  17	  HGB,	  BilReG/	  
BilMoG),	  placing	  the	  German	  Chamber	  of	  Public	  Accountants	  (WPK)	  under	  the	  super-­‐
vision	  of	  the	  independent	  Auditors’	  Supervision	  Commission	  (APAK),	  	  introduction	  of	  
special	  random	  and	  scheduled	  inspections	  (Professional	  Supervision	  Reform	  Act).	  	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  




a005:	  German	  Law	  on	  Financial	  Reporting	  Compliance	  from	  2005.	  
Monitoring	  the	  legality	  of	  specific	  annual	  financial	  statements	  by	  an	  independent	  
party.	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
a006:	  German	  Act	  on	  Electronic	  Commercial	  and	  Co-­‐operative	  Registers	  and	  the	  
Company	  Registers	  from	  2007.	  
Electronic	  publication	  of	  a	  company’s	  annual	  financial	  statement.	  
	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  
9 Not	  at	  all	  
	  
a007:	   Investor	   Protection	   Improvement	   Act	   from	  2004	   and	   the	   issuer’s	   guide	   pub-­‐
lished	  by	  BaFin	  in	  2009.	  
For	  example:	  Realignment	  of	  insider	  trading	  legislation	  (§	  13	  WpHG),	  requirement	  to	  
maintain	  insider	  registers	  (§	  15b	  WpHG),	  extension	  of	  ad	  hoc	  publicity	  (§	  15	  WpHG).	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  
9 Not	  at	  all	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a008:	  Revised	  version	  of	  the	  DCGK	  from	  2010.	  	  
Further	  development	  of	   the	  German	  Corporate	  Governance	  Codex,	  especially	   in	   re-­‐
gard	  to	  the	  transparency	  of	  share	  based	  or	   incentive-­‐	  based	  compensation	  of	  board	  
members.	  	  
1	   Not	  at	  all	  helpful	  
2	   Somewhat	  helpful	  
3	   Helpful	  
4	   Very	  helpful	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
Part	  B:	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  	  
b001:	   The	   legal	   implementation	  of	   the	   government‘s	   10-­‐Point-­‐Program	   is	   sufficient	  
for	  our	  company	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  disclosure	  and	  avoidance	  of	  balance	  sheet	  manipula-­‐
tions.	  
1	   I	  totally	  disagree	  
2	   I	  rather	  disagree	  
3	   I	  rather	  agree	  
4	   I	  fully	  agree	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
	  
Part	  C:	  Views	  on	  the	  desirability	  of	  possible	  measures	  relating	  to	  the	  disclosure	  and	  
prevention	  of	  balance	  sheet	  manipulations:	  
c001:	  Entrusting	  the	  German	  Financial	  Reporting	  Enforcement	  Panel	  with	  sanctioning	  
rights	   is	   appropriate	   for	   the	   disclosure	   and	   prevention	   of	   balance	   sheet	  manipula-­‐
tions.	  	  
	  
1	   I	  totally	  disagree	  
2	   I	  rather	  disagree	  
3	   I	  rather	  agree	  
4	   I	  fully	  agree	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	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c002:	  In	  Great	  Britain	  fines	  are	  imposed	  from	  the	  very	  first	  day	  of	  a	  delay	  in	  disclos-­‐
ure.	  The	  introduction	  of	  such	  a	  measure	  would	  also	  be	  appropriate	  in	  Germany.	  
1	   I	  totally	  disagree	  
2	   I	  rather	  disagree	  
3	   I	  rather	  agree	  
4	   I	  fully	  agree	  
9 Not	  at	  all	  
	  
c003:	   Personal	   liability	  of	   board	   and	   supervisory	  board	  members	   towards	   investors	  
for	  providing	  deliberate	  or	  grossly	  negligent	   false	   information	   to	   the	  capital	  market	  
should	  be	  ensured	  by	  extending	  the	  appropriate	  liabilities.	  	  
1	   I	  totally	  disagree	  
2	   I	  rather	  disagree	  
3	   I	  rather	  agree	  
4	   I	  fully	  agree	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
c004:	  The	  introduction	  of	  external	  independent	  auditor	  rotation	  should	  be	  put	  on	  a	  
legal	  footing.	  
1	   I	  totally	  disagree	  
2	   I	  rather	  disagree	  
3	   I	  rather	  agree	  
4	   I	  fully	  agree	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
c005:	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  consulting	  and	  independent	  auditing	  ser-­‐
vices	  should	  be	  put	  on	  a	  legal	  footing.	  
1	   I	  totally	  disagree	  
2	   I	  rather	  disagree	  
3	   I	  rather	  agree	  
4	   I	  fully	  agree	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	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Part	   D:	   How	   do	   you	   assess	   the	   cost-­‐benefit	   ratio	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
legislative	  measures	  for	  your	  company	  that	  were	  initiated	  by...	  	  
	  
d001:	  the	  catalogue	  of	  measures	  for	  the	  disclosure	  and	  prevention	  of	  balance	  sheet	  
manipulation?	  
	  
1 The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
2 The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
3 Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
4 The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
5 The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
d002:	  Regarding	  the	  monitoring	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  actual	  financial	  statements	  by	  an	  
independent	  institution	  (DPR/BaFin)?	  
1 The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
2 The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
3 Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
4 The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
5 The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
d003:	  Regarding	  the	  electronic	  publication	  of	  company	  accounts?	  
1 The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
2 The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
3 Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
4 The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
5 The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  




d004:	  Regarding	  the	  extended	  company	  obligations	  made	  by	  the	  Investor	  Protec-­‐
tion	  Improvement	  Act?	  
1 The	  benefits	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
2 The	  benefits	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  	  
3 Costs	  and	  benefits	  balance	  out	  
4 The	  costs	  slightly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
5 The	  costs	  clearly	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
Part	  E:	  Regarding	  the	  position	  and	  function	  of	  the	  responding	  company	  representa-­‐
tive:	  
e001:	  Position	  of	  the	  responding	  company	  representative:	  
1	  	   Board	  member	  
2	   Area	  Director	  
3	   Department	  Chief	  
4	   Subject	  Specilization	  
5	   Other	  position:____________________________________	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
e002:	  Functional	  area	  of	  the	  responding	  company	  representative:	  
1	   Internal	  Auditing	  Department	  
2	   Accounting	  Department	  
3	   Controlling	  
4	   Legal	  Department	  
5	   Other	  area:___________________________________	  
9	   Not	  at	  all	  
	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  you	  for	  your	  participation	  since	  it	  greatly	  supports	  my	  doctorate!	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321DEPICTIoN oF CoMPANIES ThRoUGh kEY FIGURES





zation in Mio €
Adidas 13,344 46,824 14,059.33
Allianz 103,560 141,938 45,731.79
BASF 73,497 111,141 63,329.11
Bayer 36,528 111,800 58,134.43
Beiersdorf 5,633 17,666 15,263.64
BMW 68,821 100,306 43,256.20
Commerzbank ------ 55,917 8,079.71
Daimler 106,540 271,370 40,712.64
Deutsche Bank ------ 100,996 32,081.68
Deutsche Börse 2,233 3,278 8,464.98
Deutsche Post 52,829 423,348 19,162.90
Deutsche Telekom 58,653 240,369 37,029.38
E,oN 115,046 78,889 27,733.86
Fresenius Medical Care 9,192 (12,795 
Mio USD)
79,159 16,264.14
Fresenius SE 16,522 149,351 15,625.22
heidelberg Cement 12,902 52,526 7,920.00
henkel 15,605 47,753 24,717.32
Infineon Technologies 3,997 25,750 6,163.15
k+S 5,151 14,496 6,571.72
Linde 13,787 50,417 24,364.57
Lufthansa 28,734 119,084 6,108.10
MAN 16,472 52,542 11,732.66
Merck 9,906 40,676 6,617.20
Metro 66,702 280,856 6,913.80
Munich Re 49,570 47,206 23,655.11
RWE 51,686 72,068 19,682.10
SAP 14,233 55,765 75,112.97
Siemens 73,515 402,000 70,180.46
Thyssen krupp 43,356 179,534 8,020.88
volkswagen 159,337 501,956 73,979.83
 The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 2011. 
The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012. The source of the 
data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe (www.finanzen.net).
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Company (MDAx) Turnover 
in Mio €





Aareal Bank -------- 2,353 996.62
Aurubis 13,335.8 6,279 2,210.30
Axel Springer 3,184.9 12,885 3,307.56
BayWa 9,585.7 16,834 1,143.29
Bilfinger Berger 8,208.5 59,210 3,465.62
Brenntag 8,679.3 12,950 5,096.44
Celesio 23,026.5 46,977 2,268.28
Continental 30,504.9 163,788 17,014.51
Deutsche Euroshop 190 5 1,691.19
Deutsche Wohnen 387.1 1,201 2,176.91
Deutz 1,529 4,060 381.92
Douglas holding 3,378.8 24,323 1,497.30
Dürr 1,922 6,823 1,117.96
EADS 49,128 133,115 21,980.26
Elring klinger 1,032.8 5,779 1,558.66
Fielmann 1,053.4 14,214 3,163.44
Fraport 2,371.2 20,595 3,879.55
Fuchs Petroclub 1,668.1 3,722 3,663.63
GAGFAh 399.7 1,383 1,734.20
GEA Group 5,416.5 23,834 4,587.84
Gerresheimer 1,094.7 10,212 1,222.72
Gerry Weber International 702.7 3,011 1,698.29
Gildemeister 1,687.7 6,032 892.90







hochtief 23,282.2 75,449 3,213.98
hugo Boss 2,058.8 11,004 5,629.89
kabel Deutschland 1,598.9 2,714 4,921.88
klöckner & Co SE 7,095.4 11,381 816.15
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krones 2,480.3 11,389 1,383.30
kUkA 1,435.6 6,589 885.02
Lanxess 8,775 16,390 5,498.86
Leoni 3,701.5 60,745 865.73
MTU Aero Engines 
holding
2,932.1 8,202 3,547.96
ProSieben Sat,1 Media 2,756.2 4,112 2,500.85
Puma 3,009 10,043 3,374.70
Rational 391.7 1,184 2,319.48
Rheinmetall 4,454 21,516 1,409.72
Rhön-klinikum 2,629.1 39,325 2,107.35
Salzgitter 9,839.5 25,478 2,134.65
SGL Carbon SE 1,540.2 6,447 2,110.59
Sky Deutschland 1,138.7 1,716 3,015.16
STADA Arzneimittel 1,715.4 7,826 1,344.44
Symrise 1,583.6 5,557 3,139.27
Südzucker 6,160.8 17,656 6,165.25
TUI 17,480.3 73,707 1,964.79
vossloh 1,197.2 5,000 986.07
Wacker Chemie 4,909.7 17,168 2,185.19
Wincor Nixdorf 2,328 9,171 1,053.10
 The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 2011. 
The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012. The source of the 
data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe (www.finanzen.net).
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zation in Mio €
ADvA optical Networking 310.9 1,304 198.12
Aixtron 611 978 964.84
Bechtle 1,994.9 5,479 592.52
CANCoM 544.4 2,097 156.53
Carl zeiss Meditec 758.8 2,366 1,808.33
Centrotherm photovoltaics 698.5 1,928 18.20
Drägerwerk 2,255.8 11,924 1,063.49
Drillisch Telekom 349.1 329 585.08
Euromicron 305.3 1,455 119.25
EvoTEC 80.1 590 323.83
Freenet 3,217.9 4,057 1,845.36
Gigaset 520.6 1,875 46.96
Jenoptik 543.3 2,894 446.46
kontron 589.6 3,057 202.02
MorphoSys 100.8 446 629.44




PSI 169.5 1,491 234.28
qiagen 1,169.7 3,938 3,333.32
qSC 478.1 1,305 282.89
Sartorius 733.1 4,887 1,321.07
Singulus Technologies 160 455 79.17
SMA Solar Technology 1,676.3 6,366 548.26
Software 1,098.3 5,535 2,837.10
Solar World 1,046.9 2,701 107.92
STRATEC Biomedical 116.6 458 403.72
Süss Micro Tec 175.4 624 164.91
United Internet 2,094 5,593 3,418.50
Wirecard 324.8 498 2,105.29
xING 65.1 456 238.30
 The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 
2011. The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012 respectively 
January 2013. The source of the data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe 
(www.finanzen.net).
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Company (SDAx) Turnover in Mio € Numbers of 
employees
Market capitali-
zation in Mio €
Air Berlin plc 4,227.3 9,113 115.06
Alstria office REIT 90.8 50 753.81
Amadeus Fire 130.1 2,368 196.23
Balda 66.3 1,178 182.80
BAUER 1,219.6 9,646 316.58
Bertrandt 576.2 8,603 732.44
Biotest 422 1,774 550.98











CTS Eventim 502.8 1,441 1,219.20




DIC Asset 106.8 127 331.92
Gesco 335.2 1,775 217.79
Gfk SE 1,374 11,220 1,350.83
Grammer 1,093.5 8,429 183.33
GRENkELEASING 202.9 585 721.15











hornbach holding 3,017 12,894 426.80
Indus holding 1,104.7 6,733 450.00
IvG Immobilien 517.6 613 377.10
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Jungheinrich 2,116.3 10,711 479.68
koenig & Bauer 1,167.2 6,401 214.32
kWS SAAT 855.4 3,560 1,540.44
MLP 526.7 1,584 612.31
Mvv Energie 3,804.5 5,923 1,476.31




Praktiker 3,183 20,000 64.73




Schaltbau holding 318.4 1,534 181.55
Schuler 958.5 5,168 580.46








TAG Immobilien 178.3 281 1,023.20
TAkkT 852.2 1,869 701.37




vTG 750 1,170 249.50
Wacker Neuson 991.6 3,514 664.93
zooplus 244.8 191 191.86
 The data on turnover and number of employees is based on the financial year 2011. 
The data for the market capitalization is based on December 2012. The source of the 
data is finanzen.net Gmbh situated in karlsruhe (www.finanzen.net).
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